



LECTURES on DR. GRAEBNER'S OUTLINES

By

Prof. W. H. T. Dau

Volume I

Edited by Ethan and Gene Urtel

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How to define Theology; §1 & 7.

If we examine merely the root meaning of the word "theology," we find that it denotes "the doctrine of God," logos peri tou Theou. The terms "geology," the doctrine of the earth; "psychology," doctrine of the soul, have been formed in the same way.

However if we examine the usage of the older theologians of our church, we find that they use the term "theology" to define a certain quality and faculty in certain men, which has become fixed in them, which inheres in them with the force of a habitude, i.e., a habitual proneness, readiness and efficiency for performing certain actions, namely for properly knowing God and all things pertaining to God, for teaching these things to other men, and thus guiding men in the way of everlasting salvation.

If we take the word "theology" in its grammatical meaning, we have what is called "objective, or abstract theology." If we adopt the usage of our older teachers, we obtain "subjective, or concrete theology." In either meaning the contents of "theology" are the same; it is always "logos peri tou Theou kai toon Theion," i.e., it relates to and deals with God and matters divine. But there is a vast difference between theology objectively and subjectively viewed, between theology as it exists in abstract or in concrete form.

Theology objectively or abstractly viewed is a finished product that lies before us in a written or printed discourse or treatise; or is presented in the spoken words of a sermon or oration. Theology subjectively or concretely viewed is not a product, but the ability or aptitude to bring forth a product.

Evidently before there can be any objective theology, there must be subjective theology. Or in other words before there can be a theological product there must be a theological producer. We maintain therefore that the subjective meaning of theology is its first and foremost meaning. As between subjective and objective theology, the former is also the most necessary; because it is of greater importance in a general view of the matter that there be the habitual, inherent ability for doing a thing, than the actual doing of the thing. If the ability is wanting the thing will never be done; there may be the mere pretense of doing it, but not the actual doing. Whenever the term "theology" is used in its objective meaning, namely to denote a book, or compend, or an oral dissertation on theology, we hold that this is done by a figure of speech, namely by metonymy, the effect being named instead of the cause. Theology as a "*habitus mentis*," a habitude of the mind, is always the *prius*; theology as a written or spoken product always the *posterius*. And theological products always presuppose a theological aptitude.

To teach theology then means to convey to students the fitness to rightly know, teach and defend divine matters; to study theology is to seek to obtain this fitness. To teach theology then does not merely mean to mount a platform and deliver a lecture; and to study theology does not mean to memorize the contents of certain books; but it means to secure by means of teaching and study, to obtain a *habitus*

theologios, an ingrown aptitude, fitness and ability for the work of a theologian. The delivering of theological lectures and the committing to memory of theological materials then is not the all of theology, not even the half or one-fourth. These things are never an end in themselves, but merely means to an end.

We do not find the word "theology" in the Scriptures. The noun "theologos" occurs in the superscription to the Revelation of St. John; but it is questionable whether this superscription is part of the inspired text. But the matter denoted by theology in the subjective sense we find in all those passages of Scripture which speak of the ability to take upon one the office of the ministry, or to lead men to salvation by ministering unto them the Word of God. Such texts then as 2nd Timothy 3:16, 17; Titus 1:9 printed in our *Outlines* exhibit to us the theological fitness, or theology subjectively considered. To these texts might be added 2nd Corinthians 3:5 and 1st Timothy 3:2. And the text from Acts (18:24-28) shows us by a practical example how Apollos obtained and exercised his theology.

It was stated before that instead of subjective and objective theology we may also say concrete and abstract theology. It is easy to understand why the theological fitness in a certain person should be called subjective; for he is the subject possessing the fitness and the fitness exists in him. It is also easy to understand why a theological discourse or treatise should be called objective theology; for that discourse or treatise is an object, a material, which can be handled, named, etc. But it is not so easy to understand why the theological fitness in a person should be called abstract, and the sermon or dissertation produced by that fitness should be called a theology. We imagine these terms ought to be inverted; for the

theological treatise is something concrete, while the theological fitness is something abstract. The reason is this: the theological fitness is called concrete theology because it exists in the concrete being or personality of a certain individual; and a theological discourse, e.g., is called abstract theology (from *abstrahere*) because it is something drawn away from, or derived from the personal author of it, and is viewed as independent of that author.

The older dogmaticians used to say that the words "*theologia*" and "*theologus*" hold the following relation to one another: *theologia* is the *forma denominans* of *theologus*, i.e. *theologia* expresses that which makes a person a theologian, because a given individual is a theologian for the reason that theology, or the aptness to teach divine matters is inherent in him.

It must be borne in mind that when we speak of theology, we use the term as it is related to the Christian religion. Also the pagans and non-Christians of our day use this term. We mean by theology solely the knowing and teaching of what is true concerning God and divine matters. Hence not the so-called natural theology of the philosophers, nor the activity of errorists within the church, but only the teaching of true believers in God's Word is called theology.

By establishing the original and true meaning of the word theology, viz. that it is a habitude, aptitude, fitness in man (to know and accept divine truth, to instruct others toward such acceptance and knowledge, and to defend such truth against adversaries) we have sufficiently cleared the ground before us for the inquiry: Where is this habitude found? and: How does it originate?

Nothing can exist in man, the creature, that has not existed before in God, the Creator. God is by His very essence a most perfect Being, capable of fully knowing Himself and all things divine. We are not in the habit of calling God a theologian; nevertheless this fact that all theological fitness exists primordially in God Himself has been noted by theologians as an important fact. A most intimate relation exists between the knowledge of God which exists in the Divine Being and all knowledge of God which exists in creatures. The latter is entirely dependent upon the former. Man is able to know of God and divine matters no more than God chooses to communicate to him from the inexhaustible store of His own knowledge. God's knowledge is limited only by Himself; man's knowledge is limited by the revelation which God has made of Himself. This is plainly stated in Matthew 11:27: "No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him"; also in 1st Corinthians 2:10, 11: "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of man save the spirit which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." Any knowledge of God and divine matters which men claim to possess and which they cannot prove to have obtained by communication from God, or which is not based on revelation which God has made of Himself, is not knowledge, but error. Our older theologians have expressed the relation which knowledge of God as it exists in God holds to knowledge of God as it exists in man by two terms: the former they have called "*theologia archetypos*," archetypal theology; the latter "*theologia ectypos*," ectypal theology. This means that the former is original, not derived, and forms the type, model or pattern for

the latter, and that the latter is a copy made from the former. The two German words “urbildlich” and “abbildlich” express the same thought. It is ectypal theology that we are now studying.

Ectypal theology is theology as it exists in creatures. Among the creatures which possess a habitude and aptitude for knowing God we note 1) the holy angels of whom it is written Matthew 18:10: “they always behold the face of the Father which is in heaven.” They enjoy the beatific vision and therewith every facility and ability for knowing God. But we are not accustomed to call the angels theologians. This name has been reserved exclusively for man. Man may be viewed in three states: 1) before the fall; 2) after the fall under grace; 3) in glory. In each state he possesses a habitude for knowing God; but the habitude is different in each. It is the same as regards the contents, but it differs as regards the degree of intensity with which God is known; it differs also as regards the manner in which, or the means by which it was conferred on man.

Habits may be distinguished as they are concreate or acquired. The former are inherent in our very being, e.g. such as eating and sleeping, for which every human being possesses a natural aptitude and which are performed by a natural impulse. Such habitudes however as reading, solving mathematical problems, constructing machinery, swimming, etc. are learned by practice and are acquired habitudes. Theology in the subjective sense was a concreate habitude in paradise; it is an acquired habitude after the fall. The theology of man in paradise before the fall will engage our study in the chapter on anthropology, #70. Theology as it exists in fallen man will form the matter of our study throughout our present

[section]. Fallen man may be considered however as he is now in the present life under the grace of God. As such he is a pilgrim on his way to heaven, *homo viator*, *theologia viae*; in the future life he will become *homo comprehensor*, when he has reached the goal of all knowledge concerning God, *theologia vitae*.

The theology of the *homo comprehensor* will occupy us in the chapter of Eschatology, in the last chapter of our textbook. We will now be continuously engaged in the study of the theology of the *homo viator*. And the question now is: How was this habitude, aptitude, fitness, ability, which we have agreed to call theology in the subjective or concrete sense, obtained by fallen man in the state of grace?

That it is a product of divine grace must be granted at the start. The theologian is a man whose natural heart has been seized by the Spirit of God and who has been regenerated out of spiritual blindness and death to the light and life of the saving knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.

The question has been debated whether an unregenerate man may not be a theologian. In the age of pietism there was a great controversy in the evangelical church of Germany concerning the so-called *theologia irrogenitorm*. The Pietists contended that only a believer could savingly proclaim God’s Word for the salvation of others. Orthodox theologians on the other side maintained that the Word of God is of such virtue and power that if it is only proclaimed without mutilation or adulteration, it saves men even if the party proclaiming it is himself an unbeliever. When the contrasts are stated thus it is easily seen that the truth is on the side of the opponents of Pietism. Still it does not prove a *theologia irrogenitorum*. God does not recognize in this life two classes

of theologians, by whom He carries on the work of the church, but only one. An unregenerate person may sham theology, just as hypocrites may sham any other Christian virtue or perfection. If we must acknowledge hypocrites in the pew, among our laymen, we see no reason why we should not acknowledge their existence among the clergy, in the theological professor's chair, in the government of the church. They may outwardly carry out the purposes of God and the church; they may outwardly be instruments by which God works, but they are not accepted by the all-seeing God because of their unfitness. God employs them occasionally for His purposes, just as he employed Balaam's ass, and the willful high-priest Caiaphas, but they are not the ordinary organs of His ministration. The *homo viator* who is to be a theologian after God's own heart is a regenerate or believing person. *Pectus facit theologum. Theologus fit, non nascitur*, except by the new birth.

This does not mean that every believer or every regenerate person is a theologian. It is indeed true that every Christian possesses both the ability and the right to truly know, rightly teach and successfully maintain God and divine matters. And in a sense we might call every Christian a theologian. But that would be using the term in a loose sense. Scripture recognizes a particular class of Christian men, who have obtained a particular habitude and aptitude, that is not granted to every Christian in the new birth. And this particular habitude in particular regenerate persons is what we call theology in the subjective or concrete sense.

Apollos is represented in Acts 18:24f. as "an eloquent (*logios*) man." This was probably a natural gift in him. He was also "mighty in the Scriptures," *dynatos oon en tais graphais*.

This was a gift of grace in him which had come to him while he was being "instructed in the way of the Lord," *katächāmenos tăn hodon tou kyriou*. Like every true believer Apollos also became a confessor. He was "fervent in the Spirit," *xeeon too pneumatī*; "he spake and taught diligently the things of the Lord," *elalei kai edidasken akriboos ta peri tou lāsou* [Tischendorf]. Yea according to a custom prevailing in that age among the Jews, he also "began to speak boldly in the synagogue" *ārξato parrā siazesthai en tã synagoogã*. Nature and regenerating grace had equipped this man for bearing testimony of his Lord as every believer should do. In all this he differed not except perhaps in degree from all other believers. But now Aquila and Priscilla, whose spiritual judgment discerned in this man a noble instrument for the upbuilding of the church of Christ, took Apollos aside and "expounded unto him the way of God more perfectly" *akribesteron autoo exethento tăn hodon tou theou*. Apollos received special training; he was, so to speak, put through a course in theology. And after a while he was honored with a testimonial of his brethren, who wrote to the churches in Achaia, perhaps to Corinth, asking the Christians there "to receive him," i.e. to accept him as a trained theologian who possesses the habitudes required in men of that sort. And the subsequent activities of Apollos proved that he possessed that fitness. By the more accurate exposition of the way of God which he had received, hence by diligent study he had been trained for theology. With this study he undoubtedly connected prayer for divine aid and illumination. And the ability thus obtained was put to the test in many a spiritual conflict and trial and thus was increased and strengthened.

From this incident we may derive the well-known axiom which expresses the true theological method: *oratio, meditatio, tentatio faciunt theologum*.

2nd Timothy 3:16-17 declares to us the properties, virtues and uses of all Scripture. These properties and uses Scripture possesses for all men. But the apostle now speaks of a particular whom he calls "the man of God," ho tou theou anthropos. This man is to be peculiarly fitted by the Scriptures; he is to be made "perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works," artios, pros pan ergon agathon exärtismenos. The epistles to Timothy were written to a young pastor; it is therefore natural to understand the expression "man of God" of a pastor or theologian, though that expression in a wider sense may seem applicable to any Christian.

In Titus 1:9 another pastor is exhorted to faithful adherence to the Word in which he had received a previous course of instruction, antechomenon tou kata tän didachän pistou logou. Such adherence coupled with incessant study and prayer is to make him "able," hina dynatos ä, for a theological activity.

On the basis of such texts our theologians have called theology a *habitus theosdotos*, a God-given or divinely bestowed habitude or aptitude. From God every one who wishes to obtain it, must derive this aptitude. *Theologus fit, non nascitur*. Natural gifts are very desirable; the common gifts of grace are indispensable in every theologian. But over and above these there must be the particular theological fitness.

There remains one more point that we must discuss in regard to the correct definition and the true nature of theology. The question has been raised: Is it proper to call theology a science? Our older dogmaticians deny this. A few, like Baier, do

call theology a science, but they at once add such qualifications and limitations to the term science that that the term really loses its native force. Modern theologians all call theology a science, and demand that it must be so called. Now who is correct?

To decide this question it is of course necessary that we reach a common understanding of the word "science," for there is no use arguing about the appropriateness of a term as long as one side understands the term in an altogether different sense from what the other does.

The definition of "science" which is still generally accepted we have from Aristotle who defines science as "hexis apodeiktikä ex anangkeioon," a faculty to demonstrate things from necessary premises. Science takes hold of facts that exist and must be granted; for they are necessarily there. The world of matter e.g. is an unquestionable fact. No one can reasonably deny it. The ideas of right and wrong necessarily exist in man. No one can dispute their existence. From such necessary facts the scientist draws inferences that are just as necessary. He builds up from the data which he finds in the cosmos the science of geology, astronomy, chemistry; he constructs from the necessary condition of the human mind the science of ethics, logic, aesthetics. His conclusions are laid down in the form of rigid rules, laws, theorems, corollaries, each of which can be demonstrated to be correct by a process of reasoning. The capacity to do this is called a science. A scientist wants no more than to know facts and to be able to derive other facts from them by his examination of the existing facts. His labor is ended when he has established his theories or laws.

Now theology does not operate with necessary facts. Its materials are all furnished by an extraordinary, supernatural

revelation which God has made. Theology accepts this revelation *a priori*, and does not attempt to find out why God declared this or that. Furthermore theology does not reason out new facts from what it finds in the divine revelation; its business is simply to state the facts which it finds ready made and to defend the authority of the divine revelation against all gainsayers. Theology lastly insists on acts. Its aim is to lead people to do what God in His revelation has declared He wants them to do.

It is true theology also demonstrates truths, but not as conclusions from necessary premises, but simply by showing that those truths are recorded by God and that God wants men to accept them.

It is therefore impossible to call theology a science in the strict sense. The modern theologians who have called theology a science meant there by to elevate theology to an equal dignity with other scientific pursuits at the universities, such as philosophy, jurisprudence and medicine (*triga academica*). But instead of elevating, they have degraded theology by calling it a science. Its true elevation is secured when we consider theology to be *sui generis*, in a class by itself; when we emphasize that theology deals with altogether different materials than a science, follows an altogether different method than a science (believing instead of knowing) and aims at altogether different results (actions instead of theories). To express this fact our theologians have said that theology is a *habitus practicus*, not *logicus*. And the entire definition of theology now runs: *theologia est habitus practicus theosdotos*.

§3-6.

The general definition of theology in the subjective or concrete sense, which was given in §1 is in these paragraphs applied to special theological activities.

§3. Doctrinal Theology.

[This] shows how the general theological habitude manifests itself as doctrinal theology. We note that this paragraph names 1) the personal faith of the doctrinal theologian (knowledge and acceptance of the divine revelation); 2) the personal ability of the doctrinal theologian (aptitude to exhibit and substantiate such doctrines in themselves and in their proper relations to each other). The doctrinal theologian then is a regenerate believing person, whom divine grace has endowed with the faculty of perceiving positive teachings of the divine word, with the faculty of logical discernment of the relation of each doctrine to the other, and with the faculty of grasping them all in their variety and unity. The doctrinal theologian or dogmatician is a systematician, who applies analysis and synthesis to the teachings of Scripture. However his analyzing and synthetizing is itself regulated by the divine word, not by his human logic. He must not seek to harmonize what God has not harmonized, for the reason that his natural reasoning calls for harmonizing; nor must he take apart what God has not taken apart for the reason that his natural fancy finds it convenient to take things apart. This is the fundamental error of modern theology that it gives to the mind, the critical acumen of the theologian an authority above that of the Scriptures instead of subjecting the mind of the theologian to the Scriptures. No system, no harmony, no logical

arrangement, no assumption of a relation of this doctrine to that can be admitted that Scripture itself does not furnish. The dogmatician who invents harmonies in the contents of Scripture that exist not in Scripture, but only in his own mind, is not a theologian but a philosopher, and he may be a poor philosopher at that. Scripture furnishes to the dogmatician not only the materials, but also the plan and method of his teaching.

§4. Exegetical Theology.

[This] shows how the general theological aptitude manifests itself as exegetical theology. We note that this paragraph names 1) the personal fitness of the exegetical theologian, or exegete, or expounder, or commentator of Scripture; 2) his personal preparation for exegetical work. The personal faith of the exegete is here implied. Also the exegetical theologian is a regenerate believing person whom divine grace has endowed with the faculty “to find and expound the true sense of the divinely inspired writings of the Old and New Testament.” The labor of the exegete is expended on the sacred text, its single terms, its phrases, its clauses, its periods, its groups of periods and any account viewed as a whole which Scripture gives of any matter. In these terms, etc. lie a sense; for words unless they are uttered by a senseless fool are vehicles of thought. They are intended to convey a meaning. That meaning must in each instance be one definite, determinable meaning. For only a designing knave will clothe his thought in terms of double meaning, because it suits his purpose to deceive men by his equivocations and ambiguities.

This one sense which God has intended and which is the only true sense of a given term etc. the exegete must discover. It is contained in the writings and he must bring it out of them, like a miner who is digging for gold finds what he is digging for in his diggings. Exegesis is from “exägeisthai” and means “to lead forth.” The exegete cannot claim to have performed an exegetical feat if he produces a sense that is not contained in his terms or texts. This happens not infrequently. During the study of the divine writings all sorts of meanings are suggested to the exegete from without. He may take a certain word or phrase in its common everyday meaning and may fail to see that the text itself demands another meaning. He may in a difficult passage hit upon a plausible or probable meaning which he proceeds to accept as the real and intended meaning. He may allow his carnal reason or his passion, or his worldly interest, or his prejudice or bias in favor of certain notions which he or some other person cherishes to influence him, causing him to purposely give a meaning to a passage which in his own better judgment the passage has not and cannot have. Any such labor upon the sacred text is not exegesis, but eisegesis. It is not bringing out of a text what is contained in it, but putting into the text what is not contained in it. Such work is useless to men and an insult to God. It works a fraud on men and falsifies and counterfeits the divine record. The correct attitude of the good exegete therefore as he takes up the sacred text, must be that of a person who has freed himself from all preconceived notions, and who comes to the study of the Scriptures with the single purpose of finding out what God has really said, whether it suits him or not, whether it seems reasonable or not, whether it proves agreeable or disagreeable to him. The good exegete will moreover carefully guard his

mind against the intrusion of any foreign thought from without, and will critically measure every thought that suggests itself to him against the text which he is studying, to see whether that suggested meaning is really embodied in that text. The good exegete therefore is far from believing what many superficial Bible-students believe, viz. that any thoughts which flit through their mind when they are studying the Bible must have come into their mind out of the Bible, and hence must be in the Bible. Even well-meaning exegetes have been misled into mistaking their own thoughts for those of the Scriptures.

Besides the faculty of finding the true sense the exegete must possess the aptitude to “expound” that sense. He must be able to show it to others and to prove that the sense which he has found and no other must be the true sense. The three lines of exegetical argument permissible are from 1) the text; 2) the context; 3) the parallelism of Scripture. The first is the primary argument, the other two are subsidiary. It is indeed possible that the true meaning of a text may have been suggested to the exegete first by his knowledge of the content, i.e. of the connection in which it occurs; or it may have been suggested by some parallel text of Scripture which treats the same subject. But it would be a mistake to claim that when the meaning of a certain text has been exhibited from the context or from kindred passages it has been completely proven. The sense is in the text, not anywhere else, and from the text it must be evolved. If the context, or the connection in which a certain text occurs, or if some other text of Scripture dealing with the same subject contradicts the sense which the exegete thinks he has found in the text, that is proof that he has not found the sense in his text, or that he has misunderstood the entire context, or that he regards certain statements of Scripture as parallel

statements which are not parallel at all. E.g. the passages which state that God wants all men to be saved are not parallel to the passages which state that God has elected few unto salvation. The exegete therefore must not try to interpret passages of the first kind so as to bring them into harmony with passages of the second kind and vice versa. He must allow both kind of passages to stand as they read, without fear of having evolved a contradiction. If the sense is plain in a passage, an assumed context or parallelism cannot change it. What has to be revised in such a case is the assumed context or parallelism.

Our text-book indicates the fundamental importance of the exegetical aptitude by remarking that from the divinely inspired writings of the Old and New Testaments “all theological truths must be derived as from their only infallible and sufficient source.” Exegesis is really the base of every true theological effort. A true doctrinal theology, e.g. cannot be built up on a faulty exegesis.

For such exegetical aptitude the exegete must have “the requisite knowledge.” This means, he must be a good linguist of the Bible vernaculars, a good Hebrew and Greek scholar, a good grammarian, and he must have studied hermeneutics or the laws of interpretation. He may even obtain aids for his exegetical works from geography, history, physics, etc., as far as these touch upon matters contained in the Bible. His success under God will be in proportion as he is proficient in the aforementioned attainments.

§5. Historical Theology.

[This] shows how the theological aptitude manifests itself as historical theology. Here too the personal faith of the

theologian is assumed. The historical theologian is a regenerate, believing person, whom God has endowed with 1) the knowledge; 2) the theological discernment of a) the rise, b) the progress, c) the preservation of I) the Christian church as a whole, II) and of its institutions, such as its creeds, confessions, liturgies, buildings, charitable and missionary enterprises, etc., and who 3) has the aptitude to utilize such knowledge in the promulgation, application and defense of divine truth. On first sight the historical theologian appear to be occupied not with Scripture, at least not directly with Scripture, but with men in so far as they have become affected by Scripture. His domain of study is the Christian church and he is a church historian. He studies beginnings or causes; traces effects or developments of causes and explains existing conditions in the church. He is not a mere chronicler of events who ever inquires: What happened? but he investigates besides such questions as these: Why did it happen? Why did it happen just that way? What came of it? However these are things which any historian, even the secular historian studies. The historian who is at the same time a theologian performs his work with theological discernment; that means he finds in the genesis and development, in the past and present of the church that same God and His will at work who speaks to us in the inspired writings. He reads events that have transpired in the life of the church in the light of Scriptures. The truth, the righteousness, the love of which the Bible speaks to the doctrinal and exegetical theologian are likewise seen and traced by the historical theologian. The Bible interprets for the historical theologian the meaning of historical events. And this meaning he transmits, as a theologian to others, causing them to behold what God and His Word have done among men on this earth,

inducing them to draw wholesome lessons therefrom, and confirming them in their faith in Scripture by showing how correctly the events of history in the church tally with the teachings of the divine word. The historical theologian derives aid for his word from archeology, geography, secular history, etc.

§6. Practical Theology.

The general theological habitude manifests itself lastly as practical theology. Here again the personal faith of the theologian is assumed. The practical theologian, who is preeminently the minister in the Christian church, is a regenerate, believing person, whom God has endowed with the faculty of knowing and performing the functions of the Christian ministry in the pulpit and in the confessional, at the marriage and at the funeral, in public and in private, toward children, youths, adults, and the aged, the rich and the poor, the healthy and the feeble and the dying. It is that faculty which makes a theologian be “all things to all men,” as preacher, pastor catechist, exhorter, counselor, guide. All theology is practical; no part of it is mere theory. But this department is called “practical” in the strict sense, because in the activity of the Christian minister the actual operations of the divine word are most strikingly exhibited.

The practical theologian knows however not only the functions of the Christian ministry and understands their application, but he is also conversant with the principles underlying those functions and regulates the functions by their principles. There is nothing done at haphazard and at random

or in different fashion in practical theology. For all that the Christian minister does and for every part of it there is a reason and a way that is habitually understood by the functionary, because he knows God's word as it applies to particular instances. The why, the where and the how of a Christian minister's actions must not be located in the minister's caprices, whims and fancies, but in the nature of each case as it is referred for proper treatment and disposition to the word of God. The minister may for this reason vary his action in cases that seem identical to the superficial observer.

§7. Theology in an abstract Sense.

This paragraph has practically been anticipated and explained in connection with §1.

Recommended for private reading: Walther: "Was ist Theologie?" *Lehre und Wehre*, XIV, 4ff. Pieper: "Dr. C.F.W. Walther als Theologe," *ibid*, XXXIV, 97ff. Pieper: "Wie studirt man Theologie?" published as a mimeograph. Graebner: "What is Theology?" *Theological Quarterly*, I, Iff. Dau: "The old Lutheran View of what Constitutes Theology," *ibid.*, XIV, Iff.

§8. Doctrinal Theology: Definition.

This definition, which presents no difficulties after the explanations given before, is remarkable chiefly for the fact that it represents abstract doctrinal theology as "the aggregate of doctrines laid down in Holy Scripture." The mere enumeration in one way or another, without any attempt at

"adjustment" or "harmony" of the various truths of Scripture is a true scriptural dogmatics or doctrinal theology. Such products are sometimes called "Systematic Theology" (Hodge's). The term "systematic" however is admissible only in the sense of "orderly," the order adopted being indicated in Scripture itself. Any other system, forcing the contents of Scripture into unnatural relations, would not be system, but violence.

§9. Divisions of Doctrinal Theology.

The divisions of abstract theology in the abstract sense here given state the fundamental facts and materials of Scriptural theology:

1) an account of the source and norm of all theological knowledge and effort: Bibliology, §10-18.

2) an account of the Supreme Being about whom all theological effort turns, from whom it originates, in whom it terminates: §19-54. Theology proper. *Theologia Deum docet, a Deo docetur, ad Deum ducit.*

3) an account of the creatures in whose production and preservation God has revealed certain of His attributes and His will: Cosmology, §55-95.

4) an account of the Redeemer whom God sent to restore fallen man to the divine favor: Christology, §96-129.

5) an account of the acts and means by which God reclaims individual sinners from a state of sin and wrath and collects them into a holy society: Soteriology, §130-173.

6) an account of the concluding acts in the economy of grace which God has set up among men and of the future state of men: Eschatology, §174-185.

These materials have been differently grouped by different dogmaticians. Baier treats the eschatological matters in connection with cosmological matters. Hodge divides his entire dogmatics into 1) Theology, 2) anthropology, 3) soteriology. The order adopted by our *Outlines* is genetic; it follows a natural line of thought and a natural order of development.

Bibliology

§10. Definition.

The first department of doctrinal or dogmatical theology in the abstract sense is called Bibliology. This means according to §8 that bibliology is the first in that “aggregate of doctrines laid down in Holy Scriptures, which should be known, accepted, properly applied and strenuously defended by a theologian.”

Bibliology, compounded out of hă biblos, or ta biblia, and logos, an account of the book or the books. The book intended is the Bible viewed as a whole or as a unit, or “the Holy Scriptures,” viewed as the integral parts which together constitute the whole. Of this book an account is given in the book itself, and this account which the Bible gives of the Bible we call Bibliology. “Bibliology” is a doctrine of Holy Scripture just as much as the doctrine of God, the doctrine of sin, the doctrine of the person and the work of the Redeemer, the doctrine of conversion, etc. If a theologian desires to know what the angels are, or the resurrection of the dead, he inquires of the Scriptures what God has revealed concerning these

matters. When he has gotten the desired information he has the doctrine of Scripture on that subject. This doctrine he accepts as final; this he proclaims as divine and defends against gainsayers. The theologian must pursue the same course in regard to the Bible. He must not obtain his knowledge of the Bible or his faith in the Bible from any other source. Just as the entire Bible is a fact with which the theologian operates in his labors as a theologian, just as the statements which the Bible makes concerning the angels or justification or baptism are facts, so the declarations of the Bible concerning itself are facts that must be accepted and applied as they stand. No one can be called a theologian who fails to see this point or is unwilling to concede it. We can as little admit that men’s faith concerning the Bible should be formed on the basis of their own or other men’s conceptions as we can admit such a procedure with regard to the creation of the world, or the predestination of men to salvation.

The Bible is to the theologian the *principium cognoscendi*, the source of all theological knowledge and effort. He accepts the Bible *a priori*. We shall study this matter more fully in connection with §14. For the present it suffices if we bind ourselves to respect what the Bible says concerning any other matter.

It is claimed that to present a doctrine of the Bible from the Bible, or to prove what the Bible is by what the Bible says is arguing in a circle (*argumentum in circulo*), or begging the question (*petitio principii*), or an attempt to prove something by assuming it proven. This objection is specious. The Bible’s account of the Bible is simply the biblical doctrine of the Bible. Any other account of the Bible would not be biblical, but unbiblical. If we admit the teaching of the Bible at all, what

reason is there why we should not admit its teaching concerning itself?

When our author in §9 proposed to group all doctrinal theology, in the abstract sense, under six main heads, and made Bibliology the first of these, he consciously departed from an established custom and his new arrangement is virtually a protest against the fundamental error of modern Protestant dogmatic theology.

1) The oldest Lutheran dogmaticians have no treatise on the Holy Scriptures. It was with them an accepted truth that the materials with which the theologian must work can be drawn from no other source than the Scriptures and that these Scriptures are divine. The later dogmaticians thought it desirable before presenting the doctrines of Scripture in systematic form, to treat of the source itself of all these doctrines. This was done simply to give their presentation of dogmatics greater completeness. And this treatise on the source of all doctrines they treated in their Prolegomena; not because they regarded it as less important than other doctrines, or because they offered in this treatise things that are not revealed, or because they adopted in this treatise a different mode of reasoning, but merely to indicate that what is to be said about the divinity of the Scriptures was to them an *a priori* truth to be granted in the premises. They would have considered it a preposterous undertaking for anyone to try to exhibit the substance of Christian doctrine as comprised in Theology Proper to Eschatology, if he meant at the same time to deny the divine character of the Scriptures. They considered the Scriptures the *principium cognoscendi* for the theologian. Hence after explaining that theology properly understood, is a *habitus practicus theosdotos*, they proceeded to show that this

habitude is derived from and is occupied with nothing else than the written Word of God given by inspiration. Quenstedt: "The sole, proper, adequate and ordinary source of theology and of the Christian religion is the divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures; or what comes to the same thing, the canonical Scriptures alone are the absolute source of theology so that out of them alone the articles of faith are to be deduced and proven." They deprecated and rejected any teaching that purported to be theological teaching if it was drawn from any other source than the Scriptures. As false sources of theology, false *principia cognoscendi* they regarded: 1) human reason, either in its natural or its regenerate state. The scholastic theology of the Middle Ages had introduced reason or philosophy, chiefly Aristotelian philosophy, as a criterion of theological truth. By reason the Scholastics understood the sum of all those self-evident truths which are known to man by nature or from experience, and the capacity to formulate judgments on the basis of such truths. Our older dogmaticians held that Scripture declines reason as a source of theological knowledge, because it declares that the materials of Christian theology are transcendental, i.e. they lie beyond the reach of human reason; or in other words, natural reason is utterly blind as regards spiritual matters. Nor is the natural reason of a regenerate person essentially different from that of an unregenerate one. Regeneration is in part an illumination of the intellect of carnal men, i.e. in regeneration man is made to understand things which he had not understood before. But this illumination does not become a source of knowledge, a means for producing doctrines. The regenerate man has a regenerate understanding only so far as he clings to the word of God which regenerated him.

2) They regarded as a false principle of theology the so-called traditions of the Fathers of the early church, and the consensus of the leading teachers of the church especially during the first four centuries (*consensus quinquesecularis*). These traditions are incomplete and not authentic or genuine, and the consensus of the teachers is not apparent. These traditions need to be tested by the Scriptures as to their correctness; they cannot therefore form the basis on which we establish our faith. Our belief can be determined only by what God Himself declares. Men can declare nothing to be "*de fide*."

3) Our older dogmaticians rejected as a false principle of theology private revelations made to individuals either by a so-called inner light, or in ecstasies, or dreams, or apparitions of angels, or inspirations or internal instructions which the soul claims to have received from the Spirit or during its mystical union with Christ. Such private revelations are brought in to foist upon Christians matters which God does not teach in the Scriptures and which not infrequently contradict the Scriptures.

The conditions which compelled the early teachers of our church to denounce false principles of theology exist still, yea, have become aggravated; and two false principles, which shall be added later, made their first appearance in the year 1870. We have therefore the same and even stronger reasons to set forth in our day the one true *principium cognoscendi* in theology.

1) First as regards to the use of human reason in theology, a glance at the activity of modern theologians convinces us that outside of the Lutheran church nearly every theologian of repute seeks to justify the teachings of Scripture at the forum of men's logic and understanding. The Roman Church, without any compunction, has set up doctrines and

practices, for which she seeks acceptance by an appeal to reason contrary to the Scriptures. The great chasm that yawns between the Lutheran and the Reformed churches is caused by nothing else than the rationalism that prevails in the Reformed Church. Modern authors, who have written on the history of dogma and the evolution of various religious bodies, usually claim that the rise of the Reformed Church alongside of the Lutheran was the result of a necessary process of historical development. This explanation is not correct. The division between the two churches came when the Reformed Church in a number of doctrines decided to follow reason and not the Scriptures. The rationalism of the Reformed Churches is not always expressed with the same degree of clearness and force. Often it appears veiled. But it exists in every division of the Reformed Church. It is shared in a large measure by the Arminians. Nor have those crassest rationalists of the 16th century, the Socinians, disappeared in our day.

In order that the Lutheran opposition to the use of human reason in theology may not be misunderstood and misinterpreted, we must revert to an old distinction. The term "reason" may be used in a twofold sense: 1) as that faculty in man by which he perceives anything; 2) as the innate knowledge of certain truths and the ability to apply this knowledge for formulating judgments. In the former sense the Lutheran Church accepts the use of reason and regards it as necessary also in theology. A man without reason could not be a theologian just as little as he could engage in any other intellectual pursuit. The theologian must be able to perceive clearly that certain matters are revealed in the Scriptures. He must be a good grammarian, rhetorician, logician. The Lutheran Church has therefore always advocated the diligent pursuit if

these studies for the cultivation of the reasoning power. Where reason is thus used merely as the natural instrument for perceiving something, its use is called *usus instrumentalis* or *ancillaries*. The latter phrase signifies that when reason is thus used it is merely a servant and submits to a higher power.

But when reason is used to determine whether anything that is revealed in Scripture is true or not true, viz. by the commonly accepted and inborn principles of truth in man, it is a wrong use of reason. Such a use is called *usus magisterialis*, because it makes reason the master, not the servant of Scriptures.

In rejecting reason as a principle in theology the Lutheran Church rejects merely the *usus magisterialis*. Those who advocate this use are guilty of the error that reason is introduced into a domain where it does not belong, and where everything is contrary to what it considers right. Thus there arise contradictions between the revelation of God or the Scriptures and human reason.

Contradictions are divided into explicit and implicit, or *contradictoria oppositio* and *contradictio in adjecto*. A *contradictio explicita* or contradictory opposition exists between two statements one of which affirms while the other negatives the same fact: e.g. the statements: theology is a science; theology is not a science, are in contradictory opposition and form an explicit contradiction.

An implicit contradiction or a contradiction in the qualifier of a statement occurs when in the same statement the predicate states something of the subject which seems repugnant to the nature of the subject; e.g. the statements: the iron hatchet swam; or: Peter walked on the water, contain a

contradictio in adjecto, because swimming is contrary to the nature of iron, and walking on water to a being like Peter.

Explicit contradictions can be removed by a proper explanation of their intended meaning, and in theology such contradictions are often removed by the proper exegesis. Implicit contradictions cannot be removed, because we have no way of judging on what grounds they were made. In our everyday pursuits such implicit contradictions are simply rejected as nonsense. In theology we must allow them to stand on the authority of God who uttered them and who has not made us judges of His utterances.

2) As regards the traditions of the Fathers and the so-called consensus of the leading teachers of the church, or the deliverances of church-councils, our Lutheran dogmaticians have expressed their utmost readiness to accord all due praise to the faithful labors of ancestors, and to follow their right teaching, but they have insisted that the Fathers cannot establish articles of faith, nor can church-councils, synods, etc. They can only proclaim as articles of faith what God has declared as such in the Scriptures. As to the consensus of the Fathers two things must be observed: 1) it has never been proven that there is any such consensus either on all or on any particular doctrine. The contrary can easily be shown, viz. that the Fathers often dissented from one another in their interpretation of Scriptures. 2) Even if a consensus existed that would only prove that the Fathers, not the church was of one mind. The Fathers are not the whole church.

In our day a theory has been propounded in Germany which, in our country, was taken up by the Iowa Synod, It is called "the theory of open questions." According to this theory no matter can be considered a part of the creed of

Christendom, until it has been officially declared to be such by the church, say, in consequence of a doctrinal controversy. The church must settle for all what they are to regard as articles of faith.

3) As regards private revelations made to individuals in one way or another and which are outside and independent of the Word of God, our dogmaticians have called the people who claim such revelations “enthusiasts” (*fanatici*, Scwaermer). In the ancient church this claim was set up by the Montanists, Donatists and Messalians; in the age of the Reformation it cropped out among the Anabaptists and Schwenkfeldians, who rejected as letter-worship any insistence on the written word of God, appealed from the written word to the unwritten word or light in their hearts and opposed their internal illumination as a superior revelation to the Scriptures. Later this error was adopted by the Quakers, Labadists, and even the Baptists, Socinians and Calvinists were drawn into it.

Over and against this claim our dogmaticians have urged the point that private revelation beyond and outside of the Word of God have not been promised to us, but all Christians, for all times to come, and in all questions that might arise have been referred to the Bible. The Church is declared in Ephesians 2:20 to be “built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets”, i.e., on their writings, not on private communications, claimed to have been made by God to individuals. Our dogmaticians constructed the following dilemma against private revelations: Either these private revelations agree with the Scriptures and simply repeat what the Scriptures have stated before – in that case they are superfluous and may be dispensed with – or private revelations go beyond and contradict the Scriptures – in that case they are

vicious and should be rejected, according to Galatians 1:8 and Romans 16:17.

The revelations in question usually purport to deal with questions of doctrine and faith. We admit that certain persons may receive private communications regarding affairs or events that are to occur in the Church or State. Our Apology, [*Jacobs*] p. 270, also admits this. What we deny is that new doctrines can originate from this source of private revelations. If we were to admit this, we should open the flood-gates to all heresy; for all men are naturally inclined to believe the thoughts of their own heart, which they often regard as a special illumination from God rather than God’s Word. In rejecting this inner illumination by private revelation, our Church by no means denies that no person can grasp the teachings of the Scriptures except by illumination of the Holy Ghost, but this illumination always occurs through, by means of, the Scriptures and in accordance with it, not outside and independently of it.

4) A fourth principle of theology, which we must reject, was constructed by the Lateran Council of 1870, which declared the pope the infallible teacher of Christendom and made all utterances which he chose to make binding upon the faith of all Christians. We regard this as the culmination of all the blasphemous mans-worship of which the Roman Church has been guilty in all ages.

5) Just as evil as papal infallibility, however, is the peculiar fanaticism, which has sprung up in the so-called scientific theology of our times. In order to obtain a uniform system of doctrine, modern theologians claim that doctrines must not simply be taken from the Bible, but must be evolved from the consciousness, or self-consciousness, of the theologian or the Church. The whole claim is, at best, a

ludicrous self-deception. For most of these things which these theologians claim to have evolved, they have taken over into their mind from the Scriptures, and in stating these consciousnesses they simply reproduce from their store of Christian knowledge what the Word of God put in them and produced in them. But often this evolutionary process turns out evil things, that neither God nor the Bible, but some other power put into these theologians. The whole plan, viz., of developing doctrine out of one's own mind without consulting the Scriptures, appears as childishness, unworthy of grown-up university professors, who are supposed to have cut all their teeth.

With the orthodox teachers, then, of our Church we shall continue to regard the Holy Scriptures as the sole and adequate *principium cognoscendi* in theology. And by means of this principle we propose to know and determine all that can be known and determined by this means.

Firstly, the Scriptures themselves. There is, namely, a Scriptural doctrine concerning the Scriptures, and no dogmatics is complete without it. Just as we call the aggregate of all the statements which Scripture makes concerning the world of matter cosmology, the aggregate of all its statements concerning Christ Christology, the aggregate of all its statements concerning the Church Ecclesiology, just so we may call all the statements of the Bible concerning the Bible Bibliology. Theologically we can know the cosmos, Christ or the Church only so much as the Bible reveals concerning these matters. Theologically we can know no more of the Bible than the Bible reveals. Just as little as any person can construct theologically a doctrine of the cosmos outside and independent of the Bible, just as little could a person construct theologically

a doctrine of the Bible, without consulting the Bible and exhibiting what the Bible says about itself. All this goes to show that Bibliology is just as much a revealed doctrine of Scripture as Cosmology, Christology etc., and only that is a Bibliology worthy of the name, which reproduces the teachings of Scripture concerning itself.

Dr. Graebner says: "What the Bible teaches concerning the Bible, we teach and believe because it is taught in the Bible, just as we teach and believe what Scripture teaches concerning the trinity in unity and the person of Christ because it is taught in Scripture. The testimony of the church is neither more nor less in Bibliology than it is in Christology, and again, our assurance of the divine origin, the authority, and the efficacy of the Bible is just as little based upon human authority and just as truly a divine and supernatural assurance as our assurance of the grace and mercy of God and the divinity of Christ, being derived from and based upon the infallible word of the living God. In fact, our faith in Christ cannot consistently be more firm and enduring than our belief in the divine authority of Scripture. He who draws his pencil through scriptural Bibliology is but consistent when he draws it through all the succeeding chapters of dogmatic theology, and again, we are only consistent when we deem a theologian heterodox whose Bibliology is not that of the Scriptures, just as we deem a synergist heterodox because his anthropology and soteriology are not in accordance with Scripture" (A. L. Graebner, "Bibliology," *Theological Quarterly*, volume I, number 2, April, 1897 [Saint Louis: Concordia, 1897], page 130f.).

This was the reason why Dr. Graebner departed from a time-honored custom in treating Bibliology not in an introductory chapter, but as an integral part of Biblical

dogmatics. He says: "We hold that the Prolegomena were not the best place for the exhibition of the points of doctrine which should make up Bibliology. The doctrines of the inspiration, the properties, and the purposes of the Bible are themselves as truly articles of faith as any article of Christology, and more eminently so than certain points of Anthropology. And, furthermore, the biblical doctrine *de Scriptura Sacra* is in our day more violently assailed and more flatly and directly denied than any other point of revealed theology. For this and other reasons we deem it eminently proper that doctrinal or systematical theology should, especially in our day, transfer Bibliology from the prolegomena to the corpus doctrinae itself, embodying this doctrine or cluster of doctrines in the dogmatical system proper, making the *Locus de Scriptura Sacra* the opening chapter of dogmatic theology," *Theol. Quart* I, 130.

The position which we have taken with regard to the proper grouping of Bibliology in dogmatics has been violently attacked and ridiculed. I stated before that Dr. Graebner consciously introduced this new grouping. To quote him once more, he says: "we are, of course, prepared to hear the objection that to base the doctrine of the divine authority and origin of the Bible upon Scripture itself is inadmissible, because it is taking the testimony of Scripture in establishing its own claims. But to raise this objection is not only poor theology, but also poor law. The testimony of a person in his own behalf is everywhere considered as good as the person himself. Even a defendant in a court of record is allowed to plead 'Not guilty' and to take the stand to testify for himself, and that testimony stands until the contrary is shown to the satisfaction of the judge or jury. Now, in our eyes Scripture is not a defendant at the bar of justice, as modern critical theology would make it,

but the voice of God manifesting itself as coming from the mouth of Truth everlasting, and if that testimony is not good and sufficient proof, no truth has ever been established by evidence of any kind. To us the testimony of Scripture is more reliable evidence than the testimony of our senses; we are more firmly assured that the Scriptures are indeed the word of the living God, than we are that the sun is in the sky as midday, since the latter assurance is human while the former is divine.

"Yet another objection will be liable to intrude itself upon our attention when we make the Bible itself the source of our Bibliology. We are told that in so doing we are in fact begging the question or arguing in a circle. But to raise this objection is not only poor theology, but also poor logic. Begging the question and arguing in a circle are logical fallacies, faulty processes of reasoning, endeavors to establish a truth by supposing that truth already established. But who has told our opponents that we are endeavoring to establish our Bibliology by a process of reasoning? To establish truths by reasoning processes may be good philosophy, better philosophy than that of our theological neologists is generally found to be, but is certainly not theology. We have said before this and say again: 'Our theology concedes the dignity of a theological doctrine to no statement which may be derived even from a revealed doctrine by a process of reasoning only, but is not itself in all its terms actually taught in Holy Scripture'" [this quote is from the *Theological Quarterly*, I, no. 1, page 12]. The logical blunder committed in the objection above stated is that of a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. Philosophical truths are established to human minds by argument of a human mind; but theological truths are established by the word of God as recorded in Scripture, and in no other way, and the truths of Bibliology in Christian

dogmatics are theological truths not philosophically, but theologically established.

“Being theological truths, the truths of Bibliology differ from philosophical truths, also in this that they cannot be consistently assailed by philosophical arguments, and the proper defence of these truths must not be attempted so much by philosophical apology as by the testimony of Holy Scripture. This does not exclude that the impugner of scriptural Bibliology may be met by an analysis of his faulty reasoning, where, as is generally the case, the antithesis will not even stand before the laws of logic and common sense; but a scriptural theologian must not suppose that he has performed his whole duty when he has shown how neologists are not even consistent with themselves, how the weapons with which scriptural Bibliology is assailed in our day are, philosophically considered, woefully weak because of the many flaws with which they come from the forge of modern theology. Also in the defence of the Christian doctrine concerning Holy Scripture the theologian should not allow himself to be drawn out of his fortress, which is the word of Scripture, or lay aside his proper weapons, which are again the utterances of the Holy Spirit in Holy Scripture. It is by fighting from this bulwark and with these weapons that a theologian will achieve his real and enduring victories over the assailants of the truths of scriptural Bibliology,” *Theol. Quart.* I, 131-133.

§11. Origin of the Bible.

Bibliology, being a Scriptural account of the Bible, presents first the origin of the Bible, 1) as regards its cause

(*causa*); 2) as regards the form which its cause chose for its operation (*causalitas causae*).

1. The Bible introduces itself to its readers as a known entity. “The Scriptures,” hai graphai, John 5:39, is a term that left no doubt at the time when the Lord spoke these words as to what He referred. In the same way Paul in Romans 3:2 uses the expression “ta logia tou theou” to designate a fixed quantity. In both texts the use of the definite article increases the force of these definite statements.

Both these texts refer to the Bible of the Jews. But there is also a New Testament Bible to which the very Writers, who are commissioned to write it, refer: 1st Peter 1:25; 1st Corinthians 14:37. They appeal to the commission which they have received from the Lord to make certain communications to men, and challenge investigation. There is no doubt that this appeal was heeded and that the investigation took place both in the Old Testament and in the New. Even before the exile the Jewish theologians had begun to collect and arrange their religious books in a certain order. This work was perfected by Nehemiah (2nd Maccabees 2:13) and completed by Ezra and the Great Synagogue, probably in the age of the Maccabees. Thus the Talmud narrative relates. As to the writings of the New Testament, they are said to have been collected by the Apostle John. We have evidence that they are placed alongside of the writings of the Old Testament as early as the second century, and their acceptance is universal and shows few variations in the third century. The councils of Hipporegius (393) and of Carthage (397) confirm the accepted *usus* then existing in the churches.

The writings thus accredited are called the Canon of the Holy Scriptures, or the canonical books of the Old and the New

Testaments. The word "kanoon" occurs in Galatians 6:16 and Philippians 3:16 in the sense of moral rule or norm. Any ecclesiastical ordinance was afterwards called Kanoon, in contradistinction to civil law, which was called nomos. As applied to the writings of the Bible the term "kanoon" came to denote the catalog, or list of books, which were recognized by the church to possess authority and to be sacred and divine, and were considered worthy of being read at the public worship both of the Jewish and the Christian churches.

Hutter defines the canonical books as follows: "*Libri canonici certam atque classicam auctoritatem habent. Dicuntur a canone, quoniam sunt instar exactissimae regulae, secundum quam de reliquis omnium scriptis libere iudicatur, ipsam vero aliunde iudicare minime fas est, ut Scriptura canonica sit id, quod in se ipsa est, nempe coelestis veritas, non habet nisi principaliter ea Deo ipso, eius ex auctore.*"

From the canonical books of the Bible the pure church has ever distinguished others which did not come commended in the same manner as the canonical. Their origin was in doubt, hence their authority was questioned. Accordingly these books were called apocryphal. Even though they were esteemed highly for their pious contents, or their historical value, they were not placed on a par with canonical books of Scripture until the decaying Latin Church, which had always had these books in her Latin Bible, the Vulgate, went so far, in the Council of Trent (Session IV, decretal 1) as to pass the following dogma: "*Si quis libros ipsos integros cum omnibus suis partibus prout in ecclesia catholica legi consueverunt et in veteri vulgata latina editione habentur, pro sacris et canonicis non susceperit, anathema sit.*" This wanton decree has for the Roman Church

canonized the apocryphal books of the Old Testament for all time to come.

The Greek Church after hesitating for a long time ultimately took the same position at the Synod of Jerusalem, 1672. The early Protestant churches declared the apocryphal books of the Old Testament to be void of all canonical authority, and even addicted to error, but in the main useful books, which the pious might peruse for their edification. Puritanic tendencies in the Reformed Church resulted in the entire exclusion of the apocryphal books from the printed Bibles. The British Bible Society since 1827 has waged a war upon the Apocrypha, it prints them, but only in separate form.

The Apocrypha are thus defined by [J.A.L.] Wegscheider: "*Biblia apokrypha* (in Rabbinical literature 'genuzim') *canonicis quidem opposita, nominata sunt vel ea, quorum origo latebat, vel inde a Hieronymi aetate, quorum divina origo dubia erat, vel etiam quae spurii et haereticis, ideoque quae in ecclesiis legerentur indignis habebantur*" [confer "Purgatory," *Synodalbericht des Süd-Illinois=Distrikts*, 1912].

From the apocryphal writings of the Old Testament we must distinguish 1) the pseudepigraphs of the Old and New Testaments. These were simply spurious fabrications of designing men who sought to break down the authority of the Bible; 2) the deutero-canonical writings of the New Testament, such as 2nd Peter, 2nd & 3rd John, Hebrews, Jude, James, Revelation. The authority of these writings was at first denied by some churches (Eusebius distinguishes between homologoumena and antilegomena), because they did not come sufficiently accredited. This happened in the stress of those early days of persecution. But they were ultimately

received by most Christians as canonical, though the church has never considered the refusal to accept the deuterocanonical writings as heretical.

The canonicity of the books of the Bible, i.e. those marks which render a book canonical are 1) *authentia, genuina origo, seu ea libri indoles, qua est vel eius auctoris vel certe aetatis cui tribuitur*. The older dogmatists treat this feature as equivalent to *divina auctoritas*. 2) *axiopista, ea libri (vel auctoris) indoles, qua fidem publicam meritor*. This feature is usually exhibited thus: a) the writers of the holy books were in a position to report the truth and intended to do so; b) they were intelligent and serious men and did not disguise their own faults and shortcomings; c) they were most of them martyred for their faith; d) discrepancies in parallel accounts do not disprove the genuineness of the accounts, but their independence; 3) *integritas, ea libri indoles, qua sincerum et incorruptum opus auctoris ad nos pervenit; est cum totalis sui materilis, qua nullum e canonicis librum periisse constat, tum partialis sui formalis, qua nullus locus ita corruptus est, ut arte critica restitui non posset*. These texts however are merely of human authority; they are *testimonium ecclesiae* in the view of the older dogmatists and can beget only human faith. Gerhard says: *Quando ecclesia de canonica auctoritate Scripturae testatur, sui testimonii rationes profert. Ecclesia primitiva, quae ipsos audivit apostolos, prima acceptione librorum, voce apostolorum et numero miraculorum ad canonis auctoritatem probandam excelluit; proxima durantibus adhuc apostolorum autographis primitivam antecelluit ampliorum prophetiarum Novum Testamentum complemento et versionum in varias linguas frequentia, et exarato variis libris fidelium de Sacrae Scripturae testimonio; postremo, autographis apostolorum*

sublatis, maiori saltem prophetiarum complemento primitivam ecclesiam ut mediam antecedit. Hollaz says: *Testimonium ecclesiae est quidem insigne motivum credibilitatis, quo inducimur ad cognoscendum humanae fide credendam divinitatem Scripturae, sed non est motivum unicum neque absolute necessarium*.

The question regarding the canon of the Bible and the canonicity of particular books is mainly a historical one. It establishes merely the fact that the books of the Bible were received as divine at the time of their publication by the people to whom they were published. But this is not our reason for receiving them as divine. We desire evidence at first hand which evidence is *fides divina*. This evidence we obtain in exactly the same way as those who first received the Bible obtained it, viz. from the Bible itself. Hase rightly says: "Der religiöse Glaube an das göttliche Ansehen der Heiligen Schrift oder *fides divina* ruht auf ihrem göttlichen Ursprunge." He cites Buddeus to the same effect thus: "*Fides divina est cognitio simpliciter certa et omnem oppositi formidinem excludens, quae per internum Spiritus Sanctus testimonium quod in legitima verbi divini tractatione sese exserit, producitur*."

2. The canonical books of the Old and New Testament namely exhibit themselves "in all their parts as the word of God."

3. The divine origin is indicated a) by such standard and ever-recurring phrases as: ta logia tou theou, Romans 3:2; to rhēma kyriou, 1st Peter 1:25; ho logos tou theou, Mark. 7:13; Acts 13:46; 11:1. The genitive in all these phrases is the genitive of authorship. The three nouns differ thus: logion, the diminutive of logos, denotes the word as a distinct, perhaps a brief utterance on particular occasions. Bengel renders it by

“eloquium” “Ausspruch.” Logos is the word of God in its entirety; and “rhäma” relates more to the fact that the word is speech.

b) These phrases appear in more extended form with prepositional qualifiers such as: to rhäthen hypo theou dia tou prophätou, Matthew 1:22f; to rhäthen hymin hypo tou theou legontos, Matthew 22:31. These phrases name God as the prime cause (hypo) and some human agency (dia) as the intermediary cause of the Bible (*causa principalis* and *instrumentalis*). c) God Himself is introduced as the speaker of a certain utterance or truth by “legei” Galatians 3:16 and “epängeilato” in Titus 1:2. d) This activity of God is more strictly referred to the Holy Spirit in 2nd Peter 1:21: “hypo pneumatou hagiou pheromenoi”; 1st Peter 1:11: “edälon to en autois pneuma christou promartyromenon”; Hebrews 3:7: “legei to pneuma to hagon”; Hebrews 10:15, 16: “martyrei de hymin to pneuma to hagon.”

The first of these passages moreover, while emphasizing the activity of the Holy Spirit, excludes any human agency by declaring: “ou thelämati anthroopoon, alla... apo theou.”

The passages offered in this section are intended to show that divine origin is claimed not only for the Bible as a whole, but for distinct portions of it which are being quoted. Sometimes it is a certain statement which God has made that is quoted in an argument, Mark 7:10, 13. Sometimes it is only a word as “sämeron” in Hebrews 3:7; “eti hapax” Hebrews 12:26; theous, John 10:35 on which the argument turns; sometimes even a single letter is shown to be of divine origin: Galatians 3:16 (spermati, not “spermasin”).

§12. What is the Inspiration of the Bible?

While the preceding paragraph set forth in a general way that God is the cause (*causa*) of the Bible, this paragraph shows in what manner God is the cause (*causalitas causae*). God did not compose the Bible by writing it with His own hands, as He did the Ten Commandments, but He employed a human agency for writing the Bible. This singular and extraordinary action by which God caused men to write the Bible is called “inspiration.” The dogmatists accordingly declare: *Inspiratio est causalitas causae efficientis principalis, sive ratio formalis, per quam Deus in esse actu causae Scripturae constiti est.*

1. 2nd Timothy 3:16 states in a general way that God is the author of the Bible by inspiration: pasa graphä theopneustos.

2. These passages refer to the human agents whom God employed in the act of inspiration. They are called the “inspired penmen” of God for they themselves appeal time and again to the act of writing as having taken place by divine command, and their writings are cited later as divinely inspired. The dogmatists term these penmen the *causa efficiens minus principalis* or what is better: *causa instrumentalis* or *organica*. The fact that the holy writers were wholly dependent upon God in the act of writing is expressed by the dogmatists by such terms as these: “the holy writers were the *calami, manus, notarii, amanuenses Spiritus Sancti*.” Modern theologians are horrified at these statements and in their ignorance of the *tertium comparationis* ridicule them. But if we have in mind the point of comparison, viz. that the holy writers did not pen their own thoughts in their own words, but the thoughts of God in the Word of God, these terms nicely agree with what the Bible

states of itself when it declares that pasa graphä theopneustos; and anthroopoi hagioi elaläsan apo theou pheromenoi hypo pneumatos hagiou; 2nd Timothy 3:16; 2nd Peter 1:21.

It is to be observed however that the physical action of writing letters and words and sentences and chapters and books does not belong to the essential parts of inspiration. The apostle Paul, e.g. has in some cases dictated his epistles. If errors occurred he no doubt removed them before he allowed the epistle to go out under his name, 2nd Thessalonians 3:17.

In general the penmen are called "holy men" 2nd Peter 1:21; not only because of their personal holiness as believing Christians but especially because they had been separated for this holy function (*propter munus divinum, quo fungebantur*). In particular they are called "prophets and apostles" Ephesians 2:20; the prophets are the writers of the Old, the apostles, among them such men as Mark and Luke, who were helpers of the apostles, wrote the New Testament.

3. The inspired penmen were "personal organs," and as such their writings are frequently under their personal name or official title. This indicates that their own mind had become merged with the divine mind in what they wrote, and they acknowledged their inspired writings as their own.

4. God however is ever acknowledged as the primal or moving cause in these men, so that statements found in their writings are frequently referred to God.

5. By appropriation however the act of inspiring the holy writers is referred to the Holy Ghost.

6. 7. Now what was it that God did when He inspired the holy men? Our text-book says: "He not only prompted and actuated toward writing what they wrote, but He also suggested to them both the thoughts and words they uttered

as they wrote." There is then in the act of inspiration: a) an *impulsus scribendi*, an unmistakable inward impulse to take pen and paper and place oneself in the posture of one about to write. b) a *suggestio realis*, the coming up in the mind of the writer of a certain thought or subject on which he was to write.

c) a *suggestio verbalis*, a shaping and forming of words with which to express the suggested thoughts. All these distinct impulses originated with God and were transferred to the minds of the writers.

d) Some dogmaticians add a fourth element to the above, the so-called *gubernatio*, i.e. the oversight (divine oversight) which was exercised over the writers while writing. This oversight prevented the creeping in of errors into their writings.

The *impulsus scribendi* is indicated in Scriptures in various ways:

1) In 2nd Peter 1:21 the participle "pheromenoi" qualifies "anthroopoi hagioi." It means literally that these men were "carried forward" by the Holy Ghost, or by a power or force which seized them. And in the same context it is stated that the prophecy came not "by the will of man," ou gar thelämati anthroopou änachthä prophäteia. The seizure of the Holy Ghost then took the place of the ordinary motive in men for writing.

This seizure is indicated also in 2nd Timothy 3:16, where "theopneustos" qualifies "pasa graphä." "Theopneustos" means: God-breathed. The Spirit, the pneuma (ruach) of God, came like a wind and seized the minds of the holy men, like a breeze inflates a sail, and drove them forward. Accordingly when the impulse ceased and their writing was finished, the

product could be called "theopneustos," it had come into existence by the breath of God.

2) Paul was conscious that his speaking was "en dymamei pneumatos hagiou" Romans 15:19. It was the same miraculous power which exhibited itself in another form in "sämeia, terata" signs and wonders, Romans 15:18, 19. The inspiration of the Bible is a divine miracle. And hence he can say that the Gospel which he has proclaimed is not "kata anthroopon" Galatians 1:11. This prepositional phrase connects with "ouk estin," and literally rendered yields this sense: "My Gospel is not according to men, i.e. not of such quality as it would be if it were the work of men." It is not of the same nature as human wisdom, human efficiency and the like. Bengel well paraphrases "*Non est humani census*," it is not something which men would readily estimate because they understand from their own experience in writing how such things as my Gospel can originate. Jeremiah in the Old Testament by reason of the impulse to write which he has felt, absolutely identifies what he has written in a book with what the Lord God of Israel has spoken to him, Jeremiah 30:2.

It should be noted that when the Bible introduces the holy men as speaking it refers to their writing. Quotations from one book are often made in this form: "as Esaias saith." Practically the "lalein" in these cases is "graphein." We have no knowledge of the unrecorded utterances of the holy writers.

As regards the *suggestio realis et verbalis*, our text-book offers a veritable arsenal of Scriptural weapons of defense and offense in the war which orthodox Christians in our day are forced to wage upon a theological science which has all but robbed the Bible of its divine origin. It is necessary to classify this multitude of texts somewhat: 1) The *suggestio realis* or

suggestion of the subject matter is indicated in Romans 15:18; 1st Thessalonians 2:13; Acts 2:4; 2nd Peter 1:19-21. 2) The *suggestio verbalis* or the supplying of the very words for expressing an inspired thought is indicated in Jeremiah 30:2; and in every instance where a Scripture passage is cited or a Scripture fact referred to in the Scriptures with the statement that the Lord has thus said or words to that effect. In longer quotations we may also see a proof for the *suggestio realis*, for not only the single terms of a quotation, but the entire thought expressed by the quotation are referred to the source indicated.

The quotations given in 7. can be traced thus: John 10:34, 35 to Psalm 82:6; Matthew 22:43, 44 to Psalm 110:1; Romans 15:9 to Psalm 18:49; Romans 15:10 to Deuteronomy 32:43; Romans 15:11 to Psalm 117:1; Romans 15:12 to Isaiah 11:1, 10; Galatians 3:16 to Genesis 12:3, 7; Romans 10:16 to Isaiah 53:1; 1st Peter 3:6 to Genesis 18:12; Hebrews 12:27 to Psalm 102:26; Hebrews 8:8, 13 to Jeremiah 31:31; Hebrews 4:7 to Psalm 95:7; Hebrews 7:20, 21 to Psalm 110:4; Rom. 4:7 to Psalm 32:1, 2; Ephesians 4:8, 9 to Psalm 68:18; John 7:42 to Psalm 132:11; to Micah 5:2; to 1st Samuel 16:1ff.

A *suggestio literalis* might even be established from Luke 16:7: "mia kerea" and Galatians 3:16: "spermati" not "spermasi" and others.

Since the doctrine of inspiration is one of the most controverted articles of modern theology, we shall have to study our Biblical position more closely by distinguishing it from certain phenomena which are sometimes made to pass for inspiration.

1) Inspiration is not the same as illumination. All Christians having been enlightened by the Holy Ghost have

illumination, by means of which they have begun to know the things of the Spirit of God and daily grow in such knowledge. This illumination does not at once remove all error and all possibility of erring from them. While they are in the flesh they are illumined, but not inerrant. Inspiration, however, can be predicated only of certain people, who by this act of God were lifted above their own corrupt flesh and the thoughts arising from the flesh, and were thus rendered immune from error. It is the "proton pseudos," the fundamental error, of modern theologians that they fail to distinguish between inspiration and illumination.

2) Inspiration must not be confounded with revelation. Revelation, derived from "*re-velare*," signifies the drawing aside of a veil by which things were hidden, in other words, revelation can in its nature refer only to things that were not known before. Moreover, an act of revelation is complete as soon as the concept of the matter unknown before has entered the mind of the party receiving the revelation. It is not essential to a revelation that the matter revealed be set down in writing. Inspiration deals with both known and unknown matters. Some of the things the holy men wrote were known to them before, others were unknown to them and in these latter cases they did, indeed, receive a revelation together with their inspiration. Hence Peter can say of the Holy Spirit, by whom the prophets predicted the sufferings and the subsequent glory of Christ, that he signified, edälou, literally, revealed, that these things were revealed "apekalyphthä," and that he witnessed beforehand "promartyromenon." But whether the holy men knew the matter beforehand which came to them in the act of inspiration, or not, one thing they did not know in either case, viz. that they were to write what God inspired. Inspiration

never aimed at the personal information of the inspired alone, but always at drawing from them some product of the pen.

3) Inspiration must be distinguished from divine assistance, direction, oversight, or any action of the Holy Spirit, which aims at nothing more than the prevention of error in the inspired (*assistentia, directio, gubernatio*). A book may be infallible, without being divine. Table of logarithms, if they have been purged of printers' errors, are infallible, though they are a human product. A pupil may write something by direction and under the supervision of his teacher, who may even correct mistakes which the pupil has made. The fact that the teacher has assisted in and governed the pupil's writing, does not make the pupil's writings the teacher's writings. Thus a mere divine assistance while the holy men of God were writing, would leave their products essentially human products, scarcely excelling in this respect the composition of a sermon which a pastor writes after having called upon God to aid him, or a postil which has been collected with prayerful mediation and the constant appeal to God to aid and govern the author's work. Luther's, Walther's and other people's treatises, were undoubtedly written with divine assistance and under divine direction. We may even claim that something like a divine impulse, namely the spiritual thought that they ought to be written came to these authors, but that does not make their works inspired. Many in our day think that if they explain the inspiration of the Bible to mean the divine assistance (*directio, gubernatio*) which was accorded to the writers, they have adequately and sufficiently explained the meaning of inspiration, but they have not; they have rather surrendered the very principle for which the Bible theologian in this matter must contend. Inspiration is entirely *sui generis*. There is no parallel action to it that we

know of. Nor does this assistance or government theory do full justice to the statements in which Scripture describes the act of inspiration, e.g. pheromenoi and “theopneustos.” Scripture is the Word of God and a divine product, only if the full force of these terms is admitted. *Assistentia, directio, gubernatio* are weakening these terms.

4) Inspiration extends to all parts of Scripture and applies to all matters contained in Scripture. We may, for the sake of an occasional emphasis, distinguish between cardinal, or principle doctrines of Scripture and all others. But this distinction must never carry with it the idea that some parts of Scripture are less divine than others or that inspiration admits of degrees. Both the prominent teachings and the less important concomitant circumstances recorded in Scripture are inspired. Both the spiritual matters relating to man’s salvation and historical, geographical, physical remarks are inspired. Anything that is a part or particle of Scripture partakes of the quality of the inspired. Inspiration, to be inspiration at all, must be plenary inspiration; for “pasa graphä theopneustos.”

5) Persons who are willing to admit the inspiration of the Bible, must admit the inspiration of the words of the Bible. Just this is what is meant by inspiration, as Scripture uses the term, viz. the communication of all the terms which could adequately express a certain thought, or describe a certain matter. Scripture really consists of words, written words, not of thoughts, ideas. Accordingly, when we speak of the inspiration of the Bible we mean an inspiration of those things of which the Bible is made up, viz. words. In other words, any teaching of inspiration which does not inculcate verbal, is not

teaching inspiration at all. Pasa graphä “theopneustos” says Paul.

6) Some people are willing to admit inspiration but they will not admit that there was a divine impulse. If these people will scrutinize their position they will find that, if they exclude from the act of inspiration the *impulsus scribendi* or *mandatum scribendi*, they really have no right to use the term inspiration at all. For not only is the impulse contained in the word inspiration, not only does Scripture exclude any purely human impulse when it says, “the prophecy came ou thelämati anthroopoon,” but the Bible tells in scores of places that the writers were told to write. Hence inspiration is always “*inspiratio rerum scribendarum et verborum scribendorum*.”

7) This doctrine of inspiration as now set forth is the doctrine of the Lutheran Church. While our confessions do not treat this doctrine *ex professo* in certain articles, as they do other doctrines, they assume this doctrine throughout. E.g. the Formula of Concord says, “we receive and embrace the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the pure and clear fountains of Israel,” [“Solid Declaration,” Summary, The Book of Concord, editor Henry Eyster Jacobs, (Philadelphia: United Lutheran Publication House, 1911)] page --5, paragraph 3. All orthodox Lutheran teachers down to the present have with singular fidelity maintained and defended the doctrine of verbal or plenary inspiration.

A weakening off the time honored position in the Lutheran Church occurred in the 17th century when George Calixt and his followers claimed that all in Scriptures was indeed free from error, but not all inspired. They acknowledged a true inspirational act of the Holy Ghost only for such portions of

Scripture as pertained to the doctrine of salvation (Heilswahrheiten), but as regards historical notes, in short, anything that the writers could know from experience or by the use of their intellect, Calixt admitted only a governing and guiding activity of the Spirit, by which the writers were preserved from error. In Calixt's view, then, the Bible is, in part, the word of God, in part the errorless word of man. This view of Calixt is shared and surpassed by Papists (Bellarmine, "*aliter Deus adfuit prophetis, aliter historicis*"; Suarez: "*inspiratio verborum in omnibus, quae mysterium fidei concernunt*"; Sebast. Castalio: "*methodus, dispositio, exornatio, hermeneia, phrasis et stylus Scripturae humano ingenio et industriae attribuunt*"); by Arminians (Episcopius, "*Scriptores sacro potuisse labi et re ipsa lapsos esse in rebus levibus et nihil ad salutem pertinentibus*"); Calvinists (Calvin: "*Quam figuram dum negligunt evangelistae, a nativo sensu discedunt*").

The Papists lower the importance of the Scriptures in order to raise the importance of their traditions, and claim that the apostles received no *mandatum scribendi*. Still the Papists pretend to believe the inspiration of Scripture. Quenstedt says: "*nugantur*" "they are joking." It is a logical monstrosity to affirm inspiration and to deny the impulse of inspiration.

Outside of the Lutheran Church voices are raised as late as the 16th century, now by individuals, now by religious societies, claiming that the holy writers were liable to error and actually did err in writing. Among the Papists we note Alberi Piggius, who says, "*Matthaeus et Johannes evangelistae potuerunt et labi memoria et mentiri*"; again, "*quis certos nos reddet vera esse et certa quae scribunt omnia de Christo (praesertim Marcus et Lucas) quae nunquam viderant, sed crediderunt narrantibus aliis, etc.*" Erasmus says: "*Evangelistas*

testimonia non e libris deprompsisse, sed memoriae fidentes, ita ut fit, lapsos esse."

Socinus claimed: "*Quaedam in Scriptura per se ipsa falsa apparere, sed quae parvi sint momenti*"; again: "*fieri potuisse ut evangelistae et apostoli in aliquibus leviter errarint.*"

The Arminians in their Apology (addressed to the Leyden Theologians) and their great theologian Episcopius, say "*Scriptores sacros etc.*" (see 27 lines above).

But the greatest defection from the doctrine of inspiration has appeared in modern Protestant circles. It is now *publica doctrina* among all theologians of renown, that the doctrine of inspiration as professed in the 17th century can no longer be maintained. Lutheran theologians have all gone on record denouncing inspiration. R. F. Grau says in his *Entwicklungsgeschichte des neutestamentlichen Schrifttums*, "the theologians of the 17th century taught a divine quality and character of the divine Scriptures, which does not agree with the human and historical reality of Scripture, nor proved to be a truly divine quality... In our view, Scripture is a collection of writings which came into existence by a truly and humanly historical development; and this quality of Scripture does not contradict, but it alone agrees with the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the Son of Man and of God, who exerted his power in this development. It is altogether impossible to define mechanically and quantitatively the limits of the divine and the human in Scripture, just as it is impossible to do this in the person of Jesus" (I, 11, 18). Kahnis says: "The doctrine of inspiration advocated by the old dogmatists rests on this basic thought: that the Scriptures are the word of God, because God, the Holy Spirit, is their real author, and that He is such because, on the one hand, He gave to the holy writers the

impulse for writing, and on the other hand, dictated to them both the contents and the words... The untenableness of the old orthodox doctrine of inspiration will be clearly seen" (*Die lutherische Dogmatik historisch-genetisch dargestellt*, I, 666). Thomasius: "If you will only yield to this impression (that the writers preserve their individuality) without bias, you will be convinced forthwith that these writings 'were not dictated by the Holy Spirit'" (*Christi Person und Werk*, III, 1, 449). Hofmann grants that all things necessary for maintaining the church of Christ on earth was done by the agency of the Holy Spirit, but he denies a special operation of the Spirit in the writers (*Der Schriftbeweis. Ein theologischer Versuch*, I, 567ff.).

Luthardt argues that only by comparison with the entire contents of Scripture can any particular portion of Scripture be proven to be divine. "Scripture" he says "is the nominative word of God (for the church) and contains the saving word of God (for the individual)," *Kompendium der Dogmatik*, Seite 255. Delitzsch regards theopneustia as a generic term embracing all sorts of operations of the Spirit and argues that because the holy writers wrote down some things erroneously, anyone who believes that they wrote by inspiration offends the Holy Ghost (*System der biblischen Psychologie*, Seite 319). Kurtz, on the contrary, holds that it is no offense to the Holy Spirit to believe that in matters relating to natural science, physics, the holy writers were subject to bias, prejudice and error (*Bibel und Astronomie*, Seite 8).

Dieckhoff declares that view of the older dogmaticians as regards the inerrancy of Scripture as untenable (*Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1858, Seite 757). Philippi, at first, denied, but afterwards affirmed the old Lutheran doctrine of inspiration. He is the white raven (*rara avis*) among modern theologians,

upholding the full force of the statement "pasa graphä theopneustos," as we have learned to understand it.

Very useful material on this topic can be found in *Lehre und Wehre* 1886, in the foreword (Vorwort), and in the articles, "Die Form der alttestamentlichen Zitate im N.T." by Dr. Pieper, and "Was sagt die Schrift von sich selbst?" by Dr. Stoeckhardt; also in the minutes of the 11th convention of the Synodical Conference in 1886.

In view of what Scripture states regarding the act of inspiration we find little difficulty in repelling certain objections that are raised, and often disturb the mind of the common people. E.g. the objection is raised that there are statements in the Bible which are wrong, or even wicked. Eve believed that she had given birth to the Redeemer at the birth of Cain; Cain declared his sin past forgiving. Now what we claim in regard to the inspiration of such passages is that the Holy Spirit moved the holy writers to write them down as facts, but not as the rule of faith. Hence the rule has been framed that when persons are introduced in the Scriptures as speaking *ex proprio motu*, their statements are not articles of faith, but when they are introduced as speaking *ex instinctu seu afflatu Spiritus Sancti*, they speak the *maturato* of faith.

Again it is claimed that according to the old saying: *Errare humanum est*, the liability to err cannot be said not to have existed in the case of the holy writers. Answer: we must distinguish between the holy writers as penmen for writing down the divine teaching, and as men who were to live according to that teaching. As penmen of the Holy Spirit the holy writers were inerrant. After the outpouring of the Holy Ghost they erred no more in any point of doctrine, while before they had erred. What is related concerning the quarrel of Peter

and Paul at Antioch in Galatians 2:11ff. relates to the life, practice or conversation of Peter. Peter had correctly stated at the convention at Jerusalem (Acts 15) the very principle for which Paul contended against him at Antioch. The fear of men had momentarily blinded Peter's judgment.

Again, it is argued that the holy writers studied the mysteries of faith. We ask: Why should this be considered an argument against their being inspired? Just as well as the Holy Ghost could make use of their previous knowledge, He could also use their study in composing the sacred writings.

§13. Properties of the Bible.

From the divine origin of the holy Scriptures arise certain qualities peculiar to this book which render it distinct from any other book and absolutely *sui generis*. These qualities have been differently named by theologians (*affectiones, attributa, auchämata*), and differently numbered, grouped and divided. The arrangement adopted in our *Outlines* was introduced by Hollaz and has prevailed ever since.

§14. Authority of the Scriptures.

Holy Scripture is the *objectum formale* of revealed theology. The *objectum formale* is the same thing as the *principium et ratio cognoscendi*, that which guides men to a correct and adequate understanding of all matters which are proposed in revealed theology.

The formal object or principle of understanding, in other words, holy Scripture now exercises its office as principle that it influences, moves and bends the human will, and thus lays upon the intellect of man the imperative duty to yield assent to its teaching. A mere intellectual understanding of Scripture, a mere natural knowledge of the doctrines of Scripture is not yet theology. The true theologian possesses a knowledge of Scripture which has been produced in him by a supernatural operation. And this operation has been effected by Scripture. Scripture does not only present to the theologian the matters which he must know, the materials of faith (*fides quae creditor*), but it also brings about the right way of embracing these materials by an act of the intellect and will (*fides quae credita*). The saving doctrine must not only be taken out of Scripture, but must also be accepted by a divinely wrought mode of knowing and receiving them. This divine knowledge and acceptance is called *fides divina*, and is distinguished from mere natural knowledge (*fides humana*). This divine knowledge is wrought by Scripture itself through the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* which is exerted through Scripture.

This quality, now, of the Holy Scriptures to produce the genuine divine faith in man is called its authority. The Greek theologians named this quality Authentia. As in jurisprudence we have certain authentic instruments or writings which justly possess authority, compelling submission, so in theology we have the Scriptures.

The authority of Scripture then is that manifest dignity of Scriptures which moves the human intellect to give assent to its statements and the will to render obedience to its mandates. In so far as the authority of Scriptures addresses itself to the intellect of man it has been termed axiopistia, or autopistia, the

quality that the Scripture is worthy of credence on its own account; insofar as the authority of Scripture addresses itself to the will of man, it is called exousia, power, or authority strictly so-called.

This authority is ascribed to the holy Scriptures, not on account of the sacred character of the person who wrote it; nor on account of the church which has accepted it as divine, but solely and exclusively because Scripture is the word of God. Hence solely because of the direct witness of the Scriptures to the heart of man. Any document in which a superior addresses an inferior person possesses as much authority as the superior possesses himself. Now God, who is truth and the Lord and governor of all men, is the author of Scripture. Accordingly Scripture possesses divine authority and all men must regard Scripture as absolutely true and [binding upon themselves] or they offend against God, the author of Scripture.

The inspiration of Scripture is therefore the basis of ground on which its authority rests. Scripture would indeed be the word of God obligating all men to receive and obey it even if not a single man should accept it. But in order that the individual man may recognize its authority, he must be led to clearly understand the intimate connection of Scripture to God or what comes to the same thing, the constant dependency of Scripture upon God, *dependentia Scripturae Sacrae a Deo sive theopneustia Scripturae Sacrae cognoscatur necesse est*.

The authority of Scripture can be viewed in a twofold relationship: 1) in as far as Scripture postulates (demands) and works faith; 2) in as far as Scripture is the arbiter of truth and error in the church. The former relationship is expressed by the phrase *auctoritas motiva fideique causativa*; the latter *auctoritas canonica seu normativa*. In our text-book the

causative authority of Scripture is treated in sections 1-4; the immotive in sections 5 & 6.

The causative authority of Scripture confronts man in a) a general way in "all its statements" and "all its teachings"; b) in a particular way in all its promises and "all its demands." Toward all these general and special contents Scripture demands faith; for the terms "unrestricted acceptance," "full assent," "unwavering confidence," "willing observance" in our text-book are synonyms of faith.

1. In the state of innocence before the fall God communicated with man by direct approach. Man accepted what God said to him on the authority of God Himself. He had confidence in the Speaker therefore he relied on the Speaker's word. The fall occurred when this confidence was destroyed. By his insinuating question: "Yea, hath God said?" the devil succeeded in destroying man's confidence in the word which God had spoken to him (Genesis 3:1), and by the same stratagem he attacked man's representative our Lord Jesus Christ at the temptation in the desert. The devil's "ifs" in Matthew 4:3 and Luke 4:3 are beaten down by our Lord with a word of God and thus the authority of God's word to command men's faith is reestablished by the Redeemer. For the spoken word by which God communicated with man at the beginning there is now substituted the written word, and to this written word the entire authority of the spoken word has been transferred. Our Lord (John 10:35) appeals to one particular statement of the Old Testament and his argument turns really on one word. But the binding force of this one statement he asserts by a principle: "The scripture cannot be broken." The blindness of Cleophas and his companion was owing to the fact that they had withheld their faith from "all that the prophets

had spoken.” The classical portion of the Old Testament regarding the faith-commanding and faith-begetting authority of the Scriptures is the 119th Psalm. Here the profoundest regard is uttered for the word of God again and again, without exception and limitation. The statement in v. 160 literally rendered reads: “The sum of thy word is truth.” “After examining the divine word and estimating the value of its several parts the psalmist found that the final sum was ‘truth, pure absolute truth’” (Kay in *Pulpit Commentary*). He bows unquestioningly to its authority. In v. 140 he declares that the word is “purged, assayed tried in the fire.” Its reliability has been tested, “therefore” he says “thy servant loveth it.” In v. 167 he calls the word “Jahve’s testimonies,” i.e., the witness which God has made of Himself. And because it is such he “loves it exceedingly.” Thus we see that “unrestricted acceptance of all its statements” is the correct attitude which the Bible expects from those who use it.

2. Scripture is given for “doctrine,” 2nd Timothy 3:16. It sets up any doctrine that is a doctrine. In 2nd Thessalonians 2:15 Paul calls doctrines “traditions” and binds the Thessalonians to abide by them whether they were communicated to them by word of mouth or in writing. The doctrine of the Lord’s suffering and death was laid down by the prophets, Luke 24:25-27, and the doctrine of repentance and faith likewise, Luke 16:29-31. These doctrines could have convinced Cleophas and “persuaded” the rich man’s brothers. “Full assent to all its teachings” therefore is something which the Bible demands from all.

3. The best part of the Scriptures for sinners are the promises of salvation and eternal life. These promises are offered the sinner through the preaching of the word, Titus 1:2-

3, and are accepted by faith, 2nd Thessalonians 2:13. These promises are set forth with the most urgent appeals to the hearers and readers, 2nd Corinthians 1:20; 2nd Thessalonians 2:15; 2nd Peter 1:19. “Unwavering confidence in all its promises” is what the Bible requires of all its readers.

4. Lastly the Bible contains demands “commands,” “Commandments,” “the Law.” Men are solemnly enjoined to “observe” and “keep” them, Deuteronomy 12:32; 5:9, 10; Joshua 1:8; James 2:10. “Willing observance of all its demands” is therefore an attitude which the Bible requires in all who use it.

The voice of authority is heard in all these manifold utterances of Scripture. The intellect of man is here face to face with the Supreme Intellect, and his will with the Sovereign Will, and this book makes him feel that it is his duty to bow to his superior.

Baier points out that the authority of Scripture, so far as by it the assent of faith is produced, requires the knowledge of two promises: 1) whatever Scripture was penned under the inspiration of God that was certainly and infallibly true. 2) Holy Scripture was penned under the inspiration of God, *ergo* etc. Against the major premise hardly any objection will be raised. As regards the minor that may be received either with a human or a divine faith. By human faith (*fides humana*) is understood a knowledge of the divine origin of Scriptures which rests in the last analysis on human witnesses and their testimonies, which render the opinion plausible and reasonable that Holy Writ was not invented by the genius of man, but came from God Himself and is truly divine. Human faith rests on arguments of man’s reason and accepts the divine origin of the Bible as a credible fact. Divine faith (*fides divina*) rests in its last analysis on a

direct certification that has come to man through the testimony of the Holy Spirit in him. This testimony excludes any doubt and makes him who has received it perfectly certain and infallibly sure that the Bible is from God.

Since it is only by the internal testimony of the Spirit in the heart of the believer that a person is rendered certain with a divinely wrought assurance that the Bible is God's book, the arguments which render the divine origin of the Bible credible by a human faith are frequently depreciated and discredited. Baier opposes this procedure and says: "Although this class of arguments does not produce divine faith in Holy Writ, still these arguments are not on that account useless, but serve an excellent end, viz. they keep in bounds the contempt and the rash opinions on teachings that have not been sufficiently understood, and they rouse men's interest in the Bible and thus prepare them for a serious and eager study of the Scriptures, which by the concurrent action of God produce in them a divine faith in their heavenly origin."

Two extremes must be avoided in regard to these arguments: 1) we must not attach too much importance to them. No person is made a Christian by means of these arguments. A person may accept all these arguments and admit that the Bible is inspired, and yet be without saving faith. 2) We must not utterly reject these arguments. Many silly opinions of the Bible can be repelled by means of these arguments and it can be shown by means of them that it is more reasonable to accept than to reject the Bible. Even Christians may in moments of doubt derive some benefit from these arguments, and can be made to see that their flesh, which originated these doubts within them, has no good right to argue against the divine origin of the Bible.

The arguments by which we make the divine origin of the Bible credible to men with a human faith are divided into internal and external arguments. The former relate to the internal properties and nature of Scripture, the latter are based on facts outside of Scripture.

The *argumenta interna* again relate either to the style (*materia*) or to the sense (*forma*) of Scripture.

As regards the style of Scripture its great simplicity and at the same time its sublimeness has been noted. The Bible does not seek to captivate its readers by its efforts at eloquence like human orators, and does not employ great swelling words of vanity which frequently obscure the meaning; but in plain style tells what is to be done or not, what is to be believed or not. This combination of simplicity and solemnity creates the impression that in this book God has uttered sublime thoughts by condescending to man's level.

The internal arguments which relate to the sense of the words and statements in Scripture take into consideration the fact that this book intends to save men and that accordingly there must be in this book "1) *veritas assertionum sine admixtis erroribus*": truth of its assertions without an admixture of error; "2) *sanctitas perfecta, exclusis omnibus quae inhonesta aut indecora sunt*": perfect sanctity to the exclusion of all things that are unbecoming and indecent; "3) *sufficientia eorum, quae tanquam credenda aut agenda tendentibus ad salutem proponuntur*" (Baier): a sufficiency of those things which are set before those who are seeking salvation either as things which they must believe or do.

The truthfulness of Scripture (*veritas Scripturae*) is established partly by inference: none of the teachings which Scripture sets before us, and which can either be grasped by

our natural intellect or exceed the same, can be shown to contain anything that is false; partly by the harmony of the books of the Old Testament with those of the New Testament and of their component parts; partly by a comparison of prophecies with their fulfilment. Take, e.g. what the Bible sets forth regarding God, His essence, attributes, government, worship, and regarding the lives of men how they should be ordered according to God's will. These teachings are not only quite agreeable to a correct reason, but they are also stated with a greater simplicity, firmness and perfection than can be done in the present state of corruption by the reason of man left to itself. This fact manifests not only the truth of Scripture in regard to these particular teachings, a truth moreover of such a kind that it argues the divine authorship of God whose perfections immeasurably exceed the strength of the human nature and reason, but it also leads to the reasonable assumption that Scripture is equally true in all the rest of its contents which cannot be known by the light of natural reason. The German theologian [Johann Georg] Hamann applied this argument very aptly as follows: "Die Vernunft muss sich ueber das Urtheil mit dem jenes Philosophen ueber des Heraklitus Schriften begnuegen: 'Was ich verstehe, ist vortrefflich; ich schliesse daher ebenso auf dasjenige, was ich nicht verstehe'" (I, 63).

Again as regards those contents of Scripture which are not within the grasp of human reason, we note that some of them come within the domain of natural reason as far as the underlying idea is concerned, while they exceed the natural powers of man when presented in their specific Scriptural form. E. g., guided by the light of natural reason we can know that this world and the first human beings were created by God, that

man existed originally in a state of integrity, afterwards in a state of corruption, that his goal is eternal bliss. These matters do not at all contradict natural reason, but after they have been comprehended from Scripture where they are set down as revealed facts, they perfect our natural knowledge of them and supply those defects existing in our natural knowledge. From this fact we may gather, not only that Scripture is true in its statements regarding such matters, but also that it is a book that is entirely worthy to have God for its author, and that its origin must not be attributed to men, but to God. There are other matters contained in Scripture which plainly exceed the natural comprehension of men, e.g. regarding the trinity of the divine persons in one divine essence, regarding the incarnation of Christ, His two natures, and the unity of His person, regarding the intuitive vision of God and the glorification of our bodies in which our eternal bliss shall consist, etc. These matters which are offered us as mysteries revealed by God for our salvation, deserve to be regarded as true and reliable, inasmuch as they could not have been invented by men, but must have been known supernaturally first by God who revealed them, and had them set down in writings. However the presence of such matters in Scripture argues that also in its other parts Scripture is true, hence that it is altogether truth and has come to us from God. These mysteries in the divine revelation may seem to involve a contradiction to our corrupt reason, i.e. that reason which follows the lead of its natural principles so far that by the fallacy of metabasis eis allo genos it applies to divine matters principles which are universally true not in every relation, but only within the sphere of natural things. Still even when such a seeming contradiction arises, it is sufficient to show that a real contradiction, viz. a statement that the same object under the

same categorical condition is so and is not so, cannot be proven with convincing plainness in these matters.

As regards the harmony of the various writers of both Testaments of Scripture, it certainly makes a profound impression upon men when they find that so many writers, differing widely in genius and disposition, training and habits and separated from each other by such wide space of time and place that they could not possibly communicate with each other, have nevertheless expressed themselves with admirable unanimity in regard to the serious and sublime matters that regard our religion and salvation. Men infer the truthfulness of the Scriptures from this feature by referring them back to one author, God, who furnished to each writer the concepts and the expressions for his composition. There are indeed difficult and obscure statements found in the Bible, but these do not really contradict the other passages; for in many cases the difficulty and obscurity has been removed by a skillful exegete.

Lastly as regards the harmony between prophecies and their fulfilment, it is granted by all that future events, such as occurrences in the life of our Lord, the fate of the people of the Jews, etc., could not be known in advance with infallible certainty except by God whose knowledge is infinite. Now Scripture is full of this kind of predictions which have been proven true by actual events. Hence an argument is furnished also by this feature for the truth of Scripture: Men readily believe in the strength of the fulfilled prophecies that the Bible has come out of the mind of the omniscient and truthful God.

The sanctity of the Scripture is established by an argument like this: Every part of the true religion, whether it refers directly to the relation of man to God in his duties, or to his fellowman, has been ordered in accordance with God's will

and His eternal law, and the ordinances have been recorded as a permanent guide to men in the Bible. Hence men readily [believe] that the holiness of the Supreme Being who is the author of the Scriptures has passed over to them.

As regards the third of the *argumenta interna* for the causative authority of the Bible, its sufficiency, our text-book devotes a special chapter to that and we shall study that in detail later.

The arguments adduced so far are based on the quality of the contents of Scripture. There is another class of arguments which points to certain facts that render the divine origin of the Bible probable to the reason of man. Of these *argumenta externa* Baier enumerates nine:

1) The antiquity of the Scriptures. The doctrine of faith and the rules of life were published from the very origin of the world to the very first man. Adam and Eve knew about the proper worship of God and the way to lead a righteous and holy life. And after they fell they were at once given the Gospel of the Woman's Seed. These matters were then embodied in Scripture as soon as that began to be written by Moses, whose compositions on this subject probably antedate the writings of all other men. Grotius in his famous treatise: *De Veritate Religionis Christianae*, has contended that many of the laws of the Greeks and Romans were taken over from the Hebrews.

2) The sincere intention which the writers of the Bible manifest to set down without partisanship and without yielding to their emotions the facts that they had to communicate. They have related the history of their own achievements, of their times or of ancient times. By the manner in which they wrote they showed that they possessed sufficient knowledge. Again they have set forth teachings which men may apprehend by

their natural reason. These they have set forth in such a manner that we are compelled to admire their greater knowledge of these teachings which surpasses the common knowledge which man possesses of them. This observation strikes one still more when they expound matters which transcend the common grasp of our reason. Many of the writers in whom we observe such profound and excellent knowledge were rude, unlettered persons. Hence we infer rightly that the knowledge they possessed was divinely bestowed upon them. Add to this that these writers faced grave dangers because of what they wrote; they might have become deflected from the straight path of truth by the hope of gain and private advantage, and might have set down matters in a manner slightly differing from the facts in the case. However they themselves asseverate that neither flattery nor the good will of men, nor the hatred, persecutions and extreme dangers, which they excited against themselves by their record of the truth, induced them to suppress or misrepresent the facts. They even related their own faults, sins, shortcomings, though this was very humiliating to them. All this now renders their writings worthy of being received by men. Baier rightly says: *"Sicut omne falsum ab ignorantia, vel a mala voluntate proficiscitur ita notitia et veritatis stadium scriptorem axiopiston faciunt."*

3) A third argument is furnished by the miracles which attested to the mission of the holy writers and to the divine origin of the doctrines which they propounded. By miracles we understand operations or effects which take place outside of the ordinary working of causes and effects in created things. Miracles cannot be produced except by the divine power. Now God does not assist impostors, deceivers, mountebanks,

jugglers, liars by working miracles in their behalf, but He has wrought mighty signs and wonders by Moses and other prophets of the Old, and by Christ and the apostles in the New Testament, and has thereby affixed His divine seal to the teachings which these men offered in His name and declared them true and salutary.

4) The universal testimony of the church in behalf of the divine origin of the Scriptures. Though scattered through the whole world the members of the church have since the days of the apostles offered their consentient testimony that the Bible is divinely originated. Within this body of men who recognized the theopneusty of Scripture every good and useful art together with the practice of righteous and good morals has flourished. They represent the flower of mankind. It is incredible that this body of men separated from one another by continents and seas should have conspired to invent and support a lie, when they deposited their testimony that they considered the Bible as come from God.

5) An illustrious procession of martyrs of either sex and every age, each one conspicuous for his reputation of holiness and for his innocence, have despite the most excruciating tortures, yea in their dying moment, stoutly maintained the truth of what they had taught and the divine origin of their teaching. The strength and perseverance with which they did this was superhuman. Can anyone believe that so many and different persons, who were in possession of their reasonable faculties, and devout practisers of every virtue, should have madly and maliciously chosen the wreckage of their earthly fortunes, their civil honor, their families, their very lives? But supposing that one martyr might have been so foolish, how could we account for the fact that such a host of them in

different places would do this at the same time? Shall we assume that the whole world had gone mad over a lie?

6) It is remarkable how rapidly and successfully the Christian doctrine spread over the whole world. There were opposed to this spreading the same obstacles that we observe today: a) in the people that had to be converted and that belonged to other religions and were engrossed with the cares of this life. b) in the doctrine itself that was proposed for men's acceptance, and that transcended the reasonable comprehension of men and declared difficult matters and made difficult demands; c) in the men who were sent to spread this doctrine and who certainly did not excel among their fellowmen by reason of their eloquence or their wisdom, but rather were despised in the world; d) lastly there were also powerful and cunning adversaries. All these elements combined to check the spread of Christian teaching, and at times it seemed as if they would succeed in utterly extirpating this teaching. The fact that they did not is a mighty argument in favor of the divine power that accompanied the preaching of the Gospel of Christ. This power proved greater than all of the afore-mentioned obstacles. It laid hold of the hearts of men and rendered them certain of its divine origin. Accordingly Augustine could say to an agnostic who was clamoring to be shown some miracle that would convince him of the truth of the Christian religion, that he (the agnostic) was himself the greatest miracle because of his failure to believe where thousand miracles of the progress of the Christian religion invited belief. (*"Quisquis adhuc prodigia inquiri ut credat, magnum ipse prodigium est, cum toto mundo credente, non credat."*)

7) On the same lines as the preceding arguments proceeds the one Baier has named in the seventh place; the wonderful preservation of the teaching of Christ in spite of the many persecutions to which it was subjected. Here too we recognize the presence of an invisible power, which on the one hand wrought faith in the hearts of men, and made that faith strong and robust in the most terrible dangers, and on the other hand kept the onslaughts of such great enemies within tolerable bounds or defeated them entirely and that often without the application of human force.

8) There have been unwitting testimonies offered in behalf of Scriptures by people in all parts of the world who were strangers to the Christian religion, but had received historical knowledge of it and its teachings and were impressed by the influence which they saw this religion exercise. We find such testimonies, e.g. in the writings of Jewish authors like Josephus and Philo, who acknowledge the achievements of Christ and indicate that they were miraculous, though they blasphemously ascribe them to magic. It has been observed that all man-made pagan religions, when they were about to collapse and there was no human device available that might arouse them into new life, would resort to the oracles of Christian religion and borrow from the Bible of the Christians, either such lessons of wisdom which appealed even to pagan minds, or substitute for the incredible things they had proposed to their worshippers the mysterious teachings of the Christians, which however they had failed to grasp and which appear in a mutilated and perverted form among them. There seems to be an unconscious admission among all peoples on earth that the religion which the Bible teaches is the oldest religion known to have been practiced by men. For this reason all who have

started new religions have either paid their respects to the records of the Christian religion by acknowledging their sanctity, antiquity, etc., and by citing from them, by imitating its teachings and ordinances. The most remarkable occurrence of this nature in our own times is the Bible of the Christian Scientists, Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy's book: "Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures," which is nothing but a garbled, mutilated and perverted Bible. Mrs. Eddy has done on a larger scale and with more unblushing audacity what Mohammed did before her. There is not the least doubt among persons who have made a study of this matter that the Koran of Mohammed is a strange *quodlibet* and potpourri of religious, semi-religious and irreligious sayings and doings collected from every imaginable source, so full of self-contradictions that it constantly defeats its own teachings, and when compared to the Christian Bible, from which it has borrowed not a little, is forced to surrender at once all claims to originality and genuineness as well as to spirituality. How Mohammed has used our Bible, the following selections from the Koran may serve to illustrate: chapter II "The Cow" page 6f.; p. 30; ch. III "The Family of Imram" pp. 38-43; ch. IV "Women" p. 78f.; p. 80; ch. V "The Table" p. 84, 91f., 97. We can prove not only from the writings of the O.T., but from the private writings of the Jewish Talmudists, that the ancient Jews had information concerning Jesus the Messiah, which can be used to convince them today that Jesus is come (Compare also the Book of Mormon and the writings of Immanuel Swedenborg).

9) God has by solemn visitations of his vindictive anger upon the persecutors and violators of His Holy Book shown that He holds the relation of Protector and Preserver to this book, to which He is first related as its author.

Much useful material on this subject is found in Synodical Conference Record for 1886; Western District Proceedings 1865; Luther: Walch, Band --, Seite 2626; Band 20, Seite 2770. Luthardt: *Apologetische Vorträge über die Grundwahrheiten des Christenthums*. Eirich: *Hexaemeron*.

However all of the aforementioned arguments are not sufficient to beget in man that believing assent to the matters contained in Scripture which is called divine faith. This divine faith is concerned primarily with the *formale*, that is, the sense or the doctrine of Scripture. And this divine faith is produced wherever it is produced, by the teaching of Scripture itself. For those concepts which were once produced in the minds of the holy writers by the act of inspiration are still embodied in the Scriptures. From the words of Scriptures, whether we hear them read or whether we read them ourselves, they are transferred to our minds and are thus produced in us in a similar way as when they were communicated for the first time to the writers of Scripture. They move our intellect to yield a supernatural assent to the fact that the Scriptures draw their origin from God. Hence all that is required to accept the divine origin of the Bible with a divine faith is, to attentively read and hear the Scriptures, and by an immediate effect the Scriptures will prove themselves divine. In other words the ultimate reason why a person accepts the Bible as divine is the Bible itself. No reason drawn from any outside source can beget in us that assent to the teaching of the divine origin of the Bible that is *fides divina*.

When we say that the Bible itself and by an immediate process (*per se immediate*) begets divine faith in itself, we do not mean to exclude a concurrent action of the power of God with the words of Scripture. The mere words of the Bible,

divorced from any concurrent action of God, could not move the intellect of man further than this, viz. that he apprehends or understands the bare meaning of its terms, but the matters or truths which are set forth in those terms, remain inevident, and hence incredible to him, even when he has grasped the verbal meaning of the statements in which they are set forth. They may by their singular beauty attract him and incline the will to command the intellect to accept them, - - if the will ever exercises such a power over the intellect - - but this inclination of the will would relate only to that which the person has grasped – the beauty, the external grandeur, the moral correctness and aptness of Bible statements. However the will of man is dead in regard to all spiritual matters and cannot therefore direct the intellect toward the apprehension of spiritual things.

I may here digress a little and note how one of the later dogmaticians of our church explains the psychology of intellectual acts. He says: “Es ist bekannt, dass die *logici* die *operationes mentis* oder die Wirkungen des Verstandes abteilen in *apprehensionem simplicem*, in *compositionem et divisionem simplicium*, seu *iudicium*; et in *discursum*. *Apprehensionem simplicium* nennen sie, wenn der Verstand einen *terminum simplicem concipit*, *exempli gratia lignum, lapidem*, und davon nichts affirmiert [sic] oder negiert; wohin den auch gezogen wird, wenn der Verstand eine ganze Proposition concipiert und fasset, aber *absque iudicio*, so, dass er dieselbe bejahe, noch verneine, welchen *actum cognoscendi* wir *apprehensionem simplicem* nennen, auch in *oppositione ad iudicium*. Die *compositionem et divisionem simplicium* oder *iudicium* nennen sie, wenn der Verstand die *terminos simplices apprehensos* durch die *copulam ‘est’* zusammenfueget und eine

affirmativam oder *negativam propositionem* daraus machete, so dass er dieselbe fuer recht oder fuer falsch halte. *Discursum* nennen sie, wenn der Verstand aus den erkannten und angenommenen *principiis* etwas anders folgert und schleusst. Was wir mit dem (auch *tyronibus logicis* bekannten) Schultermino ‘*apprehensionem simplicem credendorum*’ nennen, das pflegen sonst die Theologi ‘*cognitionem sensus literalis*’ die Glaubens- und Lebenslehre zu nennen.”

Whether the will sways the intellect or whether there is an ‘*imperium voluntatis in intellectum*’ used to be debated among the 17th century dogmaticians of our church. Baier following his father-in-law Musaeus affirmed this question. But Reusch, who published an annotated edition of Fecht’s dogmatic compend, which later work like Baier’s was based on Musaeus, says, “Fecht has declared the ‘*imperium voluntatis in intellectum*’ a wooden hatchet (*sidäroxylon*) manufactured by the scholastic theologians.” He adds “Upon the whole it appears that there were other theologians (viz. other than those who followed the scholastics) who considered it repugnant to the nature of the soul that the will should command the intellect to yield its assent to something; for they believed on the evidence of universal experience that the assent of the intellect depends on the clearness with which the intellect perceives something, and this clearness the soul obtains through the cognitive faculties, by the force of the characters or qualities which it perceives in objects and by reasonable deductions from them.” Compare: Philip Melancthon, “The Apology to the Augsburg Confession,” Article III, paragraph 183, *The Book of Concord*, editor Henry Eyster Jacobs, (Philadelphia: United Lutheran Publication House, 1911), page 142.

The power then by which Scripture proves itself divine is not the native force of its terms, but a “*virtus divina*” which is at all times inseparable from the written characters of the Scriptures, and which is really God acting in concurrence with them. We will have to speak of this again when we study the efficacy of Scriptures with which the authority of Scripture must not be confounded. The efficacy of Scripture however connects with the causative authority of Scripture in so far as the concursus of God, or that power of His, by which Scripture is able to attest its divine origin, is required for both.

This power of God, now, incites in the reader or hearer of Scripture holy thoughts in harmony with the subject matter before him. The intellect is being enlightened and the will drawn and moved to assent. Scripture produces in its hearers or readers the same concepts which were produced in the original penmen. Dannhauer has called this action of Scripture its “*respiratio*,” in distinction from its “*inspiratio*.” Intellect and will are simultaneously moved and seized to accept the divine origin of the Bible.

This view of the causative authority of the Bible differs 1) from the multiform, yet essentially identical views of Enthusiasts (Schwaermer), who believe that the power by which the Bible attests to its divine origin is not in, but outside and independent of the Bible. In the view of these people the Spirit of God witnesses in behalf of the divine origin of the Bible not through the same, but by private testimony; 2) from the views of Rationalists who make human reason the judge whether the Bible is divine and to what extent.

The causative authority of the Bible which is exerted by the written word through the concurrent power of God which is exerted in the hearts of the hearers and readers of God’s

word, is called the witness of the Holy Ghost (*testimonium Spiritus Sancti*). This testimony is the argument — the only faith — begetting argument, which causes any person to accept as true the divine origin and character of the Scriptures. All other arguments may be useful for the beating down of the much vaunted reasoning of men against the Bible, but they do not beget that fullness of conviction in the human heart which dispels all the clouds and fogs of doubt. This plerophory of faith, says Augustine, is a “*beneficium Spiritus Sancti, qui cathedram in coelo habet et docet corde intus*.” The testimony of the Holy Ghost in a person’s heart is not dependent upon the arguments which beget a human faith in the Bible, so that these latter must precede before the Spirit can exert His power in the heart, but the testimony of the Spirit operates independently of all human arguments. Knoesius, a Scandinavian theologian, notes several points in regard to the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* which deserve to be heeded: 1) This testimony is possible only when a person reads or hears the Scriptures; it is never furnished without the Scriptures; 2) this testimony asserts itself in a different manner in different persons; sometimes through the motive of fear, begetting pain; terror, awe; sometimes through the motive of joy, begetting happiness, admiration, etc. Knoesius holds that it would be odd if the Bible should not attest its divine origin when every blade of grass, every worm even indicates to reasoning mind the power of the Creator; 3) this testimony is ridiculed by the Papists as a *petitio principii*. They claim that we prove something by assuming it proven (*idem per idem*). They do this in order to uphold their claim that the so-called traditions must be accepted in connection with the Bible, in order that a person may become convinced of the divine origin of the Bible. But this objection is specious: in

every other instance where we observe a certain effect we reason from that back to the possible cause, and this argument *ab effectu ad causam* is considered perfectly legitimate. Why should it be inadmissible in this instance?

Our older theologians used to cite instances of persons who had come to feel the testimony of the Spirit in their heart. Musaeus gives the account of the Jew Gerson of his conversion to Christianity. Gerson relates that he had often wondered what might be that powerful delusion which held myriads of people enchained in what he considered the superstitions of Christianity. Now it happened that a poor woman pawned to him a translation of the Bible. Curious to find out what the errors in this book might be, and not acknowledging any authority of the Christian church, nor believing that there was any truth in their sacred writings, he began to read the Bible and soon began to feel his reasonable doubts shaken so utterly and his heart pierced through and through with painful sensations, and such a desire to learn all that this book contained, he kept on reading and even this translation of the Bible sufficed to kindle in him faith in its divine origin and quality. Melchior Adam relates the case of young Francis Junius who died 1602. He had been sent to Paris when a young man. While studying Cicero's books "*De legibus*" there came to him a person who began to advance many arguments in favor of the well-known maxim of Epicurus: "God cares for nothing that concerns either Himself or any other." By this conversation owing to the prominence of the person and his cunning talk, the mind of young Junius became poisoned. He adopted the Epicurean maxim as the rule of his life and after a while his conscience had become callous. Out of the unspeakable morass of sin and vice into which he had sunk after spending

more than a year in the most degrading pleasures, God plucked him in a wonderful manner. He was summoned home by his father who was shocked to find his son full of the poison of atheism and urged him to read the N.T. Junius did this and it is worth while to hear him tell what happened to him: "I open [sic] the N.T., which was put into my hands by heaven. I am busy with quite other matters than the reading of this book, but my eye falls first upon that most sublime statement at the beginning of the Gospel of St. John: 'In the beginning was the word'. I read part of this chapter and while reading become so moved that I suddenly perceive the divine character of the subject, its majesty and authority, which vastly excel above the mightiest flow of the grandest human eloquence. My body shuddered, my soul was awed and that whole day I was so strangely affected, that I was not certain whether I was myself. Thou didst remember me, O God, my Lord, according to thy boundless mercy, and didst restore thy lost sheep to the fold." From that day Junius treated with the utmost coldness all other things except such as pertained to godliness; these he grasped with avidity.

Hitherto we have studied that authority of the Bible which begets divine faith in itself in those who read it and hear it. But this authority is exhibited to us in still another manner, viz. as "that prerogative by which the Bible... is the only infallible source and norm of doctrine (section 5) and rule of life (section 6)."

5. Isaiah appealed to "the law and the testimony" to defeat the wily practices of magicians who were leading the people astray (chapter 8:19, 20). By "the law and the testimony" he meant the Bible in that form in which it existed at that time, in particular "this word" which he himself had

been commissioned to bring to the people. He demands that every other religious teaching of men must be measured against "this word" and if it is "not according" to it, it is a falsehood; it can give no light to anyone for it comes out of minds that have received no light from God in the matters of which they speak. In like manner Jeremiah denounced the "visions" of false prophets, because what they decanted to the people had not come "out of the mouth" of the Lord (ch. 23:16); and pointed with exquisite scorn to those would-be wise people who must have existed in that early age, and who considered themselves too smart to accept the "word of the Lord"; he said: "what wisdom is in them?" (ch. 8:9). Our Lord makes Abraham in paradise reject the petition of the rich man in hell that some apparition from the realm of spirits might be vouchsafed to his impenitent brothers on earth to turn them from their folly: Abraham declares such a procedure wholly unnecessary, for "they have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them" (Luke 16:29). We are told that at the apostolic Council which was held at Jerusalem about the year 50 after Christ, to decide the most momentous question of the Christian religion, viz. whether righteousness cometh by works. Peter delivered an oration against this idea, and James approved this and pointed out that Peter's statements "agreed with the words of the prophets as it is written" (Acts 15:14, 15). This instance is all the more remarkable because all the speakers were inspired men who wrote books of the Bible themselves. Even these were restricted in their teaching by the divine records. We are told of the Bereans who "searched the Scriptures daily whether these things (which Paul and Silas had preached to them) were so" (Acts 17:11). Paul demanded of the Corinthians that his teaching is of such a character that men

must acknowledge him to be not a human philosopher or orator, but a prophet or a spiritual man, i.e. a man through whom the Spirit of God speaks, and hence that his statements are "the commandments of the Lord" (1st Corinthians 14:37). And in his epistle to the Galatians he rises to the magnificent declaration: "But though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel to you than that which we have preached to you, let him be accursed" (Galatians 1:1, 8). Thus spoke an inspired apostle. Our Lutheran church had caught the spirit of the great apostle when in the Smalcald Articles it declared over and against the traditions of the Fathers which the Romanists cited against them: "We have... another rule, viz. that the Word of God should frame articles of faith; otherwise no one, not even an angel" (*Jacobs*, page 315, paragraph 15). And in 2nd Timothy 3:15-17 we have the entire authority of Scripture for the regulation of doctrine and life exhibited to us.

This authority of the Scriptures is called *auctoritas canonica seu normativa*. It is that prerogative of the Bible to determine the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of any teaching, and the correctness or faultiness of every detail of a person's conduct. The Bible is *norma normans* for these matters. And now it must be borne in mind that in determining what is correct teaching and living we must often cite particular passages or even words of Scripture. We need not in an argument operate with the entire Scriptures (*Schriftganzen*); any verse or part of a verse in the inspired Bible possesses the same normative authority as the entire Bible. Moreover this normative authority is the rule we apply to all other religious books, even translations that have been made from the original texts of Scripture. All translations of the Bible have normative authority only as far and because they agree with the original

inspirited writings. As regards our confessional writings, the so-called symbolical books, we hold that these are not *norma normans* or *norma absoluta*, like the Bible, but only *norma normata*, *norma secundum quid*, *norma secundaria*. The confessional writings of our church were not inspired. Some of our theologians have called them inspired, but in so doing they have used the word “inspired” in an improper sense; they wanted to express by that term that the confessional writings contained nothing but what is already contained in the inspired Scriptures, also that the confessional writings were compiled under the governing dispensation and guidance of God. However the majority of our theologians have rejected the statement “the Lutheran Confessions are inspired” as erroneous.

Moreover we claim for our symbolical books not an absolute necessity, but one of expedience (*necessitas expeditiae*). The orthodox church needs confessional writings because of the existence of heterodox churches and teachers: by means of confessional writings the orthodox church declares its distinction from heterodox societies that also appeal to Scripture in their behalf; and by means of its confessions the orthodox church seeks to assure itself that the teachers whom it has called and ordained, have attained to the correct understanding of Scripture. For in its confessional writings the orthodox church has deposited the true understanding of such doctrines as have been controverted and rejected by enemies of these doctrines who falsely cite Scripture in favor of their views. Accordingly when the orthodox church demands of its teachers that they govern their teaching by the symbolical books and suffer their teaching to be judged by these books, the meaning is not that another

norm is set up alongside of the norm of Scripture, but that assurance is given that the one true norm, viz. Scripture, will be really adopted and put into practice. By obligating its teachers to teach in accordance with its confessional writings the orthodox church restricts their teaching to what has become recognized as Scriptural teaching. Hence it is only in a secondary degree that confessional writings have been called a norm both in the ancient and in our own church.

§15. Perspicuity of Scripture.

By its authority Scripture awes and subdues, bringing the mind into submission to its sovereign declarations. But Scripture does not approach the mind like the mysterious oracles of antiquity, or the occult wisdom of ancient or modern theosophy which purposely veils their teaching. Scripture on the contrary lays claim to clearness in what it states, invites inquiry and holds out the promise of enlightenment. This is expressed in statements which say that Scripture is light, Psalm 119:105; 2nd Peter 1:19; and that it gives light: Psalm 119:130; 19:8; Ephesians 3:3, 4; John 8:31, 32. Moreover it can be deduced from the following grounds: 1) its author, God, is able to make Himself understood, and also desires to be understood, for He would defeat the very purpose for which He inspired the holy writings if He had intentionally made those writings obscure. 2) Scripture addresses its teachings to all men inviting them on peril of their eternal damnation to read, search and ponder its contents. Appeals of this sort were hollow mockery if Scripture were in its nature an obscure writing.

The property of perspicuity belongs indeed to the entire Scriptures, however it admits of degrees. It can be recognized by all men however on certain conditions.

1) The Bible is plainly perspicuous as regards its grand and final object, the salvation of men. All that pertains to this point is clearly stated, namely “all the doctrines and precepts” which lay down the way of salvation to sinners (*ea quae creditur et factu homini ad salutem tendenti sunt necessaria*, Baier). For Scripture offers itself as a light to those who are in darkness, 2nd Peter 1:19; and who are still out on the way to heaven, Psalm 119:105. And it is chiefly with a view to this great end of Scripture that perspicuity is claimed for it.

2) Not all parts of Scripture are alike perspicuous. There is a difference between the clearness of O.T. teaching and N.T. teaching, between prophecy and fulfilment, also between passages which expressly state and such as merely refer to or imply a certain dogma. Passages of the former kind are called “the seats of doctrine” (*sedes doctrinae*) or proof passages (*dicta probantia, loci classici*). They state a truth explicitly (*kata to rhäton*) the latter by inference (*kata tñ dianoian*). The clearer parts and passages of Scripture shed light on the darker, and hence Scripture interprets Scripture. Accordingly the perspicuity of Scripture is a graded one. Onomastic, topographical, allegorical, typical and prophetic matters are stated with a different degree of perspicuity than historical, dogmatical and ethical matters.

3) Perspicuity is claimed not so much for the deep and sublime matters, set forth in Scripture as rather for the terms in which those matters have been expressed (*non tam rerum quam verborum*). The chief contents of Scripture are in their nature inevident, because they are mysteries that cannot be

apprehended by a direct process nor by the aid of other evident principles. But these mysteries are clearly stated as such in terms so aptly chosen and so lucidly arranged as to leave no doubt as to the meaning they are intended to convey. Accordingly the style of Scripture is grave and comports with the dignity of the divine majesty. It is free from grammatical error, solecisms and barbarisms. In this respect moreover philological research by its empirical efforts corroborates more and more what our older dogmatists have stated as a plain consequence of the fact that the entire Scripture is verbally inspired.

As regards the statement in 2nd Peter 3:16 with reference to Paul’s epistles, it is to be noted that the expression “*en hois estin dysnoäta tina*” does not refer to the epistles themselves (for in that case the relative pronoun should be “*hais*”), but to matters contained in these epistles. Peter points to the deep things of revelation which Paul had stated, such as the vicarious atonement, the states of the Godman, election and the like. Besides Peter predicates difficulty to understand not all, nor many but of some of the things in Paul’s writings, for he does not say “*panta*” nor “*polla*,” but “*tina*.” But the very fact that some things in Paul’s epistles are hard to be understood must have appeared from those very epistles. Those things had been stated clearly enough and the difficulty attaching to them lay not in the manner in which they had been set forth, but in the matters themselves.

4) The perspicuity of Scripture is not absolute, but regulated by a certain order and dependent upon the proper application of that order. Like any other writing Scripture addresses itself to the common understanding of its hearers or readers. Where that is wanting either on account of immature

age, undeveloped judgment and the like, "they that are unstable" (2nd Peter 3:16) or because of some mental derangement, the perspicuity of Scripture fails to manifest itself. Besides Scripture being the expression of God's thoughts in human language, it conforms to the rules of human speech in the particular idiom in which it was uttered. Hence in order to appreciate the clearness of Scripture there is required besides average intelligence also a sufficient knowledge of the language in which God proclaimed His word. Luther: "A Turk indeed cannot but speak unintelligibly to me because I do not know his language, while a Turkish child seven years old well understands him" X, 551. A faithful and persistent use of the means by which the meaning of any statement is determined can render a passage of Scripture clear which at first seemed obscure. To this end the words, their scope, the antecedent and subsequent context must be carefully considered. Furthermore Scripture must be approached without prejudice. Preconceived opinions, such as hatred, envy, ambition, boldness must be laid aside because they blind the understanding and pervert the judgment, 2nd Corinthians 4:3, 4. An obscurity which seems to lie in the object contemplated often is found to lie in the subject contemplating, as has been shown in many a controversy waged by the church against errorists, who wrest the Scriptures from their true meaning to their own peculiar notions, 2nd Peter 3:16. The Savior spoke plainly to the Jews, but his speech was not understood and He was not believed because His audience was diabolically influenced against Him, John 8:43-45. The Gospel which Paul proclaimed was hid to some of his hearers for the same reason, 2nd Corinthians 4:3, 4. Accordingly it happens that a Scripture text is clear to an adult which was obscure to the same person

when he was a child, 1st Corinthians 13:11; or that it was obscure at first when superficially read, but became quite plain after thorough reading and study; or that it failed to enlighten and convince as long as the heart was under some spell of passion, but gave great light as soon as the spell was broken, as the example of Paul shows. Christ promises to certain Jews who already believed on Him, that by continuing in His word they should "know the truth," John 8:31, 32; and the psalmist says: "the entrance of thy words giveth light," Psalm 119:130. Luther: "wenn dein Wort offenbar wird" like in the case of the disciples at Emmaus. Some of the contents of Scripture call into exercise the learning of the doctors during the entire course of a long life. The full and perfect understanding of each minute particle of Scripture is to be expected only in heaven. But this is due to our limited powers of apprehension and to unfavorable circumstances within or without us that attend our study of Scripture and darken or eclipse the light that streams from its sacred pages.

The full perception of the perspicuity of Scriptures, as far as this is possible in his present life, is found only in those who are of God, John 8:47. The "enlightening of the eyes" occurs together with "the rejoicing of the heart," Psalm 19:8. Hence it is only the believer who truly estimates and appreciates the perspicuity of Scripture. And where faith exists in the heart a person's age or lack of mental proficiency proves no obstacle, for Scripture gives wisdom to babes, 2nd Timothy 3:15; and understanding to the simple, Psalm 119:130. He who would attain to this perception should accordingly not only study grammar and ancient languages, and train his mind by logic, but above all invoke the aid of the Holy Spirit. Gerhard: "The clearness of Scripture is twofold, as Luther says: 'One kind

is external and lies in the ministry of the Word; the other in the knowledge of the heart. If you speak of the internal clearness, no man understands a single iota in the Scriptures by the natural powers of his own mind unless he has the Spirit of God; all have obscure hearts. The Holy Spirit is required for the understanding of the whole of Scripture and of all its parts. If you refer to the external clearness there is nothing left obscure and ambiguous, but all things brought to light by the Word are perfectly clear'." So clear indeed that our theologians have maintained over and against Rathmann, that also unconverted persons can without the gracious illumination of the Holy Spirit understand the proper sense contained in the words of Scripture, i.e. the grammatical and literal sense, and can acquire an historic faith by the outward ministration of the word. Rathmann claimed that an illumination of the Spirit was necessary not only for the enlightening of the mind of the reader of God's Word, but also for the Word of God itself.

§16. The Efficacy of Scripture.

1. The Holy Scriptures are not only the record of our salvation, but the instrument by which the salvation recorded is made operative in us. They are not only the source of knowledge, but the means of grace. Paul states 1st Thessalonians 2:13 that the Word of God "effectually worketh" (energeitai) in the believers. Luther connects the relative pronoun preceding the verb with "theos" instead of "logos," as the English Version does. The sense is the same, for God works effectually when His Word is "received" "heard." And His word is "not the word of men," i.e. it does not impress with a mere

natural force by the elegance of its style, the gravity of its utterance, sublimity of thought, eloquent fervor, or logical force of its arguments, but "in truth the word of God," i.e. it possesses divine supernatural energy. Hence in Romans 1:16 the apostle calls it "dynamis tou theou" the power of God, Luther: "eine Kraft." The definite article in the English version must not be pressed. The power of God is one of His essential attributes. If the Word were the power of God in this sense it would be God itself. The expression is metonymical, the cause being named for the effect as in John 6:63; and shows 1) that the power of Scripture is of a divine quality. It belongs to God originally, essentially and independently, but to the Word organically, instrumentally and by communication; 2) that the power of God is "indissolubly united" with the Word, divine efficacy must not come first to the word from without, is not external to the Word, separable from it and merely auxiliary (parastatikon), but is perpetually inherent in it also *extra usum*, i.e. when Scripture is not actually in use. God has constituted Scripture a continuously energetic organ of His power in His spiritual realm just as He has made the sun a continuous instrument for illumination which is active even during an eclipse, and as He has placed in the seed germinating energy, which that seed retains even while lying in the granary. If the Holy Spirit must first give His power to the word every time it is used, the word of God outside of such use would be placed on a level with any human word. In view of this we also call the power of Scripture a natural power inasmuch as the word of God cannot be conceived of without such an efficacy. But as this might lead to misunderstanding, we avoid the use of the term natural in this connection. An inherent and indissoluble power of the word is maintained over and against the

Enthusiasts who hold that the Holy Spirit operates irrespective of the word rather than through it; against the Calvinists who hold that the word is powerful only when and where God chooses; and against the Lutheran theologians Rathmann and Movius who held that the word possesses only objective efficacy like that of a guide-post, or an illustration in a book, or a channel through which water flows, and who called the word a passive or inoperative instrument (*solum óchäma* [sic] *et vehiculum Spiritus Sancti*). The latter confounded the external ministration of the word with the word itself. For this reason the Saxon theologians in the controversy with Rathmann showed also that the latter did not apply the term 'instrument' to the Scriptures in the same sense as the Augsburg Confession in Article V and the Formula of Concord and denied that Scripture for producing spiritual effects needs a new and peculiar elevation by the Holy Spirit beyond the efficacy already belonging to it. However when we ascribe to the word efficacy also '*extra usum*' that does not mean that the word operates by physical contact, mechanically, like a chemical substance such as opium, or like an elementary force such as fire. But we merely maintain that it is at all times powerful *per se*, never dead, just as little as the hand of a sleeping man.

2. The power just predicated of the Scriptures belongs not to the written characters on paper or to the vocal sounds found in the air when the word is spoken, but to the divine idea or sense expressed by such letters or sounds. The Ethiopian eunuch had the codex of Isaiah before him and was tracing its lines, but it was not until the wonderful meaning contained in those lines was conveyed to him that he was converted, Acts 8:30ff. Philipp did not put this meaning into the words of Isaiah by his instruction, but merely showed that it was there.

Accordingly Paul exhorts the Ephesians (3:3, 4) not only to read, but also to understand, thus directing them not only to the material, but also to the formal word, i.e. to the concepts exhibited by means of the written word.

3. The power of Scripture is called now the power of God, Romans 1:16, to express its general character; now the power of the Holy Ghost, 1st Thessalonians 1:5, to express the particular agent who operates through it. Christ, i.e. His work is connected with it as its chief content.

4. The efficacy of Scripture belongs to all its contents and serves various purposes, such as enlightening, instructing, converting and sanctifying man (passages under 4). It belongs to the Law and to the Gospel according to the peculiar use or uses appointed for each. The law is effective after its kind, for it killeth and worketh wrath; and the Gospel is effective after a different manner, for it produces the gracious results of conversion, etc.

5. The efficacy of Scripture is exerted in a certain order, namely when it is being read, heard, kept and reduced to practice, John 7:17; in other words when it is actually used in accordance with God's will. If this is not done through negligence or malice, Scripture indeed has efficacy but does not attain the desired effect. The power is there but it is not realized. Accordingly we distinguish between efficacy *in actu primo* and efficacy *in actu secundo*. By the former we understand the power to operate, by the latter the actual introducing of the effect. This operation is resistible, for God chooses to work in His kingdom not by elementary force, but by moral suasion, influencing men with a sufficient power to convert them, but never converting them against their will. Man has over and against the power of the Gospel the power

of refusal, by which he can defeat the purpose of the Gospel as far as it pertains to him. But he cannot by his refusal destroy the power of the Gospel itself. Thus there is a seeming inefficiency of Gospel which is declared to be “the power of God.” This however is accidental and does not arise from some inefficiency in God and His word, but from a moral perverseness in man, which God in His inscrutable wisdom suffers to exist in man in opposition to His grace. Large Catechism: “God’s Word is not like any careless talk, as that of Dietrich of Berne, etc., but as St. Paul says (Rom. 1:16): ‘the power of God’. Yea, indeed, the power of God which gives the devil extreme pain, and strengthens, comforts and helps us beyond measure,” Preface paragraph 11, page 385; confer paragraphs 10 & 12. Apology: “The Word and sacraments are efficacious even when administered by the wicked,” Chapter IV, paragraph 19, page 165. “Our hearts are quickened by the Holy Ghost through the Word of Christ,” Chapter V, par. 44, p. 184. Ch. VII, par. 11, p. 215 cites Romans 1:16 and Isaiah 55:11. Large Catechism: “Such is the efficacy of the Word wherever seriously contemplated, heard and used, that it never departs without fruit, but always awakens new understanding, pleasure and devoutness, and produces a pure heart and pure thoughts. For these words are not inoperative or dead, but creative, living words. And even though no other interest or necessity impel us, yet this ought to influence every one, since thereby the devil is put to flight and driven away, etc.” Part I, par. 101f., p. 404f. Formula of Concord: “With this Word the Holy Ghost is present, and opens hearts, so that they, as Lydia in Acts 16, are attentive to it, and are thus converted through the grace and power of the Holy Ghost,” Epitome, Part I, ch. II, par. 5, p. 497f.

Formula of Concord: “God’s Spirit, through the heard Word or by the use of the holy sacrament, lays hold upon man’s will, and works (in man) the new birth and the conversion,” Epitome, Part I, ch. II, par. 18, p. 500.

Formula of Concord: “Not that man, since the fall, is no longer a rational creature, or is converted to God without hearing and meditating upon God’s Word,” Solid Declaration, Part II, ch. II, par. 19, p. 555f. Formula of Concord: “By this means, and in no other way, namely, through his holy Word, when it is heard as preached or is read, and the holy Sacraments when they are used according to the Word, God desires to call men to eternal salvation, to draw them to himself, and to convert, regenerate and sanctify them” Solid Declaration, Part II, ch. II, par. 50, p. 562. Augsburg Confession: “Through the Word and Sacraments as through instruments, the Holy Ghost is given,” Article V, par. 2, p. 38. “This power (to preach the Gospel and to forgive sins) is exercised only by teaching or preaching the Gospel and administering the sacraments, according to the calling, either to many or to single individuals,. For thereby are granted, not bodily, but eternal things: as eternal righteousness, the Holy Ghost, eternal life. These things cannot come but by the ministry of the Word.... As Paul says (Rom. 1:16),” Augsburg Confession, Article XXVIII, par. 8f., p. 61f. Apology: “When on hearing the Gospel and the remission of sins, we are consoled by faith, we receive the Holy Ghost, so that now we are able to think aright concerning God, and to fear and believe God, etc.,” Ch. III, par. 14, p. 106. “To this utterance of Peter, the testimony of the Holy Ghost is added. For the text speaks thus (Acts 10:44): ‘While Peter yet spake these words, the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the Word’,” Ch. V, par. 71, p. 190. “The Word offers the

remission of sins,” Ch. XII, par. 70, p. 273. Large Catechism: “The Holy Ghost has ever to continue his work in us through the Word, and daily to dispense forgiveness,” Creed, Article III, par. 58, p. 446. Formula of Concord: “Before the conversion of man, there are only two efficient causes, namely, the Holy Ghost and the Word of God, as the instrument of the Holy Ghost, whereby he works conversion,” Epitome, ch. II, par. 19, p. 500. Formula of Concord: “The Holy Ghost will be with his Word in his power, and thereby work; and this is the drawing of the Father,” Solid Declaration, Article XI, par. 77, p. 663. Apology: “Faith is conceived from the Word.” Ch. II, par. 73, p. 96. Apology: “Human traditions do not quicken hearts, and are not effects of the Holy Ghost, as are love to one’s neighbor, chastity, etc., and are not instruments through which God admonishes hearts to believe, as are the divinely-given Word and sacraments,” Ch. IV, par. 36, p. 170. Apology: “God, at the same time, by the Word and by rites, moves hearts to believe and conceive faith, just as Paul says (Rom. 10:17): ‘faith cometh by hearing’. But just as the Word enters the ears to strike hearts; so the rite itself meets the eyes, in order to move hearts,” Ch. VII, par. 5, p. 214.

§17. Sufficiency of Scriptures.

Only one Bible has been given to us to which the properties before named belong. This one Bible must be sufficient for the purpose for which it was given; not only now after the compilation of the canon of Scripture, but from the time the first book was written, Scripture must have sufficed for informing the people of that time for their salvation. In the

days of Isaiah “the law and the testimony” Isaiah 8:20; in the days of Christ “Moses and the prophets” Luke 16:29ff.; in the days of Timothy 2nd Timothy 3:16, 17 “all Scripture” are appealed to as the only source of religious information. In the two former passages the mutterings or apparitions of spirits and the pretended oracular sayings of wizards are rejected as a source of religious knowledge. And the religious information sought by the rich man in Luke 16:29 is contained in Moses and the prophets and concerns this vital question “How shall I escape hell?” Timothy has been “made wise unto salvation” by the Old Testament which he had been taught, and not only that, but he was through the same means “thoroughly furnished unto all good works.” If so much is claimed for that part of the Bible which contains types and emblems, prophetic words and visions relating to future things, the same must hold good with still greater force of that part of the Bible which presents the antitype, the substance, the fulfillment. Therefore Paul states that he had declared “all the counsel of God” for man’s salvation, Acts 20:27, “saying none other things than those which Moses and the prophets did say should come,” Acts 26:22. He also claims that his teaching cannot be improved upon, Galatians 1:8; cf. Revelation 22:18.

Sufficiency is predicated of the Bible with regard to its end and aim, not with regard to all things that may be known of God absolutely. There is a knowledge reserved for the future life which Scripture does not furnish, but for which it prepares its readers.

The sufficiency of the Bible must be maintained against the Roman church, which claims that the Bible needs to be supplemented and reinforced by the traditions of the apostolic church, which were not written, but orally communicated from

generation to generation. Also against the Calixtinian school of Lutheran theologians who argue that the common belief and unanimous teaching of antiquity constitutes the doctrine of the apostles. While we may value clear and unimpeachably genuine statements of the early church as testimonies of the faithful which Scripture inculcates, we cannot regard them as anything but witnesses for the truth, whose statements must be measured against the divine word, because the persons who uttered them were just as much restricted to Scripture in their teaching as we are in ours. Our Lutheran Confessions endorse not so much doctrinal traditions, as such as prove the existence of ceremonies and serve to regulate the external government of the church. Traditions: Augsburg Confession, Art. XV “of ecclesiastical rites,” p. 41. Apology, ch. XIV, Art. 28 “of ecclesiastical power,” pp. 295-302. Objections of Rome to Art. VII of A. C. refuted in Apology, p. 168. The folly of urging traditions is shown Apology, p. 168f.; unscriptural traditions arraigned: Article XXVI of A. C., p. 54. Ch. VI, Apology, p. 212. What traditions are mentioned which the confessors accepted? A. C. Art. XXVI, p. 456.

§18. Purposes of Scripture.

The Bible is grandly equipped. Its ends or aims are equally grand. It addresses itself to all men, believers and unbelievers, and strives to secure certain well-defined purposes with each.

1. It approaches the intellect of man with the intention of conveying information regarding matters which either are utter mysteries to man, or are not clearly understood by the

human intellect in its natural capacity. Paul, Ephesians 3:3, 4, possessed “knowledge in the mysteries of Christ,” i.e. he had fully grasped the divine plan for man’s salvation by the atonement of Christ. This mystery however was “made known unto him by revelation” and he made it known to others by putting it in writing. His writings answer to others the same purpose as the revelation answered to him. When persons read them they received understanding (noāsai) of the knowledge which Paul possessed. The veil was drawn aside (*re-velare*) from the hidden counsels and ways of divine mercy. True the account which God has given of this mystery is frequently overlooked. Careless and biased readers may skim the surface of this ocean of divine wisdom and may not perceive, e.g. the connection of the prophetic utterances regarding the Christ to come and the apostolic record of the Christ who is come. But the information is all there and it requires only someone to arrest the attention of “fools and people who are slow at heart to believe” to show, as Christ did on the way to Emmaus, that men need not grope in blindness as regards the things that make for their peace, Luke 24:25-27. That is the prime purpose of Scripture, viz. to “make men wise unto salvation” (sophisai eis sootārian dia pisteos tās en christoo lāsou), 2nd Timothy 3:15. On the other hand the knowledge of right and wrong, which was originally implanted in man’s heart is reinforced, quickened, clarified by Scripture. The written law conveys epignosis hamartias, i.e. thorough knowledge of sin, Romans 3:20. David has found in himself “sehaphim,” i.e. ambiguities (Luther: Flattergeister, vain thoughts) Psalm 119:113. His natural views were misleading. For that reason he turns to the law. From its precepts he is made knowing “ethboonaan,” Psalm 119:104. For the

commandment of the Lord is “**baaraach**” immaculate (Luther: lauter) and enlightens the eyes, Psalm 19:8. Therefore Paul summarily states that “all Scripture” “whatsoever things were written aforetime, were written for” and “given” “for our learning” “for doctrine” eis didaskalian, 2nd Timothy 3:16; Romans 15:4. The preposition “eis” marks purpose.

2. When Christ represents Abraham as directing the rich man in hell to Moses and the prophets, i.e. to their writings which were easily accessible to all the living, he ascribes to Scripture also this purpose, of converting unbelievers. The rich man was anxious to have his brothers repent (metanoein). Abraham replies that this may be done and moreover they may be persuaded (peisthäsontai), i.e. become believers by the writings afore named, Luke 16:29-31. The Bible exists in this world for the end of crushing the hard heart of sinners, making it “tender,” and of humbling the sinner before its teaching, 2nd Chronicles 34:27. Therefore David states that the Torah of Jehovah, i.e. not only the mosaical Torah, but the entire revelation of God is “**themiiimaah**,” complete, entire, perfect, and making the soul to return, or bringing life back, reviving the spirit (**meshiibaah nephesh**), Psalm 19:7.

3. Cleopas and his companion were believing Jews, members of the circle of disciples which followed Jesus. So were the readers to whom John addressed his Gospel. Yet the Lord and His apostle refer their hearers and readers to Scripture to the end that they might “believe,” Luke 24:25-27; John 20:31. The knowledge which Scripture gives in the first moment of conversion and the change of mind which it brings about in man is continued, maintained and increased by that same Scripture. That is its purpose. For that reason God added more writings to the original stock, and now that the canon has

been closed directs man to the whole book, to the end that his faith may be strengthened and preserved.

4. The fruit of faith is a holy life. And since the cause springs from Scripture, the effect does likewise. Gesenius renders Psalm 119:9 thus: “How does a youth keep his conduct clean?” Purity of life, something that is in special danger of being neglected by young people, is what the psalmist refers to. His answer is “by guarding it in accordance with Thy word.” And in vv. 43, 44 he expresses the fear that the “word of truth,” the reliable instruction of God and His righteous decisions may be taken from him, for he has staked his hope of living up to the standard of the law on God’s word. In like manner did the Redeemer commend to His Father the sanctification of His followers and mentioned as the means to that end the word of God, John 17:17. The purpose of the believer’s Bible reading and church attendance is to grow in holiness. Scripture supports this aim for it was given pros epanorthoosin, i.e. for making straight what was crooked, for restoration to a better condition, Luther “zur Besserund,” and pros paideian tñn en dikaioynē, i.e. for discipline in righteousness. The former expression refers to the suppression of faulty actions and their avoidance, the latter to the guidance in doing what is right, 2nd Timothy 3:16, 17.

5. Paul speaks in Romans 15:4 of tñn hypomonēn kai tñn paraklēseos toon graphoon “the patience and the comfort of the Scriptures” and says that through these we are to have hope. Tñn elpidā signifies the peculiar hope that is found in Christians. The article has the force of the possessive pronoun. The genitive toon graphoon connects with both hypomonē and paraklēsis. Hypomonē expresses our attitude towards the Scriptures, paraklēsis the attitude of Scripture towards us. We

are to listen patiently to the comforting teachings of the Bible, and in this way we are to possess our Christian hope. When afflictions are visited upon us we are not to throw away our Bible, but then is the time to take it up and to study its consolatory sayings and promises and the beautiful examples recorded therein of the saints, who have passed through the same tribulations. In this manner we are to quiet our disturbed hearts urging our souls to wait, viz. for the fulfilment of God's promises, Psalm 130:5. Thus Scripture has been appointed by God as the source of comfort and the basis of hope to its readers.

6. From 2nd Timothy 3:16 we gather one more purpose of Scripture. Pros elengchon, for reproof. Elengchos is any conclusive, convincing argument. Apollos so used the Scriptures in combating the errors of the Jews concerning Christ, and in defending his own faith, Acts 18:28. Verse 24 shows that the Scriptures had furnished him the ability for his defensive and offensive efforts. Scripture is the arsenal from which the Christian polemicists and apologists choose their weapons for the warfare of truth against error. It is not so much we that defend Scripture, as Scripture that defends us.

7. All these specific purposes of Scripture meet in one grand purpose: Scripture aims at bestowing life, spiritual and eternal. It was written for this purpose, John 20:31; 5:39; and also to start, already in the nether sanctuary of men, the everlasting songs of the redeemed to the glory of God. On the strength of the knowledge, the correction, the comfort, the protection men have received from the word, they have begun to praise even here on earth His mercy, lovingkindness, righteousness, truth, Psalm 138:1, 2, 4; 119:171. Thus Scripture has in every respect made them "wise unto salvation," 2nd

Timothy 3:15. This last purpose is not a part of the purpose, but the one great purpose of the Bible. It is attained when all the purposes aforementioned are realized, in other words Scripture increases God's glory and saves men by informing, converting, correcting, comforting and protecting believers.

Theology Proper.

§19. Definition.

We had defined theology as logos peri tou theou kai toon theion, and had agreed to consider theology viewed concretely as a practical habitude conferred by God. God then is the author of this theology in us.

However in another view God is the subject matter of all theological meditation and study. Whatever the theologian takes up in his study, he considers not by itself, but insofar as God is connected with it. Here in time the *theologia viae* is occupied with God; hereafter in eternity the *theologia vitae* will reach perfection in the immediate contemplation of God. Accordingly Baier says, "*finis externus theologiae ultimus et intermedius est Deus, infinite perfectus et summe bonus*" I, 38.

Moreover God is the great theme of Scriptures, the word of God, the revelation of God. Every part of Scripture is divine not only as regards the origin, but also as regards its contents. If anyone reads Scripture aright, he reads it with the divine author before him and learns to know from it chiefly God

as he has revealed Himself. Scripture is God's self-testimony to man regarding Himself and His works.

However there is a difference in the contents of Scripture which was noted in the paragraph on the perspicuity of Scripture. In some portions of Scripture God is directly placing His Being before us for our study. These portions speak of God kata to rhäton; they are the *loci classici* of the divine self-revelation. The other portions speak of Him kata tän dianoian. Something may be learned about God from every portion of Scripture. But by collecting those portions of Scripture which clearly set forth who and what God is, wills and does, by arranging these in a proper order, we obtain an account of God and this account, every part of which is taken directly from Scripture, represents from the standpoint of the dogmatician a *locus*, a doctrine, viz. *locus de Deo*, the doctrine of the Divine Being, in Himself considered. This account is called "theology in the narrow sense" to distinguish it from that theology in the wider sense which we studied in §1-9.

In our own literature there is found helpful material for the study of this subject in the following articles: Graebner: "Theology," *Theological Quarterly*, vol. II, pp. 1-13; 129-141; 257-278; 385-397; VI, 48-54; 121-123. Dau, "Proof Texts of the Catechism," *Theological Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 3, July, 1906, pp. 162-169. *Lehre und Wehre*, Band 21, Seite 273; 209; Band 20, Seiten 353-359;

Dau, "Zur Beurteilung der Einwände gegen den alttestamentlichen Beweis fuer die Dreieinigkeitslehre," *Lehre und Wehre*, Band 48, Seiten 161-171; 202-212.

Stoeckhardt, "Die Lehre von Gott, oder naeher, von Gottes wesen und Eigenschaften," *Bericht des Nebraska=Distrikts*, 1888.

The Scriptural material offered for study in the chapter on theology proper in our text-book may be thus subdivided:

- I. A general description of the Divine Being, §20.
- II. The argument for the existence of God, §21.
- III. The essence of God, §22-54.
 - A. His spirituality.
 - B. His personality, §22.
 - C. His unity, §23.
 - D. His tri-unity or trinity, §24-27.
 - 1) The fact that there are three persons of the one Godhead, §24.
 - 2) The personal aspects of each person, §25-27.
 - a) of the Father, §25
 - b) of the Son, §26.
 - c) of the Holy Ghost, §27.
 - E. The attributes of God, §28-44.
 - 1) His negative attributes, §28a, 29-31.
 - a) these attributes named and described, §28a.
 - b) these attributes treated in particular, §29-31.
 - aa) His individuality, §29.
 - bb) immutability, §30
 - cc) infinity, §31
 - 2) His positive attributes, §28b, 32-44.
 - a) these attributes named and described, §28b.
 - b) these attributes treated in particular, §32-44.
 - aa) they are all embraced in the life of God, §32.
 - bb) they are exhibited in what God knows, §33-34.
 - u) His intelligence, §33.
 - v) His wisdom, §34.

- c) they are exhibited in what God wills, §35-43.
 - aa) His will in general, §35.
 - bb) manifestations of His will, §36-43.
 - w) His holiness, §36.
 - x) justice, §37.
 - y) truth, §38.
 - z) goodness, §39-43.
 - z1) His love, §40.
 - z2) benevolence, §41.
 - z3) grace, §42.
 - z4) mercy, §43.
 - d) they are exhibited in what God does, §44-54.
 - aa) His power, §44.
- F. The acts of God, §45-54.
 - 1) The internal acts, §46-51.
 - a) the personal internal acts, §47.
 - b) the essential internal acts, §48-51.
 - aa) the decree of creation, §49.
 - bb) the decree of redemption, §50.
 - cc) the decree of predestination, §51.
 - 2) the external acts, §52-54.
 - a) immediate external acts, §53.
 - b) mediate external acts, §54.

§20. God.

We have here a general description of the divine Being. It is questionable whether we can say that God can logically be defined. A logical definition must name 1) the *summum genus*, 2) the specific difference or differences of the object to be

defined. The *summum genus* is that term which states the class of objects to which the thing defined belongs. Now it is obvious that God cannot be grouped with other like objects in a class. God is in a class by Himself, absolutely *sui generis*. Accordingly He has no equals from whom He might be distinguished by naming qualities altogether peculiar to Him, and not possessed by objects in the same class with Him. Dr. [Robert Verrell] Foster indeed, in his *Systematic Theology* says p. 172, "Perhaps there is no better compendium of the idea of God than the one which we have from the Westminster Catechism: 'God is a spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice and truth'. It is a true definition logically for it states the class, to wit, spirit, to which God is to be referred, and also the *differentia* by which He is to be distinguished from other objects in that class." But while it is true that God is a spirit and that there are other spirits, still when we think of the statement in Deuteronomy 4:35: "There is none else beside him," we feel inclined to put aside all attempts to define God logically, and content ourselves with a mere nominal definition, like explaining the derivation and meaning of the term "God," or simply enumerate His known qualities, hence with describing God.

God is in the common view of all men the highest Being, 1) in the sense that He represents the highest good, *ens omnium excellentissimum quo nihil melius esse vel cogitari potest* (Baier); 2) in the sense that He is absolute depending on no one for His existence and having everything else dependent upon him for its existence, *ens primum, quod a se et caeterorum entium omnium causa est* (Baier).

True the word "God" is used in Scripture also in an improper sense. E.g. of Moses it is said: "that he shall be unto Aaron" "**leloohim**," for a God, Exodus 4:16. Persons in authority

in the civil government, judges, etc. are called gods, John 10:34; Psalm 82:6; 2nd Thessalonians 2:4; yea even the idols of the heathen are called gods, 1st Corinthians 8:5; compare 2nd Corinthians 4:4. This is not a slip of the pen of the holy writers, not a literary *lapsus*, nor an accident, but is done *per analogiam quondam veram*, by a certain analogy based on a true relation, viz. because these persons being in a divinely ordained office are vested with a divinely sanctioned authority, or because they are beings which are regarded as God and have the dignity of God ascribed to them. Quenstedt accordingly says that in the former instance the word "God" is used metaphorikoos and these gods are *dii nuncupativi*, nominal deities, while in the latter instance the word "God" is used antiphrastikoos *dii (contradictorii) fictitii*.

The name "God" is never applied by Scriptures to the ministers of the church. Why are persons in authority in the state called "Gods" and not those in the church? Because civil government has been equipped with the power to issue laws and to bind the consciences of men by laws, as God does, Romans 13:5. The only limit placed upon its authority is that its laws must not nullify the laws of God. But ministers of the church have not legislative authority. The so-called constitutive authority is an authority which all Christians have in common.

§21. Existence of God.

There is such a being as God and His existence is known to natural man. To show just how man constructs his arguments for the existence of God is beyond the province of theology. But it is part of theology to teach on the strength of Scripture that there is a natural knowledge of God. It is shown to be not only

available and possible, but necessary and unavoidable for every person. The natural evidence for the existence of God is exhibited to us in our text-book in three forms.

1. In the O.T. we find an argument for the existence of God stated in the beautiful language of the Hebrew poet in Psalm 19:1-3. Delitzsch explains this text thus: "The heavens, *i.e.* the superterrestrial spheres, which, so far as human vision is concerned, are lost in infinite space, declare how glorious is God, and indeed **El**, as the Almighty." They also declare how glorious is everything that He has made, "*i.e.* what He has produced with a superior power to which everything is possible, the firmament, *i.e.* vault of heaven stretched out far and wide and as a transparency above the earth." That the firmament and the heavens are said to declare and show something, and that they are said to have a voice is simply poetic imagery. "The sky and the firmament are not conceived of as conscious beings." Under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy this view was prevalent in the Middle Ages. And in accordance with a thought of Pythagoras men have ever since spoken of a "music of the spheres." These ideas are foreign to the Psalmist; he describes what "the old expositors correctly say, *objectivum vocis non articulatae praeconium*," an objective announcement given in an inarticulate voice. The psalmist speaks of the glory of God, **Kabood**, doxa. This doxa God has conferred upon the creatures as a reflection of His own. The doxa now is reflected from the creatures and given back, as it were, to the Creator in acknowledgment of its origin. The verbs which express this action are in the participle: **mesapherrim** (they are recounting, from **saaphar**), and **maggid**, they are unveiling, revealing. These participles express the idea of perpetuity and continuance, and this idea is expanded in verse 2. The sublime discourse of the

heavens and the firmament is represented as being “carried forward in an uninterrupted line of transmission.” Day unto day, **labiah omer**, uttereth speech, literally: gushes forth lore or tale, as from a deep, “inexhaustible spring” (**omer** is a word that belongs to elevated style). And night unto night, **jehaveh dahath**, shows knowledge, it exhibits things that may be known, namely about Him who made day and night. God then has “deposited in” His creatures a **dahath** of Himself. Some have understood this verse thus: The tidings of each day concerning God “gradually die away as the day declines,” and are hushed at sunset, but they are then “taken up by the night,” which spins on the same discourse until dawn, when it is continued again by the day. But the psalmist does not say this; he connects each day with the following day and each night with the following night. His meaning evidently is: Each day reveals works which God does by day, and each night such as He performs by night, and this diurnal and nocturnal testimony of the creatures is continuous and parallel. “Each dawning day continues the speech of that which has declined, and each approaching night takes up the tale of that which has passed away.” Verse 3 is rendered thus by some: “‘there is no speech and there are no words; their voice is inaudible’, i.e. they are silent, speechless witnesses, uttering no sound, yet speaking aloud (Hengstenberg), only inwardly audible, but yet intelligible everywhere (Thenius).” But Delitzsch objects to this interpretation on grammatical grounds, claiming that in that case the “fifth verse ought at least to begin with a **Waw adversativum**,” and there would be produced a needless check in the psalmist’s fervor, and he would be made to utter a tame thought. Ewald proposes to read verse 3 thus: “‘Without loud speech... their sound has resounded though all the earth’.” But

again Delitzsch objects on the ground that the grammar of the text does not permit such a construction. He considers Luther’s rendering better: “There is no language nor speech, where their voice is not heard’.” This means that “the testimony of the heavens to God is understood by the peoples of every language and tongue.” “Hofmann’s rendering” approaches this thought: “‘There is no speech and there are no words, that their cry is not heard, i.e. the language of the heavens goes forth side by side with all other languages, and men may discourse ever so, still the speech or sound of the heavens is heard therewith, it sounds above them all’.” But Delitzsch holds that even these renderings are not quite adequate. “Thus, therefore, the only rendering that remains,” he says “is that of LXX, Vitringa and Hitzig: There is no language and no words, whose voice is unheard, i.e. inaudible.” And the meaning then is this: “The discourse of the heavens and the firmament, of the day (of the sky by day) and of the night (of the sky by night), is not a discourse uttered in a corner, it is a discourse in speech that is everywhere audible, and in words that are understood by all, αὐανερὸν, Romans 1:19” [Franz Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Old Testament*, translator James Martin, volume V (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), pages 281-283].

He [Paul] declares in Romans 1:19 that there is in this world to gnooston tou theou, that which is known or knowable about God (Wilke: das betrifft Gottes Erkennbare; Luther: dass man weiss, dass Gott sei). The contents of this gnooston are named in verse 20: hã aidios autou dynamis kai theiotãs, i.e. 1) power; 2) majesty, majestic qualities in the aggregate; 3) eternity as applying to both majesty and power; 4) personality as indicated by autou. All these matters the apostle calls ta aorata autou, the invisible things of Him. From the standpoint

of the human observer God is ao^oratos. Still He is also gnoostos, because the ao^orata of Him are plainly seen, kathoratai. But is not this a palpable contradiction, ta ao^orata kathoratai? No; the process of seeing which the apostle asserts is an intellectual or mental process. The invisible things are seen insofar as they are being understood, nooumena. This process has gone on as far as men can think back; it began apo ktiseoos kosmou, with the creation of the world. The process of understanding the invisible things of God was made possible tois poiämasin, by means of God's handiworks, Luther: so man des wahrnimmt an den Werken. The visible works of God are a revelation of "the invisible things of God," in other words men have ever seen and understood God in His creatures. Through the study of the kosmos the things which may be known of God have become manifest in them, phaneron estin en autois. The evidence which the created universe offers connects with the mind of man in such a manner that he cannot escape becoming convinced that there is a God. He is compelled to acknowledge that the things which exist not only have an origin, but also an originator, an author; and that author must be prior to and greater than anything that he has made. Yea, He himself cannot have been made by somebody existing before Him and superior to Him. The Author who is the First Cause of all things and the highest Power, must Himself be uncreated and unlimited. Moreover it must have been a wise and benevolent power; for the design, the order, the beauty, the adaptation and fitness of the creatures for certain unmistakable purposes argue forethought and intention governed by a kindly disposition. This knowledge of the existence of God which is drawn from the creature world is divinely bestowed: theos autois ephaneroosen. God so constituted man and the universe which

man inhabits that man cannot scan the heavens nor the earth without having his mind go back spontaneously in the twinkling of an eye to the Author of all that he observes. This knowledge then is universal, and will be always accessible while the means by which it is conveyed remain. As there has been no absolutely godless race found hitherto though Mr. Darwin scoured the globe to find one, so there will be no absolutely godless race in the future. The universe is sufficient to convince anyone who denies the existence of God that he is speaking a falsehood; anyone who claims that it was impossible for him to know God that that is no excuse (anapologätos), anyone who has made his own God, that that was the idle product of his vain imaginations and his foolish and darkened heart, in opposition and in contradiction of what this mute creation told him of God; and anyone who has failed to glorify and thank God, that he may have been able to put God out of his mind, but cannot put God out of existence.

This argument is based partly on the macrocosm, or the world at large, partly on the microcosm, or man, who is said to be a world in himself. Insofar as the argument infers the existence of a Creator from the creatures it is called the cosmological argument. Insofar as we reason from the fitness of things to a Fashioner, or the Highest Intelligence, who has ordained this fitness, the argument is called the teleological argument. The teleological argument subdivides into the physico-teleological and the historico-teleological. The former deals with the fitness of created things and is stated, e.g. Psalm 104:24. The psalmist declares not only that God has made "His manifold works" **bechokma**, in wisdom, but also that this wisdom of God can be perceived by men; hence he exclaims: "Lord, how manifold are thy works! In wisdom Thou hast made

them all.” The latter form of the teleological argument deals with the progress and evolutions of history. It is stated, e.g. Acts 17:26-28. Paul tells the Athenian philosophers on Mars’ Hill not only that God has appointed unto the various nations the times of their existence and the boundaries of their habitations, but also that men must seek God if they might find Him, in the movements of history. It is He who casts down nations like the Assyrian, Isaiah 10:5f.; like Napoleon, who exalt themselves against Him. From a contemplation of the microcosm there has been drawn an argument for the existence of God thus: The belief in God is universal, there is a *consensus gentium* on this point, Romans 1:18. The chief place in Scripture exhibiting this argument, declares not only as a fact that the idea of God is in all men, but also that this idea is truth. This argument is sometimes propounded in this form: The idea of God cannot have been placed in the human mind by man or any other creature; it must have been implanted by God. Anselm has given this argument a somewhat artificial shape: he reasons from the fact that in the human mind there exists the notion of a most perfect Being to the fact of the existence of such a Being. Hence God exists not only in men’s imagination, but in reality. In this form the argument is called the ontological argument.

2. A very simple and perfectly stringent argument for the existence of God is taken from the fact that there is a moral law and conscience in men. Paul advances this argument in Romans 2:15: man has a conscience; *syneidäsis* is explained by the words following: “the thoughts which accuse or excuse one another.” *Metaxy alläloön* means among each other or mutually (Luther: unter einander). The English Version wrongly treats *metaxy* as an adverb. In man’s bosom there is a war of voices regarding right and wrong, a process of approval or disapproval,

of which man is conscious while it is going on and which he can recall by his memory when it is over. Man knows and observes this conflict along with his existence. Now the remarkable feature about this conflict is that such things are approved as God approves in His law, and such disapproved as are there disapproved. Even in Gentiles who have not the Decalog this activity of the conscience can be perceived. The idea of retribution is worked into the warp and woof of the mind of man (*grapton en tais kardiais*). He expects either reward or punishment for his doings. This argues the existence of a supreme Being who will mete out such retribution and Scripture endorses and drives home this argument.

3. The third evidence is external. Scripture assumes without argument and explanation that there is a God. In the beginning, Genesis 1:1, center, Psalm 90:2, and end of the Bible, Revelation 22:19, God is mentioned, and the writers make no effort to explain whom they mean, nor do they show fear that their readers will fail to understand them. This entire absence of all logical, philosophical, apologetic argument for the existence of God in a book that was written for the use of all men is in itself a proof for God’s existence.

Scripture therefore hurls at the atheist a twofold charge, 1) he is without excuse; 2) he is a fool; **nabal**, however, in Hebrew denotes not only a person who is mentally deficient, but who is depraved at heart. The fool is also foul. To deny the existence of God is not at all a mark of superior intelligence, of advanced culture, but it is the very lowest ignorance and a worse than diabolical perverseness, for even the devils are not such fools as to deny that there is a God, James 2:19.

The following paragraphs to §44 include offering a description of God within the bounds of His revealed word. We cannot define God because there is no *genus* under which we could group Him as a species, and there are no species from which He could be distinguished by a specific difference. Even the description which we gather from Scripture is not a description of His absolute Being, but a summary of the traits which He has revealed to us. Adequately to describe God would require that we should know and comprehend Him absolutely, in other words that our intellect encompass Him. To do that our intellect would have to be greater than God. Therefore Scripture also in reference to this point emphasizes that we know in part.

§22. Spirituality and Personality of God.

God's existence is known from the existence and the manifold forms of created matter. But there is existence without matter. Such notions as those with which the conscience is occupied are immaterial. We have seen that God manifests His existence also through these notions. Add to this that even the material universe manifests God only as ao^{ro}atos, i.e. unseen and invisible, Romans 1:20, and we are brought face to face with God as a Being that differs essentially from every other being we know by observation. He is a spirit, John 4:24 (note the omission of the article before pneuma and the emphatic order of the words). A spirit has not flesh and bones, Luke 24:39. He cannot be approached in a physical manner, but only spiritually. He dwells not in a certain locality, as the woman at Jacob's well imagined; the knee cannot be bent to a material substance which might be supposed to be He; the worshiper

must not bring only his body into His presence, but must worship Him by means of his own spirit and in sincerity. The unseen and immaterial in us must approach him, the Unseen, the Spirit.

God is entirely spirit, not a thought or an energy that has taken up its abode in a body, like magnetic force dwelling in a lode-stone; nor is He a body so constituted as to exert power, like an engine; nor is He a composite being, partly matter, partly spirit, like man. The statement in John 4:24 "pneuma ho theos" is absolute and emphatic: Spirit is God, i.e. He is altogether without admixture purely and perfectly spirit. On the strength of this statement we predicate of God simplicity, i.e. that He is truly uncompounded, neither a composite of matter and form, nor of integral parts, nor of a subject with accompanying accidentals.

How a Being like this can have personal existence is beyond our comprehension. But this Being predicates personality of Himself: He calls Himself "I," Exodus 3:14; and is spoken of as "he," Psalm 90:2; thou art, God (Luther: bist Du, Gott), Acts 17:28; or speaks thus of Himself: Isaiah 41:2; 48:12; He is independent in His existence and personality, He hath life in Himself, John 5:26. He claims exclusively for Himself a name which He will share with none other, Isaiah 42:8. And that name expresses not some typical feature, nor is it an arbitrary mark chosen for the purpose of distinguishing Him, but that name is Himself, His personality, Exodus 3:14. This text furnishes the derivation of the name Jehovah. The original pronunciation is lost because the Jews transferred the pronunciation of "**Adonai**" to this word. It was probably pronounced "**Jahweh**" or "**Jahaweh**" or briefly "**Jah**." It is derived from "**hajah**," to be, to exist. The Greek "theos" is differently derived from tithenai, to place; theein, to run; theasthai, to view; deos, awe, which later

assumed in the Aeolian dialect the form “dzeus.” In the ancient church the term “anoonymos” was occasionally used for God. Rudolf von Raumer, *Einwirkung des Christentums auf die althochdeutsche Sprache* (Stuttgart, 1845), Seite 338: “Der Wichtigkeit der Sache wegen führe ich die bedeutendsten Versuche, die Etymologie des Wortes ‘got’ zu finden an. 1) Got, *deus*, haengt zusammen mit gut, *bonus*. Ein unbittelbarer Zusammenhang ist nicht moeglich wegen des verschiedenen Vokals; gothisch: guth (*deus*), gods (*bonus*). Die Moeglichkeit einer Wurzelverwandschaft zwischen got und gut ist damit nicht abgeschnitten, doch sind die noetigen Zwischenglieder bis jetzt noch in keiner deutschen Sprache aufgefunden. (Siehe Jacob Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Seite 12).

“2) Das deutsche ‘got’ ist das Persische ‘khoda’, das Zendische ‘qvadatu’ [sic] (*a se datus*), von *Grimm*, Seite 13 zweifelnd aufgenommen. Wie mir scheint gegruendete Einwendungen dagegen macht Friedrich Windischmann in *Der Fortschritt der Sprachkunde* (Muenchen, 1844), Seite 19.

“3) Die Wurzel des Deutschen ‘got’ hat sich in dem Griechischen ‘keuthoo’ (*abscondere*) erhalten, and ‘got’ bezeichnet somit den ‘Verborgenen’, *Windischmann*, Seite 20.”

Lastly actions are referred to Him as the author, Colossians 1:16, 17; Psalm 104:24; Psalm 90:2; and He refers to Himself in this manner, Isaiah 41:4. Consistently Scripture reveals God as a real, self-existent being, possessing intellect and will; in other words Scripture teaches a personal God.

§23. Unity of God.

The personal spiritual essence which we have studied is one in number, absolutely single. He is not subject to division or multiplication. His being cannot be broken up. He is always kyrios heis, Mark 12:29; heis theos, verse 32; monos theos, John 17:3. His being cannot be transferred or communicated to anyone outside of Him, in such a manner that the latter becomes He; Deuteronomy 4:35; Mark 12:32; Isaiah 44:6. Men who in perverse blindness have attempted such a transfer have attempted the impossible against God’s warning, Isaiah 42:8, 11. Idolatry, polytheism and pantheism are not various ways of reaching the true God, but they are no ways at all. They only lead away from God. They contain no germs of truth, but are altogether error. The unity of God exists for all time, past, present and future, Isaiah 44:6; 48:12 (compare Revelation 1:4: ho oon kai ho än kai ho erchomenos).

§24. Trinity in Unity.

The divine essence belongs to three different persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and that *sine divisione*, i.e. not in such a way that the divine essence is distributed among the three persons, so that the Father is one-third God and the Son one-third and the Holy Ghost one-third, but in such a way that the entire divine essence with all its attributes belongs to the Father entire, to the Son entire and to the Holy Ghost entire.

But the divine essence belongs to three different persons also *sine multiplicatione*, i.e. not in such a way that the three persons are the copies of the deity, but in such a way that the same divine essence belongs to the Father, to the Son and

to the Holy Ghost, not in kind only (*specie*), but by numerical identity (*idem numero*).

What has just been said regarding the divine essence also applies to the divine attributes, which are distinct from the divine essence not in fact, but only in conception. There are not three sets or categories of divine attributes, but only one set, which belongs wholly to each person. Baier accordingly says: "*Quod ad personas divinas attinet, simplicissime tenendum est, quod essentia omnesque perfectiones divinae sine divisione aut multiplicatione communes sint his tribus distinctis, quos Scriptura vocat Patrem, Filium et Spiritum Sanctum.*"

Regarding this sole fact as the teaching of Scripture and holding fast this single fact, we are safe from all ancient and modern errors which have been proclaimed in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity.

For a proper presentation of this doctrine it is moreover necessary that we emphasize this fact, viz. that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinct from one another not only in our mode of looking at this subject (*nostro concipiendi modo*), not only in idea (*notionaliter*), but they are *realiter* distinct, *citra mentis nostrae operationem, seu nemine cogitante, aut diversas nomenclaturas animo concipiente*. Beyond what our mind can conceive or reason out and name, there is an actual distinction between the three persons. The Athanasian Creed says, *Revera alius est Pater, alius est Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus; alia est enim persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti.* Anyone denying this truth falls into the error of Monarchianism, which denies all real distinctions between the persons, and practically acknowledges one person only. This was the error of the Praxeans, Noetians, Sabellians, Samosatensians, who held that as there was but one divine "ousia," so there is but one divine

"hypostasis" or *persona*, "*quae alio atque alio respectu iam Patris, iam Filii, iam Spiritus Sancti induat nomen.*" In this same class belong the Arians, who fought most bitterly against the admissibility of applying the term "homo-ousia" to the three persons alike, and were therefore called "Trisousians" by Fulgentius. In an effort to avoid the error of the Sabellians the Tritheites fell into another: they assumed three Gods or divine essences, one of which they called *essentia essentians*, the other two *essentias essentiatas*. The ancient and modern Photinians deny the mystery of the Trinity and hold Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinct only in name. All Antitrinitarians of our day including the Swedenborgians are addicted to this error. If the same divine essence and the same divine attributes belong to the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, not in kind only, but in actual numeration (*non solum specie, sed numero idem*), it is incontrovertibly certain that the divine essence and qualities belong to each person in like manner and in the same sense. In other words not only the Father, but also the Son and the Holy Ghost is very God. Whoever denies this fact falls into the error of subordinationism; he acknowledges the Father to be very God, but ascribes to the Son and to the Holy Ghost an inferior degree of divinity. All the ancient and modern followers of Arius have embraced this error, and Dr. Kahnis has during the past century advocated it within the Lutheran Church. He said: "Der Vater is die goettliche Unpersoenlichkeit." "Der Vater is also grosser als der Sohn." The subordination error is really a lapse into pagan polytheism, for it destroys the unity of God and assumes one supreme God with two demigods. Baier is not a bit too severe when he says: "*Fingere autem in hoc negotio subordinationem, dependentiam aut similitudinem aut nescio quid aliud.... Ne necesse sit concedere identitatem aut*

aequaditatem, alienum est a religione christiana.” For the Christian church has ever held this doctrine: *non solum Patrem, sed etiam Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse verum deum*; or to quote the Athanasian Creed: “The Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one, the glory equal (*aequalis*), the majesty coeternal. Such as the Father is, such is the Son; and such is the Holy Ghost.” “And in this Trinity no one is before or after the other; none is greater or less than another. But the whole three persons are coeternal together and coequal” (*coaeternae, coaequales*).

Lastly the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are really, objectively distinct from one another, still because one and the same essence and all its attributes belong to each alike, they are not three Gods, but one God. The church has at all times rejected the notion of Tritheism, i.e. that there are three divine essences. Hence: “*in hoc mysterio datur allos kai allos*, but not *allo kai allo*.”

The Old Testament argument for the trinity of the persons is most exhaustively presented by Kromayer, who divides the *dicta probantia* on this matter into the following groups: I. *dicta in quibus pluralitatis personarum deitatis fit mentio*: Genesis 1:1, 3, 26; 3:22; 11:7. II. *dicta in quibus duarum personarum fit mentio*: Genesis 19:24; Exodus 34:5; Jeremiah 23:33; Daniel 9:17; Hosea 1:7; Zechariah 3:2; 2:9; Psalm 110:1f.; Matthew 22:34. III. *dicta in quibus trium personarum fit mentio*: Genesis 1:1-3; Psalm 33:6; Isaiah 48:16; 63:9-11; Numbers 6:24-26; Psalm 67:7, 8; Isaiah 6:3; Joshua 22:22. IV. *dicta in quibus Deus dicitur habere Filium*: Psalm 2:7; Proverbs 30:4. V. *dicta ex quibus numerus personarum ternarius emitur*.

As regards the evidence from the Old Testament for the doctrine of the Trinity the question is not whether there are in

the Old Testament faint traces or obscure indications which hint at this doctrine, but whether this doctrine has been revealed in the Old Testament as an article of faith, which as the Athanasian Creed says must be known by all who wish to be saved, hence whether it has been revealed with sufficient clearness. It is not denied that the New Testament on this point as well as on other points of doctrine possesses greater clearness.

Here too modern Lutheran theologians have voiced their dissent from the old Lutheran teaching. Luthardt: “Das Alte Testament enthaelt nur die Voraussetzungen der trinitarischen Gotteserkenntnis, weil der trinitarischen Gottesoffenbarung; erst das Neue Testament brachte mit dieser auch jene.” Kahnis: “Im Alte Testament tritt die Einheit und Einigkeit hohe so entschieden hervor, dass, was vom Messias and vom Heiligen Geiste ausgesagt wird, nur den Keim goettlicher Persoenlichkeiten in sich traegt.” Vilmar: “Die alte Dogmatik behauptete zu viel, wenn sie behauptete, es habe nicht allein schon im Gesetz und vor dem Gesetz sich Gott im Vater, Sohn und Geist geoffenbart, sondern auch ‘die Kirche des Alte Testament’, d. [dass] i. [ist] die in Gottes Verheissung Feststehenden jener Zeit diese Offenbarung Gottes als Vater, Sohn und Geist gekannt.”

The Scripture passages under 1. which have been taken indiscriminately from the Old and the New Testament, may be classified thus:

a) passages in which the subject in the plural is connected with a predicate in the singular, thus: **baaraa elohiim**, Genesis 1:1; **waomer elohiim** “**nahhaseh**,” Genesis 1:26; **wajjibraa elohiim**, Genesis 1:27.

b) passages in which God is spoken of or speaks of Himself in the plural number: **Jehovah elohiim**, Genesis 3:22; **nāredaāh wenaacelaah**, Genesis 11:7; **bohalajic, hosajic**, Isaiah 54:5;

c) passages in which one divine person speaks to or of another: Psalm 110:1; 2:7; 45:6, 7;

d) passages in which two persons are indicated: Jeremiah 23:5, 6;

e) passages in which three divine persons are indicated or named: Isaiah 48:12, 13, 16; 6:3; Numbers 6:24-26; Psalm 33:6; Matthew 3:16, 17; 28:19; John 14:15-19.

2. But Scripture, which thus clearly teaches a trinity in the Godhead, teaches with equal clearness unity. In Deuteronomy 6:4 the three names, **Jehovah, Elohiim, Jehovah**, are said to be one, **echad**. In John 10:30 Christ declares Himself and the Father that they are "hen," i.e. one essence, though two persons. For this reason 1st Timothy 3:16 states that in the incarnation of the Son "God" was manifest in the flesh. Though the incarnation can be predicated of only one person, still because God is one it must be predicated of God.

3. That the three persons in the one divine essence are "equal in power and majesty and divine glory" will be shown in detail in §25-27, where each person will be studied separately. In the texts under 3. we have evidence that the work of creation and the honor of worship and adoration is ascribed to all three persons in common or to some one particular person.

In order to express the mystery of the trinity still further, says Baier, and in order to rule out of order the sophisms of heretics, the ancient Christians both in the Orient and the Occident or Greeks and Latins have said: "*tres esse personas in una essentia divina*," "*treis hypostaseis kai mian ousian*." And the Nicene Fathers have stated of the Son in particular, that He

is homooousios, i.e. coessential or consubstantial with the Father.

This leads us to say something about certain terms which are in vogue within the Christian Church when the doctrine of the Trinity is to be stated. In general it may be stated that the introduction of new terms and formulas for expressing doctrine should be discountenanced in the Church, because new terms are apt to beget confusion, especially among the lay-members of the church, and because new terms offer the enemies of the church occasions for slandering the true doctrine, and sometimes subterfuges. Gerhard is correct when he says "*Moderati animi est cum ecclesia non solum reverenter sentire, sed etiam loqui*"; "*nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia etiam de rebus, quae his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem*." The rule which Gerhard has in mind is Scripture itself. But in her controversies with heretics the church has also made use of terms not found in the Bible but plainly expressing the teaching of the Bible. Such terms which have received a well-defined meaning in controversies the careful theologian should regard as a rule by which he is to bind himself.

A term of this kind is the term "Dreifaltigkeit" or "Dreieinigkeit." Luther says "Es ist wohl nicht ein koestlich Deutsch, lautet auch nicht fein, Gott also zu nennen mit dem Wort 'Dreifaltigkeit' (wie auch das lateinische '*trinitas*' nicht koestlich lautet), aber weil man nicht besser hat, muessen wir reden, wie wir koennen. Denn (wie ich gesagt habe) dieser Artikel ist so hoch ueber menschlichen Verstand und Sprache, dass Gott als ein Vater seinen Kindern muss zu gute halten, dass sie stammeln und lallen, so gut sie koennen, so nur der Glaube rein und recht ist. Denn man will dennoch so viel mit diesem

Worte sagen, dass da soll geglaeubet werden, dass die goettliche Majestaet sei drei unterschiedene Personen einigen, wahrhaftigen Wesens" (*Walch*, XII, 830).

In regard to ecclesiastical usage of terms in general Luther writes: "Es ist ja wahr, man soll ausser der Schrift nichts lehren in goettlichen Sachen, wie St. Hilarius schreibet 1 *de trinitate*. Das meint sich nicht anders, denn man soll nicht anders lehren. Aber dass man nicht soll brauchen mehr oder andere Worte, weder in der Schrift stehen, das kann man nicht halten, sonderlich im Zank und wenn die Ketzer wollen die Sachen mit blinden Griffen falsch Machen und der Schrift Worte umkehren; da war vonnoeten, dass man die Meinung der Schrift, so mit vielen Sprechen gesetzt, in ein kurz und Summarienwort fasste, und fragte ob sie Christum *homousion* hielten, wie der Schrift Meinung in allen Worten ist, welche sie mit falschen Glossen bei den Ihrigen verkehrten, aber vor dem Kaiser und im Concilio frei bekennet hatten" (*Walch*, XVI, 2702).

Calvin was not so considerate in his opinion of these church terms. He says "*utinam sepulta essent nomina (trinitatis, homousias), constaret haec inter omnes fides, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum esse unum Deum.*" Gerhard remarks "*Non potest simpliciter et sine commoda interpretatione addita probari,*" and he holds that Calvin's remark is justifiable "*de occasione et origine harum appellationum quae fuit haeretica perversitas,*" but that it is not justifiable "*de ipso appellationum usu.*"

It is true that any person believing as the church believes will speak as the church speaks. Whoever introduces an unusual terminology in setting forth doctrine, exposes himself to just suspicion, viz. that it is not the new or apter term, but another doctrine which he strives to introduce; or

that he regards his personal prestige and glory as an expounder of Scripture truth as of greater importance than the peace of the church and the stability of her customs. For it is a fact of common observation that the church is thrown into confusion by various terms. Still it must be granted that occasions arise in the life and activity of the church when a new term is launched which is really good because it sets forth in striking brevity and exactness a fact that had formerly been expressed by a good deal of circumlocution. Such fitting terms cannot be rejected without rejecting Scripture.

As regards the term "unity" in setting forth the doctrine of three persons in one divine essence, Scharf notes three distinct phrases: "*unum numero* is anything which is one in such a manner, that as viewed in its entirety it cannot be divided into several such entities as it is itself. *Unum genere* is anything which belongs to the same class with others, or shares certain features while differing in other features with specimens of the same class. Thus man and beast are both of the *genus* animal; temperance and bravery of the *genus* virtue; heaven and element of the *genus* body. *Unum specie* is anything that shares the definition and essence of anything else. Thus all men are one as regards species. God is not *unum genere*, nor *unum specie*, but *unum numero*."

The terms which require particular study in connection with the study of the trinity are *essentia* or *ousia*, or essence; *persona*, *hypostasis*, person. As to essence Baier says "*Intelligitur nomine essentiae sive ousias ipsa natura divina, qualis in se absolute, quaeque una cum attributis simplicissime una ac singularis atque ita etiam trium personarum non nisi una est.*" By "essence" we understand the divine nature with all its attributes which exists but once and hence is the same in all

three persons. Hence there is but one divine Intellect, one divine Will, one divine Power, one divine Operation extending to things outside the Trinity. This truth the Athanasian Symbol drives home in the most emphatic manner in paragraphs 9-19. And its statements rest on the declaration of Christ in John 5:19 "The Son can do nothing but what He seeth the Father do." This does not mean as some have supposed that the Son is dependent in His actions upon the Father, but that there is but one divine activity *ad extra*.

Chemnitz has shown that the term "essence" when used in speaking of God is used in an altogether unique manner. When speaking of the essence of man, which is shared by all individuals of the human race, the term "essence" is a *nomen universale*, Gattungsbegriff, class name; or it is a mere notional phrase, naming something which in reality does not exist, but is simply abstracted in our thought from all individuals existing in that class. But when we use this term "essence" of God it is a concrete noun denoting something which actually exists and belongs alike (*idem numero*) to Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

For the term "ousia" some of the Greek Fathers have used the term "physis." But afterwards these two terms came to be distinguished as Quenstedt relates thus: "Ousias vox in *Sacris Scripturis non extat, attamen quia fuit ex mente Sacrae Scripturae, ab orthodoxis patribus in Nicaeno Synodo usurpata est, sicque in Chalcedonensi postea explicata, ut physis plus notaret quam ousia. Est enim essentia simplex rei cuiusque et omnibus suis proprietatibus atque accidentibus carens constitutio; natura seu physis est essentia iam suis illis proprietatibus vestita atque coniuncta. Itaque dixerunt patres in una Christi persona esse non modo simplices ousias, divinam nempe et humanam, sed etiam esse physis, i.e. ipsas essentias*

una cum suis veris proprietatibus coniunctas." The term "substance" has been suggested as an equivalent for the term "essence" in this matter; but Gerhard declines it 1) because it might lead to the idea that God is a substance with other substances only surpassing them in excellence; 2) because in God we cannot distinguish except mentally between substance and attributes; 3) because "substance" is an ambiguous term that has been used now for ousia, now for hypostasis.

As to the term "person" Luther in his plain straight forward way has said "Wir haben das Woertlein 'Person' muessen gebrauchen, wie es denn die Vater auch gebraucht haben, denn wir haben kein anderes" (W, VII, 1407). The common meaning of the term "person" is a being endowed with reason existing for itself, *suppositum intelligens*. Thus a man or an angel is a person. Any such being existing within the bounds of creation is a person. Applying this to the doctrine of the Trinity Baier says "*Ita hoc loco indicatur tres esse subsistentias seu personalitates in una divina essentia, adeoque tria supposita, Patrem, Filium et Spiritum Sanctum.*" The Augsburg Confession, Article I, states that the Protestant Confessors use the term "person" "as the Fathers have used it, to signify, not a part or quality in another, but that which subsists of itself" (Jacobs, page 37). Quenstedt defines "person" thus: "*Persona (concrete sumpta) est substantia individua, intelligens, per se ultimato et immediate subsistens, incommunicabilis, non sustentata ab sive in alio,*" i.e. a person in the concrete sense is an individual substance, as distinguished from universal substance; it is an intelligent individual substance, thus differing from individual substances which cannot be called persons for the reason that they lack intelligence; it is moreover an individual and intelligent

substance that is complete in itself and exists by itself, thus differing from so-called secondary substances, which exist in other primary substances; e.g. the human nature in Christ is an individual and intelligent substance, but it does not exist by itself, but only in the personality of the Logos; therefore the human nature in Christ cannot be called a person. Again person is not something that can be communicated to another and is not sustained in or by another. By the use of the term “person” in this doctrine we wish to decline the erroneous ideas that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three properties, or three forms of the manifestation, or three forms of operation or agency in God. We mean by three persons three independent “egos.” Chemnitz again points out that the term “person” just like the term “essence” is used in a unique manner in explaining this doctrine. For when speaking of three human persons we have in mind three individuals, each of which has its peculiar substance, its peculiar will and its peculiar activity. But this is not the case in regard to the three persons of the Trinity. Here the three persons have the same (*idem numero*) essence, will, activity in all the works of the Godhead that extend outside of the circle of the Trinity. And yet these three persons differ from one another, not only notionally, or in thought and conception, but objectively and in reality.

To sum up we have before us a teaching of Scripture that transcends our natural powers of cognition, a true mystery of faith.

The fact that the term “person” does not occur in Scripture is no reason why we should discard it. For the matter expressed by this term occurs in Scripture. Scripture ascribes to each, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, knowledge, volition and actions. These things presuppose personality,

hence are predicated, wherever they are predicated, of real persons. We would use another term if we could; a better one, as Luther has suggested.

It is necessary to note also what Huelsemann has remarked: *“Notandum, quod scriptores ecclesiasticos attinet, vix binos aut trinos vocabula ista ousias, hypostaseos et personae perpetuo unoque significatu usurpasse.”*

In conclusion it can be pointed out what interest the church pursues in all the statements made by the orthodox teachers regarding the doctrine of the Trinity. This interest is one only, viz. to do justice to those Scripture passages in which this doctrine is revealed. It is beyond the interest of the church to satisfy inquiring reason. When human reason is asked for an opinion on this matter it will declare invariably that if we wish to conceive of God intelligently we have the choice only between Monarchianism and Unitarianism or Tritheism. Human reason will ever tell us: If you really wish to believe three persons, you will have to give up believing one essence and will have to believe three essences or three parts of the one essence. On the other hand if you wish to cling to your faith in the one essence you must surrender your belief in three persons. The utter incomprehensibility of the Trinitarian teaching of Scripture is seen most strikingly when we bear in mind that each of the three persons differs from the divine essence only in our conception, and yet the three persons are really distinct from one another. Accordingly we must decline making the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity so plain, that it must appear comprehensible to human reason. Any such attempt would involve one of two alternatives: either the attempt rests on a self-delusion, the party merely pretending to explain, while in reality leaving unexplained the mystery in

this doctrine; or the attempt is a virtual sacrificing of this doctrine. Baier says "*Sane si quid ratio nostra hic ausit definire (quod tamen in re suos cancellos agrediente non debet), tantum abest ut suis ex principii demonstrationem firmam huius dogmatis afferre possit, ut potius, vel quae sunt aliena a quaestione attulerit, vel in absurditatem manifestam illapsura... vel mysteriam ipsam negatura aut impugnatura sit.*" If you examine some of the attempts that have actually been made to explain the doctrine of the Trinity in a reasonable way, you will at once see the justice of Baier's remarks. The Roman dogmaticians Becanus and Lullius, the Reformed theologian Keckermann of Danzig attempted the following explanation: In the divine essence there is an *intellectus* and a *voluntas* "*quorum actus non sint accidentia in Deo sed substantiae, in ipsa essentia divina subsistentes*" and thus there had been produced a second person in God by the divine intellect and a third by the divine will. To this "reasonable argument" the Lutheran theologian Musaeus replied "*Inauditum est rationi humanae, quod intellectus se ipsum intelligendo et voluntas se ipsum amando personas a se distinctas producant.*" In other words this reasonable explanation has produced another most incomprehensible thought and thus proved to be an explanation that failed to explain. Sartorius, the Lutheran theologian, explained the Trinity by the motive of love. Love, he argued, must have an object which it loves, which in this case would be the Son whom the Father loves. From the union of Father and Son there must come an offspring of love, the Holy Spirit. The speculative theology of modern times has produced many similar efforts which [Friedrich August] Muecke has described in his *Die Dogmatik des 19ten Jahrhunderts*.

The orthodox teachers of the Lutheran Church have accordingly warned against all attempts to make the doctrine of the Trinity acceptable to human reason. We have two valuable treatises of Luther on this matter which have been especially translated for the St. Louis edition and carefully annotated by a number of illuminating glosses (Band X, Seiten 177ff.: "Zwei Disputationen von der Einheit des goettlichen Wesens und dem Unterschied der Personen in der Gottheit").

It is a precarious undertaking too to try to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity. Such illustrations usually imply falsehoods. E.g. the illustration used by Hans Egede, the missionary to the Eskimos (a glass into which a lump of ice, some snow and some water was put and then placed over a fire and melted) or that popular one of the tree, its blossoms, leaves and fruit. The *Chicago Evening American* has made a curious attempt of this kind on its editorial page:

"IT IS NOT AT ALL DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE EXISTENCE
OF A REAL TRINITY.

"The Trinities of various religions are far above our heads and we have no right to discuss them. But have you ever thought about the trinity of Beethoven, the grand piano and Paderewski?

"For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one', 1st John 5:7. This quotation is sent to us by a reader who apparently has lost his faith in religious teachings, and expresses the belief that any teaching as to a religious Trinity is an impossibility, an absurdity which should not be imposed upon the human mind.

“It is well occasionally to remind human beings that things which to them seem impossible are not impossible, and that statements which we believe to be the creations of imagination and scheming are often expressions of profound truth. As an example and proof of the fact that a Trinity may be real, and that three separate things may find expression through three voices, and that all three of them may be one, we ask our friend to imagine the following conditions: You are sitting in a room with the door closed. In the adjoining room there is a sound, the playing of a Beethoven sonata. You hear the music. If you had never seen a piano and knew nothing of music, you would not believe that in that room there were three separate and distinct forces giving expression simultaneously to one thought, one sound. You would not believe it if it were said to you: ‘In that room there are three that bear record to the greatness of musical genius, the piano, the artist, and the dead composer; and these three are one’. That is a paraphrase of the text which is sent to us, and yet we can show you that in that room where you hear the music it is perfectly possible to have the three distinct persons bearing record to the greatness of music, and to have those three ONE.

“In that room there is a grand piano. In front of the piano sits Paderewski playing. And on the piano there is a book containing one of Beethoven’s sonatas. The genius that created the piano died long ago. Paderewski is the only living one of the trinity. He sits there and plays. Yet you hear the three voices; they all bear record to the greatness of music. ‘AND THESE THREE ARE ONE’. If you should take away the piano, there would be no music. If you should take away Paderewski, leaving the piano and the score, there would still be no music. If you take away the text by Beethoven, still there

would be no music. The piano, the player, and the music of the dead composer are necessary; they are all separate, and yet all three are ONE. There, kind friends, you have proof of the fact that the Trinity speaking through three voices, all saying the same words, all three necessary to expression, are in reality one.”

However while we admit the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity is above human reason, we deny that it contradicts human reason. A real contradiction does not occur in our presentation on this doctrine, because unity and trinity are not predicated of God in the same relation. A real contradiction would exist if we were to teach: there *is* one essence, and there is not one essence; or: there *are* three persons, and: there are not three persons. But since we predicate unity of the essence and trinity only of the persons of the Godhead, there is no real contradiction.

We conclude with the remark of Baier: “*Quamvis vero in hac vita satis intelligere aut explicare non possumus, quomodo unius simplicissimae essentiae tres personae, ab ipsa quidem essentia tantum ratione, inter se autem realiter distinctae, esse possunt, tamen, quia utrumque revelatum est, utrumque etiam merito credimus.*”

§25. The Father.

A complete presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity requires that the three persons of the Godhead be considered, not only jointly as was done in the preceding paragraph, but also severally, as is done in the three succeeding paragraphs.

When we spoke of the persons of the Trinity as distinct from one another, there was indicated in that remark that distinctions must exist between the three persons, which not we, but the three persons themselves have created. These distinctions are usually divided into 1) *actus*, 2) *proprietates*, 3) *notiones personales*.

All the divine acts are either *opera ad extra* or *opera ad intra*. *Opera ad extra* are activities which extend from the Godhead to something that is outside of the Godhead, e.g. the creatures. The work of creation, redemption, sanctification, preservation are *opera ad extra*. In these works all three persons of the Godhead concur and cooperate, hence the axiom: *opera ad extra sunt indivisa*. You cannot divide the work of creation ascribing a particular part to each person; but the entire work is performed unitedly by all three persons alike. True we ascribe creation to the Father, redemption to the Son, sanctification to the Spirit, but this is done *per appropriationem*, i.e. one work is particularly ascribed to one person merely for convenience' sake. *Opera ad intra* are activities which terminate within the Godhead and extend from one or several of the persons to another. In these activities all three persons cannot concur, because in these activities one or two persons are acting with reference to another. Hence the axiom: *opera ad intra sunt divisa*, i.e. *non omnibus personis divinitatis communia*. The *opera ad extra* are also called *opera essentialia*, or *actus essentialia*, while the *opera ad intra* are called *opera personalia* or *actus personales*.

There is one act in the Trinity that is neither *opus ad extra* nor *ad intra*, but in a manner refers to both and is therefore called *opus mixtum*; that is the incarnation of the Son of God. It must be ascribed to the three persons of the

Godhead so far as the efficient cause and the origin of it is to be determined; but it can be ascribed only to the Son so far as the execution of it is concerned. Scripture speaks of the incarnation thus: "The Father sent His Son into the world; the Holy Spirit coming upon the virgin sanctified those drops of blood out of which the body of Christ was formed and purified them from sin, so that what was born of Mary was holy; and by a divine power this was brought about in the blessed virgin, that contrary to the laws of nature she conceived without the male element. The Son descended from heaven, overshadowed the virgin, came into the flesh, was made flesh by taking part of the same, manifesting Himself in the same and assuming it into the unity of His person."

From the *actus personales* or *opera ad intra* there result certain attributes or properties which are called *proprietates personales* or *constitutivae*. These represent qualities which are necessary in order that a certain person may be just that person. Some dogmaticians have called them *notiones systatikai*.

Likewise from the *actus personales* there spring the *notions personales*. These are conceptions under which distinct persons in the Godhead present themselves to us as just those persons and as distinct from others. Some dogmaticians do not distinguish the *proprietates* from the *notions personales*. Those like Baier who do call the latter *notiones sāmantikai kai gnooristikai, significativae aut indicativae*.

1. Scripture in many places introduces a person of the Godhead whom it designates by the name "Father." Christ by this name refers to this person in His discourses, John 3:35; 5:20, 25; Matthew 10:20; John 15:9, 26; 20:17; and even addresses prayers to this person, John 17. Elsewhere both in

the Old Testament (2nd Samuel 7:14; Psalm 2:7) and in the New Testament (1st Peter 1:3; Galatians 4:6) we meet with this person who is called **Aab**, patär, Father. In all these passages it is plain that a certain individual possessing all the requirements of personality, hence a real person is being referred to. Hence the dogmaticians say that in these texts the term "Father" is used hypostatikoos. Our text-book expresses the same fact by saying "The Father" is "personally so named in Holy Scripture."

In the Lord's Prayer we are taught to address the Deity by the name "Father." In many passages of Scripture the relation which the Godhead holds to the created universe is expressed by the same name, e.g. in Malachi 2:10, the terms "Father" and "God" are plainly synonymous. In Isaiah 9:6 there occurs among the names of the Virgin's Son, the Redeemer, the name "Everlasting Father." In such texts the name "Father" is used ousioodooos, like the name "God." It refers to the entire Trinity, the one true God who deserves to be called Father by reason of His creation and preservation of the universe, and in particular by reason of the fact that in the Redeemer He has adopted fallen men as His children and guards the believers with a fatherly affection. Gerhard suggests this rule for keeping these two uses of the term "Father" distinct: "*Quando divinitatis intra se describitur nomen Patris sumitur hypostatikoos, quando vero fit collatio divinitas ad creaturas nomen Patris sumitur ousioodooos et complectitur singulas tres personas.*"

2. The Father "is from eternity of Himself and unbegotten." The statement of our Lord in John 5:26: "The Father hath life in Himself" is "the sublime assumption of the self-existence and eternal being of the Father, the absolute Possessor of life per se, the Source ultimate and efficient of all

that is connoted by life, the eternal fountain of life" (Reynolds). The Father is not of another, but of Himself. This is termed His aggenäsia or *innascibilitas*. To use the terminology which we noted before the innascibility of the Father is His *notio personalis*.

3. There is a reason why this particular person of the Trinity is and deserves to be called "Father." Father is a connotative term; it necessarily implies that there is another being to whom the Father holds the relation of progenitor, and who is the Father's son. The Father who is from eternity, "has by equally eternal generation begotten or filiated the Son from His divine essence." This is the reason why this particular person is called "the Father." David, the ancestor according to the flesh of the future Messiah, is told by the prophet (2nd Samuel 7:14) that God Himself will be the Messiah's Father, and the Messiah His Son. The Messiah shall be a person who has an earthly and a heavenly Father. An act of generating is indicated by the verb "jalad", Psalm 2:7. The Unbegotten has begotten. He hath life in Himself and even as He hath it, "so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself" John 5:26. As Augustine has it: "He generated such a Son who should have life in Himself, not as a participator in life, but one who should be as He Himself is – Life itself" (Reynolds). This - generation or filiation - is called the *actus personalis* of the Father.

We must dismiss every material conception of this act. Gregory Nazianzus rightly warns us: "Theou genäsia sioopä timasthoo." The act of generating and the capacity for such an act are to us an inscrutable mystery. But this does not give us the right to declare this generation to be figuratively or improperly so-called. The generation was a real act: the divine essence of the Father was communicated to the Son. Nor

would it be doing justice to the language of Scripture describing this act to say: “the generation of the Son is an act of the Father’s intellect.” This would make the Son not a person, but a thought, an idea, which the Father by self-reflection or introspection produced from Himself. Melanchthon, following some of the early fathers and the scholastic theologians, expressed this view in the *Corpus Doctrinae Misnicum*. He said that the Son of God had been born by an act of cogitation on the part of the Father, for the Father had by reflecting on Himself and considering Himself generated a certain substantial and permanent image of Himself, just as one mind by thinking produces an accidental and vanishing image. The Philippists defended this dream of Melanchthon as a sure dogma and an article of faith.

Nor is the generation of the Son to be called an act of the Father’s will. That would make the Son not a person, but a wish, or a purpose on which the Father decides.

The generation of the Son is “eternal.” It cannot be fixed in time like the birth of God’s Son at Bethlehem; it occurred, or occurs **hajjoom** “today” Psalm 2:7, in the immeasured existence of the Father who regards neither present nor future. The same fact is indicated in Micah 5:2, where it is said of the future ruler of Israel who shall come out of Bethlehem, that “his goings forth” (**mootsaaothaiv**) are “from old” (**miqqedem**), “from everlasting” (**miimei hoolaam**). When Paul cites Psalm 2:7 in Acts 13:32f., he does not say that Christ became, but that He was manifested as the Son of God by the resurrection.

Quenstedt remarks that for this generation there is no parallel in the realm of matter. It did not take place by derivation or transfusion, or by an act that commenced and

then stopped, but takes place by ceaseless emanation. The Father has begotten the Son from eternity, ever is begetting Him, and will never cease begetting Him. For if this generation had a point at which it terminates it would also have a beginning, and then it would no longer be eternal.

Luther shares this view of the eternal generation, but styles it more practically. He says, “Some inquire whether we must say ‘the Father has ever generated’, or ‘the Father is ever generating the Son’, whether we ought to say the Son has ‘ever been’ or ‘is ever being born’. Those who have adopted the former mode of speaking give as their reason why we should say ‘the Son of God has ever been born’ is that the past tense denotes what is perfect, while the present denotes what is imperfect. Hilarius and others have been so bold as to say that the Son is ever being born of the Father, the Living always is living by means of the Living and is being born of Him who is never born. But I think that his controversy, by which the flesh or reason is stirred up, belongs to grammar and philosophy rather than to theology. Since it is certain that in the Deity, which is eternity itself, there is no room for grammatical and philosophical discussions, for past, present and future are the same in eternity; therefore it is the same whether you say in the past tense: the Son has been born; or in the present: He is being born; or in the future: he will be born.”

For illustration of this mysterious generation the theologians have pointed to the rays streaming from the sun. The sun is not older than its rays. As soon as there was a sun, as long as there has been or will be a sun, there have been and will be rays. And the fact that the emitting of rays from the sun is constantly going on does not argue that the rays are not complete. However *omne simile claudicat*: in the illustration

adduced we have to do with a material object and its accidental accompaniments; but in stating the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, we must not forget that we declare the substance of the Son to be the same as that of the Father.

The generation of the Son from the essence of the Father has been declared altogether impossible. If Christ was begotten from out of the substance of the Father this must have been either from the whole or from a part of the substance. It could not have been from a part because the essence of the Father is indivisible. Nor could it have been from the whole, because the Father could no longer be the Father, since the essence of the Deity is numerically one (*una numero*), and hence could not be shared by several. Gerhard remarks that this argument did not originate in the school of Christ but rests on rationalistic grounds. Over and against this argument we urge 1) when an article of faith is set forth in the proper and clear terms of Scripture, philosophical arguments, no matter how plausible, cannot be urged against it; 2) the principle on which this whole argument rests can be applied only to a finite essence, but is plainly false when applied to an infinite and immeasurable essence. By generating, the Father indeed imparts to the Son His entire essence and that the same essence as His own (*eandem numero essentiam*), but He is not Himself destroyed by such communication, nor does He lose thereby, because He is infinite and immeasurable; 3) the argument adduced is not always valid when applied to matter: man generates man, a candle is lighted from another candle; still by the act of generating or lighting nothing is taken away from the man or the candle.

The question has been raised in this connection whether the Father could be called the *causa* of the Son. The

Greek fathers frequently call the Father archä kai aitios (*causa*) of the Son. Damascenus says: "Ho hyios ouk anarchos, tout' estin, ouk anaitios, ek tou Patros gar." The Latin teachers of the church however have rejected the term "*causa*" in this connection, and have preferred in the place of it the term "*principium*." They call the Father "*principium sine principio*," the Son "*principium de principio*," for they hold that the term "principle" has a wider scope than the term "*causa*." Principle stands for the genus while cause is a species of the genus. Every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause.

Related to this question is another, viz. whether the Son is autotheos, autogod, independently God. Gerhard points out that the question contains an ambiguity: if it is put with reference to the communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son, it must be answered negatively; but if it is put with reference to the equality existing between the Father and the Son, it must be affirmed. Hence we may say both: *Christus est autotheos*, and: *Christus non est autotheos*, according to the view which we wish to express. Gregorius de Valentia says: "*Filius, ut est persona, est ex alio; ut simplicissimum ens, non est ex alio.*" Gerhard adds: "*Christus vere et se ipso deus est, non tamen a se ipso deus est.*"

From the generation of the Son there results the state or relationship of paternity (*paternitas*), i.e. the state of being the Father. Paternity is the *proprietas personalis* of the Father.

4. The Father "with the Son by equally eternal spiration spirates the Holy Ghost." Christ declares that "the Spirit of truth" who in this case is a person distinct from the Father and the Son, "proceedeth from the Father (para tou patros ekporeuetai)" John 15:26. The verb "ekporeuetai" is in the present tense and denotes an issuing forth that was going on at

the time when the Lord spoke of another issuing forth that was to occur later when He would send the Paraclete who was then, and in fact ever had been, and ever will be “proceeding from the Father.” Hence there is here indicated to us a mysterious process similar to that of the eternal generation. This process is called the spiration when referred to the Father as the Principle or the agent; and procession when applied to the Spirit. Because of the relationship created by spiration the Spirit is called “the Spirit of the Father,” Matthew 10:20 (genitive: *auctoris*). Baier: “*Dicitur spiritus eius personae, a qua spiratur.*” And since we have the same relationship expressed in the same grammatical way with reference to the Son in Galatians 4:6; and since Christ has declared that He would “send” the Paraclete (John 15:26) and asserted that He and the Father are one, we hold that the spiration of the Holy Ghost is a work in which the Father and the Son share, or in other words, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (*a Patre Filioque*), although we have no text that states as John 15:26 states of the Father “para tou hyiou ekporeuetai.”

It is a rather lukewarm and, by its seeming admissions towards the end, misleading statement when Reynolds (*Pulpit Commentary*) reviews the historical signification of John 15:26 as follows: “This is the great text on which the Western Church and the Greeks alike relied for their doctrine concerning the procession of the Spirit, the timeless, premundane relations among the Personalities of the Godhead. The expression ‘ekporeuetai’ only occurs in this place, and from it ‘ekporeusis’ became the ecclesiastical term for the relation which the Spirit sustains to the Father, just as ‘gennāsis’ was the especial term to denote the peculiarity of the Son, and just as “agennāsia,” the condition of unbegottenness and paternity was that used

to denote the Father’s own hypostatic distinction. The Holy Spirit is ever proceeding, issuing forth from, sent by the Father on His work of self-manifestation and divine activity in the universe. Of this there can be no question, and the Nicene Symbol originally expressed it without amplification, and the Greeks founded upon it their conception of the Trinity. The relation of the Son and Spirit to the Father were believed to be coordinate; and though both were of the same eternal substance, yet both were equal to the Father. But the Western Church in after years—notwithstanding the tremendous anathemas against all alteration which guarded the Nicene and Chalcedonian formulae—felt that the whole truth concerning the divinity of the Son was concealed, if the idea was not also conveyed which our Lord utters side by side with the ekporeuetai para tou patros in this verse. Christ says: ‘I will send Him para tou patros’, and this must be compared with (14:26) ‘whom the Father will send in my name’, and the Latins to express this thought added ‘*filioque*’ to the phrase ‘proceeding from the Father’, and claimed our Lord as equally the source of the divine Spirit with the Father, so that it runs ‘proceeding from the Father and the Son’. In the endless discussions that arose the two churches probably meant to effect the same thing, viz. to affirm the glory and the perfect Deity of the Lord Christ. The Greeks in ancient times never limited their statement to ‘proceeding from the Father only’, nor did they object to add ‘through or by the Son’, but it is probable that Augustine and the Western Church, and the liturgical forms that arose in it, approach a little more closely to the reality and quality of Him who said ‘I and my Father are one’ in this respect, that the Spirit proceedeth from the Father and the Son when he comes into human hearts and testifies of

Christ.(!) There are those (Beza, Alford, Luthardt, Meyer) who urge that these passages do not bear at all on the internal relations of the Godhead, but simply refer to the temporal mission of the Holy Spirit.(!) 'The words' says Luthardt 'must be understood historically, not metaphysically'(!) and much may be said in favor of this view.(!) If this verse does not furnish the basis of an argument, there is no other which can be advanced to establish the view either of the Eastern or the Western Church."(!)

Since the Father and the Son, though in reality two distinct persons, produce the Holy Ghost by one and the same spirating power, the teachers of the church have called the Father and the Son "*unum principium spirans Spiritum Sanctum*." Gerhard: "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father mediately, viz. through the intervention of the Son; for in that case He would be more nearly related to the one person than to the other; but He proceeds immediately from both, as from one fountain and essence. For as the Father and Logos are one essence, so they are one essential principle in producing one and the same Spirit consubstantial with themselves, and are therefore in their essential unity to be altogether coordinated (*syndiaxomenon*) in the act of spirating, with this only difference that the Father has the faculty to spirate from Himself, while the Son has received it from the Father by the ineffable generation.

Spiration agrees with generation in this that both denote an emanation within the divine essence of one from the other or others.

That spiration is an act of the will of God, or that God spirates by loving, we would admit as little here as we admitted similar thoughts regarding the generation of the Son.

Quenstedt: "If the Son of God, properly speaking, proceeds from the intellect, and the Spirit from the will, the persons of the Trinity are not equal. For 1) it might be said that the person which proceeds from the intellect is unlike as regards the will from the person which proceeds from the will, and vice versa; 2) no convenient reason can be adduced why one person should proceed from the intellect rather than from the will, and vice versa. Nor should we seek a difference in a distinct operation of either the intellect or will, because the operation of the intellect and will is common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. The act by which the Son through generation and the Spirit through spiration proceed from God should rather be referred to the very essence of God. If we may select some quality or virtue in God which we claim to have been especially active in generating or spirating, why not select the Power of God, since the second person of the Trinity is called the 'power of God' in 1st Corinthians 1:24?"

That there is a difference between the generating act and the spirating act is certain, because both acts were expressed by different terms; but wherein these acts differ we cannot tell. "*Quid sit nasci, quid processus, me nescire sum professus.*" "*Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio immanenter emanate et emananter immanent*" (Kromayer).

§26. The Son.

1. There is one person in the Deity who bears the name of the Son, (*hyios*, Matthew 17:5; *ben*, Psalm 2:7). He is so called by the Father, Matthew 17:5; and calls Himself so, Psalm 2:7. He also speaks of a person as His Father, John 20:17. In all

these texts the Son is represented as a personality distinct from the Father. Not only does the use of the personal pronouns (“I” John 20:17; “him” Matthew 17:5; “thee” Psalm 2:7; “this” Matthew 17:5) indicate this, but the attending circumstances (conversation between two persons, Psalm 2:7; purposes to be achieved like “ascending to the Father” John 20:17; “hearing” the Son speak Matthew 17:5) likewise exhibit this fact.

2. The Son is “from eternity,” Micah 5:2; see preceding paragraph. His existence antedates that of Abraham, John 8:58. The “egoo eimi” in this text is the continuous present. John 1:1 places His existence ahead of “the beginning,” viz. the beginning of time and created things. When the world began, He already “was.”

3. There is only one such person whom God calls His Son. He is “monogenēs,” John 3:16, 18; 1st John 4:9. The act by which He came forth from the Father, the eternal generation, was explained in the preceding paragraph. That act is termed *generatio activa* when predicated of the Father; *generatio passiva* when predicated of the Son.

4. From this act results the *proprietas personalis*, the personal attribute of the Son, viz. His *filiatio*, the state of being the Son. This state and relationship is not only declared in the texts quoted above under the paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3, but is shown to be an abiding condition which the Son did not even quit when He became incarnate, John 1:14, 18.

5. In His incarnate state and while sharing the lot of men in His humble life as men’s substitute, the Son has coordinated Himself with all men so completely that He spoke of the Father as “His God and their God,” John 20:17. But this coordination does not imply that He was subordinate to the Father. By the eternal birth He shared the essence and the most intimate

communion with the Father, John 1:1, 18; yea it is expressly stated that He is God, John 1:1.

5-8. The proof-texts for the divinity of the Son will have to be studied again in the opening paragraphs of the chapter on Christology; hence we waive a discussion of them at this place all the more since His consubstantiality (homo-ousia) and coequality with the Father have been exhibited already in the preceding paragraph.

It is customary to designate the Father as the first, the Son as the second, and the Holy Ghost as the third person of the Trinity. This indicates that there is a certain order among the persons of the Godhead, but it is not meant to express rank, or subordination of one person to another. Neither in point of time, nor as regards His nature and essence, nor as regards His dignity is one person before or above the other. They are in these respects equal. But because the Father is not from another, while the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit from both the Father and the Son, therefore we enumerate them in an orderly and natural manner by calling the Father the first person, etc. Since the days of Athanasius it has been customary to call the Father “ridza kai pāgā tou hyiou kai tou pneumatōs” the root and the fountainhead of the Son and the Spirit. Quenstedt discusses the validity of this expression as follows: “The source or fountainhead does not imply a preeminence, or a higher degree of greatness over and against the rivers that spring from it, but only a priority of sequence (*prioritatem saltem ordinis*). The relation of the sun to its rays is similar to that of the Father who is the fountainhead of the Deity, to the Son: he does not surpass the Son in excellence. From the order of procession no conclusion must be drawn as to any prerogative of essence.... We must distinguish between a

primal entity (*ens primum*), as opposed to a created entity that is dependent upon some one else, and as opposed to other persons who by reason of their origin are coeternal with the *ens primum*. Thus the Father can in the realm of divinity be called the primal entity with regard to the other persons, with the understanding however that they are and remain coeternal with the Father; in other words, that as regards their essence, they are from eternity together with the Father a simply infinite and primal entity. Again we must distinguish between the term “cause,” which cannot, in the sphere of divinity be applied to the Father to express His relation to the Son (for in that case the Son would by His nature be a dependent being, later than the Father and differing from Him as one essence differs from another—*numero essentiarum*--), and the term “principle,” this term being employed to express, not the idea of nature or causality, but the idea of comparison, relation and subsistence. Hence the Greek fathers who call the Father “aition,” i.e. the cause of the Son, have made a catachrestic use of the term “cause” in preference to the term “principle”; the Latin fathers would under no consideration admit the term “cause.” We distinguish Christ insofar as He is viewed as man and in the state of exinanition, and insofar as He is regarded as God. Christ says, John 14:28: “The Father is greater than I,” but this statement He makes with reference to His humanity; for in John 10:30 He has declared that He and the Father are one, and in John 5:18 that He is equal with the Father. He calls the Father greater than Himself according to the nature in which He by His death and resurrection went to the Father. Luther has rightly explained the words “of Christ: ‘The Father is greater than I’ as referring not to the origin of the Son from the Father in the sphere of the Deity, as Origen, Gregory Nazianzus, and Hilary

have explained it, but rather to the state and condition in which Christ was living at that time, that is the state of exinanition.” Luther whom Quenstedt has quoted, says “Dass er sagt: ‘Der Vater ist groesser denn ich’, dass redet er nicht von dem persoentlichen goettlichen Wesen, seinem oder des Vaters, wie die Arianer den Text faelschlich verkehret, und nicht haben wollen sehen, wovon oder warum Christus hier also redet; sonder vom Unterschied des Reichs, so er soll haben bei dem Vater, und seines Dienstes oder knechtischen Gestalt, darin er vor seiner Auferstehung war. Jetzt bin ich klein, will er sagen, in meinem Dienstamt und Knechtes Gestalt; wie er anderswo sagt Matthew 20:28: ‘Des Menschen Sohn ist nicht kommen, dass er ihm dienen lasse, sondern dass er diene und gebe sein Leben fuer viele’. Das heist ja klein geworden, wie St. Paulus sagt, Philippians 2:8, sich gedemuetiget und heruntergeworfen unter alles, Suende, Tot, Teufel, Welt ueber sich treten lassen. Das ist der Gang den ich von euch gehe; aber es soll nicht in solcher Kleinheit geblieben sein; den das waere doch gar zu nichte worden; sondern soll nur ein Durchgang sein und eben der Weg und das Kittel, dadurch ich zum Vater komme, da ich nicht mehr klein, sondern so gross und allmaechtig sein werde als er ist und mit ihm ewiglich herrschen und regieren.... Darum ist solch Gehen und Groesse des Vaters nichts anderes, denn Christum verklaert werden, was und wer er sei; nicht was er der Person halben werden sollte oder sein koennte; denn das war er bereit und von Ewigkeit her, aber es war noch nicht offenbart und zu erkennen, weil er in dem knechtlichen und leidenden sterblichen Amt daherging. Darum war der Vater grosser den er: nicht nach dem Wesen der beiden Personen, daher er Vater und Christus der Sohn ist; sondern nach dem Regiment und Herrlichkeit, und wie man in den Schulen redet: *non actu primo*

sed secundo" (II, 1079f.). "Es ist zu glauben festiglich, dass Christus sei wahrer Gott und wahrer Mensch, und zuweilen redet die Schrift und er selbst als ein Mensch, zuweilen als ein Gott. Als da er sagt, John 8:58, 'Ehe Abraham ward, bin ich', das ist von der Gottheit gesagt; aber da er sagt Maatthew 20:23 zu Jakob und Johanne 'Es ist nicht mein, dass ich euch gebe zu sitzen zur rechten Hand oder zur linken Hand, das ist von der Menschheit geredet, gleich als die selbst er sich am Kreuze nicht helfen mochte; wiewohl etliche hier grosse Kuenste wollen beweisen mit ihrem feinsten Auslegen, dass sie den Ketzern begegnen: Also ist das auch der Mensch Christus, da er sagt, 'Der Vater ist grosser denn ich', John 14:28; *item* Matthew 23:37, 'Wie oft habe ich deine Kinder wollen sammeln, wie eine Gluckhenne unter ihre Fluegel'; *item* Mark 13:32, 'Von dem Tag weiss niemand, weder die Engel, noch der Sohn, sondern allein der Vater'" (XII, 155).

In the same category belong such texts as John 20:17, where Christ speaks of the Father as "His God", and 1st Corinthians 11:3, where God is called "the head of Christ." This is to be understood of Christ insofar as He is man. For otherwise, as 1st Corinthians 8:6 shows, He is one with Father and as such the head and Lord over all things.

The objection is raised that Christ declares the Father the prime author of His doctrine and works, hence the Father must possess an eminence above the Son. It is true that Christ has repeatedly made such a statement when He wished to explain His mission on earth, but when He referred to His essential sovereignty, He said: "All things, whatsoever the Father does, the Son doeth likewise" John 5:19.

Others still argue that the Father who has His essence of Himself must be above the Son, who has His essence not of

Himself. But even in human generation the fact that a person is somebody's progenitor does not necessarily imply a higher degree of greatness. Nor does the fact that a person has sprung from a certain person make him inferior. But in the matter before us we are dealing with an event that has occurred within the indivisible divine essence, and the generation of the Son from the Father, or the procession of the Spirit from both cannot be viewed in any way that would destroy the unity of their essence. Hilary and not a few of the ancient fathers have said that the Father is greater than the Son in point of origin; but they have meant that the Father is greater than the Son not insofar as the Son is God, but insofar as he is Son: *non ratione naturae, sed personae*. However the more careful teachers have warned against the idea that because of the origin of the Son from the Father the Father is greater than the Son. The claim of M. Nicolai that the Son as God regards the Father as His God and Head has ever been regarded as heterodox and profane. Calov notes that not one of the Greek fathers has expressed himself in this wise: The Father is worthier or more excellent than the Son; or possesses a greater authority than the Son; although some of them have said that one person is *dignitate prior alia*.

The fact that the Son is of the same essence with the Father is brought out more strongly than by direct statements when we study what the dogmatists have termed "consequences of the homoousia." a) There is a mutual and most singular immanence and existence in one another by which the Father is declared to be in the Son, John 14:17; 17:21. The unity of their essence makes this state of being in one another (Ineinandersein) necessary. The technical terms for this state are "perichooräsis, enhyparxis, or circumincessio." b)

There is an equality of the persons by reason of which no person is smaller or greater than any other, and the Father cannot be called God katexochän, or God because of His superior mode of existence. c) There is a most perfect communion of the persons as regards all essential attributes. d) There is a sameness of action by reason of which the three persons perform the same works in the same manner, though not always in the same order, when their action extends beyond the circle of the Trinity. To this fact our Lord refers when He says John 5:19: "The Son can do nothing of Himself but what He seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." In these words Christ does not express Himself powerless, but He declares this most perfect unity in cooperation by which, as Augustine has put it, "*opera ad extra sunt indivisa*." The Lord's remark, that He "sees" the Father acting must not be understood in the sense that He observes the Father as a pupil watches the teacher to learn from him, but it denotes the individuality of His workmanship in His joint activity with the Father, as He has said elsewhere: "The Father worketh hitherto, and I work."

§27. The Holy Ghost.

There is in the Godhead a person who is "Spirit," 2nd Corinthians 3:17; the "Spirit of God," Job 33:4; Romans 8:9; 1st Corinthians 3:16; 2:10, 11; the "Spirit of the Lord," 2nd Samuel 23:2; Psalm 139:7; the "Spirit of truth," John 15:26; the "Spirit of His Son," Galatians 4:6; the "Spirit of Christ," Romans 8:9; 1st Peter 1:11; the "Holy Ghost," Matthew 3:16; 28:19; Luke 3:22;

Acts 5:3; the "Comforter" or "Paraclete," John 14:16; the "Spirit of glory," 1st Peter 4:14.

As regards the term "spirit" (from spirare, to breathe), this name indicates the essence of this person. He shares with the Father and the Son the quality of being incorporeal, immaterial (see §22). This name is applied "ousioudoos," viz. as denoting essence to the entire Godhead, John 4:24. But in the case of this particular person in the Godhead the name denotes also a personal characteristic and the mode of His existence (tropos hyparxeoos seu character hypostaticus). He is breathed forth from the Father and the Son ("Breath of the Almighty," Job 33:4). In this sense the Father is not the Spirit, nor the Son, but only the Holy Ghost.

The Spirit is called "holy" not only because that is an essential attribute which He shares with the Father and the Son, but also because of the peculiar work in which he is engaged among men; He is the Sanctifier of men, because He creates faith in their hearts. Luther says: "Scripture calls this Spirit of God the 'Holy' Spirit for the reason that His office should be indicated to us, even as the office of the Son is indicated to us in this that He is called a Teacher of righteousness, for the Spirit of God makes us holy who because of sin are born and are altogether unholy and wicked" (H, VI, 2315).

1. The Spirit is a person: He speaks, 2nd Samuel 23:2; He teacheth, John 14:26; signifies the meaning of prophecies, 1st Peter 1:11; cries, Romans 8:9; men can lie to Him, Acts 5:3.

2. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (see §25). This His procession is His *proprietas personalis*, also known as *spiratio passiva*.

3. The Spirit is “very God.” The act of spirating must be understood like that of generating as the communication of the divine essence. The Father and the Son give forth the Spirit as that which they themselves are: God. The Spirit is therefore consubstantial with the Father and the Son (homoousios). Accordingly He is directly called “God,” Acts 5:3, 4; “Lord,” 2nd Corinthians 3:17.

4. He shares the divine attributes, such as omnipresence, Psalm 139:7, 8; and omniscience, 1st Corinthians 2:10, 11.

5. He receives the worship of the angels, Isaiah 6:3; in His name divine rites like baptism are executed, Matthew 28:18; and He is the bestower of glory to the believers, 1st Peter 4:14.

§28. The Attributes of God.

When we distinguish in God His essence from His attributes, we must bear in mind that this distinction is merely our human effort to grasp fully the concept of God. We conceive of God first as a being; that is the concept of essence (*essentia*, *substantia*). Next we ascribe to this being certain qualities, perfections, attributes. In reality this distinction does not exist. The essence of God and the attributes of God coincide. Baier says of the divine attributes: “*Revera non sunt accidentia* (that is, matters that may or may not go with the concept of God) *neque ab essentia divina realiter differunt*.” Nevertheless we are compelled to make this distinction between the essence and the attributes of God, because with our limited power of comprehension we cannot form any

proper conception at all of such an infinite and absolutely singular Being as God. The distinction is therefore made “*propter infinitam Dei perfectionem et nostri intellectus imperfectionem*” (Baier). Quenstedt, who gives the same reason for this distinction, says that our poor intellect must speak of “affections” in God, that is of qualities which in our way of studying God affect and help us to describe the divine essence; or of “attributes,” that is of qualities which our mind must ascribe to God. The same writer calls the divine essence “*to pan kai ouden, omne et nihil*.” God is “all” because the perfection of all things exists in Him, and whatever is has its being from Him. God is “nothing” not in the sense of deficiency as if the divine essence were nothing, but because He exceeds all existing things.

Now such concepts as essence, existence, and certain qualities are predicated both of God and of creatures. Hence the question arises whether we predicate those alike of God and of creatures. Such statements as “God is” and “Adam is” or “God is just” and “The judge is just” are neither univocal or synonymous, nor equivocal or homonymous but analogical expressions. An expression is used *univoce*, synonymously, when the term and that which the term stands for is predicated with the same force of everything to which it applies, so that there would be no inequality whatever between the various objects to which the term is applied. Since all creatures are dependent and God alone is independent, evidently such a concept as “existence” has a higher meaning as regards God than as regards Adam. An expression is used *aequivoce*, homonymously, when the same term is applied to various objects but not that which the term signifies. Equivocations are really fallacies. Now the term existence when applied to Adam

denotes a real fact and expresses a truth just as much as when applied to God. Accordingly we hold that the above terms are used analogically, *analogice*, analogoos of God and creatures. They express not an identity but a similarity of facts.

Chemnitz has discussed the axiom "*In Deum non cadit accidens*," that is there are no accidental or fortuitous features imaginable in God. The axiom is found in Cyril's *Thesaurus*, chapter 2. By "*accidens*" we understand with Bonaventura, something that may be lost or set aside or may be added to some existing object without destroying the substance of that object. E.g. virtue in the angels became lost when the devils fell, however the essence of the fallen spirits was not changed. Or when a person is regenerated by divine grace, his human substance is not changed. Augustine expresses the same thought as Cyril thus. "*In Deo nihil est mutabile vel admissibile*" hence there is no accidental feature in God. The true and simple meaning of the above axiom then is that God is ever what He is and that He cannot be affected by the changes of time or by our malice. When we argue from certain virtues or actions of ours to God, the argument is not from like to like, but from lesser to greater. Thus when such things are predicated of God as truth, goodness, justice, purity, mercy, etc. they do not exist in God as the corresponding virtues exist in men, or in angels. Accordingly by the love of God we do not understand such a love as is found in creatures, for that is an accidental feature in them, changeable and subject to loss, but we mean by it the essence of God, which earnestly and ardently loves us. In the case of creatures it is one thing to speak of a person possessing life and wisdom, and another thing to speak of the life and wisdom possessed by a person. But in God there is nothing that is distinct from this very essence, His life, wisdom,

grace, mercy, goodness, love are the very essence of God and cannot be changed in Him as in men. The objection is raised that some things are predicated of God from the viewpoint of time, e.g. the Word was made flesh; God becomes the Creator; or a Helper in trouble, etc. These things then must be regarded as accidental. Cyril replies to this objection as follows: in reference to the creatures certain things are said of God from the viewpoint of time, and these things are predicated of Him as though they were accidental; not indeed as though there could be anything accidental and implying a change in the essence of God, but they are accidental as regards the creatures in whom a change occurs when God becomes their Creator, their refuge, etc. Accordingly it is said in the schools: Nothing implying time is predicated of God as if it were essential or inherent in Him, but it is predicated of Him either to indicate the cause, as when He is called the Creator, or to express a union, as in the statement "The Word was made flesh." In such instances a change occurs with regard to the creatures. This rule is not an empty figment of the scholastic theologians, but rests on plain Scripture texts like Numbers 23:19; Malachi 3:6; Psalm 102:13; James 1:17; 1st Timothy 6:16; Hebrews 13:8. However we must note also the right use of this axiom; for from a false use of this axiom the Scholastics have deprived God of all affections, so that they have even declared that the most comforting statement in Hosea 11:8, 9 must be understood "*secundum affectionem tantum, non secundum affectionem*," that is as showing what effects God wants to produce, not in what He is affected. True God's pity is not human pity, which is accidental and there is nothing accidental in God; but since God's pity cannot be distinguished from His essence, therefore it is in Him a far more ardent feeling than we can imagine.

If the attributes, says Gerhard, really differed from the essence of God, God would certainly be a composite and not the absolutely simple, one and undivided essence, for He would be compounded out of essence and attributes. God is good, not by goodness being added to His being, but by Himself, that is, by His essence; and hence He is goodness itself and the highest good. Nor is He powerful by reason of the accident of power being added to His being, but He is by Himself, that is, by His essence powerful, and hence He is omnipotence itself. And so on through the entire list of His attributes. Thus it comes that power, goodness, wisdom, etc. are called "attributes," not "qualities" or "accidentals" in Him. Hence the rule "Nothing is in God that is not God itself." *"Nulla in Deo sunt accidentia."* The divine essence identifies with itself all that is divine. This complete identification of the divine attributes with the divine essence is proven first by those Scripture texts which call God the very light, the very life, very goodness, etc. Next by a comparison of Scripture texts as, e.g. Psalm 25:6 where the royal prophet prays: "Remember, O Lord, thy tender mercies and thy lovingkindness, for they have been ever of old. Remember not the sins of my youth nor my transgressions; according to thy mercy remember me for thy goodness' sake, O Lord." Compare this text with Isaiah 43:25, especially the expression "for mine own sake." Finally there should here be cited the texts which refer to the immutability of the divine essence. However though the divine attributes do not exist in God as distinct from one another or from the divine essence, still on account of the feebleness of our intellect we treat them separately and singly. Augustine says: "God lowered Himself to our level that He might raise us to His." Since we are human God speaks to us after the manner of men.

What creatures, says Quenstedt, do and accomplish by diverse and distinct qualities and virtues, God does and accomplishes by His essence. We are, as regards our essence, men, and as regards qualities, good and wise. By reason of one virtue we are just, by reason of another liberal, etc. But God is all and does all by reason of His essence. Hence the theological aphorism: "In an abstract view the divine attributes are predicable of one another insofar as they exist in God, but not insofar as they exist in our concepts."

What follows if we ascribe to God essence and attributes *univoce*, that is in the same sense as we ascribe these to creatures? The specific difference between God and the creatures disappears, the creatures become coordinate with God, and are practically made to be God. The Scotists and some of the Nominalist philosophers (Occam, Biel) assert that such terms as *"ens, essentia, spiritus"* are predicated of God and creatures *univoce*. This error was later taken up by the Universalists.

What follows on the other hand when essence and attributes are predicated of God and the creatures *aequivoce*? Practically this that all knowledge of God is destroyed. We would, e.g. not be sure that we state a truth when we say that God is love. For if this statement is equivocal we do not know whether God really is what we call love, or whether He is anything that He is called. The truth is that although our conceptions and declarations concerning God are imperfect, being formed within our limited comprehension, they are nevertheless true. Some of the Scholastics and others who have followed them like Keckermann, Bartholinus, Rabbi Moses have fallen into this error of equivocation. Dionysius Petavius entered upon a most elaborate argument in his dogmatic

theology to show that to be and to exist, truly and properly speaking, can be predicated only of God. Thomas Aquinas in his day opposed this error, because it would destroy all meditation on the subject of God, render the argument of the apostle in Romans 1:17f. nugatory, and lead to the following absurdities: 1) If creatures share only the name of existence, when in reality they are non-existent, it would follow that God had produced things that do not exist when He created. 2) If a creature is a *non-ens*, it cannot be related to God as an effect of His or as dependent upon Him. 3) Christ by assuming the human nature would have assumed a *non-ens*.

In the Reformed Church some Calvinists have contended that the divine attributes are non-existent, that they are ascribed to God in an improper sense, that they do not really exist in God, that God is void of all qualities, etc. This claim was advanced for a purpose: These Calvinists meant thereby to escape the admission that when the Son of God was incarnated the divine attributes were communicated to the human nature of Christ. Beckmann argued: You cannot give to another what you do not possess yourself. Now God has no attributes; hence He could not give or communicate any to the human nature of Christ. For the same purpose Massonius and Sachs, in his controversy with the Lutheran Meisner, denied that in God there are attributes properly so-called.

On the other hand Socinians like Crellius have asserted that there are in God accidental features, and have denied that the divine attributes are God Himself.

In the Modern Lutheran Church Dr. Thomasius has declared: "Diese (immanenten oder wesentlichen) Eigenschaften unterscheiden sich daher von den eigentlichen Wesensbestimmtheiten (Sein, Bewusstsein, Wille), auf denen

sie ruhen, und nicht minder von den trinitarischen Relationen, welche personliche Unterschiede in Gott setzen. Andererseits muessen diejenigen von ihnen ausgeschieden werden, welche bloss Beziehungen gottes zur Welt ausdruecken.... So zum Beispiel druecken die Attribute der Allmacht, Allgegenwart, Allwissenheit, Strafgerechtigkeit ohne Zweifel Beziehungen Gottes zur Welt aus, sie lassen sich ohne hinzunahme des Weltbegriffs garnicht (denken) vollziehen. Waeren nun diese Attribute wesentliche Eigenschaften, so muesste auch die Welt sein, damit Gott sein koenne.... Jene Ausscheidung ist also unerlaesslich. Sie findet sich auch bei unsern alten Dogmatikern, welche die *attributa in immanentia* oder *absoluta* und *in transeuntia* oder *relativa* einteilen... nur dass diesem richtigen Unterschied nicht die rechte Folge von ihnen gegeben wird.... Fuer die Christologie ist unsere Ansicht in so fern von Wichtigkeit, als hiernach eine Aufgebung relativer goettlicher Eigenschaften ohne Gefaehrung der wesentlichen gar wohl behauptet werden kann."

1) The divine attributes have been variously enumerated by particular writers, but they are by universal agreement classified in two groups. The first of these is called the group of negative attributes. These attributes have been called thus because the very terms in which they are expressed contain a negation, and the force of these terms is to express what God is not and cannot be. The negation is made from the standpoint of our human imperfections and limitations. Quenstedt proposes to call these attributes immanent, because they describe the divine essence as viewed in its absoluteness and by itself, without reference to any operation of God. This would be the same as intransitive, which means attributes that do not and cannot pass over from God to something that is not

God. These same attributes Quenstedt likewise proposes to call "*anenergāta seu quiescentia*" for the reason that they do not enter into any activity of God, or had for their purpose an operation that God performs.

Besides the three attributes of indivisibility, immutability, and infinity, which our text-book puts in this group, others have placed in addition such attributes as unity, simplicity, eternity (Baier), spirituality (Quenstedt). Most of these have been treated in connection with the essence of God.

2) The other group embraces the positive attributes, because they are viewed as positive perfections in God - such as exist in creatures, only with this difference that in God they exist in an immeasurably higher degree. Quenstedt has proposed to call these attributes "*operativa et ad extra se exserentia*," that is, attributes by means of which God, so to speak, passes out of Himself (*transire*) to something else that is not God and performs certain actions.

Hollaz propounds an altogether different view and classification. "There is" he says, "a distinction to be made between divine perfections (*perfectiones*) and peculiarities (*proprietas*). The 'perfections' are those attributes which God, to a degree, can share with created finite substances, although in God these perfections are found in a most eminent degree and singularly complete.... (Hollaz then enumerates as perfections of God: *intellectus, voluntas, scientia, sapientia, iustitia, potentia, beatitas*.) Peculiarities I call those attributes which belong to God alone in every possible view of the matter, and can never be transferred to anything that is not God. Of these peculiarities some are '*naturales*' and belong equally to the three persons of the Deity.... (Hollaz names *independentia, aeternitas absoluta, infinitas, immensitas, immutabilitas*.)

Others are '*personales*' because by means of these either the three persons are distinguished from one another, or two of them from the third." (Hollaz names *aeterna generatio et spiratio, utraque vel activa, vel passiva*.)

§29. Indivisibility.

The indivisibility of God, or His simplicity, is absolute, and consists in this, that no true and real composition can be imagined as existing in God. God is not a composite Being. A composition is effected by the union of several ingredients. The composition is the "*tertium quid*" which results from the union. In God there are no component parts. His spiritual essence implies that a composition of matter and form in Him cannot occur, and hence there cannot be integral parts in God. But also that composition which is formed by a subject and accidental features attached to it, or by a nature (essence) and its subsistence is not possible in God. Quenstedt, moreover, refuses to admit the logical composition of a genus and its specific difference in God. For even though practically God would become a "*species monadica*," that is the only species in His class, and hence a perfectly unique being, not sharing His characteristic position with any other in actual fact, still it would be possible for our mind to treat Him as a generic or class-subject and multiply the concept of God in thought. Even such a mental multiplication would be impious and absurd, repugnant to the divine essence.

From the statement of God to Moses, Exodus 3:14, the axiom has been built up "*Quicquid est in Deo, hoc est Deus ipse*." The statement was made in answer to the request of

Moses for God's name. God calls Himself "**ehjeh**," i.e. I Am. When He is named by others He is "**jahveh**," i.e. He is. The name denotes the absolute self-existence of God. He only truly exists: cf. Deuteronomy 4:35; Isaiah 45:6; Revelation 1:4. Some scholars however prefer to take the word as a future "I will be," in which case the name expresses rather the faithfulness of God, the assurance that He will be with His people and will deliver them. Others again take the word to be the causative form of the verb, in which case it will mean "He who causes to be, the Creator." We can very well accept the three views - existence, character and activity of God - as expressing the indivisibility of God. Commenting on the statement which John makes in his first epistle, chapter 4:8, and repeats in verse 16, Plummer rightly says: "We must beware of watering down 'God is Love' into 'God is loving' or even 'God of all beings is the most loving'. Love is not a mere attribute of God; like light it is the very nature. As 'God is light' sums up the being of God intellectually considered, so 'God is Love' sums up the same on the moral side. Only when this strong meaning is given to the statement does St. John's argument hold, that 'he that loveth not, knoweth not God'. A man who has no idea of any of the attributes of God as order, beauty, or power, or justice, has an imperfect knowledge of God. But he who has no idea of love, has no knowledge of God, for love is Himself." We would only add that this text shows that the attributes are inseparable from the essence of God. The same fact is shown by Psalm 139:8, in which the psalmist declares his consciousness, not of some manifestation, some trace of God in every imaginable place, but of God Himself.

The question has been raised whether the indivisibility of God was transferred to the incarnate Christ. Quenstedt

declares that he will not censure those who call the God-man "Hypsistamenon syntheton," a composite personality, provided they do not mean that Christ was formed by two persons or natures uniting to form a third, but only in the sense that two natures are most intimately joined in His one person.

The ancient Photinians declared that the doctrine of the Trinity militated against the indivisibility of God. They erred, because they viewed the divine essence as separate from the three persons and regarded the personal attributes really as three personal divine essences, while the orthodox teachers declared that in the triune God there was one indivisible divine essence, which belonged to the Father "agenätoos," i.e. as unbegotten; to the Son "genätoos," i.e. as begotten; and to the Spirit "ekporeutoos," i.e. as proceeding. Both the Trinity and the indivisibility of God are revealed facts of Scripture and must therefore be accepted.

Occasionally the Scriptures speak of God as having the members of a human body. This is a peculiar metaphor called "anthropopatheia" or "syngkatabasis": God descends in such expressions to the level of our comprehension. Such texts must be understood "theoprepoos," i.e. in a manner comporting with the true character of the divine Being. In the early church a misunderstanding of these texts gave rise to the sect of the Anthropomorphites, who ascribed a body to God; while the ancient Manicheans believed that God diffused Himself physically through all the creatures. The American Mormons also ascribe corporeity to God. Thomasius has sketched the progress of this error from Tertullian to Oetinger as follows: "Endlich koennen wir nicht umhin, von unserem Gottesbegriff aus noch ein Bedenken gegen die Vorstellung von einer Natur oder Leiblichkeit Gottes zu erheben. Dieser von Tertullian

bereits ausgesprochene, von den Mystikern aller Zeiten haeufig wiederholte Gedanke (Tertullian legte Gott Koerperlichkeit, *corpus et forma*, bei, was jedoch nur der anthropomorphe Ausdruck fuer Substantialitaet und Persoenlichkeit ist, wie Baur sehr gut bemerkt (Seite 24), klingt auch in der neueren Theosophie vielfach an; vor allen bei Oetinger, den man als den Begruender derselben bezeichnen kann. Ausgehend von der gerechten Polemik gegen einen alle Realitaet verfluechtigenden Idealismus, macht dieser tiefsinnige Theosoph den Begriff des Lebens, der *vita absoluta*, mit Berufung auf Ezra 1 v. 10 als den allein adaequaten Gottesbegriff geltend. Nicht das Denken, nicht das Sein ist das Erste in Gott, sondern beiden voran geht das Leben. Dieses Leben ist Bewegung, gleichsam radartige, kreisend, sich aus sich selbst gebaerende Bewegung, von Oetinger am liebsten *intensum* genannt... ein lebendiger, sich aus sich selbst entwickelnder, erfuellender, geistiger Organismus. Aber dieser Lebensbewegung laesst nun Oetinger sich nach aussen zur Leiblichkeit verdichten, in eine hoehere Naturhaftigkeit ausbrechen, und vindicirt [sic] demnach Gott ein physisches Wesen, eine geistleibliche Natur, worin er erst seine volle Realitaet habe; denn zur konkreten Wirklichkeit gelangt das Geistige erst im Leiblichen (!). Und hiermit schliesst sich Oetinger rueckwaerts an Jac. Boehme an, dessen Grundgedanke von einer Natur in Gott auch dem System Fr. Banders und seiner Schueler zu Grunde liegt. Aber auch die neueste Philosophie hat sich demselben vielfach angeeignet. Ich finde ihn bei Billroth, bei dem juengeren Fichte, bei Hanne, am klarsten bei Schwarz: *Das Wesen der Religion*, Seite 185. Hier heisst es: 'Das weltsetzende Prinzip ist nicht reiner Geist, sondern die Einheit von Geist und Natur'. Diese Natur aber

wird bestimmt als 'die reale Seite des goettlichen Wesens, welche das ewige Substrat ist, aus dem die zeitliche Welt in der unendlichen Vielheit ihrer einzelnen Dinge hervorgeht', also die ewige, vor- und urbildliche Welt in Gott, dass heisst als die Welt, wie sie noch zusammengehalten wird zur Einheit von dem durchdringenden Geiste Gottes! Hier ist also der Gedanke ganz klar. Und man sieht zugleich den eigentlichen Grund desselben. Es ist die totale Abneigung von der Schriftlehre einer Schoepfung aus Nichts. Weil diese nicht begriffen werden koenne (was ganz wahr ist), muss die Welt aus dem Wesen Gottes hervorgehen; sie entsteht, indem Gott die Natur aus sich entlaesst, indem sie durch seinen Willen in Raum und Zeit auseinandergeht, aber als solche von seinem Geiste auch immerfort durchdrungen und geeint wird, Seiten 187, 193. Und eben hierin liegt fuer uns der Grund, warum wir diese Theorie entschieden abweisen muessen; sie macht die Schoepfung zu einer emanation aus Gott; sie setzt die Substanz der Welt als wesentlich eins mit der Substanz Gottes, den Unterschied zwischen beiden bloss in der Form der Existenz."

Deuteronomy 6:4, which has been quoted for the indivisibility, really declares the unity of God. These two concepts will ever merge into one another. There is this difference: unity means that God is *ens unum indivisum*; or *ens unum absolute*, indivisibility; that He is *ens unum indivisible*. The unity of God is in a manner recognized universally. The saner of the pagan thinkers, though living in polytheism and often speaking in a popular way of the "gods," seem nevertheless to have acknowledged and professed only one true God. Hence Tertullian could hurl this claim at Marcion: "*Deus, si unus non est, non est.*" And Athanasius in his sermons against idols says: "Hä polytheotäs estin atheotäs" (*multitudo*

numinum nullitas numinum, Quenstedt). This view is Scriptural; for Ephesians 2:12 Paul calls the polytheistic Ephesians atheoi. It should be noted however that the knowledge of the unity of God which is cognizable by the light of reason is not an adequate knowledge of that unity which the Scriptures set forth; for that always embraces the three persons. To believe in the unity of God and to reject the Trinity is also atheism.

§30. Immutability.

1. The immutability of God has to do with the possibility of change in God. God declares Himself the Changeless One in Malachi 3:6. The text reads, literally: "Jehovah, I change not," i.e. being Jehovah, or, I am, I etc. The declaration of God's self-existence, independence is perfectly balanced with the declaration of the immutability. In other words God ceases to be the Great I Am if He changes. The context shows that these words were uttered to enforce the moral law among the hypocritical Jews. In James 1:17 it is denied that in God there is parallagē ā tropās aposkiasma, i.e. "no variation neither shadow that is cast by turning" as in the moon or sun. The "ouk eni" in this text has the force of "there is no room for." "It negatives not only the fact, but also the possibility of" (Gibson). These statements are made of God comprehensively; they embrace both His essence and His attributes.

2. Changes can be brought about in the vitality of a person through fatigue and exhaustion, which decrease, and through rest and recuperation, which increase the powers of a person. Isaiah 40:28 connects the Creator with His creatures, upon whom He continues unabated His efforts of preservation.

Psalm 121:4 assures the individual, dependent upon God, of the same fact. On the immutability of God rests the continuance of the world, and the safety of men in dangers. The very nature of God forbids us to think of weakness or deficiency in Him.

3. Exodus 3:14 declares that God ever was, ever will be, ever is the I Am. He does not gradually develop in His full divinity. An evolved immutability would not be an absolute immutability.

4. The immutability of God is expressed in Scripture when He is called "aphthartos" (uncorruptible) Romans 1:16; or basileus aphthartos, 1st Timothy 1:17; and when He is declared "the only one that hath immortality," 1st Timothy 6:16, which text Calvin paraphrases as follows: "*Ac si dixisset Paulus, solum Deum non a seipso tantum esse immortalem et suapte natura, sed immortalitatem in potestate habere, ut in creaturas non competat, nisi quatenus suam illis virtutem inspirans eas vegetat*" (meaning: "As if the Apostle had said, not only that God alone is by Himself and by reason of His very nature immortal, but that He has immortality in His sovereign hand, so that immortality does not belong to creatures except as He prospers them and by breathing His power into them"). Very often the immutability of God is joined in a common statement with the eternity of God (1st Timothy 1:17; 6:16) and endless endurance of God (Psalm 102:26, 27), and these again may be coupled with such attributes as His power and glory, as in 1st Timothy 6:16. This shows that the attribute of immutability is not separate from His essence or other attributes.

5. Immutability is predicated of God also "*secundum voluntatem aut propositum*" (Baier), as regards His will and purpose. Such passages of Scripture as state that God repents of an action are to be understood anthropopathically. God

really does not feel sorry for anything, as the contrast in which He is placed with man in 1st Samuel 15:29 shows. Confer Psalm 110:4. God's slackness in terminating the existence of the present world, as He has declared He will, is often viewed as evidence that there may be a change in His counsels. Scripture aids us in understanding this seeming suspension of a pronounced decree in Psalm 90:4 and 2nd Peter 3:8. God, by the way, never said when He would usher in the end of the world. Bengel remarks aptly: "No delay happens which is long to God. As to a very rich man a thousand guineas are as a single penny, so to the eternal God a thousand years are as one day; wherefore in the next verse 'but is long-suffering' is added: He gives us span for repentance without annoying Himself." Confer Ecclesiastes 18:10, 11. To sum up, the age-measurer (*aeoniologium*), so to speak, of God differs from the hour-reckoner (*horologium*) of mortals. Its index shows at once all hours in the greatest activity and in the deepest repose. To Him time passes neither more slowly nor more quickly than befits Him and His economy. There is no reason why He should consider it needful either to delay or to hasten the end. How shall we understand this? If we could understand it, it would be unnecessary for Moses and Peter to add "with the Lord." Even to what we would consider tardiness in God, the statement in Psalm 33:11: His tardiness is included in His counsel.

The immutability of God was attacked (chiefly by Photinianism) on two grounds: 1) the Creation of the universe. God, it was held, must have been different before there was a world to which He could relate Himself, than after. The reasoning is fallacious. If we consider the *principium agendi* in creation, that is the divine essence which performed the

creative act, there was no change introduced into that by the creation, for in creating God merely accomplished in time what He had determined to do in eternity by His immutable will. If we consider the created substances there was a change indeed, but that did not affect God, but only the creatures, who came into existence, while before they had not existed. 2) the incarnation of the Son. Socinus argued: "Who can deny that something of an adventitious nature, something new—and that something of the highest importance—was added to God and His substance if God really was incarnate and became a man when Christ Jesus was by the Holy Spirit conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary?" This argument too is fallacious; for in the incarnation the person of the Logos remained the same, though it began to be the person also of another, of the human nature.

To sum up, with Quenstedt: "The immutability of God is the perpetual identity of the divine essence and all its perfections, to the exclusion of every motion whatsoever, whether of a physical or moral nature."

§31. Infinity.

Infinity, from "*finis*" (boundary, limit, end), is here applied, not to the divine attribute, such as wisdom, power, goodness, which are declared infinite, but the divine essence. It denotes that the divine essence cannot be contained within any bounds. Two species of this attribute are usually noted: "*immensitas*," which is infinity applied to space, practically the same as omnipresence, and *aeternitas*, which is infinity applied to time.

The infinity of God must be viewed together with His spirituality. It is not an infinity of corporal quantity, or of physical extension, but of His Spiritual Being and perfections. Nor is it an infinity understood in a privative, but in a negative sense. A non-finite subject, understood in the privative sense, is something that has not yet reached its final stage of development, e.g. an embryo. A non-finite substance, negatively considered, is something that is without termination and limitation in the sense that it must not and cannot be confined and delimited. Accordingly something that is infinite in the privative sense has not actually reached its limit, though it may, e.g. quantity; something that is infinite in the negative sense simply cannot have an end. Infinity, as derived from *finis*, seems to refer only to the end of something, but as applied to God, this term also refers to the beginning, and denotes God as the Being without beginning or end, there being no *termini* for God either way. In philosophy infinity is referred to substance, quantity and quality. In created things, which all have a composite substance there can be no infinity in any sense. God alone is infinite as regards His substance, not as regards quantity or any quality inherent in quantity. Gerhard offers a pretty word-picture of the infinity of God as follows: "God is infinite as viewed from below, because everything is smaller than and inferior to God, and hence removed from Him by an infinite distance. God is infinite as viewed from above, because He has not received His being from anyone and acknowledges no one superior to Himself. God is infinite as viewed from before, because he is from no efficient cause, and before Him there is nothing formed, Isaiah 43:10. God is infinite as viewed from behind, because nothing will be formed after Him. God is infinite as viewed from without, because nothing outside of

Him is superior to Him. God is infinite as viewed from within, because He is His own subsistence and subsists of Himself and by Himself.

1. 3. 6. God is infinite firstly "inasmuch as He is not limited by space, there being in Him no distinction of here or there, His essence being in relation to the universe omnipresent."

On the occasion of the dedication of the first temple, Solomon in 1st Kings 8:27 and 2nd Chronicles 2:6 arrays himself against an unworthy idea of God prevalent in a polytheistic age which localized deities, and declares "the heaven and heaven of heavens," i.e. "all the spaces of heaven, however vast and infinite" (Gesenius), "cannot contain" God, i.e. confine Him within limits.

God Himself turned against the false prophets in the days of Jeremiah with an assertion of His infinity, which those men practically denied, Jeremiah 23:24. The preponderance of false prophets over the true does not prove that Jehovah is not aware of their mischief. He is nevertheless omnipresent, but keeps His silence for reasons of His own. Ephesians 1:23 ascribes the infinity of God also to Christ, and asserts that the exalted Christ places this perfection of His at the service of His church on earth. In Psalm 103:19 the infinity or "incomparable majesty of God is set before us in contrast with the feebleness of man, and He is put forward as the one and only fit Object of worship, alike to the spiritual (verses 20, 21) and the material creation (v. 22b). Seated on His everlasting throne He challenges the adoration of the universe" (Rawlinson). Isaiah (57:15) speaks of God as "the high and lofty one, that inhabiteth eternity and dwells in the high and lofty place." He is high in Himself, transcending thought and lofty, i.e. lifted up in that He

is the absolute Lord of His creatures and therefore high above them. He lives eternally and cannot be confined even in His majestic habitation. But "He is not an Epicurean Deity, too far exalted above man to have any regard for him, or concern Himself with man's welfare (see Job 22:12, 13)." On the contrary He condescends to "dwell with" man, only let man have a "humble and crushed" or "bruised" spirit (Rawlinson). In Psalm 139:7-12 the psalmist puts the rhetorical question whether God's presence can be escaped, which is of course to be negated. Jonah discovered that. Continuing the psalmist assumes the impossible: his journeying into heaven, into the place of departed spirits, to the confines of the earth, traveling thither with the swiftness of rays of light as on the wings of the dawn. Everywhere he is confronted with Jehovah's presence. Yea he is sure that no cover can hide against the omnipresent God. Cf. Amos 9:2. In Job 11:7 a practical consequence of the infinity of God is set forth. The last clause should be rendered: "Canst thou attain unto the perfection of the Almighty?" i.e. understand His inconceivable perfectness. Rawlinson remarks: "In one sense all men do well profess themselves Agnostics – not that they can know nothing of God, but they can never know Him fully, never exhaust the knowledge of Him. As the Apostle says Romans 11:33ff."

The infinity of God viewed as omnipresence is a most practical and useful attribute, for it places Him into immediate touch with all His creation; "*idque*" remarks Baier "*sine extensione sui, quoad substantiam suam et nihilominus indistanter.*" The large group of texts under 6. exhibit this omnipresence of God as a most comforting fact to believers, while it is a terrible truth to the wicked. Augustine accordingly declared that God is everywhere "*praesente potentia, non*

absente natura," that is not by His might only, but by His essence, personally, God is everywhere present. Hilary exclaimed: "*Nullus sine Deo locus est.*"

The mind of man has wrestled with the task to adequately express the essential omnipresence of God. It must not be understood, says Gerhard, "as if God were everywhere present only by His power and efficacy, or only in the sense that He could be perceived and known everywhere." No, He is essentially present. "Enter, *praesenter, Deus hic et ubique potenter.*" God is everywhere present "*non synektoos, non periektoos et perigraptoos, sed synektikoos et periektikoos,*" that is not so that He can be comprehended by all, but so that He comprehends all. The scholastic theologians accordingly have said that God is everywhere, "*non definitive,*" like angels and the souls of men, who can be anywhere, however always confined within the limits of a certain locality, "*sed replete,*" so that He fills all things, which statement however must be understood "*modo divino,*" in a manner befitting the immaterial essence of God, not in a crass and material manner, as a body, by filling space, keeps any other body from occupying that space. God is everywhere present not "*per essentiae suae multiplicationem*" so that exhibitions of Him could occur in any place. This would militate against His indivisibility. He is "*holoos holonti*" an entirely entire being, and is present entire everywhere. Nor is God everywhere present "*per essentiae suae divisionem,*" so that the center of God would be present in the center of the universe, and so on. Nor is He present everywhere "*per extensionem et rarefactionem,*" like ether becomes diffused in infinitesimal particles throughout space. Nor is He present everywhere "*per commixtionem,*" by infusing parts of His essence into everything. This would be a

pantheistic view. Omnipresence exists in God “*non subjective*,” that is as an accidental feature, of which we are to conceive because our ideas are attached to place and space, while the idea of locality is utterly foreign to God; but “*effective*,” so that He is everywhere present as the “*principium et causa*.” But how little has really been achieved by this effort in the way of explaining the divine infinity, Gerhard reveals when he sums up his account thus: “*Est praesentia a) illocalis, b) impartibilis, c) rationi nostrae incomprehensibilis, d) efficax et operosa, e) omnia instar minutissimi puncti in se continens.*”

A number of difficult questions have been raised in reference to the infinity of God. Tertullian (*Adversus Praxeam*) answered the question “Tell me, where was God, when besides Him nothing existed?” thus “He was where He is now, in Himself, because he is sufficient unto Himself.” Quenstedt, with his ability of drawing fine distinctions, limits this remark as follows: “When nothing existed there was no presence of God *ad extra* or omnipresence; there was however in God from eternity the power of illocally being present with all things. Hence the immensity of God is from eternity, but not the omnipresence, which began with creation. For when God willed that there should be creatures, He also willed His own presence with those creatures, and He willed this presence not by adding anything to His substance, but by calling into being things that had not existed before.” In his controversies with the sacramentarians and with Erasmus Luther had to discuss the subject of the divine omnipresence in its relation to other doctrines of Scripture. Against Zwingli he wrote “Zum dritten gibt er damit seine groben Toelpelgedanken an Tag, da er nicht anders von Gottes Wesen an allen Orten denket, denn als sei Gott ein grosses, weites Wesen, das die Welt fuetet und

durchaus raet. Gleich als wenn ein Strohsack voll Stroh steckt und oben und unten dennoch ausraet, eben nach der ersten leiblichen, begreiflichen Weise. Da wuerde freilich Christus Leib ein lauter Gedicht und Gespenst sein, als ein grosser Strohsack, da Gott mit Himmel und Erden drinnen waere; hiesse das nicht grob genug von Gott geredt und gedacht? Aber wir reden nicht also, sondern sagen dass Gott nicht ein solch ausgereckt, lang, breit, dicke, hoch, tief Wesen sei, sondern ein uebernatuerlich, unerforschlich Wesen, das zugleich in einem jeglichen Koernlein ganz und gar, und dennoch in allen und ueber allen und ausser allen Kreaturen sei; darum darfs keines Umzaeunens hie, wie der Geist traemet. Denn ein Leib viel, viel zuweit und koennten viel tausend Gottheiten drinnen sein. Wiederum auch viel zuenge, dass nicht eine Gottheit drinnen sein kann. Nichts ist so klein, Gott ist noch kleiner; nichts ist so gross, Gott ist noch groesser; nichts ist so kurz, Gott ist noch kuerzer; nichts ist so lang, Gott ist noch laenger; nichts ist so breit, Gott ist noch breiter; nichts ist so schmal, Gott ist noch schmaeler, und so fortan ists ein unaussprechlich Wesen ueber und ausser allem, das man nennen oder denken kann” (XX, 960ff.; cf. 802ff.).

Against the ridicule of Erasmus Luther maintained the presence of God even in filthy and indecent places. “Doch auch das Beispiel behandelst du nicht recht und verdammt es als etwas Unnuetzes, dass vor der Menge davon disputiert werde, ob Gott in einer Hoehle (Misthaeferhoehle) oder in einer Kloake sei, denn du hast zu menschliche Gedanken von Gotte. Ich gestehe zwar, dass es einige leichtfertige Prediger gibt, welche ohne Ehrfurcht und Gottseligkeit, entweder aus Ruhmsucht und dem Bestreben, irgend etwas Neues vorzubringen, oder weil sie eben reden wollen, ganz leichtfertig schwatzen und

Possen treiben; aber solche Leute gefallen weder Gotte, noch Menschen, wenn sie auch behaupten wuerden, dass Gott im hoechsten Himmel ist. Aber wo ernste gottselige Prediger sind, welche mit bescheidenen, reinen und vernuenftigen Worten lehren, da ist es ohne Gefahr, ja, vom groessten Nutzen, wenn sie derartiges vor der grossen Menge lehren. Muessen wir nicht alle lehren, dass der Sohn Gottes im Schosse der Jungfrau gewesen und dass er aus ihrem Leibe geboren ist? Aber was fuer ein grosser Unterschied ist zwischen dem menschlichen Leibe und irgend einem andern unreinen Ort? Und wer koennte nicht schaendlich und unanstaendig davon reden? Aber solche Leute verdammen wir mit Recht, da reine Worte im Ueberfluss vorhanden sind, um von diesem notwendigen Vorgange auch mit Schicklichkeit und Annehmlichkeit zu reden. Auch Christi Leib war ein menschlicher Leib, wie der unsrige, was ist garstiger als der? Sollen wir etwa darum nicht sagen, dass Gott leibhaftig in ihm gewohnt habe, was Paulus gesagt hat? Was ist greulicher als der Tod? Was abscheulicher als die Hoelle? Aber der Prophet ruehmt sich, dass Gott bei ihm sei im Tode und ihm beistehe in der Hoelle. Darum scheut sich ein gottseliges Herz nicht zu hoeren, dass Gott im Tode oder in der Hoelle sei, was alles beides scheusslicher und greulicher als ein Loch oder eine Kloake. Ja, da die Heilige Schrift bezeugt, dass Gott ueberal sei und alles erfuelle, sagt sie nicht allein, dass er an jenen Orten sei, sondern man wird auch notwendigerweise lernen und wissen muessen, dass er da sei; man wollte denn sagen, wenn ich itwa von einem Tyrannen gefangen gelegt, in ein Gefaengnis oder in ein heimlich Gemach geworfen wuerde, was vielen Heiligen widerfahren ist, dass ich dort Gotte nicht anrufen duerfe, noch glauben, dass er da bei mir sei, bis dass ich in eine geschmueckte Kirche gekommen waere. Wenn du

uns lehren willst, solche Possen in bezug auf Gott zu treiben, und Anstoss nimmst an den Orten, wo er gegenwaertig ist, so wirst du ihn uns schliesslich auch nicht mehr im Himmel wohnen lassen, denn auch die hoechsten Himmel fassen ihn nicht und sind seiner nicht wuerdig" (XVIII, 1700f.).

In their determination to deny the real presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper, the Calvinists have been carried to the extreme of denying that God is essentially present with all His creatures (Crocus), and of claiming that the right hand of God to which Christ is exalted is a certain locality in heaven and that the omnipresence is "*nuda in distantia absque operatione*." Adapting itself to our mode of comprehension and speech Scripture says of God that He "comes to" or "forsakes" men, both evil and good. Such expressions are to be understood anthropopathically. The presence of God in and with believers has been made the subject of special inquiry. Baier holds - and he tries to prove that he is in harmony with all the dogmatists of our church - that the coming of God and His dwelling in believers must not be understood as an approach of His essence, but only as a special manifestation of His operation upon them. Quesnstedt however claims a special approach of the divine essence to believers. The Form of Concord insists that when we speak of this matter we must declare in accordance with John 14:23, that God Himself, the Holy Trinity, not merely some gracious gifts of God, enter into believers and take up their abode there. For in the text quoted the Lord says "We will come to him and dwell in him." However this view is not identical with that of Quenstedt, who calls the *praesentia divina gratiosa* in believers "*specialem Dei propinquitatem, ab illa generali vere distinctam, quae infert non solum operationem gratiae, sed etiam peculiarem*

approximationem essentiae divinae ad substantiam hominis fidelis.” Calov calls attention to the fact that there are degrees of the divine presence, and that those of a later order always presuppose and include the earlier ones, as e.g. the gracious presence of God presupposes His omnipresence, the glorious presence presupposes the gracious presence, etc. But this order cannot be inverted.

Luther has also answered the idle question “What did God do before the world was made?” “Wollen uns auch mit dieser Frage nicht bekuemmern, was Gott vor der Welt Anfang gemacht habe, ob er geruht habe oder nicht? Auf welche Frage, wie Augustinus *de Confessione* schreibt, auf ein Zeit einer also geantwortet hat, dass Gott gebauet haette die Hoelle fuer die, so vorwitzige Dinge forscheten und vorgaeben, hat also mit dieser Antwort, wie Augustinus sagt, von solchen unnoetigen und unziemlichen Fragen die Menschen wollen abhalten. Derohalben mir St. Augustins Bescheidenheit sehr wohl gefaellt, sonderlich, dass er aufrichtig bekennt, er ziehe in solchen Fragen sein Ingenium ein und halte an sich. Denn so wir gleich von solchen hohen Dingen speculieren und disputieren, so bleiben sie doch unbegreiflich. Und weil wir die Dinge, so wir auch selbst sehen und tun, nicht ganz noch gruendlich verstehen koennen, wie viel weniger werden wir solche hohe, goettliche Dinge begreifen koennen? Denn was willst du setzen oder sagen, was ausser der Zeit und vor der Zeit gewesen sei? Oder was willst du denken, was Gott, ehe die Zeit gewesen, gemacht habe? Darum soll man mit solchen Fragen und Gedanken zufrieden sein, und es dafuer halten, dass Gott vor der Schoepfung der Welt in seiner wesentlichen Ruhe unbegreiflich gewesen sei; jetzund aber, nach der Schoepfung, sei er in, ausser und ueber allen Creaturen, das ist er sei

unbegreiflich. Auf andere Weise kann man nicht davon reden, denn unser Verstand kann sich auf dies, was ausserhalb der Zeit gewesen ist, nicht erstrecken. Darum offenbart sich auch Gott nicht anders, denn in seinem Wort und Werken; denn dieselbigen kann man etlich dermassen begreifen. Das Andere aber, das zur Gottheit eigentlich gehoert, kann man weder begreifen noch verstehen, als da ist was ausserhalb der Zeit und vor der Welt gewesen ist, etc. Denn unsere Natur ist dermassen durch die Suende verstellert, ja verrueckt und verderbet, dass sie Gott bloss nicht erkennen, noch begreifen kann, was er sei. Darum muss man sich an die aeusserlichen Dinge halten, darein sich Gott wickelt und kleidet. Eben ein so grosse Torheit und Unsinnigkeit ist es auch ausserhalb und vor der Zeit von Gott viel disputieren; denn also heisst die Gottheit oder goettlich Wesen los ergreifen wollen. Weil aber diese unmoeglich ist wickelt sich Gott in begreifliche Werke und eine gewisse Gestalt; gleichwie er sich taeglich wickelt in die Taufe, Absolution etc. Da du nun von solchen Dingen wiechen wolltest, wuedest du ausser den Ziel, Mass, Ort und Zeit in ein lauter nichtig Ding geraten, davon man nichts wissen kann, wie die Philosophen sagen” (I, 13f.).

2. 4. and 7. “God is infinite,” secondly, “inasmuch as He is not limited by... time, there being in Him no distinction of... sooner or later, His essence being... in duration eternal.”

The term “eternity” is here taken in its absolute or in its strictest sense, in which it denotes not ever-enduring time, or duration which has no end, though it had a beginning, but is the definition of Boethius, “the entire and at the same time perfect possession of interminable life.” The term, then, includes a denial of all limits.

The eternal God is placed before us in Psalm 90:2 as antedating and outlasting the created universe. The expression “from everlasting to everlasting” has been thus interpreted by Hunnius: “so that no limit, neither a beginning nor an end can be assigned to God; for ‘a thousand years in the sight of God are but as yesterday’ (v. 4) to indicate that no intervals of time exist with God, with whom the times of all the ages are but one individual now.” Psalm 102:25-27 contrasts the absolute eternity of God with the perishable nature of the whole creation. In a weakened meaning the term “eternal” is popularly used to denote a very long duration, e.g., the era of the Old Testament. Again, eternity is used in Scripture of something that had a beginning, but has no end, as, e.g., the endless life of the blessed with God.

Eternity is presented in Scripture also as that state of God, by which He is elevated above all conceptions of time (Zeitlosigkeit). The expression “years,” which in this text is applied to God is an accommodation to our human mode of thought. In reality there are no “years” in God’s existence. Eternity is unity; it is not made up of parts that succeed one another; it admits of no before or after, past or future; it is simply “*duratio uniformis*” (Baier). Such distinctions as “first” and “last,” “before” and “after,” “beginning” and “ending,” “alpha and omega” (Isaiah 41:4; 43:10; 44:6; Revelation 1:8) are wiped out in the eternity of God. With Him it is ever “today,” Psalm 2:7; 2nd Peter 3:8. The texts under 7. connect the eternity of God with the needs and sorrows and worries of men, and exhibit it as a source of enduring comfort and a strong support of their weakness to them. In his pastoral epistle to young Timothy (chapter 1:17 and 6:15, 16), Paul holds up “a magnificent embodiment of the attributes of the living God,

supreme blessedness and the living power, universal dominion and unchangeable being, inscrutable majesty, radiant holiness, and glory inaccessible and unapproachable, save through the mediative work of His only begotten Son” (Lord Henry). That is the God whom Christian pastors serve, and with whom they acquaint and connect men. Though He has created time, He has thereby not become temporal, just as little as by creating space He became local. He, the timeless One, accompanies all time.

Attacks upon the eternity of God have been made chiefly by those who would defeat the divinity of Christ. The Photinians have taken the lead in this attack, but they have had countless followers.

5. To conclude, God is in His Being immeasurable, Job 11:8, 9; 1st Timothy 6:16.

§32. Life.

1. In both Testaments occurs the title “the living God,” “**el chai**,” Joshua 3:10; Psalm 84:2; “**elohim chaiim**,” Jeremiah 10:10; “**theos dzoon**,” Acts 14:15. In the first text the speaker is God Himself, who reminds Israel through Joshua that a living God is among them, “not some idol of wood or stone, or some deified hero, long since passed out of reach, but a living, working, ever-present God, who shows by His acts that faith in Him is not vain” (Lias). This contrast with the lifeless idols of paganism is at least suggested in all the other texts. *Per contra* this God is viewed as immune from death and decay, 1st Timothy 1:17; 6:16; Romans 1:23. His life is ever-enduring. God also makes oaths by His life, Deuteronomy 32:40; Ezekiel 33:11.

A customary formula for swearing among the Jews was: "As the Lord liveth." As God can swear by none greater, He swears by Himself, but in so doing emphasizes His life, His vital energy which is ever ready to avenge wrong and to carry out His promise of mercy. When the world was vouchsafed the one great theophany, when "God was manifest in the flesh," we are informed that "the Life" had appeared, John 1:4; 11:25; 1st John 1:2.

2. This life of God, as we have seen, is unoriginated and shared by the three persons of the Trinity, John 5:26. In these two sections the life of God is viewed as the absolute self-existence of God, the life that is independent of any cause whatsoever, while every other life is derived from and sustained by Him, Acts 17:25.

3. The life of God is exhibited concretely in God's activity. God, also the incarnate God, is continuously at work, John 5:17, 19-21. All activity of the creatures is rendered possible only by Him, Acts 17:28. The dogmatists distinguish between *vita Dei in actu primo spectato* and *vita Dei in actu secundo*. By the former they understand the very essence or nature of God in so far that essence moves itself in a certain manner, the "*principium operationis vitalis seu immanentis*," the source of all vital and immanent activity. The idea of movement in space, is, of course, to be excluded from this view of the life of God. By the latter the dogmatists understand "*ipsam operationem immanentem, prodeudentem a natura divina*" (Baier), the actual workings of God in which He engages. They may be of an immaterial order, such as acts of the intellect and will, or of a material order, such as effect the vegetable and sensitive life of creatures. This distinction, however, is made only from one point of view. In God Himself life *in actu primo*

and *in actu secundo* coincide. In fact, "*ipsum esse Dei est vivere ipsius*" (Baier). Gerhard defines thus: "*Vita Dei est actus, quo essentia divina se actuosam esse demonstrat; tribus autem modis, ut scholastici docent, essentia divina se actuosam esse ostendit; intellectu, voluntate et potentia agendi; haec ergo tria ad vitam Dei pertinent; intellectus, voluntas et agendi potentia.*" This view is followed in our text-book: "God is life," *in actu primo*, "inasmuch as He has His being of Himself"; "God is life," *in actu secundo*, "inasmuch as He of Himself knows, wills, and does whatever He knows, wills and does." Consistently with this view the life of God is exhibited in the succeeding paragraphs as Life in the divine intellect, §33, 34; Life in the divine will, §35-43; Life in the divine power, §44-54.

§33. Intelligence.

1. God is a living God, because He is a knowing God, "*el dehoth*," 1st Samuel 2:3. His life is, first, intellectual life. The dogmatists call this *scientia seu intelligentia Dei*, and they embrace under this concept both, the power of God to know and His actual knowing, or cognition, and insist that this divine intelligence is "*cum divina essentia, realiter idem et simplicissimum unum*," because, as we learnt before, in God there are no accidental features, separable from His essence.

2. Divine intelligence differs from human intelligence both extensively and intensively, or, as regards the objects known, and the manner of knowing them. As regards the objects known by God, or the contents of God's intelligence we note, first, that God Himself is the object of His intelligence. God's knowledge is self-knowledge. Though God had made

manifestations of Himself, and declared many things concerning Himself, before Christ came, all the knowledge which He had thus conveyed to men of Himself proves that incarnation was not exhaustion. The Son who came forth from God draws forth from the depths of that knowledge which He, being God, has of God all that it is possible that we shall see, know, or realize of God (Reynolds). In Jesus God became His own interpreter to men, John 1:18. Another interpreter of God is the Spirit, Himself God. By His illuminating work He transfers to men treasures of knowledge concerning God from the inexhaustible store of His own knowledge. Naturally, the knowledge thus conveyed to men is but a portion of what God knows of Himself, 1st Corinthians 2:10, 11.

3. God's intelligence embraces, secondly, all other things outside of Himself "that are, have been, will be, can be, or might be." The knowledge of God is omniscience, 1st John 3:20; Hebrews 4:13; Psalm 147:5. In particular, Scripture declares that God is "kardiognoostās," a Discerner of the secret thoughts of men's hearts, 1st Kings 8:39; Psalm 34:15; 139:1-4; Proverbs 15:3.

The dogmaticians have divided the intelligence of God, according as the objects known differ, into a) *scientia naturalis, simplicis intelligentiae, scientia abstractiva*. This is the knowledge of all things that possibly can be. This knowledge is necessarily posited with the very idea of God, belongs to His very nature, and is antecedent to everything that can be; b) *scientia libera, scientia visionis aut intuitionis*. This refers to things which actually are, were, or will be. This knowledge is consequent upon a certain determination of God, by which He deems things. c) *scientia media, hypothetica seu conditionata*. This refers to events that would have come to pass, if certain

conditions would have been fulfilled, Matthew 11:21. Gerhard divides the knowledge of God into the theoretical and practical. By His theoretical knowledge God simply and absolutely knows all things; by His practical knowledge He knows things as things that He will enact. This knowledge extends only to good things, and is also called *scientia beneplaciti et approbationis*. The theoretical knowledge is distinct from, the practical is allied with the divine will. The theoretical knowledge is not, the practical is a *causa* of things. The theoretical knowledge can be illustrated by the instance of a physician who knows that his patient has but a day to live; the practical, by the instance of a highwayman who knows the same regarding the victim whom he intends to kill. Still another distinction is suggested by J. Ad. Osiander, who calls the knowledge of God "*generalis*," insofar as it extends to all things and their causes, good or bad, considered collectively or particularly; and "*specialis*," insofar as it extends to the elect.

That all these distinctions are made from our human viewpoint appears most strikingly when we speak of the prescience or foreknowledge of God, by which He predicts future events. Scripture indeed names this prescience as a characteristic by which God is distinguished from idols, but Scripture never separates the foreknowledge of God from His knowledge, as a particular virtue. J. Ad. Osiander says: "To speak of a foreknowledge of God, not with respect to God, but with respect to things. For, as there is no room in God for after-knowledge, although He knows things that are past, so there is no reason to ascribe a foreknowledge to Him when He knows things that are going to be." "It is," as Gerhard says, "from our point of view that foreknowledge is ascribed to God; for to God Himself all things are present which, in our view, shall be in the

future.” Luther says: “Hier auf der Welt hat es wohl ein Mass, dass die Zeit nacheinander geht, der Sohn nach dem Vater, und also fort. Als, dass wir ein Gleichnis geben: Wenn ein Holz fern von dir liegt, oder dass du es nach der Laenge ansiehst, so kannst du es nicht uebersehen; wenn es aber nahe fuer dir liegt, oder du oben drauf stehst und kannst es nach der Quer ansehen, so hast du es gar im Gesichte. Also koennen wir auf Erden dies Leben nicht begreifen, denn es gehet immer von Fuss zu Fuss nacheinander bis an den juengsten Tag, aber fuer Gott stehet alles in einem Augenblick. Denn fuer ihm sind tausend Jahr Ein Tag, Psalm 90; 2nd Peter 3:8. Also ist ihm der erste Mensch eben so nahe, als der am letzten geboren soll werden, und siehet es alles zugleich an: wie des Menschen Auge zwei Dinge, die auch fern voneinander sind, in einem Augenblick zusammenbringen” (IX, 1245).

The intelligence of God differs from that of men secondly, as regards the manner in which God knows anything. Our text-book says: “He beholds or perfectly knows etc.” God knows things not by certain marks and distinctive features, but by comprehending their very essence. Human knowledge grasps only the husks and coverings, God’s goes to the core of every matter. All honest naturalists profess the truth of this fact. Moreover, God knows things by one single act, and knows them thoroughly. Human knowledge is a labored process, painfully working its ways often through many obstacles, from item to item, and then piecing the various items together to get a complete view. Again, God knows things immediately, without the aid of any phenomenon produced by matter (*citra speciem visibilem*). Men’s knowledge comes to them mediately through the views which intelligible things present to their minds. Lastly, God’s knowledge is not obtained by discursive

reasoning. It does not, as in men, proceed from cause to effect, or inversely, or from the known to the unknown. It comprehends all and everything at once. The question has been raised, whether alongside of the all-embracing and infallible foreknowledge of God a thing such as a contingency can exist, and whether there is any room left for human freedom of action. Do not all things exist? This difficulty has induced pagan thinkers, and even some who professed Christianity, to deny the infallible foreknowledge of God. The Photinians denied that God foreknew man’s sinning. Socinus declared that no ground could be shown from Scripture, and no reason could be adduced which would show conclusively that God foreknows evils which are contingent upon the will of men, before they happen. Calvin, on the other hand, held that God foreknows future things only, because He has decreed beforehand that they shall happen. Some of our theologians have sought to overcome the difficulty by distinguishing between a twofold necessity, one of which they called “*necessitas consequentis*,” the other, “*necessitatis consequentiae*.” Only the latter they connect with the infallible foreknowledge of God. Gerhard explains this distinction, as follows: “In order to explain somewhat, that the certainty and immutability of the divine knowledge does not destroy contingency and the freedom of the human will, we must distinguish between ‘*necessitas consequentis*’, which some call the absolute, precedent, and simple necessity, and which springs from a necessary connection between cause and effect, and an internal connection of the terminal points of a matter, and ‘*necessitas consequentiae*’, which some call the hypothetical, consequent, concomitant, conditioned, or assumed necessity, and which arises from the mere fact that

something exists regardless of any cause, because whatever is, must necessarily be, for the reason that it is. By reason of this latter kind of necessity things are necessarily as viewed from the standpoint of divine foreknowledge, although they arise from causes that operate freely and contingently. This necessity does not destroy, but rather presupposes freedom." But aside from the fact that this distinction is labored, it does not really remove the difficulty. Luther felt this, when he wrote against Erasmus: "Hier haben sich die Sophisten nun schon viele Jahre lang abgemueht, und ueberfuehrt haben sie zugeben muessen, dass alles mit Notwendigkeit geschehe, aus Notwendigkeit der Folge, wie sie sagen, aber nicht aus Notwendigkeit dessen, was folgt (*necessitate consequentiae, sed non necessitate consequentis*). So haben sie dieser so gewaltigen Frage entgehen wollen, haben sich damit aber nur selbst betrogen. Denn wie nichtig dies ist, wird mir nicht schwer fallen nachzuweisen. Notwendigkeit der Folge nennen sie, dass ich grob davon rede: Wenn Gott etwas will, so ist es notwendig, dass es geschehe, aber es ist nicht notwendig, dass das sei, was geschieht. Denn allein Gott ist mit Notwendigkeit, alles andere kann auch nicht sein, wenn Gott will. So sagen sie, die Wirkung Gottes sei notwendig, wenn er will, aber das Gewordene selbst sei nicht notwendig. Was richten sie aber mit dieser Spielerei in Worten aus? Das ist's: die gewordene Sache ist nicht notwendig, das heisst, sie hat kein notwendiges Wesen, das ist nichts anderes gesagt als: die gewordene Sache ist nicht Gott selbst." Luther adds: "Ich wuenschte in Wahrheit, dass es in dieser Disputation ein anderes, besseres Wort gaebe, als diese gebraechliche 'Notwenigkeit', welches nicht richtig gesagt wird, weder von dem goettlichem, noch von dem menschlichen Willen. Denn es hat eine fuer diese Lehre (dass

der freie Wille nichts sei) gar unangenehme und unangemessene Bedeutung, weil wir dadurch die Vorstellung gleichsam von einem gewissen Zwange bekommen und ueberhaupt von dem, was dem Willen entgegen ist, was doch gar nicht zu der Sache passt, von der hier gehandelt wird. Denn der Wille, sowohl der goettliche als auch der menschliche, tut nicht aus Zwang, sondern nur aus Gefallen oder Belieben (*cupiditate*), gleichsam als ein wirklich freier, was er tut, sei es gut oder boese. Aber Gottes Wille ist dennoch unwandelbar und unfehlbar, der unseren veraenderlichen Willen regiert, wie Boethius singt: Unveraenderlich bleibst du, gibst allein Bewegung. Und unser Wille, zumal der boese, kann an und fuer sich das Gute nicht tun. Was daher das Wort nicht ausdrueckt, muss der Verstand des Lesens ergaenzen und unter 'Notwendigkeit' das verstehen, was man sagen wollte, naemlich den unwandelbaren Willen Gottes and das Vermoegen unseres boesen Willens, wie etliche es genannt haben: Notwendigkeit der Unveraenderlichkeit; aber dies ist weder der Sprachkunst noch der Theologie gemaess" (XVIII, 1693).

The proper way to deal with this difficulty is to group the infallible foreknowledge of God with the inscrutable matters and not to try to find them out. That is the advice the Form of Concord gives (*Jacobs*, Article XI, paragraph 55, page 659).

In conclusion, it is to be noted that the term "foreknow" has a peculiarly energetic and efficacious meaning when applied to the elect. This meaning will be studied in connection with the doctrine of predestination.

§34. Wisdom.

The wisdom of God might seem to be embraced in His intelligence. However, there are two reasons why the wisdom of God should be treated as a separate attribute. 1) Scripture in Romans 11:33 names “sophia” and “gnosis” as coordinate, yet distinct attributes of God. 2) Wisdom as commonly understood, even in popular speech, has a wider scope than intelligence. As applied to God, it signifies that God, besides knowing all, “devises, disposes and directs all. Hence Scripture in naming the wisdom of God separately, accommodates itself to our human view. Many a person abounds in intelligence, yet lacks wisdom. Not so God.

1. Scripture not only ascribes to Him wisdom, Job 12:13, but calls Him “monos sophos,” 1st Timothy 1:17, because He is essentially wisdom, and declares that there is in Him “bathos ploutou sophias,” “a depth of the riches of wisdom,” Romans 11:33. While we may consider the intelligence of God “*per modum habitus*” we shall have to view His wisdom “*per modum actus*.” It is a governing quality in God, by which He orders the ways of men, Isaiah 55:8, 9; [it] directs but is not directed, Isaiah 40:13, and that forever and infallibly, Isaiah 46:9, 10.

2. and 3. The records of the wisdom of God are placed before us in the realm of nature and the realm of grace. The manifold creatures which fill the universe exhibit the designs of a wise Fashioner. The proper means have always been adapted to the proper ends, Job 28:20-27. More eminent still is the wisdom which planned the salvation of our race, Ephesians 1:7, 8; 3:10, 11. No one can rise from the contemplation of this ordering wisdom of God, without being filled with profound

admiration of God and being incited to praise Him, Psalm 104:24; Romans 11:33-36.

§35. Will.

This paragraph forms an introduction to the three succeeding. The holiness, justice and truth of God are regarded as modes which the will of God has for manifesting itself. It is, therefore, necessary to speak, first, of the will of God. The term “will” may be understood in a threefold manner: 1) as denoting that faculty or power of the soul by which we will (“to thelätikon”); 2) the acts of willing, the volition (“tän theläsin; noeran orexin”); 3) the object willed (“to thelätön”).

1. When we speak of a will in God, we speak of a fact that Scripture has revealed, e.g., in Romans 9:19. It is understood from our previous study that the faculty of willing or the act of putting forth a volition, when predicated of God, does not signify something that is separate, or separable, from the essence of God. As Gerhard says: “The will of God is the very essence of God or God willing.” The will in God then, is that power in Him, by which He determines what is desirable or undesirable to Him.

2. By His will God “consciously prompts His own acts.” There can be no outside cause, properly so-called, which induces God to will. Cause and effect, in our view, are two different factors, the effect being regarded as a product of, or as dependent upon, the cause. Now since God is the absolutely independent Being, there cannot be imagined a “*causa formaliter causans*” for Him that is other than Himself. That is the force of the teaching we find in Psalm 135:6; Romans 11:34; Job 36:23; James 1:18. Still Scripture, in interpreting God to us,

guides us from one thing to another, makes us contemplate one thing before the other, and from our point of view to regard the first as the cause of the second. Thus we are first taught that God is; next that the God who is, wills. This mode of reasoning the dogmatists term “adducing *a ratio a priori*,” or stating a “*causa virtualiter causans*”; thus certain volitions are put forth by the holy God, others by the just, still others by the kind God. In all these cases there is a “*causa efficiens*” named, but that is nothing but God Himself, viewed in a certain attitude towards something. “*Deus ipse est causa efficiens actuum voluntatis suae*.” Again, God is said to be moved by the merit of Christ to forgive sins. This sounds as if there were an external impelling force prompting God. But the work of Christ was performed in accordance with a divine decree. Hence this seeming “*causa impulsiva externa*” is again God Himself. Lastly, God is said to do certain things “for His own glory.” This sounds as if a purpose, a “*causa finalis*” swayed the will of God. But the glory of God is simply the glorious God, and this “*causa finalis*,” then, is merged in the essence of God.

3. The will of God is back of every purpose, Isaiah 46:11, which God has formed, and tends towards its execution; back of every design which God has formulated, and pushes it forward to its accomplishment; back of every counsel which God has framed, and seeks to have it realized, Psalm 33:9, 10; back of every ordinance which He has appointed, and brings it to fulfillment. The opposition which He meets with, owing to the rebellion, indifference, hardness of heart on the part of the people to whom His will extends does not defeat His will, but only seems to reveal it the more strongly and strikingly, Psalm 33:10; Isaiah 65:2; Matthew 23:37; Romans 10:16-21.

4-7. A number of distinctions regarding the will of God has been attempted by the dogmatists. One that is not mentioned in the text-book is the distinction between the “natural will” of God, “*voluntas libers*,” by which God wills Himself, and the “free will” of God, “*voluntas libera*,” by which He wills creatures. This distinction is of importance in order that the difference between God and the creatures may be fully exhibited. God alone is an “*ens necessarium*”; all creatures, having sprung from a free choice in God, are merely “*res contingentes*.” This latter will of God is expressed in Psalm 115:3: “He hath done whatsoever he hath pleased.” Thomasius remarks: “God does not will necessarily whatever He wills; however, when He wills anything, that thing is necessary, because His will is immutable.” Baier explains the distinction between the natural and the free will of God thus: By His natural will God is said to will that which He cannot but will (“*velle, quod non potest non velle*”); by His free will, He is said to be able also not to will, or to will the contrary (“*etiam posset non velle, aut velle oppositum*”). This distinction must be maintained over and against those theologians which do not describe the creation of the world and the salvation of the human race to the free will of God, but represent them as acts which were demanded as necessary by a certain natural disposition of God. The idea is utterly wrong; it is essentially pantheistic and atheistic. To say that God had to create the world, had to save mankind, is to destroy the concept of the Deity. The free will of God, again, has been subdivided in many ways by the dogmatists. E.g. Baier makes the unhappy distinction of *voluntas efficax* and *voluntas inefficax*. The efficacious will of God, he says, is that by which God wills something with a view of effecting it, while by His inefficacious

will He is merely pleased with something without any intention of affecting it. Baier consciously differs from some theologians in his definition of the *voluntas efficax*: while others call the efficacious will of God that which is in every instance realized, Baier holds that even when the effect does not follow the purpose, it may be an efficacious will, as e.g. God wills the salvation of all men with an efficacious will, though this will is not actually realized. The inefficacious will of God Baier has tried to illustrate by the prayer of the Lord during His agony in the garden: "Father, if Thou wilt, let this cup pass from me." This is a gross misunderstanding of the text. There were, as we shall see later, in Christ two distinct wills, a human and a divine, and each was exerted in the earthly life of Christ according to its native force. According to His human will Christ really desired it to pass from him, but His divine will conquered His human will, while Christ prayed those words which expressed His human wish, His divine omniscience did not assert itself for the time being. That was the rule as regards all His divine attributes in His state of voluntary humiliation. This whole distinction of Baier is useless, yea, even self-contradictory; for how can a true will of God be a will and yet to be inefficacious? Augustine is right when he says: "*Voluntas Dei semper impletur, aut de nobis, aut a nobis.*"

Baier has attempted a subdivision of a subdivision when he divides the efficacious will into the absolute and the conditioned will. By the former God wills something "*sine conditione*," by the latter, "*sub conditione*." This distinction is admissible, but Baier does not always apply it correctly. He is right in saying that God willed the creation of the world by His absolute will, because He did not make this will dependent on any condition. But He is wrong when he says that God wills

"*absolute*"; that those whose final faith He foresaw shall be saved, "because their final foreseen faith bears to their salvation the relation of a condition that is fulfilled (!), not of one that is still pending. Baier afterwards introduces a wrong illustration for the *voluntas conditionata*, when he cites the will of God that all should be saved, viz. provided they believe. Faith, in the whole business of our salvation, is at no point to be viewed as a condition that man must fulfil. (See Soteriology.) A true instance of the *voluntas conditionata* is the promise of all manner of temporal and eternal blessings which is contained in the Law. However, Baier also distorts his terminology when he employs the term *voluntas absoluta*, just noted, in another sense. For he distinguishes the free will of God, secondly, as *voluntas absoluta* and *voluntas ordinata*, and proposes now to call *voluntas absoluta* that will of God, "*qua vult aliquid potentia sua absoluta, seu ad causas secundas non alligata*," while he describes the *voluntas ordinata* as that will of God, "*qua vult aliquid, sua ordinata seu ad causas secundas ac certum ordinem mediiorem a se institutum alligata, potentia efficiendem*." Baier illustrates the *voluntas absoluta*, thus understood, by citing the command of God that the sun should stand still upon Gibeon, Joshua 10:12. Here God manifested His will as absolved from (*ab* and *solvere*, German: losgeloest), independent of every law, order, or cause of nature which ordinarily governs the movements of the stellar bodies. God can at any time employ His will in an absolute fashion. A proper illustration of the *voluntas ordinata* is the will of God that men should be saved by faith, i.e. in the way of faith, and through appointed means of grace.

A distinction of the free will of God that is also noted in our text-book (6, 7.) is that which views the will of God either

as *voluntas antecedens*, or *voluntas prima* (Chrysostom: "Theläma proägoumenon"), or as *voluntas consequens*, or *voluntas secunda* (Chrysostom: "Theläma epomenon"). Baier describes the antecedent will thus: "*qua vult aliquid ex se solo, seu ex nativa sua inclinatione praecise, necdum habita ratione circumstantiarum*," while he characterizes the consequent will thus: "*qua aliquid vult, consideratis circumstantiis, seu intuitu alicuius causa aut conditionis, ex parte creaturae, cui aliquid vult, spectatae*." Not all who employ this distinction use the terms as Baier understands them. The distinction is correctly used in our text-book, when the antecedent will is illustrated by texts (6.) showing that God would have all men to be saved, while the consequent will (7.) is made to apply only to those who are lost. The idea is this: God's first intention in regards to all men is that they should enter heaven. This is the antecedent will, also called *voluntas misericordiae*. In forming this will God considers nothing but His own grace. However, if men will not suffer themselves to be saved, another intention of God is that they shall be consigned to hell. This will, then, becomes operative only upon the contingency of a person's unbelief. If the antecedent will were brought into a causal relation to the perdition of the damned, the grace of God which saves men could never be universal grace. The damned could charge God with never having given them a chance to be saved, because of His antecedent will, their damnation being a foregone conclusion with Him. If, on the other hand, the consequent will is brought into a causal relation to the salvation of men, the free grace of God is destroyed. The saved can claim that they enter heaven because of their having conducted themselves in a manner pleasing to God. The former error is Calvinistic, the latter synergistic. Dannhauer cites with

approval the comment of Casper Sanotius on Ezekiel 18: "The Lord denies that it is His will to hand the sinner over to death, and yet He does hand him over to death, even to capital punishment, of hell yea, He even condemns him to the punishment of hell. Hence, I stated before that God is, as it were, unwillingly and against His choice drawn to inflict death on men, even the most criminal men. His proper intention is to take pity on them and spare them, and to this function He rushes with such eagerness and force as a river flows down hill. The theologians recognize in this matter two wills in God; the one they call the antecedent will. This will exhibits principally the goodness of the divine nature which would have all men to be saved, and which does not think evil concerning any person, unless something occurs on the part of men which summons and impels another will of God – a will of a severe nature – which is called the consequent will. This will does not originate so much in the kind nature of God, as it is rather roused on account of men's sins, which God desires to heal though with a severe medicine, i.e. [to] punish them with His vindictive rod. The antecedent will, then, springs from the mercy and goodness of God, the consequent, in a manner from the wickedness of men. This can be illustrated from the following examples: it is not by an antecedent will that a merchant wills to cast overboard the cargo which he loves very much, having gathered it with much toil, nor that the judge hurries the culprit when he has sentenced to capital punishment to the gallows, nor that the physician burns and cuts a beloved brother. However, by a consequent will the merchant in the stress of a storm does cast his goods into the ocean, though he would rather save them, if he could; and the judge by the same kind of will, in the interest of the public weal, and because the culprit

deserves it, sentences him to death, though if these considerations were wanting he would prefer to check the avenging rod and his official power; nor does the physician cut and burn a patient by a prior resolution, but by a consequent will, viz. because the rules of his science and the condition of his patient demand it. Thus, then, it is not the will, viz., the antecedent will, of God that the wicked should die; for He does not rejoice in the destruction of the living; however, He does punish and condemn men by a consequent will because correct reason and the public welfare demand that sins should not go unpunished.” Dannhauer explains, however, that this twofold will (*gemina Dei voluntas*) exists, not in reality (*non re ac essentia*), but only in our human method of orderly thinking (*nostrae rationis ordine, unum actum prae altero concipientis*). Dannhauer rightly connects the antecedent will with the saving mercy, the consequent with the retributive justice of God, and holds that the distinction between the two wills is necessary to remove a contradiction that may seem to arise in a number of Scripture passages. He holds, too, that this two fold will of God is indicated in such parables of Christ as that of marriage of the King’s son, Matthew 22:1ff., and of the great supper, Luke 14:16, in the wail of Christ over Jerusalem, Matthew 23:37, and in such a passage as Matthew 5:45 compared with Amos 4:7. In the former passage God is said to send rain upon the just and the unjust, while in the latter God is said to send rain upon one city and not upon another, according as the inhabitants have either served Him or not. Gerhard notes that this distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God is of some service in resisting Calvinism. The Calvinists place God’s liberty of action in opposition to the other attributes of God; they ascribe acts to God which militate against the goodness, justice,

and wisdom of God, e.g. that God incites to sin, that He has formed an absolute decree of reprobation; and when they are reminded that such acts are incompatible with other attributes in God, they have recourse to the claim that God is an altogether free agent, not amenable to any laws. It is necessary, however, to warn theologians not to try to harmonize in Scripture what cannot be harmonized. While Gerhard’s and Dannhauer’s intentions are unquestionably good, they may be grievously misapplied in another direction, as will be shown in the doctrine of election.

Another distinction made as regards the divine will is that between the secret and the revealed will of God. This is an old distinction: from the age of scholasticism it was taken over by Luther and used in his controversy with Erasmus. The scholastics distinguished in God a “*voluntas beneplaciti*” and a “*voluntas signi*.” By the former they understood the sovereign good pleasure of God, His essential will, or God in His absolute majesty. Inasmuch as God has not revealed all to us that He wills in His sovereign majesty, this will came to be known as the “*voluntas abscondita*,” “*voluntas arcana*,” or “hidden will.” The other, “*voluntas signi*,” is [the] will which has been signified to us, for which there exists an authorized interpretation in the Word of God, which is to us the “*signum*” of what God wants. In and by means of His Word God steps forward, so to speak, out of His inscrutableness, and makes known to men His will. Hence *voluntas signi* is the same as “*voluntas revelata*,” revealed will. That both wills – viewed, again, from our mode of looking at the matter – exist in God, is shown, for the hidden will, by Deuteronomy 29:29 and Romans 11:33f.; for the revealed will by John 1:18, and the passages in [section] 5. When we pray: “Thy will be done”; when Scripture admonishes

us to “do the will of the Father”; when it tells us that “this is the will of God, our sanctification,” the reference is always to things concerning which God has expressed His will, either by commanding them, exhorting us to do them, prohibiting them, permitting them, or effecting them. The dogmaticians have enumerated five forms of the *voluntas signi*: “*praeceptum, prohibitionem, permissionem, consilium, operationem*,” and have coined this memorial line: “*Praecipit ac prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet*.” Luther speaks of both wills in his commentary on Genesis chapter 6: “So haben wir ein Neues Testament, die Taufe, Sakrament des Altars, Absolution und Predigtamt. Und sind solche Bilder eigentlich der Wille des Zeichens, wie man in den Schulen davon lehrt, darein wir sehen sollen, wenn wir Gottes Willen wissen wollen. Der andere Wille, des Wohlgefallens, ist der wesentliche Wille Gottes oder die bloße Majestät Gottes, die Gott selber ist: da sollen wir die Augen nicht hinwenden, denn er kann nicht ergriffen werden” (I, 488). The Calvinists, too, employ this distinction, however, in a sense altogether different from that of the old scholastics and Luther. They teach that God deals according to both wills with one and the same individual: by His revealed will He wants to save him, but by His hidden will He has rejected him. If Calvin knows that much about the hidden will of God, we would like to know what is hidden about that will. Calvin’s teaching destroys both wills: it treats the hidden will as if it were a revealed will, and casts reflections on the revealed will by making it appear that God is not serious in what He has declared in His revealed will. In the Predestinarian Controversy, into which our church was plunged in 1879, the charge was raised against the Synodical Conference that its teachers manifested a Calvinizing tendency, because they asserted that

there was a hidden will in God. However, this will is clearly stated as a fact in Scripture, and no one teaches the Scriptures completely who ignores this will. An error can only arise in a person’s teaching [of] the hidden will of God, when that will is not allowed to remain a truly hidden, inscrutable will, but is treated practically as a revealed will. Luther taught both wills, but counselled men to seek their salvation, not in the hidden, but only in the revealed will of God. The seeming contradictions which arise to our thinking mind from a contemplation of both wills will all be dissolved in the life everlasting. See Pieper, “Luther und die Concordienformel,” *Lehre und Wehre*, 1886 (Band 32), Seiten 193ff. (For a curious anecdote showing the dangerous tendency in the Calvinistic view of the hidden will of God, see *American Magazine*, February, 1916, page 28.)

§36. Holiness.

Through His will God manifests Himself, first, as a holy God. Our text-book suggests two lines of study, as regards this attribute: 1) holiness, insofar as it represents “the absolute purity of God,” that is, the entire absence of anything sinful in Him; 2) holiness, insofar as it is entirely engaged in the conflict with sin. However, as a matter of fact, it is almost impossible to distinguish these two in the passages cited, which exhibit God as holy by showing Him employed in holy actions. Leviticus 19:2, with its New Testament echo, 1st Peter 1:15, 16, exhibit God, both in the legal and in the evangelical dispensation, as the model of holiness. God made man to be like unto Him, particularly in respect to holiness. The scenes in heaven which

are depicted in Isaiah 6:3 and Revelation 4:8 ascribe holiness to the three persons of the Trinity: "Holy is He who has created us, and bidden us to worship Him in the beauty of holiness. Holy is He who has redeemed us, and washed away our sins, and made us by profession holy. Holy is He who day by day sanctifies us, and makes us in very deed and truth, so far as we will permit Him, holy" (Rawlinson). The holiness of God suggests itself to the singers of the praises of God as the theme nearest at hand, Exodus 15:11; Psalm 145:17; Revelation 15:4. No human thought, however, can encompass and no human tongue can adequately express the holiness of God, Job 15:14, 15. The most perfect of God's creatures, "the saints," are not flawless compared to their holy maker. "The limpid liquid blue (of the heavens) in which the human eye sees no stain or speck, to the divine eye is tinged with uncleanness. The idea is that neither animate nor inanimate nature contains any form of being that is absolutely without spot or blemish. In God alone is then perfect purity" (Rawlinson). He is holy in His affections, i.e. His love and hatred are both pure. He is holy in His thoughts: not the shadow of an impurity ever inserts itself into His thinking. He is holy in His will: He is never seen in any alliance with, but in stern opposition to evil. He has made the church of His believers to reflect His holiness, Ephesians 5:27, and urges its believers to continue the pursuit of holiness "in His fear," 2nd Corinthians 7:1; 1st Peter 1:15. The world has seen His stern opposition to unholy acts and conditions in many visitations of His holy anger, Psalm 145:17; Joshua 24:19, 20; Romans 1:18. In solemn earnest God makes oaths by His holiness, Psalm 89:35; Amos 4:2.

The question has been raised in [this] connection: what relation does the holy God hold to sin, especially its origin?

Gerhard records the fact that the Lutheran theologians of his day refused to say either, viz. that sins are committed "*simpliciter Deo nolente vel invito*"; for that would seem as if God could be coerced, or anything could occur against His will; or that they are committed "*Deo simpliciter volente*"; for in that case God would seem to approve of sin. Accordingly, they chose to say that sins are committed "*Deo non volente*." Gerhard explains the difference between "*nolens*" and "*non volens*" thus: The former implies a privation of the will and active principle in God, together with repugnance and opposition; the latter signifies only "*sterāsın*," i.e. barrenness, without any violently reluctant feeling. The whole distinction is worthless. It only shows the supreme effort of the theologians to hold fast to these clearly revealed truths: 1) God is the Sovereign Lord of the universe, and without His will nothing can occur; 2) God cannot be the cause of sin, nor can He approve of it.

§37. Justice.

1. Justice is derived from *ius*, legal right. *Ius* implies law. It is anything that folly measures up [sic] the standard of law, that is as it should be. But if justice is that, it is difficult to see how such an attribute can be predicated of God, who is not amenable to any law, who is above all law, or, as Luther expresses it, "*exlex*." God is His own *lex* and *ius*, "His own perfect ethical norm." If we fail to insist on this view, if we even in our thoughts imagine that there is something by which God can be measured, we destroy every conception of God. All pagan theology has committed this blunder, and not a few

theologians who are employing philosophical instead of revealed arguments in their theology have fallen into the same error. Baier evidently feels ill at ease when, explaining what the justice of God is, he says: "The justice of God bears some analogy to universal justice, as the philosophers call it. By this they understand the state of living in conformity with all laws and from it the complex of all virtues is derived." He adds cautiously: "However, this term must be applied to God in a manner suitable to Him, not in that vigorous sense in which it is used by the philosophers. For God bows to no law handed down to Him by a superior; He is His own law." He cites as an instance of how the Bible shows God bowing to His own law, Hebrews 2:10: "It became him," "epepe autoo," i.e., it was in conformity with His own most perfect nature. Justice in God, then, is this, that God is, thinks, wills, is affected as God ought to be, "*omnia, quae recta et bona sunt, aeternae suae legi conformiter vult*" (Baier). "His work is perfect" and "his ways are judgment" (justice), because "just and right is he," Deuteronomy 32:4. He dwells in justice as in His native element, Psalm 89:14. In all His acts He is straight as His own rule, Psalm 145:17; 92:15. *Per contra*, every moral crookedness is foreign to Him, Psalm 92:15b, even His avenging acts are regulated by justice, Romans 3:5, and He requires this characteristic also in His worshippers, Isaiah 5:16.

2. The justice of God is best understood from His concrete acts, which can be studied under four heads. His justice is the source and support of all His laws, these being "true utterances of His will," "sure," Psalm 111:7, "faithful," Psalm 119:86, "truth," *ibid.* verse 151, "righteousness," *ibid.* verse 172, "perfect," Psalm 19:7, and "right" and "pure," *ibid.* verse 8. They cannot be improved upon; and men can rely on

them. The divine law is the last word that is to be said on any moral question (*iustitia legislatoria*).

3. Also in the application of His laws, in His "judgments," God is never at fault. He never exceeds or falls below the rules which He Himself has laid down, Psalm 19:9; Romans 2:5, 6. Partiality and regard of somebody's person, 1st Peter 1:17, Romans 2:11, connivance at wrong, Genesis 18:20, 21, or excessive rigor, Galatians 3:10, are foreign to God. Every application of His law looks unerringly to the goal of happiness to which He is leading His creatures.

4. 5. In executing His own *ius*, the justice of God becomes either *ius vindicativa*, *ius ultrix*, or *iustitia remuneratoria*, avenging or rewarding justice. Every evil-doer is made to feel the former; everyone who complies with God's laws, the latter. The former is voiced to man in threats, sometimes couched in the direst and most appalling terms (4.), the latter, in promises, often exceedingly generous and sweet (5.). Regarding the former Dannhauer says: "God is the most just judge, a rewarder of good and an avenger of evil. He cannot pass over even the slightest sin, without exacting condign punishment either from the sinner or his surety. His entire [sic] enemies, to which Aristotle has rightly referred His vindictive justice ('kolastikān iustitiam'), corresponds, as it were, with arithmetical exactness to the evil perpetuated, and is a retribution adequate to every guilt; e.g., since sin is an infinite evil, its wages is infinite and eternal death." Gerhard notes, with seeming approval, the question of Thomas Aquinas, whether the justice of God commutes, i.e., makes His rewards to correspond with the good deeds of men. Thomas negatives this question on the ground that whatever we may give God we have received from Him before, and God is not anybody's

debtor. This is true, but this thought belongs properly under the head of the grace of God. God Himself declares it an act of justice that He fulfills His promises to his followers. However, His rewards always exceed man's service, and for that reason, His justice is not really *iustitia commutiva*. Baier proposes to view the holiness and the justice of God as one attribute, by defining holiness as "*iustitia qua Deus in se iustus est*," and justice as "*iustitiam in ordine ad alios*." But Scripture predicates of God, viewed *in se*, both that He is holy and that He is just. It is, therefore, proper to treat these two attributes separately.

§38. Truth.

1. Hardly any other operative attribute of God reveals the enormity of human degradation as strikingly as the fact that God has thought it necessary to assure us in His Book that He is true, yea, truth. He knows the perverseness of men's nature thoroughly; He knows that men will not believe Him, even when He threatens them or issues promises to them. This revelation of the truth of God is, therefore, a great condescension on the part of God. God practically tells men: I am not what you suppose me to be – a liar.

God is truth, first, "inasmuch as He really is as He manifests Himself." What the Bible tells us of His wonderful Being surpasses our understanding, and does not exhaust His being, but it is literally true. There is no being that is truly God except the God who speaks to us from out of the pages of the Holy Bible, Jeremiah 10:10, 11; Romans 3:3, 4; 2nd Timothy 2:13, and has become incarnate in Jesus Christ, John 5:18ff. Whoever has not this God, surely worships a God that is a

fiction, not a fact, an idol. God's "*veritas in essendo*" perfectly agrees with His "*veritas indicendo*."

2. When God expresses His will, He uses the words of human speech, not to conceal, but to elucidate His determination. We may stand aghast in our imperfection and impotency at the declarations of His will which He has made to us; we may only by degrees, through our study of His Word, approach a proper perception of His will, but He has stated it all. There is no defect in His language, 2nd Samuel 7:28. And He means what He says. Let no one try to dicker with His plain demands, or give them a meaning which they have not, Psalm 25:10. Nor does He ever change His mind once expressed. His uttered will is an abiding fact, Numbers 23:19; 1st Samuel 15:29; Hebrews 6:17, 18. God is truth, "inasmuch as He wills what He professes to will." He cannot lie.

3. God is truth, thirdly, "inasmuch as He does what He has promised to do." As by His infinite intellect, knowledge and wisdom never fail Him, so by reason of His infinite will, He never is balked in the execution. His promises are the one reliable thing that poor mortals have in this world full of cheats and deceptions, Titus 1:2; Psalm 146:6.

4. In a word, the truth of God is this, that "His works are in full agreement with His words."

§39-43. Goodness, Love, Benevolence, Grace, Mercy.

The goodness of God is to be considered now, not "*absolute et in se*," but in His relation to His creatures. Absolutely considered, the goodness of God is nothing else than the divine essence which embraces every perfection. In

this sense God alone is said to be good, Luke 18:19. Gerhard makes this distinction: "It is one thing to say, a thing is essentially good, and another, the essence of a thing is good. Hence Augustine says even of the devil, the author of every evil: '*Diabolus, in quantum est, bonus est; omnis natura, in quantum est, bona est*'. But no thing created is essentially, i.e., by and of itself, good. Its goodness is always derived, imparted, accidental, and imperfect. Hence, the scholastic theologians declared '*solum Deum per essentiam esse bonum*'." The goodness of God which we are now studying, is viewed as the efficient cause of every goodness existing outside of God, as the pattern and model of every created goodness, and lastly, as the goal to which God draws His creatures with a great desire. The four divisions of this active goodness of God are suggested either by various forms in which the goodness of God is revealed to men, or by various needs in men which this goodness seeks to meet and supply. The goodness of God is a) love (§40) insofar as it exhibits God as making advances to men to the end of joining them with Himself in a holy union and maintaining a holy communion with them, Jeremiah 31:3. By His love God has the persons whom He loves constantly before Him in His thoughts, Isaiah 49:15, 16, and declares that He is "troubled for them," Jeremiah 31:20. His love makes Him a tender father and mother to man, yea, He is as tenderly affectioned to man as a bridegroom to his betrothed, Hosea 2:19, 20. The grandest expression for His love is the surrender of His own Son in an effort to reclaim Him His prodigal children for a life everlasting, John 3:16. His Son is called Immanuel, because by His incarnation love has effected a union between God and man, Isaiah 7:14; Matthew 1:23. This gives God a just claim on man, Isaiah 43:1. Those who accept this evidence of

God's love become united with God here in a peculiar spiritual union, Jeremiah 31:33; Deuteronomy 33:5, and hereafter in an everlasting union, John 3:16. The goodness of God is b) benevolence (§41), insofar as God showers favors upon those whom He loves. It is called "kindness." Benignity may be said to embrace benevolence and beneficence. Our salvation, regeneration, justification, glorification (Titus 3:4-7, 1st John 4:9), our temporal support (Psalm 104:27, 28), our enjoyments, and comforts (Psalm 37:4) are manifestations of the benevolent God.

The goodness of God is c) extended to utterly unworthy objects, who have not only not merited it, but have merited the very contrary. Insofar as the good God disregards these unfavorable qualities in the objects of His love, His goodness is called grace, "charis" (§42). Grace always has as its proper object the befriending of sinners, Psalm 103:10; Romans 3:23, 24; 6:23; 5:8. In the salvation of man grace is the contrary of merit. Grace and merit exclude another, Romans 4:5; 11:6; Ephesians 2:8, 9; Galatians 3:18. To the objects of His love, insofar as they exist in much misery, affliction, and suffering, God extends His goodness d) in the form of mercy (*miser cordia*, "eleos, oiktirmos, ta splanchna tou theou"). Mercy is God in His pity and compassion with the oppressed, the poor, the widows and the orphans [§43].

Other manifestations of God's goodness (Exodus 34:6) are His long-suffering ("makrothumia," *longanimitas*, *clementia*), His patience ("anochä," *patientia*, *indulgentia*), His leniency ("chrästotäs," *lenitas*).

§44. Power.

The divine life is viewed, thirdly, as power. That is, the divine essence, or God, is viewed as doing things, producing something outside of Himself. This attribute, too, can be viewed as connected with the divine will. In fact, Baier holds that power “either is the will of God, or His active knowledge, which by itself is conceived of as so efficacious that by mere willing, without any distinctive faculty or executive ability in Him, it can produce anything He wishes, or it is the very existence of God, which is conceived of as subordinating itself to His knowledge and will for the purpose of operating. Wherefore God is conceived as doing by His power what He has freely willed, hence, as operating through the power of His will, directed and applied in a free act.” God’s power, then, is always “*potentia activa*.” It is utterly impossible to imagine in Him a “*potentia passiva*,” that is the capability of receiving an impulse from without. Power, viewed as ability, is asserted of God, Romans 4:21; Ephesians 3:20. But it must [be] remembered that such ability or capacity for executing something is not separate or separable from God, or His life, or His will. God does all by willing it. The will of God is His power. In this view the power of God operates in a manner different from every other power.

The power of God extends to everything that is at all possible and that does not imply any imperfection on the part of God. It is, therefore, omnipotence, Mark 10:27; 14:36; Luke 1:37. “Pan hrāma” in this text signifies anything that God has declared that He will do. Compare Psalm 33:9; 115:3; 135:6. God is “pantokratoor,” the All-powerful, 2nd Corinthians 6:14. It is an old error that concludes from the rest of God on the

seventh day that God has exhausted His power by His creative activity. Abelard held that God cannot create anything beyond what He has already created. In modern times Schleiermacher has repeated this error. A number of sophistries and absurdities have been advanced to defeat the teaching that God is omnipotent. It is being argued that God cannot cease to exist, cannot hunger, sleep, lie, *ergo*. The persons advancing such puerile arguments and spending valuable time over it, logically should go a step further and claim that because they can do the aforementioned things they surpass God in power. The question is not worth a serious thought, because it implies the surrender either of the true concept of God or of some substance. Yet our dogmatists have attacked also this problem. Baier regards it as absurd, because the things mentioned are evidences, not of the imperfection, but of the perfection of God. So also Quenstedt and Gerhard, who, moreover, point out that the problem is based on a contradiction, viz., of the essential attributes of God, and of qualities of the things themselves. Scherzer says: “If God were to lie, die, sin, He would not be God: God cannot give to a creature infinite perfection, because, if He did, the creature would no longer be a creature. God cannot make the past to be present, or needs something that has been done, because if He did the past would not be the past, and an act would not be an act. For the same reason He cannot make tomorrow to be today.” Gerhard distinguished two classes of impossibilities: *impossibilia naturae*, impossibilities in the domain of the created universe, such as making the sun to stand still, keeping free from burning, etc.; and *impossibilia natura*, impossibilities which the nature of a thing creates, simple impossibilities, e.g. to be and not to be. God’s power is not limited by any

impossibilitas naturae. But God does not undertake an *impossibilitas natura*, because that would necessitate the destruction of things and conditions which He Himself created. But even this last statement must be made guardedly; for we do not possess such a full knowledge of God as to be able to say conclusively what would imply a contradiction to God. We are in danger of transferring the consciousness of our limitations to God. Our faith contains mysteries which startle us, but we accept them on the authority of God. Scherzer rightly says: "A brute cannot by its intelligence understand what a man is or is not able to do. A man cannot by his intelligence grasp the power of an angel, much less will man determine what God is able or not able to do; for as regards intelligence there exists a far greater distance between God and man than between a man and a brute. Why, we cannot not even from God's own revelation state what all God can or cannot do. For nowhere has God revealed absolutely to us all things that are possible. Beware, then, of the forwardness and recklessness in saying: This or that thing God cannot do, because I cannot with my intellect comprehend how He could do it."

The last four texts in the paragraph refer to opposition that the power of God meets with, and raise the question, whether God's power, whenever actually exerted, can be defeated. As regards the method by which the power of God operates, it is customary to distinguish between *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta*. The ordered power of God works in accordance with some decree or law which He Himself has chosen for His operation. It is an exercise of the divine power which admits of the action of secondary laws, with whose working God concurs. E.g. the power of God sustains the life of His creatures ordinarily by supplying them with food

which nourishes them, and which He makes nourishing to them. God converts a sinner by having His saving Word proclaimed to him, etc. The absolute power of God works according to no such laws, yea, He may work contrary to established laws. E.g. He makes a virgin bear a son, a dead man walk out of his sepulcher, etc. Kromayer states this axiomatic truth: He who freely laid down laws to nature is not Himself amenable to the laws and order of nature. He calls this a golden rule which should be applied to all who try to measure the wide domain of the Christian religion with the inch rule of their human reason, as do the Socinians and all people whose religion is their own reason. The rule should also be applied to the Reformed who are convinced that God cannot demand of us that we should believe what is incomprehensible to our reason, whence they even deny the omnipotence of God in connection with their assaults on the mysteries of our faith. Kromayer then cites an array of instances in which things happened against the ordinary cause of nature. This leads Gerhard to say that by His absolute power God can do many things which He does not do: He could liberate the damned from hell, but He doesn't, because this would conflict with His justice. The ordered and the absolute power of God are not two different kinds of power, but two ways which God has for exercising the same power.

It is a characteristic concomitant of the ordered power of God that it can be resisted, while the absolute power of God cannot. The reason is, because in the former instance man can resist the secondary causes and agencies by which God chooses to operate, and because in the latter instance He works by His bare sovereign majesty without means, eliminating even the

so-called “unchangeable laws of nature,” if He so purposes. This is the true explanation of the resistibility of the one and the irresistibility of the other power. It is wrong to say that the *potentia ordinata* can be resisted, because it is not so efficacious, so thoroughly divine as the *potentia absoluta*. Also the power which works faith by means of the Gospel is declared the mighty power of God, Ephesians 1:19ff.

§45-48. Acts of God: Internal, Personal Internal, Essential Internal.

Acts of God were noted when we spoke of the divine attributes such as terminate within the Godhead (*opera ad intra*, §25-27). But the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Ghost are only one class of eternal acts. They are called personal internal acts, because they extend from one person to the other, and do not affect and cannot be predicated of all three persons alike (§47). There are internal acts of God in which all three persons of the Godhead concur. These are called essential internal acts (§48). Such essential attributes of God as His power, wisdom, goodness, or His grace and mercy have prompted the Godhead to certain actions. The resolution to undertake these actions must be viewed as an act of itself. However, by carrying out His resolution, or by executing His decree, God has made these acts to take shape and form to us, to be projected in time and space. These executed decrees of God are called external acts (§52-54). They correspond to the essential internal acts; for God does in time what He has decreed to do in eternity (Acts 15:18).

The “decrees” come under the head of the divine will. They are particularly significant, elaborate, and solemn volitions of God. We are said to will things that are in themselves desirable, although considering all the attending circumstances we may not want them. But what we decree we desire energetically. It is customary to distinguish absolute and non-absolute decrees of God. The former spring from no impelling cause outside of God, the latter do. Dannhauer calls the latter hypothetical decrees. He illustrates the two kinds thus: By an absolute decree God decided to create in such and such an order, in so many days, within such and such bounds. No human condition intervened in this act. The preaching of the Gospel was of such a decree, Acts 5:39; likewise the banishment of Satan into hell. Hence the thesis: If Satan had repented, he would have been saved, is an impossible condition, and amounts to saying: Satan could not be saved, just as the remark of Paul in Galatians 1:8: If an angel from heaven, etc. By an absolute decree I am born of such and such parents, in such and such a locality, at such and such a time. It was an absolute will of the Lord that John should die a natural death, John 21:22. The absolute will of God manifests its sovereign decrees in the domain of the divine miracles which occur at His beck and nod. By an absolute decree the woman in the Gospel had the flow of blood stopped after she had despaired of any cure of medical devices, not before. Hypothetical decrees depend on a condition. Thus the decree that the Son of God should be incarnate to save man presupposes the fall of man. The passion of the Lord could not be altered, but it was not absolutely fated that Pilate, Herod, Judas, and others should act the parts they did in that awful tragedy. There is no absolute decree of reprobation by reason

of which men are unalterably damned. It is a mistake, however, which nearly all our theologians after 1600 have committed, to call the decree of predestination a non-absolute or hypothetical decree. For it is not conditioned on anything outside of God. It is, however, so ordered as to embrace the merit of Christ and the order of salvation. Thus viewed the decree of predestination is not absolute, as the Calvinists have it. But if the question is whether outside of His own grace there was anything else that prompted God to elect, the answer must be "No." In this sense the decree would be absolute, not hypothetical as Synergists would have it.

§49. Decree of Creation.

Of the essential internal acts of God we note 1) the Decree of Creation (§49). The universe as a whole ("all His works," Acts 15:18) and particular parts and phenomena of the same, such as rain, thunder, and lightning (Job 28:26, 27), the development of the races of the earth from one family, their distribution over the globe (Acts 17:26) – all these are matters of divine foreknowledge and foreordination. God has not only surmised by His eminent knowledge, that such or such events take place, as a philosopher or a historian from the known connection between cause and effect is able to prognosticate events; but God stands to all beings and to all events in time and space in a causative relation. He has "known," "seen," "searched out," "determined," "appointed," "decreed," "prepared" in His eternal decree all things as they shall be. Nothing can occur in any other manner than as He has determined. There is no such thing as chance. God has

deliberated especially upon the creation of man. The human being that issued from His hand stood forth in His own mind, perfect and complete, as "man" before He took up the clay to shape it. The works of God which man views in the wide expanse of the universe reveal certain qualities of the workman. Their numberless variety shows evidences of His wisdom, power, and skill; their beautiful adaptation to unmistakable ends, their harmony and order manifest His goodness; their continuance despite of all manner of feebleness argues His faithful mercy. Hence the decree of creation reveals God as a good God. "*Si vis cognoscere artificium circumspice*" (Sir Christopher Wren).

§50. Decree of Redemption.

The second essential internal act is the Decree of Redemption (§50). God has willed all things beforehand, but He has not willed sin. He has, however, known sin in advance of occurrence and has willed to oppose it. The entire plan of redemption, its exact beginning in time, Galatians 4:4, the birth, Luke 2:31, and the suffering, Acts 4:28, and the death of the Redeemer, Acts 2:23, occurred in accordance with the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. The Savior was "foreordained," 1st Peter 1:20, and the salvation which He wrought was "prepared before the foundation of the world," Luke 2:31. Hence Christ emphasized the fact that He must suffer, and acknowledges in the midst of His agony that the cup cannot pass from Him.

§51. Decree of Predestination.

The third essential internal act is the Decree of predestination. The decree connects with the preceding one of redemption; it flows from the same motive in God, viz. His goodness and grace, and aims at the same end, namely the salvation of men. It presupposes the work of Christ and the way of salvation ordained by Christ, and cannot be studied outside of it. "Before the foundation of the world," Ephesians 1:4, "before the world began," 2nd Timothy 1:9, "from the beginning," 2nd Thessalonians 2:13. God has entertained a certain fixed purpose concerning those persons who enter life everlasting. Scripture calls this "his own purpose" ("idia prothesis"), 2nd Timothy 1:9, and "his eternal purpose" ("prothesis toon aioonoon"), Ephesians 3:11, "the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsels of his own will." The term "purpose" represents in itself this matter as a real act in the mind of God, but Ephesians 3:11 makes this still clearer by adding "hän epoiäsen" (English version: "which he purposed"). This purpose is connected with and guided by one virtue in God, viz., His grace, not His justice, or His omniscience, or His power. It is therefore called "prothesis kai charis," "purpose and grace," i.e. gracious purpose in 2nd Timothy 1:9. *Per contra* it is shown to have taken place regardless of human merit, "ouk ex ergoon," Romans 9:11. This same passage declares that if human merit is injected into the eternal deliberation of God in behalf of men's salvation, the purpose cannot stand. The decree of predestination is accordingly termed "ek logä charitos," the election of grace, Romans 11:5. The decree takes cognizance of the work of the Redeemer. The eternal purpose of God was "purposed" in Christ Jesus our Lord,

Ephesians 3:11, "in him," Ephesians 1:4, "purpose and grace... was given us in Christ Jesus," 2nd Timothy 1:9. This means that what God purposed to do in behalf of those whom He predestinated, He purposed to do on the basis and in view of the merit which Christ was to work out. The eternal purpose of God is to insure the end for which Christ performed the work of redemption, viz., eternal life, Acts 13:48, the heavenly inheritance, Ephesians 1:11, the everlasting glory, 2nd Timothy 2:10; Romans 8:30. There is no eternal predestination unto perdition. What is stated [in] Romans 9 in regard to Esau and Pharaoh does not contradict this notion. Esau was not favored as signally as Jacob, but he was not eternally reprobated (Deuteronomy 21:15; Luke 14:26; Matthew 10:37; John 12:25-30), and Pharaoh had prepared himself for a vessel of wrath, as the choice of the two different verbs "katärtismena" and "proätoimasen," Romans 9:22 and 23 shows. The end which the election of grace posits for the elect is not reached in any other way than that commonly appointed for all men. God calls, justifies, sanctifies, and glorifies the elect, Romans 8:29, 30; Ephesians 1:4, 5. Through repentance, faith, and trials He leads them to their heritage in heaven. To secure this end He employs the common means of grace, the Word and the Holy Sacraments. There is no absolute transfer of glory for the elect by an irresistible act of God without means. God attains unfaillingly the end of His election, Mark 13:20, 22.

The election of God is not universal, but extends to a fixed number of individuals ([Confer] 6. and 7. [passages]). The terms employed to name this act are as follows: "eklegesthai," to choose, Ephesians 1:4; 1st Peter 1:2; Matthew 20:16; 22:14; John 13:18; "haireoo," to choose, 2nd Thessalonians 2:13; "tassoo," to ordain, Acts 13:48; "progignooskoo," to foreknow,

Romans 8:29; 1st Peter 1:2; "prohoridsein," to predestinate, Romans 8:29; "ginooskoo," to know, 2nd Timothy 2:19. The verbs all describe the same act from different view-points. "Ekleg," and "haireoo" refer to the mass, the "many," from among whom the choice is made. "Prohoridsein" to their separation as God's own. "Tassoo" represents them chosen as standing in a fixed array, like a host. "Ginooskoo" and "progignooskoo" express the affectionate knowledge of God by which He has embraced them, *nosse cum affectu et effectu*, Luther's "versehen."

§52-54. External Acts: Immediate and Mediate.

The external acts of God are such as exhibit God to man's perception. They produce certain visible and palpable effects, such as the creation of the universe, the production of the Bible, the successful preaching of the Word, and the like. Whenever these acts are performed without an intervening agency they are called immediate external acts (§53). In such acts God approaches the objects, upon which His energy works, directly. Whenever He employs agencies already created to produce new efforts, the act is called a mediate external act (§54). Thus He produced from the ground plants, animals and a human being. He created Eve out of the corporeal mass of Adam. He effects a sinner's conversion by means of the Gospel.

Cosmology.

§55. Definition.

From the study of the essence of God we proceed to the study of His works. The remainder of our textbook is devoted to this study, as follows:

- I. Cosmology, or the doctrine of created things, §55-95.
- II. Christology, or the doctrine of the Redeemer, §96-129.
- III. Soteriology, or the doctrine of salvation, §130-173.
- IV. Eschatology, or the doctrine of time and of future existence in eternity, §174-185.

By collecting and grouping the statements of Scripture regarding each of these matters the theologian is able to present a divine doctrine, a "logos," concerning them. By dividing each doctrine into its constituent parts he may again exhibit a minor doctrine, or "logos," of particular parts. The term Cosmos may be understood in a wide and in a narrow sense. In the former it embraces all created thing, whether they exist as spirit or matter; whether they possess life or not, and whether they are endowed with reason or not. Cosmos, understood in this sense, is the world outside of God. God is not a part of the Cosmos, as little as the architect is a part of the building which he has constructed. The Cosmos may be divided on the lines indicated above, and each division may be called a cosmos on a smaller scale. Three divisions are possible: that part of the cosmos which embraces the created spirits who are not matter and are endowed with life and reason, i.e. the cosmos of the spirits, or the spirit-world. The doctrine which

treats this portion is called pneumatology (angelology) §59-67. That part which embraces beings composed of matter and spirit and endowed with life and reason is called the cosmos of man. The doctrine which treats it is called anthropology, §68-95. That part which embraces substances without life and living matter, without reason is called the cosmos of matter. The doctrine which treats it is called cosmology in the strict sense §56-58.

Cosmology Proper.

§56. Cosmos.

1. Cosmology Proper is a doctrine of Scripture. We have the word of God from which we can “understand that the worlds, etc.,” Hebrews 11:3. “Aioonas” in this text denotes “things which are seen,” hence the visible universe, the world of matter, the cosmos. The cosmos is, in itself, such a stupendous fact, and is, moreover so constituted that it bears witness of the Creator, Romans 1:20. By studying created things men may also learn a great many things about the cosmos. But knowledge thus obtained is not theological knowledge. The theologian gets his knowledge of the cosmos, not from the cosmos, but from God. He acquires it not by research work and logical deductions, but “by faith,” by accepting as *a priori* true any statement God has made about the cosmos. Lastly, he aims to learn, not the natural fitness and usefulness of the myriad forms of matter in the cosmos, but the design and purpose which God connects with them. A theological study of the cosmos, therefore, differs from a

philosophical one 1) [as] regards the means of study, 2) as regards the mode of study, 3) as regards the ends of study. Whatever Scripture does not state concerning the cosmos is no subject for the theologian’s study. A theological argument regarding the cosmos is possible only between parties who have agreed to accept the statements of Scripture concerning the works of God. The theologian, lastly, is not so much interested in the question: What purpose of mine can be served by this or that matter? but: Why has God placed these things round about me? It is possible, in this as in other doctrines of the Scriptures, that the findings of philosophy do not harmonize with the teachings of revelation. This need not shock any one more seriously at this point than at any other point of the revealed religion. The cause for the disharmony is the same: the insufficiency of the human reason. Nor must a disharmony between theology and philosophy, discovered at this point, tempt the theologian to make disagreeing facts agree any more than at any other point. There is not a doctrine of Scripture against which contradictions have not been raised by the reason of men. No person incurs a greater risk in believing cosmological facts which God tells him than in believing any other facts. Through faith we understand that thing which are seen “were not made of things which do appear,” “mā ek fainomenoon to bleponenon gegenenai.” “To blepomenon,” in the singular, “presents all things visible as a unity.” “Fainomena,” in the plural, are the various forms of visible matter. “Had the visible world been formed out of materials which were subject to human observation, there would have been no room for faith. Science could have traced it to its origin. Evolution only pushes the statement a stage back. There is still an unseen force that does not submit itself

to experimental science, and that is the object of faith" (Marcus Dods). The visible world, then, started with nothing. There was no material out of which its various objects were formed. The cosmos was made "in the beginning," viz., when visible materials began. There were no such materials before the beginning. The world was made out of nothing. Twisten: "Der Ausdruck ('aus Nichts') ist aus der Vulgata genommen, welche 2nd Maccabees 7:28 die Worte: 'ex ouk ontoon epoiäsın auta ho theos', durch *ex nihilo illa facit Deus* uebersetzt. Man darf also nicht etwa das Nichts als gleichsam den Stoff denken, woraus die Dinge gebildet worden; dagegen liesse sich mit Recht das bekannte Axiom geltend machen: aus Nichts wird Nichts. Wir muessen naemlich die Richtigkeit jenes Grundsatzes zugeben, inwiefern der Sinn ist: Nichts werde ohne wirkende Ursache (*in genere causarum efficientium*), oder das Nichts koenne nicht der Stoff von etwas sein (*in genere causae materialis positive sumtae*); wir geben ihm also nicht zu, wenn dadurch geleugnet werden soll, dass Gott zum Schaffen keines Stoffes beduerfe (*in genere causae materialis negative sumtae*). *Ex nihilo* bedeutet: *non ex aliquo, non ex priori materia; non designat materiam, sed excludit*. Obgleich dies aber eigentlich in dem Begriff der Schoepfung schon liegt, so hatte man doch guten Grund, es noch besonders auszudraecken; denn eben dadurch wird, im Gegensatz der Immanenz und der Disjunktion, welche dem Pantheismus und dem Dualismus zugrunde liegen, das reine Verhaeltness der Dependenz Bezeichnet und behauptet.... Wer die Welt als Eins mit Gott betrachtet... kann zwischen Gott und Welt kein anderes Verhaeltniss annehmen, als was die orthodoxe Lehre zwischen Vater und Sohn annimmt und... Zeugung nennt. Ebenso wenig kann aber auch derjenige, der ausser Gott ein

zweites... Princip des Daseins setzt, z.B. eine ewige Materie, Gott als den Schoepfer aus Nichts, er kann ihn nur als den Weltordner oder Weltbaumeister begreifen. Alle Religionen ausser denjenigen, die in der Heiligen Schrift enthalten oder aus ihr (in gewissen Punkten) abgeleitet sind (der juedischen, christlichen, mohammedanischen), schwanken zwischen diesen Gegensetzen, oder verfallen auf eine noch wenige statthafte Mischung derselben, dem Hylozoismus, in welchem die Materie mit dem formenden oder belebenden Princip urspruenglich verbunden, d.h. das Absolute mit einem urspruenglichen, sein Wesen aufhebenden Gegensatze behaftet gedacht wird." Philippi: "Der Begriff der Schoepfung ist allein auf dem Boden der positiven Gottesoffenbarung erwachsen, und wo er sich noch ausserhalb dieser Sphaere findet (im Muhammedanismus, Rationalismus), ist er nachweisbar von dort entlehnt. Im vorchristlichen Heidentume, in welchem der Inhalt der natuerlichen Menschenvernunft unvermischt mit Offenbarungsideen ausgepraegt ist, findet sich die Idee der Schoepfung nicht, denn alle heidnische Spekulation, welche einerseits Wurzel, andererseits Bluete und Ausdruck der religioesen Volksanschauung ist, geht entweder von der pantheistischen Lehre einer Weltentwicklung oder der dualistischen einer Weltbildung aus. Entweder wird Gott gleichsam als der Keim betrachtet, aus welchem sich heraus die Welt mit innerer Notwendigkeit entfaltet hat, oder sie wird ihrem Steffe nach gleich ewig mit dem weltbildenden Principe gesetzt, so dass dem goettlichen Verstande ('nous') die uranfengliche Materie ('hulä'), welcher derselbe seine Ideen eingebil-det habe, beigeordnet wird. Im ersten Falle ist Gott die urspruengliche Substanz, der dunkle Urgrund der sich evolvierenden Welt; im

letzteren Falle ist die ihm die Rolle des Weltbildners oder Weltbaumeisters ('damiorgos') uebertragen." Among modern Lutheran theologians Delitzsch has held that Scripture does not state that the world was made out of nothing. He claims that prior to creation the world had an ideal existence in God. Inasmuch as God created immaterial and material objects, the term "*ex nihilo*" must be explained in such a manner as to apply to both. Immaterial objects, such as the angels' and Adam's soul do not depend upon the matter for their being, hence, in their case the creative act occurred without any preexistent or coexistent substance. Material objects can be divided into simple and compound bodies. The creation of the former was, likewise, without any preexistent substance, while the latter were taken from the substances before created, but indirectly and in the last analysis these too were created out of nothing. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were 'framed'. 'Katartidsoo' is perhaps used in the present connection to suggest not a bare calling into existence, but a wise adaptation of part to part and the whole to its purpose" (Marcus Dods). It refers, then, not only to the initial creative act, but to the whole creative activity extending through the six days of creation. The term "create" denotes the production of something out of nothing, or giving existence to something that did not exist before. This is the original and proper meaning of the term in Scripture. When we speak of "creating" magistrates, consuls, leaders, or of a new heart being "created," we use the word in a moral sense. The philosophers agree that creation in the strict sense means "*productio rei ex nihilo praecise*." Quenstedt calls the expression "*ex nihilo*" the starting point of creation, however, not in any material sense. "*Ex nihilo*," as Thomas Aquinas said, amounts to "*post nihilum*." First, then, was

nothing; next, God created, and there was something. "*Post nihilum, velut terminum a quo, aliquid factum est*."

In Genesis 1 the term "create" is used in verse one of the unformed mass which first sprang into existence at the call of God; in verse 21 and 27 it is used of the fishes that were created out of the water, and of man who was created out of the dust. The divine power was seen as much in shaping an existent substance into a certain animate form as in producing the original substance. Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed "by the word of God," "hrāmati theou." This expression states not the instrument so much by which God executed His creative acts; for God wrought without tools, as we shall see anon in detail, but it describes the mode of creation. God spake the creatures into being. In the account in Genesis the statement: "God said" is repeated at the head of the creative acts. God called the things that were to be, before they were. Hence in His mind they existed as concepts. He had them in His divine thought. And at the end of the account of creation we are told that "God saw all that he had made, and behold, it was very good." This means that the creatures corresponded exactly to the divine ideas.

2. 3. The cosmos, in the narrow sense, was created "to provide for rational beings an abode where, the conditions under, and the means by which, they might subsist and fulfil the purposes for which they have their being." The host of inanimate and irrational things which were created before God made man, are all to serve man. God made the cosmos for man. Acts 17:26 declares the reason why not a multitude of different types of men, but only one type was created: the unity of the human race. It also declares that the eras in the history of mankind, and their habitations were in God's mind

when He created the cosmos. The institution of marriage, the lordship given to man over the creatures, Genesis 1:28ff., and the arrangement of the seasons, Genesis 8:22, the self-propagation of the animals and plants, Genesis 9:3, was all for the purpose of enabling man to fulfil his mission.

§57. Creation of the Cosmos.

1. The creation of the cosmos was an *opus ad extra*. Hence the three persons of the Trinity concur in this work, and represent the one joint efficient cause of creation. They are jointly named in the plural, **Elohim**, in Genesis 1:1, severally in Psalm 33:6; Colossians 1:15f. "*Deus trinunus est causa efficiens principalis creationis*" (Baier). That the three persons of the Trinity united in this work does not justify us in speaking of three "associate causes." Luther says: "Nun behaelt die Schrift die Weise, dass sie spricht: die Welt sei durch Christum und vom Vater und im Heiligen Geist geschaffen, welches alles seine Ursache hat, wiewohl nicht genugsam erforschlich, noch aussprechlich. Doch ein wenig anzufuehren, braucht sie solche Weise darum, also zu reden, dass angezeigt werde, wie nicht der Vater von dem Sohn, sondern der Sohn von dem Vater das goettliche Wesen habe, und der Vater die erste ursprungliche Person in der Gottheit sei. Darum spricht sie nicht, dass Christus habe die Welt durch den Vater gemacht, sondern der Vater durch ihn, dass der Vater die erste Person bleibe, und von ihm, doch durch den Sohn, alle Dinge kommen." The power, wisdom, and goodness which are necessary for the work of creation are essential attributes of the entire Godhead, and

were put forth as one power, one wisdom, one goodness, by the three persons of the Godhead. Hence the verb in Genesis 1:1 which expresses the activity of **Elohim** is in the singular ("**barah**"), nor is it proper to imagine the Father as the real Creator, and the Son as His agent or instrument. Chemnitz says: "We must not dispute too curiously concerning the distinction of the persons in the work of creation, but let us be content with the revelation, that all things were created by the eternal Father, through the Son, while the Holy Ghost hovered over them, Romans 11:36. But these things are not [to] be construed into an equality of persons, as the Arians blasphemously assert that the Son was God's instrument in creation, just as the workman uses an axe. For the prepositions ("apo, dia, en") do not divide the nature of the Creator, but express the properties of a nature, that is one and unconfounded." Into this error Philippi has fallen, who seeks to distribute parts of creative work among the three persons. "Fragen wir nun," he says, "in welcher besondern Art und Weise bei diesen nach aussen gehenden Werken der einen, ganzen und ungeteilten Gottheit sich die einzelnen Personen beteiligt haben, so wird such uns die Art ihrer Beteiligung an der Schoepfung durch einen analogischen Rueckschluss aus der Art ihrer Beteiligung an der Erloesung ergeben. Wie naemlich die Erloesung vom Vater, der den Erloesungsratschluss von Ewigkeit gefasst und den Sohn zur Verwirklichung desselben in der Zeit gesendet hat, ausgegangen, durch den Sohn als das Organ der objektiven Ausfuehrung vermittelt und im Heiligen Geiste als der Potenz der subjektiven Zueignung der Erloesung in uns kraeftig geworden ist: so werden wir auch in bezug auf die Schoepfung zu sagen haben, dass sie vom Vater durch den Sohn und im Heiligen Geist (daher die sogenannten *particulae*

discriticae 'ek, dia, en') vollzogen ist, und in der Form der Erhaltung sich fort und fort vollzieht. Der Vater ist der letzte Grund und Quell wie der Gottheit, so auch der Creatur, der Sohn derjenige, dessen Vermittelung sich der Vater bei der Schoepfung bediente, und der Heilige Geist derjenige, in dessen Kraft der Vater durch den Sohn den Schoepfungsratschluss in tatsaechlicher Wirklichkeit umgesetzt hat. Wir schon hier die Wirksamkeit auf alle Drei ziemlich gleichmaessig verteilt, wenn auch die Schoepfung auf den Vater in urspruenglicher Weise vorherrschend bezogen scheint." The analogy of which Philippi speaks is an assumed one. Scripture does not suggest it at all, and it is offensive to see the work of creation thus "verteilt." Nor is it proper to make the Son the basic idea and guiding principle according to which God created. Kahnis has propounded this view: "Das Durch drueckt aus, dass er (der Sohn) die Mittelursache ist, das Zu, das er Ziel alles Erschaffenen ist, Durch und Zu aber sind nur die Entfaltungen des In, welches erstens die *transeunte*, zweitens die immanente Ursache bezeichnet, d.h., ausdrueckt, dass Christus die allem endlichen Sein zu Grunde liegende Idee, woraus folgt, dass Christus auch das alles endliche Sein rekapitulierende Ziel ist." The expression "proototokos pasäs ktiseoos" in Colossians 1:15, which refers to Christ, might be cited in this connection to advance the idea that Christ is the first product of the creative genius of God, and all others are in a way patterned after Him and related to Him. This expression, however, does not class Christ at all with the world of creatures, assigning to Him the priority and supreme eminence over the rest of the creatures. The genitive "proototokos ktiseoos" is the genitive of comparison, and the sense is: compared with (Luther's "vor" – Latin "*prae*," not "*ante*"), or over and against every creature.

He is the first-born, not First-Created. In other words, He is something which no creature is. The creatures are in one class, He is in another, in a class by Himself.

2. The creation "was begun and completed within six consecutive days." The peculiar language of the record of creation in Genesis chapter one ("evening and morning, the first day," etc.) and the comparison in Exodus 20:9ff. of one week's toil consisting of six work days with a day at rest at the end, plainly show this. From these plain statements of Scripture there have been deviations in all ages. Luther notes that "Hilary and Augustine, two of the greatest lights of the church, think that the work was created suddenly, in a moment, not in six successive days. Moreover Augustine engages in a fanciful play when treating the period of the six days: He treats the days as mystical days, such as angels know, not as natural ones. Now it is useless," says Luther, "to make Moses out to be a mystic and allegorizer in the very first chapter of his book. For he did not wish to inform us regarding allegorical creatures, or an allegorical world, but about real creatures and a visible world, subject to sense perception. He calls a spade a spade (*appelat scapham scapham*); for he names day and night, in the customary sense, without any allegory, just as Matthew in the last chapter of his Gospel uses these expressions, when he writes that Christ rose 'late on the Sabbath Day, as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week'. If we cannot sufficiently account for the reason of the six days, nor understand why God should want to adopt such intervals of time, let us rather profess our ignorance than twist the words to a strange meaning that is outside of the stated facts. Accordingly, as regards this notion of Augustine, we declare that Moses has spoken in proper, not in allegorical or figurative

terms, in other words, that the world with all its creatures has been created within the space of six days, as the text reads. If we cannot find the reason for this, let us remain pupils and leave the Holy Spirit the honor of being the teacher." Quenstedt emphasizes the same fact as Luther and adds this general hermeneutical rule: We must not depart from the dear words of Scripture, unless the analogy of faith (?), the context, and other circumstances (?) advise such a procedure. Quenstedt adds to the two arguments from Scripture noted above an argument "*ex ratione*," thus: "If all things had been created in a moment, a reason should be given us why Moses told the story of creation the way he did. He has not adopted for his account the order of nature, nor the order of dignity, nor the order of mental perception; hence there remains only the order of time." The view of Augustine, before, noted, was shared by many medieval scholars, who even elaborated it in a grotesque manner. In modern times Vilmar has coolly proposed the following: "Die Untersuchung und Beantwortung der Frage, ob die Tage 24 stuendige, von der Axendrehung der Erde abhaengige Tage oder Schoepfungs – (*Restitutions*) – Perioden oder von unbestimmter Dauer seien, kann die Dogmatik unbedenklich frei lassen (!). In der Anwendung, welche von diesen 6 Tagen schon Genesis 2:2, 3 und nachher im Gesetz gemacht wird, sind allerdings 24 stuendige Tage gemeint (!!), und der Wortlaut (Abend und Morgen, 1. Tag, der 2. Tag, etc.) scheint dafuer zu sprechen (!!!). Dagegen ist die Bestimmung Psalm 90:4 und 2nd Peter 3:8, wonach 1000 Jahre wie en Tag, und ein Tag wie 1000 Jahre vor Gott sind, der Annahme von Schoepfungsperioden nicht unguenstig. Diese Perioden koennten mit einer Daemmerung geschlossen und mit einer Daemmerung wieder angehoben haben, also durch

eine Nacht, in welcher Gott nicht schuf, getrennt gewesen sein, haben aber nicht von der Axendrehung der Erde, sondern von andern Kaempfen nur Licht und Finsterniss abgehangen."

The six days of creation are called the hexaemeron ("hex" and "hämera"), because according to Hebrew chronology the day begins at sunset. On the first day God created heaven and earth, and light. This was "the beginning." Before this there was nothing. By their peculiar mystic system of interpretation the ancient cabbalists read out of "**bereschit**" the month of September, and Calov held that the time of the year was fall. Many of the fathers contended that the world was created in spring, and Scherzer agrees with them, because, says he, if the time had been fall, the trees would have had to bear fruit twice during the first year, and God would have thus broken through the usual order of the seasons at the very start. But the exact season cannot be determined from the first word in the Hebrew Bible. "In the beginning" simply means "*primo instanti temporis*." The "beginning" to which Moses refers, is the beginning, not of eternity, which has no beginning, but of time. The beginning of the world and of time coincide. (It is not exact to say: the world was created in the beginning of the world, or of creation; nor that it was created "in time." And it is a quibble to contend that there was a time when the world was not. The proper way is to say: The world has not been.) To say that the world is eternal is to destroy the concept of God, of creation, and of creature. To debate the question whether God could have created the world from eternity, is [a] mere waste of time. The terms "heavens" and "earth" in Genesis 1:1 are preceded by the article, indicating the objects which are commonly known by those terms. But the qualifiers "without form and void" warn us not to imagine that heaven and earth

existed in the first moment in that form and condition in which they are observed now. The substance of each was there, but what form it was to take ultimately was determined by the work of the following days. Heaven, earth, and water are mentioned in Genesis 1:1 as coexistent in a confused formless mass – the chaotic state of the universe. Air and fire are not mentioned, but their existence even at this time is taken for granted, because they are not mentioned elsewhere in the account of creation, and they certainly exist and were created, and are a necessary prerequisite for the most of the creatures that were created on the days following. The presence of fire, moreover, may be inferred from the mention of the light that was created on the first day. Hence accepting as true the old view of the four elements, we may say that on the first day God produced – without separating or ordering them – the elementary substances of the universe. It has, however, been questioned for hundreds of years whether air is a substance distinct from water. Some hold that the air, or rather, the atmosphere in which we live, was created on the second day. That the light which God created on the first day was a luminous body is self-understood. This light served the purpose which was later attached to the sun, for it marked morning and evening. Luther takes this view of this part of Moses' account: all that is has been created of God, and in the beginning of the first day the rude mass of clay, or the earth, and of nebulae, or water, was created. Into these God during the remainder of that day poured light, and caused the day to appear, which was to exhibit that rude mass of heaven and earth, looking like an undeveloped germ, capable, however, of producing something. It is an old opinion that on the first day God created the empyrean, i.e., the heaven of fire, as the abode for the angels

and the blessed, and for His own palatial habitation. The majority of the scholastic theologians held this view. Roman dogmaticians still defend it, e.g., Becanus, who claims that the heaven created on the first day is distinct from the "firmament" created on the second day, and located above it. Many Calvinists, Socinians, and Armenians hold this view in one form or the other, all of them agreeing in the belief that the heaven in which God dwells, "the third heaven," etc. are localities and that God exists locally. Quenstedt subjects the view of the empyrean – which he calls "*dulce sine somno somnium*" – to the following criticism: The heaven of the blessed is, indeed, not a physical locality, yet it is neither nowhere nor everywhere, but somewhere. But to define precisely where it is, is a rash undertaking. The view of a certain corporeal heaven as a fixed dwelling for the angels does not agree with Matthew 18:10 which describes the angels as attending the "little ones" on earth, while at the same time they "always behold the face of the Father." It is also difficult to maintain this view of the empyrean when we think of the final destruction of the created universe. Either the empyrean will have to be spared in that catastrophe, or if it is destroyed with all the rest of created things, what becomes of the home of the angels and saints, yea, of God's palace beyond the clouds?

A peculiar view of the meaning of **Tohu va Bohu** is held by nearly all renowned German theologians of the present time. Kurtz states it as follows: "Wir nehmen den Codex der heiligen Offenbarungskunden zur Hand und treffen gleich in der ersten Zeile auf das rätselhafte **Tohu va Bohu**, auf jene Wuestniss, Leerheit und Finsterniss, in welcher der erste Blick des heiligen Sehers der Erde, die durch das Sechstageswerk zur Staette des Lichts und der Lebensfuelle werden sollte,

erblickte.... Wir haben bereits in vormenschlicher Zeit eine Erde, und nicht minder eine Geschichte, die sich auf ihr und in ihr entfaltet hat. Der Prophet der Urgeschichte erblickte diese Erde als Wueste und Leerheit. Voran ging dem chaotischen Zustande der Verwuestung und Verordnung ein Zustand der Ordnung, des Lichts, des Lebens, wie er jeglichem Gotteswerke geziemt; und ebenso folgte eine schoepferische Restitution im Sechstageswerk, durch welche aus der Finsterniss das Licht, aus der Verwuestung und Verordnung Ordnung und Lebensfuelle hervorgerufen wurde, durch welche unsere jetztige Erde gegruendet, gebildet, geordnet und belebt wurde. Die Verwuestung war eine Folde des Falles der Engel, woraus wir weiter schliessen, dass jene urweltliche Erde die Wohn- und Uebungsstaette desjenigen Theiles der Engel war, die sich gegen Gott empoerten und dadurch ihr Fuerstentum verloren und ihre Behausung zu verlassen genoetigt waren. Die Restitution dagegen war des goettlichen Ratschlusses, vermoege welches er sich seinen Weltplan nicht storen laesst, vermoege welches er eine ganze Welt des lebens, die ins Verderben geraten war, wieder aus den Fluten des Verderbens emporhebt, den Verderber von ihr exiliert und einen neuen Bewohner und Herrscher, den Menschen, auf sie setzt – woraus wir weiter schliessen, dass der Mensch an die Stelle Satans und seiner Engel gesetzt, auch dessen unterbliebene Aufgabe auszurichten, den gestoerten Einklang des Weltalls, den Durchbrochenen Zusammenhang des Ganzen, wiederherzustellen, und ihn selbst, den Zerstoerer und Empoerer, zu besiegen und zu richten berufen war.” (See this view also in *Scofield Reference Bible* ad Genesis 1:1 and *passim*.)

On the second day God divided the watery element into masses of water below and above the visible vault of heaven (“**raqijh**” – firmament). This was an aerial expansion by means of which the waters, which had so far been mingled with the earth, were separated into an upper and a lower aqueous body. Baier and many of our older dogmaticians take the upper waters to be clouds, and understand by the firmament the air which envelopes the earth. They translate the two prepositions “**mehal**” and “**mithachath**” – “from above” and “from below,” and argue that the air touches the clouds from above, and the seas, lakes, and streams from below. To confirm their view they point to the fact that the aerial regions are sometimes called “heaven” in Scripture. But this interpretation does not do full justice to the text, and has not been followed by the better exegetes of our church, who understand by the firmament the ether-heaven, and believe that above this heaven God placed masses of water which He used, e.g. at the deluge. Compare Luther, I, 29ff.

On the third day God gathered the waters lower into particular localities, thus causing the dry land to appear (continents, isles, seas, lakes, rivers). The land portions He at once decked with grass, herbs, and trees. Many theologians believe that the stones, metals, and minerals, also the Garden of Eden were created on this day.

On the fourth day God created the stellar bodies, prescribed their courses, and thus made them means by which to measure time and seasons. The energies stored in these bodies were to be utilized for other creatures, which are effected by the stellar bodies in various ways. Since the days of Copernicus our theologians have expressed [themselves] on the question whether the earth is a planet moving in space.

Hollaz says: "The all-wise Creator founded the earth as a body which ordinarily was to be at rest and immobile. To the heavenly luminaries he assigned the function of measuring time by their movements." Calov denies both the rotary motion of the earth around its axis and the elliptical movement around the sun, and holds that Copernicus, Kepler and Lansberg with their astronomical view contradict Psalm 104:5; Job 26:7; 38:6, 7; Ecclesiastes 1:5. He also rejects the ideas of dwellers on the moon, for whom Christ had also died and to whom the Gospel was to be proclaimed, as Origen held. When the followers of Copernicus were confronted with the above texts they declared that the Bible spoke of astronomical facts "*ad captum vulgi erroneum*," not as they were in reality, but as the common people regarded them. This view was declared false and blasphemous by Dr. Rambach of Halle and Dr. Engelken of Rostock. Deyling sought to remedy this dangerous view of the Scriptures, that the Scriptures accommodated themselves to the erroneous conceptions of man. He saw that the Cartesian school of philosophy was advocating this view to the great detriment of the reliability of Scripture statements, and hit upon the idea that the astronomical statements in the Bible must be understood "*optice*," not "*physice*." He reasons thus: Our astronomical observations are made by means chiefly of the optic sense. What we see was intended for us to see, and is reliable to the extent that we can base astronomical observations on what we see. But it is not necessary to hold what we see really happens as we see it. This view is not essentially different from the former: it, too, depreciates the correctness of Bible statements. One of our theologians, Hafenreffer, was a friend of Kepler; he advised him to pursue his hypothetical reasoning on the causes of astronomical

phenomena but abandon the hope of reconciling his hypothesis with the Scriptures. Luther, who also holds that the earth is stationary and that the sun rotates about it, says: "Darum sollen wir Christen von den Ursachen dieser Dinge anders reden und gesinnt sein, denn die Philosophen, wiewohl deren etliche ueber unsere Vernunft... und vielmehr mit Bekenntniss unserer Unwissenheit zu glauben, denn entweder aus gottloser Meinung zu leugnen, oder vermessenlich nach unserem Verstand zu deuten sind. Denn wir muessen behalten die Art zu reden, wie sie die Heilige Schrift hat, und bleiben bei den Worten des Heiligen Geistes, etc." (I, 36f.). There is so much uncertainty connected with the Copernican system and astronomers contradict each other in so many points that a theologian ought to consider it beneath him to babble unproven guesses after them. (Compare Biography of Gustav Knaack by Wangermann, chapter on Copernican System, page 385.)

On the fifth day God created animals that can live in the water and such as can move through the air. The command in Genesis 1:20 is addressed to the water. Luther and Calvin understand this to mean that the water is the matter out of which fishes and birds were formed. Hollaz and Baier differ: the latter, pointing to Genesis 2:19, claims that the birds were formed from the air.

On the sixth day God created the terrestrial animals, quadrupeds and reptiles, from the ground. Hafenreffer has raised the question what we are to think of the creation of such hybrid animals as the mule, the lynx, the leopard, which spring from miscegenation, and of the creation of such animals as originate in putrid matter. Gerhard adds to this question a kindred one about poisonous plants. The answer must be that

all these animals and plants were created within the hexaemeron, if not "*actu*," at least "*potentia*," i.e., if they did not actually exist, the conditions for the existence were created. To what extent the incoming of sin has effected the natural world with its vegetable and animal growths, we cannot now declare with certainty. That no harmful plants or animals existed in the state of innocence is a fact that we derive from the general description of that state ("all very good"), from the dominion over the creatures which was accorded Adam, and from the absence of death in that state.

3. 4. 5. The manner in which the universe was created follows a natural order: first, God created natural substances (*simplicia, principia*); then composite substances (*mixta*), and of these latter, first, such as are imperfect composites, as the clouds; next, perfect composites: plants, fishes, birds, beasts, and each one of these from a material that was suited to their species. Quenstedt says: "The act of creation is completed in three phases: 1. the production of rude matter which was, so to speak, the granary (*seminarium*) for later creations, took place on the first day; 2. the separation of substances, light from darkness, the upper from the nether waters, the dry land from the seas, occurred on the three first days; 3. the completion and ornamentation of the universe so far created fill the three last days."

However, while following a natural order the manner in which God created was altogether different from physical or natural generation; for God produced from no materials, used no tools, and even when He employed substances already existing for producing other substances, there was no favorable predisposition, no aptitude in those substances, which could have made the work of creating easier for God. Hence the

creation of the world in the strict sense evidences the power of God, because He spoke things into being by His will, Jeremiah 32:17, also His wisdom, because He has wisely adapted His means to His ends, Psalm 104:24; 136:5; Revelation 4:11. The glory of God, then, is "*finis creationis*," the end and aim of creation. Inasmuch as the entire cosmos was made for man, as we noted in the preceding paragraph, man is called "*finis intermedius*" of the creation of the cosmos. Man, too, is to appreciate before other creatures the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator, and glorify Him. Gerhard rightly says: "God would not have commanded things to be, if He had not determined to create man." Baier points out that some creatures furnish man the necessities of life, others serve his delight, still others cure his diseases, or protect his health, and many aid him in his daily pursuits, or arouse the spirit of emulation in him. The macrocosm (the universe at large) has been created in the interest of the microcosm (man, who is a little world in himself).

§58. Preservation.

After the creation of man – which will be considered in Anthropology – God rested from all His works, that is, He ceased producing new species of creatures. But His rest was not mere inactivity. The inanimate and irrational world requires, for its continued existence, an activity on the part of the Triune God, who created it, which activity is called preservation (*creatio continuata*).

1. In Hebrews 1:3 this activity is expressed by "feroon," which means "to uphold," "to sustain," and being in the present

participle, denotes a continuous action. Chrysostom has paraphrased this term by “kubernoon, ta diapiptonta sugkratoon” – “governing or directing, forcing things that are falling apart, together.” This is a correct idea. “Ta panta,” the universe, would be doomed to dissolution, if the same power which composed it did not unceasingly apply its energies to preserve the relations, compositions, and combinations of the creatures, which were formed by the creative act. The activity is executed “by the word of his power,” that is, by the same cause by which according to Hebrews 11:3 the worlds were framed. It refers to Christ by whom all things were made. He has been appointed Lord over all things, and it is He that bears the universe in the hollow of His hand, even in the period of His humiliation. In Colossians 1:17 the effect of this activity of God by His almighty word is expressed by “synestäken.” All things have their unity and correlation in the Son, who is the unifying principle in the created universe. Even the Judaist Philo declared, though from different premises than St. Paul’s, in this text: “Things of themselves are loose; and if they happen to be consolidated anywhere, it is the Divine Word by which they are tied fast. For it is the cement and bond of things with its essence.” The last remark is wrong: not by His essence, but by His word God enters in as the unifying bond between all His creatures.

2. In the passages cited in this section the general truth stated in the preceding section is expressed in detail: the means and conditions of life are procured for the creatures by God. The power of reproduction and self-perpetuation which God has imparted to the creatures is a secondary cause of preservation. It is really through the word of the divine blessing that the creatures are sustained. But the power of this word is

so great that a distinction of any created substance is not possible, except by the will of God. Even the natural science of our day has in its own way discovered that matter and energy may change its form, but it cannot be annihilated.

Pneumatology or Angelology.

When the Epistle to the Hebrews sets out to prove that Christ is more excellent than every creature, it asserts, chapter 1:4, that He is better than even the angels. This implies that among all the creatures which share in the manifestation of the Creator’s goodness the angels are the most perfect. We believe the existence of angels on the authority of Scripture alone, though plausible and probable grounds can be adduced by human reason for this fact, and the belief in the existence of such beings is found outside of the revealed religion. Philosophy regards the existence of a cosmos probable by assuming a gradation of existences, and holds that their existence is a necessary link between the highest existence, viz., God, and the lower, such as man.

§59. Creation of Angels.

1. The angels are classed with the creatures in Psalm 148:2, 5; Psalm 104:4; Colossians 1:16. Being simple substances that do not depend on matter for their existence, the angels, too, were created out of nothing. That they were created with the other creatures, we infer e.g., from Proverbs 8:22, where the Son of God, the personified Wisdom, is said to

have been with God “before his works.” This excludes also the angels from the predicate of eternity. They are included in the comprehensive statements of the records of creation in Genesis 2:2, 3; Exodus 20:11. The exact time of their creation has not been revealed. Since heaven and earth were created “in the beginning,” they cannot have been created before these; for then they would be eternal. That they were not created after the sixth day, follows from the fact that God rested after the sixth “from all his works.” Hence they were created “within the six days of creation.” It is not safe to define the time more closely. Job 38:7 we read that when God laid down the foundation of the earth, “all the sons of God shouted for joy.” In Job 1:6 the term “sons of God” is applied to the angels. The work of “laying the foundations of the earth” may refer to the work of the first day. Hence the angels may have been created immediately before or in connection with the creation of the rude and unordered mass that sprang into existence on the first day. That the angels were created before man is inferred 1) from the fact that all things were made for man’s service; 2) from the fact that Hebrews 1:14 calls the angels directly “ministering spirits appointed for the service” of men. But these arguments are not conclusive.

Following Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, XII, c. 16), Photinius, Porphyry, the Simonians, Nicolaites, and Archontici in the early days of Christianity declared the angels to be coequal with God. Ireneus relates that the Valentinians believed two classes of angels, of which the “superior” had created the “inferior.” Many of the church-fathers, Origen, Gregory Naz., Basil, Chrysostom, Damascenus in the oriental, and Ambrose, Jerome, Hilary, Isidor, and Cassian in the occidental church believed that the angels were created before the visible world.

The Socinians at first wavered in claiming premundane existence for the angels, but at last adopted that belief, because they thought it helped them in their fight against the eternity of the Son of God. The leader of the Armenians, Episcopius, joined them in it. Among the Rabbis some have held that the good angels were created on the first, the evil angels on the second or the fifth day; others believe that angels or demons were created on the evening of the sixth day, about the time when Eve was formed from a rib of Adam, and that Satan had at once accepted the opportunity for tempting Eve.

2. God made the angels in unnumbered multitudes, Daniel 7:10; Revelation 5:11. The fact that in both these texts a definite number is mentioned proves indeed that there is a fixed and finite number of angels, so that an attempt at numbering them would be feasible. But the numbers given are indefinite and mean no more than “a multitude,” Luke 2:13.

§60. Nature of Angels.

The term “angel” is an official title, denoting a messenger. From the Greek the term has passed over to the Latin, and to languages derived from that (English, French, Spanish). Also the German “Engel” is from the same word. The Hebrew term for angel, “**malak**,” is from an obsolete root, which still appears in the Ethiopian and signifies “to send.” “*Angelus officii nomen est, non naturae*,” says Augustine, but this fact is well nigh forgotten. It is owing to this general meaning of the term that we find it applied in Scripture also to men who are discharging the office of legate or ambassador, Genesis 32:3, 6; James 2:25. In particular this term is applied to

prophets, 2nd Chronicles 36:15, 16; Haggai 1:13; the Levitical priests, Malachi 2:7; and ministers of the Gospel, Revelation 2 and 3. A peculiar interest attaches to the "Angel of Covenant," mentioned throughout the Old Testament. This is none other than our Lord Christ, whom German devotion has aptly called "der Grossbote unserer Seligkeit." He appeared to the patriarchs and the chosen people at critical moments of their history to confirm the promise of the Messiah made to them. To determine where in a given passage of the Old Testament the angel is a common angel or this illustrious Angel, Quenstedt suggests this rule: "Whenever and wherever the name Jehovah, or a divine attribute or work, or divine worship is accorded to an angel appearing to the patriarchs and other believers in the Old Testament, there, not a created, but the uncreated angel, viz., the Son of God, the Captain of the heavenly host, the Lord of all the angels, is to be understood. By an ineffable condescension He condescended to appear to the patriarchs in an assumed form, and thus gave them, as it were, a prelude of His incarnation." These Christophanies of the Old Testament are not anticipated incarnations. Quenstedt distinguished the *unio* "parastatikä" from the *unio* "hypostatikä." Only the latter is the personal union which was forever effected by the incarnation. The former is a temporary assumption of a certain visible form which was put aside again after it had answered its purpose. "That which appeared," says Suarez, "was not He who appeared, but only a medium which He employed to make Himself visible." Calixtus had discussed the question: In what way were the Father and the Spirit by these apparitions of the Son in the Old Testament? Quenstedt declares in regard to this point: "We do not declare that in these apparitions the persons of the Trinity had become

separate, or that the Father and the Spirit were not present, in the places where the Son exhibited Himself to view in an assumed form.... Their coessentiality and intercommunion ("homooousia kai perichooräsis") forbid this thought. Wherever one divine person is and operates *ad extra*, there the others are and operate also (John 5:19). Calixtus confounds the appearance and the presence of the persons of the Trinity. Their coessentiality necessitates that whenever and in whatsoever manner one person appears, the others be present, but it does not follow from the fact of their presence that all what occurs in a divinely arranged appearance of this kind must be indiscriminately ascribed to all the persons." Jewish theologians, Paulus of Samosata, the Papists, some Calvinists, the Lutheran theologians George Calixtus, Hofmann, Delitzsch, Kurtz, and, in a half-hearted way, Luthardt, deny that the "Angel of Jehovah" in the Old Testament is the Son of God. Luthardt adduces as the one reason for this belief that in the respective places in the Old Testament the "Angel of Jehovah" is identified with Jehovah and accepts divine honor shown. But he cites against this belief five facts: 1. The ordinary meaning of "**malach Jahveh**"; 2. The meaning of "aggelos kyriou" in the New Testament; 3. The view common to the New Testament writers, viz., that divine revelations are communicated by the agency of angels; 4. The substitution of the angel Michael for the Angel of Jehovah in later writings of the Old Testament; 5. The Old Testament passages in which the Angel of Jehovah is unquestionably a created angel. The one reason, however, adduced for the belief outweighs the five reasons cited against it. That reason was convincing to such exegetes as Hengstenberg, Kahnis, Philippi, Keil, and others.

1. 2. “*Sunt autem angeli,*” says Baier, “*sua natura spiritus.*” Angels are immaterial beings, “pneumata,” as they are called, Hebrews 1:14. This means that they have no body. They are “*substantiae spirituales aut incorporeae,*” Pythagoras, Plato. Some of the ancient church-fathers, Justin and Origen, the Mohammedans, some Calvinists and Armenians, Hugo Grotius, and modern theologians (e.g., Kurtz, *Bibel und Astronomie*, Seiten 78-84) have ascribed to the angels a delicate, ethereal corporeity, a “*substantia corporea subtili*” like the wind, which is called “pneuma,” John 3:8, or like the breath of a living being, which is called “**neschamah**” in Isaiah 2:22. But when Scripture uses the term “spirit,” it employs it “*in oppositione adaequata ad corpus,*” i.e. in complete or perfect contrast to body. In Luke 24:39 the risen Lord, appearing before His disciples in the most ethereal body imaginable, viz., in the “sooma doxäs,” the glorified resurrected body, allays their fears by telling them that He is not a spirit. And in Ephesians 6:12 we are told that when we fight against diabolical spirits, we are not fighting against “flesh and blood.”

It always has been felt, however, that a careful distinction must be drawn between God, who is the uncreated Spirit, and the angels, who are created spirits. Kromayer calls attention to the fact that we must [not] imagine that the angels were produced out of the substance of God, for that is the exclusive distinction of the Son, who is therefore called “monogenäs,” only-begotten, and “idios huios,” God’s only Son. Nor were they created as sharers, in some way, of the divine essence; for God is indivisible. Quenstedt says, when we view the angels in comparison with ourselves, we must view them simply as spirits. If we would view them from the standpoint of God, we would be inclined to ascribe to them

“*convenientiam cum substantia corporea*, i.e., a sort of an approach to a corporeal substance, because the angels are creatures made by God and subject to change. Quenstedt thinks that for this reason some of the ancients have ascribed bodies to the angels and have said, “*Angelos esse incorporeos ‘pros hymas’, sed corporeos tamen respectu Dei, ad quem relatione quadam omnino crassitudinem obtineant et materiam.*”

The bodies in which the angels have appeared were only temporarily assumed. The dogmaticians call these bodies *forma assistens*, to distinguish them from *forma informans*, which designates a body that belongs to the essence of an individual. The union of some individual angel to the body which he has assumed on a given occasion is called *unio accidentalis*, and distinguished from *unio naturalis seu assentialis*. Scharf says: “A *forma assistens* is anything which directs the movement and activity of something, but does not enter into the essence of that thing, e.g., the driver is the *forma assistens* of his team of horses, the teacher that of the pupils. And the bodies which they assume, the angels obtain by the creative will and power of God, not by their own power (Kromayer). When angels are said to eat and drink, that is not done, says Ad. Osiander, as men do it, “*ob egestatem*, because they need food, but *instar flammae consumunt eibum ob potestatem*, they consume food like a flame because of their power.” It is therefore part of the definition of angel-spirits to say that they do not consist of angelic matter and form. The qualifier “finite” which our textbook adds to the definition of the nature of the angels serves to distinguish them from God who is the infinite Spirit, from whom the angels are removed by a vast distance, because He has His being from Himself, and

cannot be limited, while the angels have their being from Him and are limited. On the other hand the term “complete” serves to distinguish the angels from the souls of men, who are incomplete spirits, because human souls were not created to exist by themselves but only with a body, with which as its component part they are to form *unum per se*, an entity.

3. Angels possess personality; for they refer to themselves as persons (“I am Gabriel”) and are addressed as such by their name, Luke 1:19; Daniel 8:16. They bear titles indicating personal rank (“principalities, powers, dominions,” etc., Colossians 1:16). They hold a personal relation to God (“sons of God,” Job 2:1; “men of God,” Judges 13:6).

4. 6. 7. Angels also possess intelligence. For actions are ascribed to them which plainly flow from the intellect such as praising God, Isaiah 6:3; worshipping Him, Hebrews 1:6; knowing what is being preached in the church, Ephesians 3:10. And if some men excel above others in intelligence and wisdom, Scripture tells us in 2nd Samuel 14:10, that they are “wise, according to the wisdom of an angel of God.”

A threefold knowledge of the angels may be distinguished: *cognitio, naturalis, revelata et beatifica*. Natural knowledge is shared alike by the good and evil angels on account of the identity of their nature, although this knowledge may admit of degrees. Revealed knowledge, too, was shared alike by the good and evil angels before the Fall; but after the Fall it was taken away from the wicked angels, as a punishment of their fall, while the good angels do not need it after the Fall, because they were transferred to the state of glory, and now have obtained the beatific knowledge. The intelligence of the angels is an “*accidens*,” distinct from their essence. By their natural knowledge they may know intuitively themselves and

the coexistence of other angels, heaven and earth, and the things therein, and, by abstraction, God. Successive events in time and such as happen to individuals the angels must learn by observation and reasoning. Ephesians 3:10: “That now may be known to the principalities and powers by the church, etc.,” shows that the angels are not omniscient. Future events and contingencies which depend on the action of a free agent, the angels do not know for certain and infallibly, Mark 13:32, for this is an exclusive prerogative of God. They may know, as we do, constellations and eclipses, that are to occur, because these depend on the working of the laws of nature, but they cannot know in advance a miracle which God may choose to perform by suspending the natural order. The angels, however, may have a conjectural knowledge of coming events by calculating effects of wars and revolutions, sins, and remarkable actions, by observing the genius and temperament of men, their manners, etc. In this respect they far excel our human sagacity, but this knowledge is, with them as with us, merely a probable, uncertain and fallible one. The diabolical apparition which Saul had at Endor, 1st Samuel 28:19, produced knowledge which had been gained, no doubt by conjecture. Similarly the angels may surmise the secrets of men’s heart, but cannot have the accurate knowledge of these things that God has, who is the discernor of our very thoughts. The Chaldean soothsayers in Daniel 2:10, 11, could not tell Nebuchadnezzar’s dream, because their master, the devil, did not know it. On the other hand, the devil may have known what was going on in Judas’ heart, because he had made a special study of him. The devils certainly know such thoughts of men as they themselves have suggested to them. The faculty of speech which enables angels to converse with one another and with men and to address

God, is also evidence of their intelligence, Isaiah 6:3; Revelation 7:11; Zechariah 2:3; Luke 1:13, 19; 20:30, 35; 24:4-6; Acts 1:10f.

5. The angels are moral beings. They have a will which is exercised in holiness, Matthew 25:31. Impartiality is inculcated on Timothy by the example of the angels. The angels, then, have the faculty of desiring what is good and eschewing what is evil. They understand the import of obedience and disobedience. This quality has undergone a change in some of them through their defection from God.

8. The great power of the angels is indicated in 2nd Thessalonians 1:7 ("mighty") and Psalm 103:20 ("excel in strength"). Certain abilities of the angels were alluded to in the preceding sections, such as their power to assume human bodies, speak, etc. It has been contended that the narrative in Genesis 18:19, and other places, which relates that angels had their feet washed, consumed food, took Lot by the hand, etc., state not what actually happened, but what appeared to the spectators to happen. For it is claimed that angelic bodies, e.g. need no food, and do not digest it. But this objection is rationalistic. The texts in question clearly relate the respective events as facts, and we cannot charge the Holy Spirit with producing fiction when He inspired those accounts. If it [would be] possible for angels to assume a body – which nobody denies – why should it be impossible for them to do with those bodies what others do with them? We cannot understand why they should eat, and we do not know whether food is turned into blood and muscle in their assumed bodies, but this does not give us a right to make a Scripture statement to appear fictitious. Even our risen Lord ate with His disciples in His glorified body. We may not understand how this or that could

be, but is that a theologian's business? The power of the angels is not omnipotence. They cannot create anything, they cannot raise the dead, etc. Their power is proportioned to such tasks as God assigns to them. It is so great that viewed "*absolute et unde*," says Quenstedt, it would be sufficient to upset the universe and stop its ordered existence, but being entirely dependent on the will of God and subject to His providential acts, it cannot accomplish what it might. That the good angels are more powerful than the evil, Scripture indicates, when it pictures the former as men's protectors against the latter.

To sum up, angels are simple substances, not having essential parts like man (body and soul), or integral parts (head, chest, feet, arms, etc.). Though having been created, they could be destroyed by God, or changed, they are in themselves incorruptible, because they contain no element of decay or something that could destroy them, and hence, they are of endless existence. Accordingly, some dogmatists have drawn a distinction between the corruptibility and the annihilability of the angels: the former they affirm while they deny the latter. In order to avoid the inconvenience of ascribing eternity to angels, which is an essential attribute of God, the term sempiternity has been coined. But this could also be applied to men. Being immaterial, the angels are not like us anchored to place. They are somewhere, yet illocal. They are not omnipresent; for they can be only in one place at a time. They can move very fast, Psalm 104:4; Hebrews 1:7, so as to appear ubiquitous, but their movement is like ours: progressive, step by step, successive.

9. The different orders and ranks of the angels indicated in 1st Peter 3:22; 1st Thessalonians 4:16, and elsewhere does not prove that they differ in kind or essence. Quenstedt notes

the fabulous views which scholastic and papistic theologians have borrowed from Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, viz., that there are nine "*ordines seu chori angelorum*," which again are divided into three ternaries according to their dignity and official functions. The highest are closest to God, and instruct the next class, and so on down the scale. The highest ranks are said only to assist, but not to minister. This is all dreams. All that we can know about the matter is that there are orders and ranks in the angel-world, but it is impossible to fix the grades and determine their sequence, for in the passages of Scripture in which these ranks are mentioned, there is no unity of order. Augustine: "*Dicant, qui possunt; ego me ista ignorare confiteor.*"

§61. Fixed Number of Angels.

Incidentally, as it were, namely, in telling His disciples of certain features of the life eternal, the Lord had revealed two conditions of the angels by which we are enabled to claim that their number is not subject to change from natural causes. Their number is not increased through procreation, because no marriages take place among them, the angels being sexless, Matthew 22:30; Mark 12:25. Nor is their number decreased, for no deaths occur among them, the angels being immortal, Luke 20:36. From very ancient times (Philo) down to the present age (Hofmann, Kurtz) the account of the cohabitation of the "sons of God" with the "daughters of men" in Genesis 6:2 has been interpreted of angel-marriages. Talmudists, Cabbalists, Sethians, Justin, Clement of Alex., Tertullian, Sulpitius Severus, etc. have held this view, but the orthodox

teachers of the church in all ages have repudiated it as "monstrous." Philo held that the angels who thus burned with carnal lust were cast out of heaven for it. The true meaning of the text is this: The "sons of God," that is, the members of the godly race, who still kept up an external connection at least with God's people, or who were descended from god-fearing parents took to wives the "daughters of men," that is, worldly women.

§62. Good Angels.

1. The spirit-cosmos was originally a unit. All angels had been created essentially equal from a moral point of view, their ranks and orders notwithstanding. All were serving the end for which they were created; for in the general inspection which the Creator made of all His works at the end of the sixth [day], also the angels were all pronounced "very good," Genesis 1:31. God had conferred on the angels certain innate perfections which were [to] enable them [to] act in accordance with the divine will and [to] attain the end for which they had been created. The angels were not created in a "*status purae naturae*," that is, morally indifferent, still less, with a proneness to sin, but they were, by divine grace, positively good. The "*status purorum naturalium*" which the Papists claim for the angels and man in their original state is pure fiction. The original condition of the angels is called their "*status gratiae*." In this state the angels correctly knew God, loved Him above all things, believed Him truthful, confided in His goodness, obeyed His commands, and had the hope of eternal life. Their intellect and will were so constituted that they could form the act of

faith, and every act of obedience from pure love of God, without being in any way coerced. Having thus been created by their knowledge, righteousness and holiness, to be conformed to the will of God, it is not improper to say that they were created after the divine image. Such a relation seems to be indicated in the name “sons of God,” by which the Scriptures call them. All these qualities of the angels will be seen by men at the return of the Lord, when He will be accompanied by His “holy angels,” Matthew 25:31.

2. The original state of the angels was continued only by a part of their number. Scripture distinguishes these from another class which it calls “angels that sinned,” 2nd Peter 2:14, and “that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation,” Jude 6. These latter, then, were evil “*non ortu, sed lapsu, non entitate, sed qualitate*” (Quenstedt). As distinct from this latter class the good angels are called “the elect angels,” 1st Timothy 5:21. The original goodness and perfections in which they have been created has never been impaired.

§63. Confirmed State of Good Angels.

2-5. How long the state of grace lasted for the angels, that is, when that separation took place after which some were permanently good, others permanently evil, we cannot say. Some imagine that it took place on the second day, because the usual formula: “God saw that it was good,” which Moses inserts in his account of each day’s work, is wanting in his account of the second day. This proves nothing, however, because the statement at the end of the sixth [day] may

remedy this seeming defect. We can only say that the separation took place before the fall of man, because the tempter appears as a lying and murderous spirit even at that time, while the fact that God appoints the cherubim to guard Eden after the expulsion of Adam indicates that the good angels had by that time become confirmed in their original goodness, immune from sin and temptations by their evil comrades, for which reason they could be entrusted with that duty. Their “*status gratiae*” had now passed over into the “*status gloriae*.” They had during the period of probation, rendered God constant obedience. When the evil angels revolted, they remained firm in their allegiance; they may even have resisted them and borne their insults, as the poets think who have thought to describe the battle of the good with the evil angels, of which Scripture, however, relates nothing. God now filled these faithful and constant spirits with the light of glory and admitted them to the beatific vision of Himself, Matthew 18:10. This highest privilege that any creature can obtain and which is the climax in the blissful life of eternity was accompanied by the most intense love, by which the will of these angels began to cling inseparably to God as the supreme object of their affection. In this way they became confirmed in goodness. Their will was unchangeably determined to act only in agreement with the will of God, without a slip, or taint in their actions. They had become sinless beings, yea, it was henceforth impossible for them to sin (*impeccabilitas*, “*anamartäsia*”); for they “always behold” God. As a consequence they had also become immune from death, Luke 20:36. When our Lord shall return for the last judgment, they will form His glorious retinue and witness His righteous judgments. It is insipid to argue that the angels’ impeccability

limits their freedom of action, as if the ability to sin were an essential element of that freedom!

1. The confirmation of the angels in their blessed state took place “in accordance with divine election.” This is indicated by their designation as “*eklektoi aggeloi*” in 1st Timothy 5:21. It is not easy to describe this election, or predestination, of the angels to a life in glory. An absolute decree of God, by which some of them were predestinated, while the others were rejected, is not compatible with the uniform goodness and grace of God toward all His creatures, nor is this election to be explained, as Baier explains it, by saying that God had foreseen the obedience which the good angels would render Him. For this would claim for these angels a certain merit and depreciate the grace of God, which view Baier himself declines. No good angel even can contend with God on the basis of self-righteousness, as Job 4:18 declares. Nor can the election of the angels be embraced in the election of the believers. For the latter have a Savior, who assumed their flesh and blood, but “took not on Him the nature of angels,” Hebrews 2:16. The elect angels were not redeemed by Christ, as it were, because they were not in need of redemption. What is stated in Ephesians 1:10; Colossians 1:19, 20 about angels and men brought under a common head by Christ and about a reconciliation of all, does not mean that angels share in the redemption accomplished for men, but that as an effect of our redemption the element of sin which separated men also from the angels has been removed. The angels rejoice with the redeemed sinners over the redemption of the latter. The passages cited, moreover, may not refer to angels at all, but to the believers of the old covenant who with the believers of the new form one Holy, Christian Church of which Christ is the

head. The Calvinists have applied their absolute decree of predestination and reprobation also to the spirit-cosmos, while scholastic theologians, Papists, and some of the Reformed have applied the entire way of salvation appointed for men (repentance, faith, means of grace) also to the angels.

§64. Occupation of Good Angels.

1. 3. The blissful life of the good angels is not spent in idleness. They are happy in a number of activities, some of which pertain to God and constitute the very bliss of the angels, others pertain to men whom the angels rejoice to serve at the command of God. The angels are seen “standing before” God, in the expectant attitude of dutiful servants who are ready to carry out their Lord’s errands, and to “minister” to Him by “doing His pleasure,” that is, anything which He has pleased to bid them do, Daniel 7:10; Psalm 103:21. (However, we must not imagine that the angels serve God because He stands in need of their service: *ex quadam Dei indigentia*. He employs them for His purposes *ex voluntate libera*.) For this reason they have attended also the God-man during His redemptive work on earth from the manger to the tomb. (Texts under 3.) While the beatific vision and the intuitive knowledge of God which the good angels enjoy is said to constitute their “*beatitudo essentialis*,” they are said to enjoy a “*beatitudo accidentalis*,” because in their service of God they are acquainted with the mysteries of the grace of God in the government of the universe, the redemption of the human race by the incarnation of His Son, the government of the Church, the conversion of sinners, etc., all of which discoveries yield to the angels’ intense

gladness and inflame them with ever new motives for loving God. This latter beatitude of the angels, being subject to circumstances in time, is increased until the end of time shall arrive.

4. In the service which the angels render men they serve at the same time God, who “sends them forth” for such ministrations to individual believers, Hebrews 1:14. In the days of infancy, Matthew 18:10, and in mature life, Psalm 34:7; 91:11, yea, also, in the hour of death, Luke 16:22, the god-fearing have the guardian care of good angels vouchsafed them. They brought messages to Joseph and Mary, Matthew 1:19, 20; 2:13, 19, to Cornelius, Acts 10:3, 5, to John, Revelation 1:1; 22:6, 16. They were with Daniel chapter 6:22, Peter, Acts 12:7, the apostles, Acts 5:18, 19, in critical situations. They administered comfort to Zacharias, Luke 1:13, Mary, Luke 1:30, the shepherds at Bethlehem, Luke 2:10, the women at the sepulcher of Christ, Matthew 28:5. From the fact that the angel was active at the Pool of Bethesda, John 5:4, our older theologians have drawn the assurance that the angels’ service is rendered men at healing fountains, and that, while the devils are bent on destroying, they are busy averting destruction in many ways, that cannot be specified *a priori*, though their mysterious service has been recognized *a posteriori* in innumerable instances. The question has been raised whether it is proper to believe that particular angels are detailed for ministering to particular individuals (“a guardian angel”). This belief is very old. Gerhard believes that “ordinarily” this is the case. Baier is inclined to admit this, but says that the service of the other angels must not be denied men, because of their having a guardian angel appointed for them. Quenstedt says, the whole matter is a *“quaestio problematica, non fidei*

articulus.” The Lord’s statement in Matthew 18:10 refers to all angels and all little ones. Deuteronomy 32:8 is often cited as proof for the doctrine of guardian angels, but the text has been wrongly translated in the LXX, and it is cited in this wrong translation. In Psalm 34:7, “angel” is in the singular, and the service which he renders extends to many. In Psalm 91:11, “angels” is in the plural, and their service is extended to an individual. The service of the angels is rendered to men not only singly, but also collectively, in the three divinely ordained estates of church, state, and family. Their relation to the affairs of the church is indicated by their presence and ministry on Mount Sinai at the promulgation of the Law, Deuteronomy 33:2; Acts 7:53; Galatians 3:19, and at the birth of the Savior. From 1st Corinthians 11:10 and 1st Timothy 5:21 we learn that they are present in the gatherings of Christians for worship, for the women and the pastor of the congregation are warningly reminded of this fact. From the obscure strife of the angel in Jude 9 with Satan, some have drawn the belief that the angels energetically oppose the introduction of idolatrous practices into the church. For it is held that Jude refers to an attempt of Satan to exhume the body of Moses whom God had concealed, and to set his remains up for adoration. The interest of the angels in the affairs of the State is indicated by the events at the Persian court, Daniel 10:13; 6:22, and at the court of King Hezekiah, 2nd Kings 19:35; Isaiah 37:36. With the domestic affairs of men the angels are shown to be connected in the account of the marriage of Isaac, Genesis 24:7, and of the prosperity of Job, Job 1:10. Psalm 34:7 and Matthew 18:10 also point to domestic scenes. Paganism, Rabbinical theology, and Mohammedanism with their belief in local genii, tutelary deities, and the Roman Church with its teaching of guardian

angels, patron saints, etc., are in opposition to the teaching of Scripture. Among Calvinists the belief is occasionally found that for each one of the elect a guardian angel has been appointed – surely an unnecessary provision of God, if He elected by an absolute decree. The angels have a peculiar office to discharge at the last judgment when they shall accompany the Lord, Matthew 24:31, [to] sound the trumpet before Him, 1st Thessalonians 4:17, gather the nations before His tribunal, separate the sheep from the goats and hurl the damned into hell. On account of this manifold and beneficial activity of the good angels, it is proper that we should esteem them highly and be careful not to offend them by any evil deeds. However, it is improper, yea, idolatrous to worship them by prayer. We have neither command nor promise in Scripture for such practice, nor do we find an instance when this was done with divine approval, but an instance is recorded, Revelation 19:10; 22:8-9, when such service was repudiated by an angel. Augustine says: “We honor the angels by our love not by our service, and we build them no temples. They do not wish to be thus honored by us, because they know that we ourselves, when we are good, are temples of God.” The Smalcald Articles (Part 2, Article II, §26, page 317) grant that the angels pray for us in heaven, but deny that on that account we must pray to them and worship them. Abraham, Lot, Balaam, we are told, worshipped angels, but the term is in those places used not of divine worship, but of acts of reverence which were shown the angels. In the case of Abraham, however, there was actual worship, because the Angel that appeared to him was the Son of God. The distinction which the Papists have invented between “*latreia*” and “*douleia*” is a distinction without a difference when one observes their actual practice and reads their official

declarations about praying to angels and saints (Council of Trent, 25th Session). Even in the apostolic church an attempt was made to introduce angel-worship, Colossians 2:18.

§65. Evil Angels.

1-3. Evil angels are such “*non orto, sed lapsu, non entitate, sed qualitate*” (Quenstedt). They are those who “kept not their first estate,” Jude 6, who “abode not in the truth,” John 8:44, and “left their own habitation.” Their number is “legion,” that is an indefinite, but great multitude, Mark 5:9. Scripture has not clearly revealed the manner and cause of their defection. The probable cause was pride, or an inordinate self-esteem and ambitious craving for divine honor and dominion, Genesis 3:5; Matthew 4:8; Ecclesiastes 10:14; 1st Timothy 3:6. Others have suggested, besides pride, envy and intemperance or licentiousness. The language in Jude 6 indicates a sullen spirit in these angels which refused to remain subordinate to a master. The suggestion of the tempter in Eden and in the desert certainly shows that the devil entertains thoughts of equaling God, and the warning against pride which Paul administers to Timothy is made very pointed by the reference to the devil. In the rebellion of the evil angels one acted as the leader, who is, accordingly, called “the devil” “*kat’ exochän*,” John 8:44; 1st John 3:8, “the prince of the devils,” Luke 11:15, “that old serpent and Satan.” His followers are called “his angels,” Matthew 25:41; Revelation 12:7. It cannot, however, be determined exactly in what order and degree the devils “sinned,” 2nd Peter 2:4, whether all revolted at the same time, or one after the other. Quenstedt holds that John 8:44

refers not to an individual but to the whole mass of malignant spirits, because what the Lord says in that place of the devil applies to all of them.

4-6. When Peter applies to these angels the sad epithet “that sinned,” 2nd Peter 2:4, he not only indicates that sinning began with them (“ap’ archäs,” 1st John 3:8), but also that sinning has henceforth become a standing characteristic of these angels. Having lost their concreated grace, their intellect became darkened. They lost their judgment of what is right and good. That is what the Lord means when He says: “They abode not in the truth,” and became “liars” to such an extent that “there is no truth in them.” Lying is, so to speak, their native element (“ek toon idioon”), and they are constantly busy disseminating lies, John 8:44. Their name “devil” indicates this; for “diabolos” is from “diaballein,” to slander, calumniate, prevaricate. The Hebrew “**schatan**” has a similar meaning (“adversary,” “one who lies in wait”). The devils slander God to man, Genesis 3:5, 6; Matthew 4:6, and men to God, Job 1. They mislead men from the service of God to idolatry, 1st Corinthians 10:20. How foolishly, however, their corrupt intellect acts, can be seen from the eagerness with which the devils promoted the destruction of Christ; they seem not to have perceived that by so doing they inflicted the greatest harm on themselves. Quenstedt remarks that when the devil said to Christ: “If Thou art the Son of God,” he either had no certain knowledge of the divinity of Christ, but merely suspected it, as Hilary thinks, or if he had a definite knowledge of the fact, he was plainly insane if he thought that he could destroy Him. Luther used to say: “*Diabolus est doctor non promolus, sed expertus.*” The devils have a great knowledge, both of supernatural things, of which they are quite sure, James 2:19, and of natural things, which

their subtle intellect enables them to understand intuitively or to learn by experience. But all their intelligence is corrupted by hatred of God and His creatures and affords them no joy. For their will, too, and all their moral faculties are depraved, as a consequence of their falling away from God. Their knowledge of God and His righteousness does not deter them from their mad opposition to God. Thus their defection has resulted in an utter perversion of their original nature. They are now “pneumata akartharta,” defiled spirits, Matthew 10:1. They have become so contaminated in their being that wickedness has taken up its abode in them, and they are “ta pneumatika tās ponārias” (neuter plural with genitive of abstract noun, denoting their mass and quality). Despite their sagacity and energy they have, with their blurred intellect and blunted will, become the standing contradiction to truth and right.

§66. Confirmed State of Evil Angels.

The state of the evil angels is a hopeless one: they are confirmed in wickedness and cannot but sin. They are now in “chains of darkness,” bound like prisoners already sentenced and “reserved unto judgment,” that is, for execution, Jude 6; 2nd Peter 2:4. Everlasting fire is already “prepared” for them, Matthew 25:41. Scripture states that God “spared them not”; He showed them no pity, appointed them no Redeemer, left them no time of grace, nor room for repentance, and gave them no means of grace. The following “probable reasons” Gerhard has culled from the fathers, why God, who is a lover of men (“philanthroopos”), is not likewise “philaggelos,” a lover of angels: 1. not all the angels fell, nor did the entire angelic

nature perish when the devils fell; this, however, happened in the fall of Adam, in and with whom the whole human race fell; 2. The devils did not fall having been tempted and seduced by another, but by their own malice, while man fell by his infirmity. The evil angels in their confirmed state of wickedness are, therefore, not morally indifferent and free to choose either good or evil, but they have a choice only between this or that form of wickedness. Dante has inscribed over the entrance to the Inferno: "*Lasciate ogni speranza, chi entrate,*" abandon hope, all ye who enter here. This is a correct thought: the devils know no hope. Endless is the punishment decreed for them: "pur aioonios, kolasis aioonios," Matthew 25:41, 46, "pur asbeston," Mark 9:43. The Augsburg Confession rejects the error of the Anabaptists who hold that the punishment of the damned and devils will have an end (Article 17). It was especially their leader Denck who defended this erroneous view which Origen had held before him. That no such hope can be entertained for the devils has been shown before. Origen and those who have followed him have cited the mercy of God in support of their belief; but they seem to forget that God is also just, and that we can speak of His mercy only within the limits in which He has declared Himself merciful and has provided agents and instruments of mercy. Whatever remains dark to us in regard to God's treatment, we must reserve to the time when all will be made plain. The eternal punishment of the evil angels is described by an imagery of a fiery furnace in which they are tormented, and by chains with which they are loaded, and by a prison in which they are jailed. These expressions not only refer to a locality but also to a state: wherever the devils may roam, they are in a condition indicated by these terms; they carry their hell and chains and prison with

them. But there will be a public confirmation of the devils' judgment on the last day, when they will be cast into the pit at the command of Christ. The question as to the exact location of hell and as to the quality of the fire in hell, whether it be a material or immaterial fire, burning only in the minds and souls of the damned, exceeds our information. So much is sure: that God has real punishment in store for the wicked.

§67. Occupation of the Evil Angels.

1-5. 7-9. Being confirmed in wickedness the devils maintain an active hostile attitude toward God, and all the works of God, chiefly man. "The enemy," "the adversary," Matthew 13:39; 1st Peter 5:8 – these terms by which Scripture calls them describe also their occupation. In their enmity toward the human race they attack not only individuals, but also the fundamental ordinances and estates which support the temporal and spiritual happiness of men.

The devils attack the bodies of men, as the instance of the infirm woman, Luke 13:11, 16, and of Job shows. They attack the temporal possessions of men, as in the instance of Job, Job [chapters] 1, 2. They attack the souls of men. Christ warns His disciples, Luke 22:31, that Satan had desired to sift them like wheat, i.e. he sought to confuse and perturb their minds, shake their faith, and, if possible, cause them to apostatize on account of the offense which they would take at His passion. The battle for which Paul, Ephesians 6:11, 12, would arm believers, suggests that the devils strive by all manner of insults and assaults to cause the Christians to lose their souls. And the violent rage which 1st Peter 5:8, 9, pictures

in the devil is directed chiefly at the destruction of the souls of believers; for the means suggested for resisting him are faith and prayer. The state of unbelief in which many men live, is the work of the devil, 2nd Corinthians 4:4; 2nd Timothy 2:26; Ephesians 2:2. When this state becomes greatly aggravated, it is called diabolical obsession. We distinguish an obsession of the mind and of the body. A flagrant example of the former is Judas Iscariot. The suggestion to betray Christ had come to him from the devil, John 13:2, and Judas had acted upon it, Luke 22:3, thus showing that he had yielded his mind to the domination of Satan. But after the Supper the devil “entered into Judas,” John 13:27, that is, he spiritually obsessed Judas driving him with increased force to commit his wicked deed. Augustine says: While the devil impelled Judas first as a stranger, he now possessed him as his own. We must be careful not to assume [as] reality that a person is spiritually obsessed because of his unbelief. It is only by the commission of some atrocious crime that we become aware of the extraordinary power which Satan wields over some men. We may be prompted to reserve our judgment on some instances which the dogmatists cite as evident cases of spiritual obsession. But it is well to take a comprehensive view of the terrible power of the devil over the minds of men, as Scripture describes it. John [the] Baptist calls the Pharisees a viper’s brood because of their venomous spirit and maliciousness, Matthew 3:7. Our Lord tells these same people, John 8:44, that they are the devil’s offspring, not indeed by physical generation, but by their imitating the devil, 1st John 3:8. In actual spiritual obsession the mind of the obsessed cooperates consciously and willingly with the devil. Hence spiritual obsession does not make a person irresponsible. For although the prompting of Satan is

ever present in the minds of the obsessed, they themselves delight in obeying his impulses. Quenstedt has examined Matthew 12:43ff. and Luke 11:24ff. to discover the circumstances attending spiritual obsession. When a person has once been liberated by divine grace from the bondage under sin, and then begins to yield himself to a feeling of spiritual ease and security, and imagines that he may sin with impunity, he is in danger of obsession; for the devil that had left him may return with any number of demons worse than himself – for there are degrees of malignity among the devils – and possess the person by dwelling in him. The aim of the devil in each case of obsession is, of course, to hurl men into eternal perdition. Our Lord warns the Pharisees that, unless they believe in His Sonship and Redeemership, they shall “die in their sins,” John 8:21, 24. Sometimes an instance of spiritual obsession may be so utterly disguised that things which such persons do may seem to proceed from the Holy Spirit, as happens in the case of heretics; for Satan can be changed into an angel of light. Spiritual obsession may not be so horrible to behold as corporeal obsession, but it is a far graver and disastrous occurrence. As instances of bodily obsession, the instances of the demoniacs whom our Lord exorcised are usually cited, Matthew 8:28, 31, 32; Mark 7:25ff.; Luke 4:35, 36. The devil is said to be present in these unfortunates, not only “kat’ energeian,” by reason of his working, but “kat’ ousian kai autoprosoopoos,” by reason of his essence and in his own person. The manner in which our Lord and the apostles speak of and to the demoniacs indicates that the devil has taken possession of the bodies of these men, either entirely or in part, by afflicting some member. But it is not only the presence of the devil, but also his savage, violent, blasphemous activity in

which he causes the obsessed to engage that serves as an indicator of such an instance of obsession. Even believers may become thus obsessed, as witness Paul, 2nd Corinthians 12:7, who speaks of Satan's angel buffeting him, and Job, chapters 1, 2. Physical or bodily obsession destroys all responsibility of the obsessed. Care must be had so as not to view every case of epilepsy and insanity as corporeal obsession. The following "signs" of this form of obsession have been collected by Quenstedt: 1. sudden knowledge of foreign languages or of accomplishments and skill which the obsessed had not acquired by study and practice, and which he does not remember when restored to sane conditions; 2. knowledge of hidden articles and of coming events; 3. unnatural and superhuman physical strength; 4. ability to exactly reproduce the cries of birds and beasts without their organs; 5. foul speech; 6. coarse gestures; 7. bellowing voice; 8. blasphemy and gross slander; 9. savage cruelty against one's own body or against others. However, the concluding remark of Quenstedt deserves to be heeded: "*Singularis tamen circumscriptio hic requiritur, ne gravioribus morbis afflictos pro obsessis habeamus.*" In this connection the old dogmatists have also discussed diabolical apparitions, spectres, the play of satyrs by means of which the devils seek to terrify or mock men. We learn from Psalm 78:49 that such illusions occurred during the Egyptian plagues. 1st Corinthians 10:20 declares that at the idolatrous feast of the pagans the devils are the real hosts, and Isaiah 31:21 declares that the devils may appear in some assumed shape. However, caution is necessary again in passing judgment on such occurrences: for it is certain that visions may come from God, or from the good angels, or from natural causes which we have not yet learnt to understand. Much of

what sorcerers, necromancers, conjurers, witches, etc. are supposed to do by the power of Satan can be explained on natural grounds. But it must be admitted by all who wish to do justice to the teaching of Scripture that there are occurrences which must be referred to direct diabolical operation. The devils are filled with special hostility against the church. They disseminate heresies, Matthew 13:27; 1st Timothy 4:1, 2; 2nd Thessalonians 2:8 (antichrist); they hinder the ministers of the church in their work, 1st Thessalonians 2:18; they make the hearers at the church inattentive, prevent men's conversation, etc., Luke 8:12, and raise up persecutions and adversities against the church. The devils show their malice against the state by instilling into the minds of the rulers pernicious counsels, and raising up political disturbances, 1st Chronicles 22:1; 1st Kings 22:21, 22. Their principle is: *Divide et impera*. They hate, lastly, the domestic relation: they sow discord and strife in families, and hinder their peaceful and prosperous activities, 1st Corinthians 7:5; Matthew 15:22; Job 1.

6. However, the pernicious work of the devils is "subject to God's supreme dominion and control and confirmed within the bounds of His permission," Job 1:12; 2:6. For reasons of His own, which we may sometimes surmise but cannot certainly know, God employs the ministry also of the evil angels, but for the chastisement and correction of [the] godly (Job and Paul) and for the punishment of the ungodly. There is, however, no Scripture passage that compels the belief that the devils will be tormentors of the damned in hell. Rambach rightly says: "Die Teufel werden keine totores sein, wie manche sich einbilden und Gerharders in *loci theologici*. 1. *de infern[i]*. #73 und Dannhauers in *Hodosoph[ia Christiana sive Theologia positiva]*. p. m. 1505, vermeinet. *Idem* Fechtius [Johannes Fecht] in

Sylloge [selectiorum ex universa theologia Controversatorium]
Seite 562."

Anthropology.

§68. The Creation of Man.

All the creatures had been produced by the divine fiat in their order. The sixth day had been reached, Genesis 1:31, and the terrestrial animals, such as quadrupeds and serpents, had been created. Now man is to make his appearance. Philo, the Jewish author, in his work on the Architect of the World, has uttered this beautiful sentiment on the order and time of man's creation: *"Ut convivatores non prius ad coenam vocantur, quam ad epulam necessaria praeparaverint: et qui gymnicos ludos et theatrales exhibit, antequam in theatra vel stadia congregunt creatatorum, et earum rerum, quae ad aurium vel oculorum oblectamentum attinent, copiam parent; ita totius mundi princeps, tamquam certaminis aut convivi dator, hominem ad epulas et spectaculum vocaturus, quidquid ad utrumque pertinebat, apparit, ut in mundum ingressus ille statim inveniet et convivium et theatrum sacratissimum."*

The account of the creation of man we find in Genesis 2:6 to 2:27. All the accompanying circumstances of this last creative act of God serve to exhibit the glory and the sublime purpose which God connects with this last of His creatures: We note 1) the preceding deliberation, 2) the careful formation of the body, 3) the creation of the soul of man and its union with the body, 4) the ordaining of the sexual difference and relationship.

The use of the term "**Elohim**" in Genesis 1:26 "suggests the fullness of the divine personality and foreshadows the doctrine of the Trinity." Philo, Aben Ezra, and Delitzsch interpret the words "Let us make man" as meaning that God takes counsel with the angels; Maimonides, M. Gemudius, that He deliberates with the earth; Kalisch, with Himself. But all these views must be set aside for that which "detects in the peculiar phraseology allusions to a sublime *concilium* among the persons of the Godhead (Calvin, MacDonald, Murphy). The object which this *concilium* contemplated was a new creature to be named Adam." Various views are proposed why God named the first being "adam": to be red (Josephus, Gesenius, Tuck, Hupfeld), or of his appearance, from a root in Arabic which signifies "to shine," thus making Adam the "brilliant one," or of compactness, both as an individual and a race, from another Arabic root which means "to bring or hold together" (Meier, Fuerst), or of his nature as God's image, from "**dam**," likeness (Eichorn), or, and most probably of his origin, from "**adamah**," the ground (Kinder, Rosenmueller, Kalisch, Whitelaw).

Luther calls attention to the fact that when God created man, He did not say, as at the creation of the other creatures: "Let the earth bring forth man," but "Let us make man." He sees that in this indication are [an] excellence in the human race and a revelation of the singular counsel which God employed in the creation of man, although man afterwards is made to grow and multiply like other animals. He also holds that this dissimilarity between the creation of man and the brutes indicates man's immortality and that man is God's foremost creature.

1) "The divine counsel of creation embraces the determination to create man 'in his own image, and after his likeness', Genesis 1:27. Man was to be a '**tzelem**' and '**damuth**' of God. '**Tzelem**' is rendered in Psalm 39 by '**skia**', '**skiasma**', shadow; and '**damuth**' is from '**damah**', to bring together or compare, Isaiah 40:8. As nearly as possible the terms are synonymous. If any distinction does exist between them, perhaps **tzelem** (image) denoted the shadow outline of a figure, and **damuth** (likeness) the correspondence or resemblance of that shadow to the figure. The early fathers were of the opinion that the words were expressive of separate ideas: image, of the body, which by reason of its beauty, intelligent aspect and erect stature, was an adumbration of God; likeness, of the soul, or the intellectual and moral nature. According to Augustine, image had reference to the *cognitio veritatis*, likeness to *amor virtutis*. Bellarmine holds that the divine image is located in man's nature, the divine likeness in his probity and uprightness, and consequently conceives that by sinning, man lost the divine likeness but not the divine image. Haevernick suggests that the image is the concrete, likeness the abstract designation of the idea. Modern expositors generally discover no distinction whatever between the words, and in this respect follow Luther who simply translates: 'ein Bild, das uns gleich sei'" (Whitelaw). This subject will be further studied in §70.

The divine counsel also determined the relation which man was to hold to the rest of God's creatures. He is to rule and be supreme in the earth. In determining this point, God speaks of man in the plural: "Let them have dominion." This is "the first indication that not an individual was about to be called into existence, but a race, comprising many individuals" (Whitelaw). "The range of man's authority is further specified

and the sphere of his lordship traced by enumeration in ascending order" (*idem*).

2) God formed man "**min haadamah**," *ex terra*, from the ground, Genesis 2:7. In Genesis 2:19 the brutes are said to have been created from the same, so that so far the principle of the origin of man and beast is the same. But man is said to have been made "**haphar min haadamah**," *pulvis a terra*, "dust from the ground," Genesis 2:7, not as our Authorized Version renders: "from the dust of the ground." The verb here used is "**hashah**," which many correspond to "plassoo." Tertullian has conjectured that God mixed with the earth some liquid and formed a putty, out of which He shaped man, like a potter shapes a vessel on his disk. Luther says: "Man, before he is being formed by God, is a dead clod lying there; this clod God takes up and forms from it the most beautiful of creatures, which shares immortality. If Aristotle were to hear that, he would split with laughter, for though he might consider it not an unpleasant, still he would regard it as a most absurd tale." Thus, Luther thinks, reason shows: "*se plana nihil scire de Deo*." When the sentence of death is pronounced on man, Genesis 3:19, he is reminded of his origin: "Till thou return unto the ground, for out of it wast thou taken." Paul declares the same, 1st Corinthians 15:47: "ho prootos anthroopos ek gäs choikos," and Ecclesiastes 12:7 describes man's death thus: "Then shall the dust return unto the earth as it was."

3) The creation of man's soul is described thus: "And the Lord God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul," Genesis 2:7. This "*insufflatio*," which is said to have proceeded from God, cannot denote the emission of physical breath because God is incorporeal. The language in this text merely expresses that after the material

action noted before, God now performed an immaterial action, and while He produced a material effect, the body, before, He now produced an immaterial one, the soul. Delitzsch says: "The formation of man from the dust and the inbreathing of the breath of life, must not be understood in a mechanical sense, as if God first of all constructed a human figure from the dust and then by breathing His breath of life into the clod of earth which He had shaped into the form of man, made it a living being. The words are to be understood "theoprepios." By an act of divine omnipotence man rose from the dust and in the same moment in which the dust, by virtue of creative omnipotence, shaped itself into a human form, it was pervaded by the divine breath of life and created a human being, so that we cannot say, the body was earlier than the soul." Baier argues with this view: "In the same moment," he says, "the body was produced from the dust and the soul breathed into it. For although the verb "jazar" (which is here used) is elsewhere employed to designate a potter who forms some vessel out of clay, we must not on that account think that there was a gradual production of the parts of the body and the gradual shaping of the distinct form of each part, and then, at last, there came the animation of the body. It is not proper to think thus when considering the work of the divine power. We must never go beyond the *tertium comparationis* in any case, i.e. not take a comparison literally and thus carry it too far."

The expression "man became a living soul" - **nephesh chajah** – is employed in Genesis 1:29, 30 of the lower animals. It describes a being animated by a "psychä" or life principle and does not necessarily imply that the basis of the life principle in man and the inferior animals is the same. The distinction between the two appears in the mode of their creations. The

beasts arose at the almighty fiat, complete beings, "**nephesh chajah**" every one. The origin of their soul was incident with that of their corporeality, and their life was merely the individualization of the universal life with which all matter was filled in the beginning by the Spirit of God (Delitzsch). Man received his life from a distinct act of divine inbreathing, certainly not an inbreathing of atmospheric air, but an *inflatus* from the "**ruach Elohim**," or Spirit of God, a communication from the whole personality of the Godhead. In effect man was thereby constituted a **nephesh chajah**, like the lower animals, but in him the life principles conferred a personality which was wanting in them.

The inbreathing of Jehovah must not be misunderstood, on the other hand, as an impartation to the physical organism of man of a part or particle of the Deity. Not only does the indivisibility of the divine essence forbid this thought, but also the character of the affect which would have been produced, had such a topping off of a particle of the Deity been possible, for then man would not have become a living soul, but a demigod.

We turn once more to Genesis 1:27, where the creation of man, which we now have studied in detail from the second and more elaborate account in Genesis, is recorded briefly. The text is remarkable for "the threefold repetition of the verb created." [Thomas] Whitelaw, in the *Pulpit Commentary*, remarks that this fact "should be observed as a significant negation of modern evolution theories as to the descent of man, and an emphatic proclamation of his divine origin." The threefold parallelism of the member of this verse is likewise suggestive, as Umbert, Ewald, and Delitzsch remark, of the jubilation with which the writer contemplates the crowning

work of God's creative word. Murphy notices two stages in man's creation, the general fact being stated in the first clause of this triumphal song and the particulars – first his relation to his maker and second his sexual distinction – in its other members. In the third clause Luther sees an indication that woman was created by God, and made image and of dominion over all [sic].

The particular language of Moses in Genesis 2:7 has been debated by dichotomists and trichotomists, the latter especially claiming that this passage favors their side. Dichotomists hold that man is composed of two essential parts: body and soul; Trichotomists claim three: body, soul, and spirit. Osiander grants that Moses indeed mentions three elements, the dust from the ground, the breath of life and the living soul. But he holds that only the first two are essential parts, while the third is a composite which results from the union of the first two. Quenstedt says: "Man consists only of two essential parts: a rational soul and an organic body; and hence the spirit is not a third essential part of man, nor does a rational soul alone, but also a human body constitute the essence of man." He offers this remark on the meaning of the word "spirit": "We must distinguish between spirit in so far as it denotes the essence of the soul (for the soul itself is also a spirit and an incorporeal essence), and in so far as it denotes the qualities, emotions and affections of the soul, according to which it is now glad, now sad, now brave, now weak and timid." Weigel was a trichotomist in the days of Quenstedt. Weigel based his views on all those Scripture passages in which the soul and spirit are mentioned as distinct, e.g. Luke 1:46, 47; 1st Thessalonians 5:23; Hebrews 4:12. Quenstedt holds that this argument is insufficient, because it does not follow that when

two distinct terms are used, they must denote an essential difference. He would say in German: Nicht jede Unterscheidung ist eine Scheidung. In passages of this kind it is not necessary to take the spirit as something substantially different from the soul; spirit, as Dr. Feuerborn used to say, is simply "*pars animae superior*"; for the soul is usually divided into "*superiores et inferiores suas potentias et facultates*." Quenstedt notes that Luther and some other authors occasionally name three parts of man: body, soul and spirit. But he says they do not mean "*tres partes essentialiter a se ipsis differentes*," for they teach *expressis verbis* that the soul, as regards its essence, is that spirit of which they speak, and the spirit, again, by its nature and substance is the soul. They simply use the word "part" in a loose way, which is frequently done, when certain adjuncts of a thing are called parts of that thing. In such a case the logician recognizes an imperfect division. Another distinction which Quenstedt offers is valuable: we must distinguish between the spirit in so far as it constitutes man's natural being and humanity, and thus understood, spirit means a rational soul; again, spirit may refer to man in his spiritual being and his Christianity, and thus understood, it is a regenerating and sanctifying gift of grace; likewise, spirit may be used to describe man in his corrupt being, as in Isaiah 10:14, "perverse spirit" or "spirit of perverseness"; Hosea 5:4: "spirit of whoredoms." Bengel points to Jude 19 where infidels are described as "pneuma mā echontes," which both English versions render "not having spirit" with Spirit written with a capital. "Pneuma," however, need not be the divine Spirit, the third person of the Godhead; it is the spiritual life which indeed is a product of the Holy Spirit in us. But Bengel's argument is telling; if there are

men who have not spirit and still are men, then spirit is not an essential part of man.

The ancient Manicheans and Heracleonites, fanatics like Schwenkfeld, Weigel, the new prophets and the Calvinist Amos Comenius were trichotomists. The Lutheran professor at Rostock, Luetkemann, used to teach that besides the soul and the body another essential part is required to constitute man, and this something must be a substance which perishes when man dies; and because of the absence of this *tertium quid* he held that Christ at the time of His death was not a true man.

This leads me to say a few things regarding the relation of the body to the soul in a living human being. Frequently the body is called the instrument of the soul. Here Quenstedt rightly urges that we must not call the body an instrument in such a way as to exclude the idea that the body is at the same *pars essentialis hominis*. The horse of a soldier, the hammer of a smith, the zither of a musician are true instruments, and these instruments are united to their respective owners in outward fashion, extrinsic, but the human body is united with the soul intrinsic, for the soul gives form and individuality to the body. For this reason, too, it makes no difference either how much the human body changes, from youth to age, by accretion or wash, it always retains its individuality because of its union with the soul.

4) It remains to study the ordaining of the sex distinctions and relationship at the creation of man. Adam was created as male being, and while recognizing in Eve a being consubstantial with himself, she being "bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh," Genesis 2:23, he also noticed a difference, and he expressed both the agreement and the difference between himself and Eve by calling himself "**ish**" and her

"**ishah**." Luther has tried to imitate this by his translation: Mann und Männin. Other languages have the same linking of the sexes and the names for each. Woman in Anglo-saxon was "womb-man" and was so written. The Greeks formed "andris" from "anär"; the Latins' *virgo* and *virae* from *vir*; Sanscrit forms nari from nara; Ethiopian – "beesith" from "beesi." (Then Adam calls himself **Isch**, while God had before called him Adam; the difference is about the same as between *vir* and *homo* in Latin or between "anär" and "anthropos" in Greek.)

The account of the creation of Eve begins in Genesis 2:20. The assembling of the creatures had revealed Adam's loneliness. The sleep which God caused to fall on him was "a supernatural slumber which, however, had been superinduced upon the natural condition of repose." Some commentators translate the Hebrew "**tardoomah**" (a deep sleep) by ecstasy, and go off in most fanciful vagaries about dreams and visions which they imagine Adam had in this state. There is more of aptness in the observation of Lange, that in the deep sleep of Adam we have an echo of the creative activity that preceded the divine evening. "Everything out of which some new thing is to come sinks down before the event into such a deep sleep," is the far-seeing and comprehensive remark of Ziegler. God took from the sleeping Adam a "**zeelah**," something bent, from "**zalah**," to incline, hence, a rib. If a superfluous rib, or if his body was mutilated by the abstraction of a rib is a question for the curious. Calvin thinks that if the first is the case, then there is nothing in that which is not in accordance with divine providence. He favors, however, the latter possibility and thinks that in that case Adam got a rich compensation, "*cum se integrum vidit in uxore, qui prius tantum dimidius fuit.*" Luther inclines to think that Adam's language in v. 23 implies that not

the bare rib, but the rib with the accompanying flesh was extracted. The verb in v. 23 which describes the action of God upon this rib is “**jiben**,” which the Vulgate renders “*aedificavit*,” the LXX “*ookodomäsen*,” Luther “baute.” We have then in the account of the creation of man 4 different verbs: creating, forming, inspiring, building, which together “set forth that wondrous workmanship for which the psalmist (139:14) so lauds God.” Quenstedt remarks: “The rib out of which the woman was formed, was not lifeless, but animate, because it was taken by the divine hand from a living body. And thus Eve was created out of that rib both as regards her soul and body. Eve’s soul was not created by God in an immediate way only of nothing and breathed into her body, but she received it by propagation or traduction from Adam. Out of the living rib the living woman was formed.” Heerbrand adds this observation: “Ita semper Deus hominem ex homine, totum ex toto, etiam animam ex anima, sicut lumen de lumine accenditur, creare creditur. Hic enim ordo in natura est videtur divinitus institutus, ut simile generet simile, brutum brutum, sic etiam homo hominem.” Baier says: “It pleased God to produce the woman out of a part of the man’s body, partly that the substantiality of both spouses, and that the unity of origin and beginning of the entire human race might be more clearly recognized, partly in order that a noble foundation for conjugal friendship might be laid.” And he cites the peculiar observation of Hugo St. Victor, that Eve was not formed out of Adam’s head, not out of his feet, hence, she was not intended to be either Adam’s master nor his slave, but his associate.

Both Adam and Eve were created mature beings. God “brought her unto the man,” Genesis 2:22, i.e. God led, conducted and presented her to Adam. “The word implies the

solemn bestowment of her in the bonds of the marriage command, which is hence called the covenant of God (Proverbs 2:17); implying that He is the author of this sacred institution” (Bush). “On awakening from his slumber, Adam at once recognized the divine institution and joyfully welcomed his wife” (Whitelaw). Also the blessing of fruitfulness, of the dominion over the creatures, and the appointment as keepers of the garden of Eden, indicate that man was not created as an infant, child, or youth, but in the state of puberty and maturity; for all these appointments were to go into effect at once.

§69. Nature of Man.

1) The human being whose creation we studied in the preceding paragraph was an intelligent being. The first striking proof of this is furnished in the account of the strange scene in Genesis 2:19, 20. “We agree with Willet in believing that ‘neither did Adam gather together the cattle as a shepherd does his sheep, nor did the angels muster them, nor the animals come themselves, and, passing by, while he sat on some elevation, bow their heads at his resplendent appearance; nor were Adam’s eyes so illumined that he behold them all in their places – all which’, says he, ‘are but men’s conceits’; but that through the secret influence of God upon their natures they were assembled round the inmate of paradise, as afterwards they were collected in the ark. The reasons for this particular action on the part of God were manifold; one of them being ‘to see what he would call them’. Adam, then, had received from God the gift of speech. Speech presupposes thought, of which it is the utterance. ‘Already man had received his first lesson in

the exercise of speech in the naming of the trees, and the imposition of the prohibition regarding the forbidden tree'. For, when God placed him in the garden, He, no doubt, told him what his tasks were to be, and in explaining this, and in issuing the injunction concerning the one tree, God addressed Himself to Adam in Adam's speech, and was understood. The naming of the animals, now, was the second lesson – it afforded Adam an 'opportunity of using for himself that gift of language and reason with which he had been endowed'. In this it is implied that man was created with the faculty of speech, the distinct gift of articulate and rational utterance, and the capacity of attaching words to ideas, though it also seems to infer that the evolution of a language was for him, as it is for the individual, yet a matter of gradual development. Another reason was to manifest his sovereignty or lordship over the inferior creation. 'And whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof'. That is to say, it not only met the divine approbation as exactly suitable to the nature of the creature, and thus was a striking attestation of the intelligence and wisdom of the first man, but it likewise adhered to the creature as a name which had been assigned by its master. 'And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field'. The portrait here delineated of the first man is something widely different from that of an infantile savage slowly groping his way towards the possession of articulate speech and intelligible language by imitation of the sounds of animals. Speech and language both spring full-formed, though not completely matured, from the *primus homo* of the Bible. As to the names that Adam gave the animals, we need not doubt that they were founded on the best of reasons (Calvin), though what they were it is impossible to discover as it is not absolutely

certain that Adam spoke in Hebrew" (Whitelaw). Also the fact that in the review of the animals Adam was made conscious of his own loneliness, is a mark of his intelligence.

But a still higher proof of Adam's intelligence is afforded in Genesis 1:23, 24. We have here the first recorded speech, or oration, of a human being. It has a glorious subject and discourses on that in excellent style. "Adam said," Moses begins. "Either Adam, while in a sinless state, was possessed of a power of intuitive perception which has been lost through the fall, or he was speaking under divine inspiration" (Whitelaw). At any rate, his words are cited as a remarkable Divine utterance, Matthew 19:4-6. "This is now bone of my bones, etc.," Adam exclaims. Literally rendered, the words are: "This time it is bone, etc." it is, as if Adam were "looking back to the previous review of the animal creation, and as if he, 'for whom no helpmeet had been found', wished to say: 'At last one has come who is suitable to be my partner'" (Whitelaw). And the being whom he had referred to by the pronoun "this," he now proceeds to refer to by the personal pronoun "she," twice in close succession. In Hebrew "this" and "she" are the same word: "**tzoth**." Delitzsch has noticed this, and says: "The thrice repeated **dzoth** is characteristic. It vividly points to the woman on whom, in joyful astonishment, the man's eye now rests with the full power of first love." "Instinctively he recognizes her relation to himself. 'Bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh'. The language is expressive at once of woman's derivation from man (gunä, ex andros, 1st Corinthians 11:8, 12) and of her likeness to man. The first of these implies her subordination or subjection to man, or man's headship over woman (1st Corinthians 11:3), which Adam immediately proceeds to assert by assigning to her a name; the second is embodied in the name

which she receives" (Whitelaw). I see no reason why v. 24 should not be treated as a combination of Adam's speech. It is certainly strange to hear Adam speak of fatherhood and motherhood and to foretell with prophetic eye what is going to happen at future marriages. But a person who has exhibited such high intelligence before, why should he not be capable of uttering these sentiments? And the fact that our Lord quotes these words in Matthew 19:5 does not utterly exclude the possibility of Adam being the speaker. But whether uttered by the first husband, as Delitzsch and MacDonald believe, or by the historian Moses, as Calvin and Murphy believe, these words must be viewed as an inspired declaration of the law of marriage. These words state: a) the basis of marriage, or its fundamental reason and predisposing cause; therefore this is 1) the original relationship of man and woman, on the platform of creation; 2) the marriage union effected by the first pair. These words state: b) the nature of marriage: this is, 1) a forsaking of father and mother, on the part of the woman as well as the man; a forsaking, not in respect to duty, but locally, in respect to habitation, and comparatively in respect of affection; 2) a cleaving unto his wife in a *conjugium corporis atque animae*. These words state: c) the result of marriage: they shall be one flesh; (literally, into one flesh, eis sarka mian, Matthew 19:5; LXX). The language points to a union of persons, and not simply to a conjunction of bodies, or a community of interests, or even a reciprocity of affections. Malachi (2:16) and Christ (Matthew 19:5) explain this verse as teaching the indissoluble character of marriage and condemning the practice of polygamy (Whitelaw). Thus Adam's first recorded speech has left its impress on all subsequent ages and its meaning reaches to the very base of social, civil, organized life.

2) But the first man was also a moral being. In Genesis 2:16, 17 we hear **Jehova Elohim** issuing a command to him. Probably these were the first words listened to by man. We have already seen that these words clearly presuppose, that the person to whom they were addressed possesses the power of understanding language, i.e. that he can interpret vocal sounds, and respond to his own mind the conceptions or ideas of which they are the signs. This is a degree of intellectual development altogether incompatible with modern evolution theories. But these words of **Jehova Elohim** assume, moreover, the preexistence of a moral nature in man, which could recognize the distinction between "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." God permits Adam to eat freely of every tree of the garden. Adam, it thus appears, was permitted to eat of the tree of life, not, however, as a means of either conferring or preserving immortality, which was already his by divine gift, and the only method of conserving immortality which the narrative of Moses recognized was by abstaining from the tree of knowledge. But the tree of life was to Adam a symbol and guarantee to Adam of that immortality with which he had been endowed, and which would be his, so long as he maintained his personal integrity. He was, of course, under obligation to do this by the very terms of his existence, apart altogether from any specific enactment, which God might enjoin. As a moral being, he had the law written on his heart, but, as if to give a visible embodiment to that law, and at the same time to test his allegiance to his master's will, which is the kernel of all true obedience, an injunction was laid upon him of a positive description: "But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it." Speculations as to what kind of a tree it was, whether a vine, or a fig, or an apple tree, are more

curious than profitable. There is no reason to suppose that any noxious or lethiferous [lethal] properties resided in its fruit. The death that was to follow on transgression was to spring from the eating, and not from the fruit: from the sinful act, and not from the creature, which in itself was good. The prohibition laid on Adam was for time being a summary of the Divine Law. Hence the tree was a sign and symbol of what the tree required. And in this, doubtless, lies the explanation of its name. It was a concrete representation of that fundamental distinction between right and wrong, duty and sin, which lies at the base of all responsibility. It interpreted for the first pair those great moral intuitions, which had been implanted in their natures, and by which it was intended they should regulate their lives. Thus it was for them a tree of the knowledge of good and evil. It brought out that knowledge which they already possessed into the clear light of definite conviction and precept, connecting it at the same time with the Divine will as its source and with themselves as its end. Further, it was an intelligible declaration of the duty which that knowledge of good and evil imposed on them. Through its penalty it likewise indicated both the good which would be reaped by obedience and the evil which would follow on transgression (Whitelaw). When we ponder, in particular, the effect on Adam of these words: "The day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," the tremendous issues which were made to hang upon a single action of his, we understand at once that God is not only dealing with a moral being, but with a moral being of the very highest order.

3-4. The statements of the thesis established by the texts here offered have already been treated in connection with the preceding paragraph.

§70. Primeval State of Man.

The moral condition of man is always measured by his relation to God and the expressed will of God. By applying this rule we obtain four distinct stages through which man passes: 1. *Status integritatis*, 2. *Status corruptionis*, 3. *Status restaurationis*, 4. *Status perfectionis*. Each of these stages, moreover, exhibits a peculiar condition of that distinguishing mark which the Creator had set upon man, the Divine image. In fact, the names which have been chosen to designate the four stages refer directly to the condition of the Divine image. For the state of integrity is that state, in which the Divine image in man was still entire, and the dogmatists inscribe their treatise of this state either: *de statu integritatis*, or *de imagine Dei*. In point of time it may be called the primeval or original state of man. The *status corruptionis* is that state in which the divine image had become corrupted, in fact, was lost; the *status restaurationis* is that state, which begins when man is by the grace of God reclaimed from sin and has the lost image of God gradually restored to him through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit. Since this restoration, however, which results in this life in a complete reconstruction of man to his original condition, there is noted, as a fourth stage the *status perfectionis*, which begins in the glorious life of the elect in heaven, where we shall again be like Him, says John, for we shall see Him as He is.

By creating man in His image, God had conferred on man a certain form and character which caused man to resemble God, as far as a material creature can be made to resemble the immaterial God. We had also noted that the use of two words of Moses to describe this resemblance, **zelem** and **damuth**, is probably only for the sake of emphasis, "ut

intelligatur imago simillima" (Baier). Man, thus rose in distinction immeasurably above every other creature of God. For although every creature corresponded to some idea which the Creator had previously conceived of it in His own mind, and was, accordingly, pronounced very good, it was of man alone that the statement was made from the beginning that he was made after the Divine likeness. Gerhard gives an exegetical reason why it is best to take the two terms "image" and "likeness" as expressions for one: So he points out that while Moses says, Genesis 1:26: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," he says in v. 27: "God created man in his own image," thus omitting the second term "likeness," which shows that no essential point is expressed by this second term. I pointed out that Luther favors the idea of compounding the two terms into one concept: "ein Bild, das uns gleich sei." True Luther speaks in his Genesis of a "*differentia inter haec duo vocabula*," but when one examines the difference closely, which he assumes, it is found to be of small import. He says: "'zelem' proprie vocarunt *imaginem* seu *figuram*, ut cum dicit scriptura (Numbers 33:52): '*destruite aras imaginem vestrarum*'. Ibi vocabulum nihil significat aliud, quam *figuras* seu *statuas*, quae eriguntur. *Damuth*, vero, quod *similitudinem* significat, est *perfectio imaginis*; *exempli causa*, cum loquimur de *imagine mortua*, quales sunt in *numismatibus*, dicimus: *Haec est imago Bruti, Caesaris*, etc. Sed ea imago non statim refert *similitudinem*, non ostendit *lineamenta omnia*. Quod igitur Moses dicit hominem etiam ad *similitudinem Dei* factum esse, ostendit quod homo non solum referat Deum in eo, quod *rationem* seu *intellectum* et *voluntatem* habet, sed etiam, quod habet *similitudinem Dei*, hoc est *voluntatem* et *intellectum talem*, quo Deum intelligit, quo vult, quae vult, etc. (Vol. I,

410ff.). This is, in the last analysis, a claim that the two terms in Genesis 1:26-27 must be taken together and express the idea of a strong likeness.

6. Our text-book says that the Divine image in man is "the image and likeness of the Triune God." *Causam efficientem constat esse Deum triumum*. This is shown by the plural noun **Elohim**, the plural verb, **nahase**, and the two plural suffixes, **betzalmenu** and **kidmutenu** in Genesis 1:26. We gather from this language that the likeness or image which God, in creating man, stamped upon him, cannot be something which is peculiar to one person of the Godhead alone but must be common to all three persons. The sense of the passages is this: "We, who are several, shall make man in our common image." Quenstedt points out that while in v. 26 we read "our image," the language in v. 27 is "in his image," "**bezalmo**." "*Quod itaque prius in plurali dixerat, mox in singulari repetit, unde recte concludimus, imaginem quidem esse plurium, hoc est omnium trium Deitatis personarum imaginem, sed iuxta id quod in tribus istis personis unum est, essentiae enim, perfectionem, quae equaliter omnibus personis competit.*" In Genesis 3:22 we find the entire Divine image referred to each individual person in the Godhead, when God says: "Adam is become like one of us," **haadam hajah ceachad mimmenu**. In Genesis 5:1 Adam is once more said to have been made **bedamuth Elohim**, in Ephesians 4:24 that he is: "kata theon ktisthenta," in Colossians 3:10 that he is renewed "kat' eikona tou ktisantos auton."

Origen, in the patristic age, and Osiander in the age of the Reformation, defended the thesis that Adam was created after the likeness of the human nature in Christ as that was preconceived in the divine mind. This view militates against all passages afore quoted. Nowhere do we read in Scripture that

man was created "kata tou huiou." But in refuting Osiander the luth. dogmaticians cited still other reasons. In 1st Corinthians 15:45 Christ is called "the second Adam," because He came "in the likeness of sinful flesh," Romans 8:3, and took upon Him the form of a servant, Philippians 2:7. But if the human nature of Christ was a fixed product of the mind of God, and served as a model for the creation of Adam, then Christ might with greater propriety be called "the first Adam" (Quenstedt and Hollaz). Moreover the order of the eternal decree forbids the Osiandrian view. The decree to create man precedes the decree to redeem man, and to that end sent the Son of God upon earth. Besides the whole idea of Osiander is faulty, because it grossly views the image of God in man, as something that lies in physical organism, the figure and stature of a human being, while that is merely an accompanying feature, the essentials being certain qualities of the mind and will of man, and his immortal nature. If Osiander's view were tenable, it would follow that Christ could not be called the image of the Trinity. In the luth. Church of our times the Osiandrian view has been adopted. Philippi: "Der Sohn Gottes ist das Bild Gottes, der Mensch ist nach dem Bilde Gottes, also auch dem Sohne zu seiner Aehnlichkeit geschaffen." Thomasius: "Der Mensch war das kreatuerliche Abbild des den Vater Schauenden, wollenden, liebenden, vom Vater gewollten, geschauten und geliebten Sohnes... und eben deshalb ruhte das Wohlgefallen des Vaters im Sohne auf ihm." Vilmar: "Das Vorbild dieses Ebenbildes ist Gott der Sohn, und so vervollstaendigt die heilige Schrift N.T.'s die Lehre von der Schoepfung, wie dieselbe im A.T. gegeben ist." We may sum up our remarks on this part of the paragraph by saying, that the Divine image in man must not be thought to embrace all that is in God, e.g. these features that

God is self-originating (*quod Deus a se est*), that He is immutable, immeasurable, eternal, infinite are not found in similar fashion in man. Moreover, those Divine qualities in which man resembles God, are not in that degree of perfection in man in which they exist in God. Divine knowledge and wisdom in God are infinite, in man they are always finite. Divine holiness includes the fact of God's impeccability, but man is peccable. Similarity must never be made to virtually mean identity.

We shall now take up the study of the scope and contents of the Divine image in man. A number of our older theologians distinguish between the Divine image "*generaliter et sine restrictione accepta*," and "*specialiter, seu cum restrictione et kat' exochän accepta*." In the general sense, they say, the Divine image in man is "*omnia, in quibus conformitas quaedam hominis cum Deo archetypo locum habet*." They embrace under the general signification also such items, as the spiritual existence of the human soul, the fact that it possesses the powers of intellect and will, also the immortality of the body, and the general dominion of man over the creatures. Gerhard calls this the "*minus principalis seu deuterä, conformitas*." Others have described the contents of the Divine image in the general or wide sense thus: "*Consistit minus principalis conformitas, primo in anima, tum quoad substantiam, tum quoad attributa; secundo in corpore, ratione impassibilitatis et immortalitatis; tertio, in toto homine respecta externi domini super omnia*." That which we usually name as the Divine image, concreated knowledge and righteousness, Gerhard calls the "*principalis, seu prootä conformitas*." These theologians argue that while the Divine image strictly understood must refer to the qualities of the

human soul which is a spirit, and in that respect resembles God, who is altogether spirit, still the qualities and characteristics of the human body and his distinction as ruler of the brutes cannot be regarded as an accident, but they must also be part of that design which God had when He created man in His own image. These theologians, likewise, hold that if we accept two meanings of the term "image of God," one a general, the other a special meaning, we can easily understand why God speaks of the Divine image in man, even after the fall. In Genesis 9:6 manslaughter is forbidden, because man is made after the similitude of God. It is held that these passages show that in a certain sense the Divine image must be said to exist also in fallen man. Others, again, say that these passages intend to recall to us the glorious condition of primeval man, and the sad loss of his first estate, and to point out what he has become again through the redemptive work of Christ and may become through the sanctification of the Spirit. Even if we admit a general signification of the term "Divine image," we shall have to guard against error. Anthropomorphic sects have existed in every age. These teach that the Divine image consists in the structure and lineaments of the body. The error of the Roman Church, especially of the Jesuits, I pointed out before, by distinguishing the image from the likeness of God as two essentially different things, they have minimized the effects of the fall, for they hold that the likeness of God (*similitudo*) was, indeed, lost, but not the image (*imago*). The Lutheran theologian Flacius and his followers have fallen into the opposite error, for they hold that the Divine image is "*ipsa primi hominis forma substantialis, ipsa animae rationalis essentia*," and that this was "*lapsu Adae penitus abolita*."

1. Our text-book calls our attention first, to the fact that in his primeval state, "man" was sound in body and soul, without a germ of disease or death.

We have the first mention of death in the Divine prohibition regarding the tree of knowledge: "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," Genesis 2:17. This is a conditional clause: it makes the dying of Adam the consequence of his sinning. In other words, if sin be the cause and death the effect or "wages of sin," Romans 6:23, then if the cause is wanting, the effect cannot appear. This means that the original state of man embraced the element of immortality, and that this element was to be lost in the event of Adam's sin. As prior to his fall, his immortality was sure, being authenticated for him by the tree of life, so now, subsequent to that catastrophe, his mortality was certain (Whitelaw). If the original state of man was characterized by immortality, and immortality vanished only at the appearance of sin, it follows, that that state also was a sinless state. Accordingly, St. Paul in Romans 5:12 says: "Hä hamartia eisälthen eis ton kosmon, kai dia täs hamartias ho thanatos." Neither had existed before. "*Ante primum facinus patratum nullum erat facinus*" (Fritzsche). Dr. Dickson, in Meyer's commentary, says that Adam was created immortal. Our passage does not affirm, and 1st Corinthians 15:47 contains the opposite. But not as if St. Paul had conceived the first man as by his nature sinful, and had represented to himself sin as a necessary quality of the "sarx," but thus: if Adam had not sinned in consequence of his self-determination of antagonism to God, he would have become immortal, through eating of the tree of life in Paradise (*Ad* Romans 5:12, page 202). It is true, that a "*potentia moriendi remota*" must be acknowledged in man, because his body was

a material substance. Still there was not in man's original state a "*necessitas moriendi et potentia proxima*," because "the elementary qualities in man's body, though contrary to one another, had nevertheless become conjoined in a most perfect harmony, thus leaving us room for any passion which might have brought on ruin and death." And thus it must be said that man, in the original state, "*ex parte corporis potuerit non mori, per ipsam naturae bonitatem, sine speciali Dei, velut necessitatem moriendi avertentis, auxilio*." God was not busy with anxious care, like a fond mother about her child, keeping all manner of causes, disease, mutilation, etc. away from man. Man, as he was constituted, was in no danger of death except by his own choice. Baier adds: "*Dicitur autem, hominem primum ex parte corporis fuisse immortalem natura; non eo sensu quo Deus natura immortalis est, cui per essentiam repugnat esse mortalem aut posse destrui; neque eo, quo angeli, per naturam immateriales, etiam natura immortales dicuntur, etsi a Deo annihilari possint. Sed quatenus ipsa natura corporis primi hominis talis fuit condita, ut posset perpetuo vivere, neque obnoxia esset morti, serius ocus subeundae*." The claim of the original immortality of man, then, is not a claim of his absolute impossibility to die. The point in controversy is only this: whether it always required a special, gracious interposition on the part of God to keep man from dying. This we deny. Man in his original state was "sound in body and soul." He was impassible. No disturbing passions stirred up his soul, and such internal causes of ruin and destruction, as heat, cold, wild animals, fire, and those thousand other death-dealing causes, which now wasted human life, were absent in the original state. The tree of life, too, must not be regarded as an antidote to death; man did not eat its fruit to keep from

dying, for then he should have been able to avert the Divine doom by eating all the more from this tree. But the tree of life simply served to support and maintain that immortal life, which Adam possessed, as our common food now serves to support our mortal life. Quenstedt points to the nakedness of man in the state of integrity as a proof of his impassibility. Man could not have remained unclothed with impunity in rain, heat, cold, and the various atmospheric changes, if his body had not been impassible. No doubt, the exquisite shaping of the various limbs of the human body, and man's erect stature, too, can be viewed as parts of the Divine image in the general acceptance.

2. There was in the original man no "taint of sin." God could not have pronounced him "very good," Genesis 1:31, if His all-seeing eye had discovered the least trace of evil in man. The significant statement in Genesis 2:25, regarding the absence of shame in the mutual intercourse of the first twain was not a sort of animal innocence, such as is sometimes observed among nude and uncultured people, or in little children, in whom the moral sense and insight is still undeveloped. That is the view of the modern evolutionists, whose view of man starts from an ourang-outang roaming in the trackless forests. What Moses says is this: "Their souls were arrayed in purity and their bodies were made holy through the Spirit, which animated them" (Keil, Whitelaw). Delitzsch says: "They were naked, but yet they were not so. Their bodies were the clothing of their internal glory, and their internal glory was the clothing of their nakedness."

3. God added to the excellent natural qualities of the body and soul in the original man the dominion over the brute creatures, "*quo ibidem aliquam cum Deo, universi huius domino, similitudinem gessit*." This dominion was conferred on

man not only *iure ac potentia*, but also *vi ac potentia*. Man actually ruled and the creatures actually submitted to his rule. Also fallen man exercises still a sort of dominion over the brute creatures, but only through overpowering them by main force, or through all manner of cunning devices and stratagems. In reality, the brute creation has been turned into a warring camp against man since the fall. Luther, in his drastic way of representing things, says: "I believe that Adam could, with one word, govern a lion, as we now govern a house-dog. Adam and Eve are made rulers of the earth, sea and air. This dominion is committed to them, not merely by plan and intuition, but by an express mandate. Accordingly, the naked man, without arms and walls, yea, without any garments on his bare body ruled over all the birds, beasts and fishes.... Who can think of this part of the Divine image without seeing that Adam and Eve understood all the traits, qualities and strength of every animal? For what had their dominion amounted to, if they had not known this?... Hence if we wish to proclaim an eminent philosopher, let us proclaim our first parents while they were still free from sin.... They also had the most reliable knowledge of the stars and of astronomy. What we accomplish in our life, is not accomplished by that dominion which Adam had, but by toils and tricks. For we see that birds and fishes are caught by fraud and cunning, and the beasts are tamed by our skill. For those animals which are most domesticated, like geese and hens, are nevertheless by their nature, wild animals. Hence even our leprous body, by the grace of God, still has some show of a dominion over the other creatures. But it is very paltry and far inferior to that dominion, in which there was no need of tricks and cunning, when the brutes simply obeyed the divine voice, when Adam and Eve were commanded to rule over

them. We retain now the mere name and word of the empty title of that dominion, but the matter itself has been completely lost. And yet it is good to know and think of these things, and to long for that day, in which all these things shall be restored to us which were lost in Paradise through sin."

4. We now pass on to the study of the divine image "*specialiter accepta*." Thus understood "it denotes certain accidental perfections, concreate in the intellect and will of the first man, and conformed to perfections existing in God. These perfections were conferred on man to the end that he might properly order and perfect his actions, and attain to the ultimate end of his existence" (Baier). For from the remark at the end of Genesis 1, we rightly infer that man, like the rest of the creatures was "very good," because he was endowed with all the qualifications necessary for the preordained end of his existence.

These perfections, or qualifications, are called "accidental," i.e. they do not belong to the essence of a mere human being. The divine image in man was "*mutabilis et amissibilis*," i.e. subject to change and utter loss. Accordingly, (Dannhauer) the rational soul in man cannot be called the divine image, or a part of it, because the soul was not lost, while the divine image was. The divine image reappears in the regenerated, but also the wicked have a soul. Hence the soul was merely "*mappa et speculum*," the napkin for the image of God, or the mirror, in which it shone forth. Luther says (*ad* Genesis 1): "We have, indeed, 1) a memory, 2) a will, 3) a mind, but it is very corrupt and most grievously weakened, yea, to speak quite clearly, it is leprous and unclean. Now if these qualifications were the image of God, it would follow that Satan, too, is created after the image of God, who possesses

these qualifications in a far stronger degree than we. For he has a very keen memory and a very high intellect and most stubborn will." Likewise Dannhauer declines the idea that the divine image was in the body, though he grants, with Luther, "that before the fall, the eyes of Adam were sharp and clear, so that he surpassed the lynx and the eagle in keen-sightedness, and in his greater strength, toyed with lions and bears, whose strength is very great, as we toy with kittens; also that the fruit which he used for his daily food was much more pleasant and nourishing than nowadays."

By the divine image, strictly so-called, our theologians understand a right condition in the intellect and will of man. All our theologians agree that this strict sense of the term is the proper and intended sense; for when Scripture speaks of the restoration of the image of God in sinful man, which it regards as possible only in Jesus Christ, it mentions only this condition of the intellect and will of man, as we shall see from Colossians 3:10; Ephesians 4:27.

As regards the intellect of man, it had been "endowed with concreated wisdom and knowledge." Baier says: God conferred on the first man "*sapientiam quandam, i.e. lucem seu perfectionem aliquam habitualement intellectus, ad cognitionem rerum divinarum, humanarum, et naturalem eximiam, et pro statu primaevo sufficientem.*" In Colossians 3:10 Paul addresses the regenerate, who by divine grace have been ushered into the new life and on exercising the new strength of that new life in daily renewal. This exercise of the new life is called "putting on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." The expression "after the image" is clearly an allusion to Genesis 1:26-27. Anthroopos veos in this text is best rendered by *homo recons*,

the recently created man "in contrast to the decayed and worn-out nature of the pre-Christian's moral condition" (Findlay in *Pulpit Commentary*). This recently sprung-up creature of divine grace is being developed in a process of renewal (ton anakainoumenon); this process has for its end knowledge (eis epignoosin), and this knowledge is regulated kat' eikona tou ktisantos auton. Paul has floating before his mind the creation of the first Adam. That was a wonderful creative act; just such an act is the creation of the anthroopon neon in regeneration. And now in looking back to that primeval creation he picks out from the sacred historical type of the sinless Adam this one feature epignosis. That was a remarkable characteristic of the first Adam, that will be a characteristic again of the new man, for in both cases, knowledge in accordance with that which God possesses and resembling that, is bestowed. Original man possessed a knowledge sufficient to understand the proper worship of God and how he must lead a just and holy life. We have already noted Adam's knowledge of things and conditions in nature. His naming of the animals and his recognition of Eve is called by Quenstedt "*magna sapientiae extemporaneae abyssus.*" He holds that: "*Fuit haec Adami scientia excellens, plena, perfecta et tanta, quantum nullus hominem post lapsum sive ex libro naturae, sive ex libre Scripturae sibi acquirere potest.*" Thomasius: "Der Mensch besass eine tiefe Einsicht in die Natur, Genesis 2:19-20, denn die Sprache ist die Verobjektivierung des Gedankens, das Wort der Name, das Lautbild fuer die Sache, die Benennung der Tiere, Bezeichnung ihres Wesens, und setzt also ein inniges Verstaendniss der Natur, einen Geistesblick in ihre Tiefen voraus. Aber, so wenig der Mensch dieses Verstaendnisses erst durch Reflektion gewonnen hat, so wenig hat er die Sprache erst durch

Abstraktion gelernt, sondern beides beruhte auf einer Art unmittelbarer Intuition." The principal object of this knowledge was, no doubt, God and the divine will, and it is for this reason chiefly that the renewal of the divine image in sinful man had for its aim "knowledge," viz. of the divine things which the natural man spurns as foolishness, and which he cannot know.

The concreate spiritual knowledge and wisdom of God was, however, not equal in measure to the absolute and unlimited knowledge of God. God made revelations and gave directions to man after He had created him, which shows that the divine image implies a knowledge that could be augmented. Man was to penetrate further and further into the perception of things that were presented to him in the wide world, and in his intercourse with God. By reason of his concreated knowledge, therefore, Adam was a profound theologian in regard to divine matters, and an erudite philosopher in regard to physical matters.

5. The divine image in man, in the strict sense, embraced "perfect natural righteousness, goodness and holiness," and these two were concreated. "The Preacher in Ecclesiastes 7:29 has been scanning his surroundings. Vanity, vanity of vanities, all is vanity! was his verdict. Universal corruption was that which his wide imaginations found, but of one thing he was sure, which he proceeds to specify: 'Lo, this only have I found!' he exclaims: or 'Only see! this have I found!' What? He has learned to trace the degradation to its source, not in God's agency, but in man's perverse will. God hath made man upright. Koheleth believes that man's original constitution was 'jashar', 'straight', 'right', 'morally good', and possessed of ability to choose and follow what was just and right (Genesis

1:26). Thus in the Book of Wisdom we read: 'God created man to be immortal, and made him an image of his own nature (idiotätos). Nevertheless, through envy and the Devil, came death into the world, and they that are his portion tempt it'. Men have sought out many inventions (**chishehebonoth**) 2nd Chronicles 26:15, where the term implies works of invention, and is translated 'engines', i.e. devices, ways of going astray and deviating from original righteousness. Man has thus abased his free-will, and employed the inventive faculty with which he was endowed in excogitating evil (Genesis 6:5). How this state of things came about, how the originally good man became thus wicked, the writer does not tell. He knows from revelation that God made him upright, he knows from experience that he is now evil, and he leaves the matter there" (Deane in *Pulpit Commentary*). Ephesians 4:24, like Colossians 3:10, is addressed to regenerate Christians, who are now entering upon that stage of spiritual life which is known as daily renewal. The Apostle bids them: "put on the new man, anthroopon kainon." "Kainon" denotes a new quality and condition, and this is specified in "righteousness and holiness of truth," kata theon, i.e. "according to God, *ad exemplum Dei*, according to the model of God" (Meyer). By these words "the creation of the new man is placed upon a parallel with that of our first parents (Genesis 1:27), who were created after God's image; they, too, until through Adam sin came into existence, were as sinless en dikaiousunä kai hosiotäti täs alätheias. This prepositional phrase belongs to ton kata theon ktisthenta, and expresses the constitution of the new man created after God: that man is furnished, provided with rectitude and holiness of the truth. The truth is the opposite of the apatä (deceit) v. 22, and like this is personified. As in the old man, the apatä pursues

its work, so in the new man, the alätheia, i.e. the truth kat' exochän, 'preeminently' the divine evangelical truth, bears sway, and the moral effects of the truth, righteousness and holiness, appear here when the truth is personified, as its attributes, which now show themselves in the new man, who has been named... dikaiosunä and hosiotäs are distinguished so, that the latter places rectitude in itself (dikaiosunä) in relation to God (*sanctitas*)" (Meyer).

Our older dogmaticians refer this part of the divine image to the will of man, on which God "conferred spiritual powers, or a habitual inclination or proneness to love God above all things, to do all which their rightly informed intellect prescribed, and to omit all that their intellect bade them shun, and thus to govern the lower faculties in them so, that they did not break forth in disorderly and sinful actions" (Baier). These lower faculties in man are by our older dogmaticians distinguished from the higher, and called "*appetitus sensationis*." The divine image extended its influence also to these appetites, for they were in such perfect condition in Adam that they submitted promptly and without a struggle to the right judgment of the intellect and the sacred rule of the will. The dogmaticians point to the fact that in the state of integrity the sexes could look without blushing upon each other's nude bodies, for there was no inordinate desire aroused in them by objects which otherwise excite lust. And now, it is these last features noted in 4. and 5. of which Baier says: "*Haec sapientia, iustitia, et sanctitas primorum hominum ita obtinet rationem imaginis divinae, ut ea sola atque unica sit, a quo homo, absolute loquendo, imago Dei appellari possit.*"

This knowledge and righteousness were concreated, i.e. though they did not belong to the essence of a human being,

still they belonged to the nature of those human beings, which God had created, and deserve to be called a "*donum naturale et intrinsecum*," "*donum per naturam debitum*." When Adam fell into sin and lost the divine image, he was still in every essential part a man, but his original nature was no longer entire (*integra, pura*), but corrupt, impure. Hence though the divine image did not belong to the essence of man, it belonged to the essence of the first man. Adam knew, and loved, and obeyed God out of that nature in which he had been created. God did not first create his body and soul, and then add this *donum* to them, but body and soul were created with this *donum*. The Papists call the image a *donum supernaturalem et extrinsecum*, something that came to be attached from without, and did not belong to the original nature. Accordingly, the loss of this supernatural and external ornament did not destroy anything that had been in man's nature, but left him in *puris naturalibus*.

That the divine image belonged equally to Eve and Adam is shown from Genesis 1:27; 5:1, 2, when the man whom God created in His own image is said to have been created male and female; and the texts in Colossians 3:10 and Ephesians 4:24, which were addressed to entire Christian congregations, certainly pointed out the way to the restoration of the lost image, not only to the male, but also to the female members. It is true that the husband was from the beginning the head of the wife, and woman was created to be subordinate to man in their mutual relations, but outside of this relationship, the woman possesses all the divine qualities with which man had been endowed.

The view of the primeval state of man which Scripture has opened up to us differs *toto coele* from that view of ancient

and modern times, which proposes to believe that man was by slow stages lasting many ages evolved from a brute, or that he was created a moral blank, without a knowledge of good and evil, without virtue, or that there was planted in man's heart from his very creation two hostile forces, ever in conflict with one another. These views which were defended by some Gnostics, by the Pelagians and the Jesuits, are now rehashed by the Evolutionists of the nineteenth century, and by that hybrid theology which bears the name of the old rationalistic school, and of Schleiermacher, and by the strange philosophizings of Hegel.

Dr. Whitelaw appends to his comment on the scenes in Paradise a resume of the legends of a golden age which have been discovered in many nations. "It is not surprising," he says, "that the primeval history of mankind should have left its impress on the current of tradition. The Assyrian tablets that relate to man are so fragmentary and mutilated, that they can scarcely be rendered intelligible. So far as they have been deciphered, the first appears to give on its obverse side the speech of the deity to the newly created pair (man and woman), instructing them in their duties, in which can be detected a reference to something that is eaten by the stomach, to the duty of daily invocation to the deity, to the danger of leaving God's fear, in which alone they can be holy, and to the propriety of trusting only a friend; and on the reverse, what resembles a discourse to the first woman on her duties, in which occur the words: 'with the lord of thy beauty thou shalt be faithful; to do evil, thou shalt not approach him' (*Chaldean Genesis*, pp. 78-80). The Persian legend describes Meschia and Meschiane, the first parents of our race, as living in purity and innocence, and in the enjoyment of happiness

which Ormuzd promised to render perpetual, if they persevered in virtue. But Ahriman, an evil demon (*Deo*), suddenly appeared in the form of a serpent, and gave them of the fruit of a wonderful tree. The literature of the Hindus distinguishes four ages of the world, in the first of which Justice, in the form of a bull, kept herself firm on her four feet; when Virtue reigned, no good which the mortals possessed was mixed with baseness, and man, free from disease, saw all his wishes accomplished, and attained an age of 400 years. The Chinese, also, have their age of happy men, living in abundance of food, and surrounded by the peaceful beasts (Marcus Kalisch on *Genesis*, p. 87). In the *Zendavesta*, Yima, the first Iranic king, lives in a secluded spot, where he and his people enjoy uninterrupted happiness, in a region, free from sin, folly, violence, poverty and deformity. The Teutonic *Eddas* have a glimpse of the same truth in their magnificent drinking-halls, glittering with burnished gold, where the primeval race enjoyed a life of perpetual festivity. Traces of a similar belief are found among the Thibetans, Mongolians, Cingalese and others ([George] Rawlinson, *Historia Illustrata* of Icr, p. 10). The western traditions are familiar to scholars in the pages of Hesiod, who speaks of the golden age, when men were like Gods, free from labors, troubles, cares, and all evils in general; when the earth yielded her fruits spontaneously, and when men were beloved by the gods, with whom they held uninterrupted communion (*Hesiod, Opera et Dies*, p. 90). And of Ovid, who adds to this picture the elements of moral goodness as a characteristic of the *aurea aetas* (*Metam[orphoses]*, I, 80). Macrobius (*Somn. Scip.* [i.e., *Commentari in Somnium Scipionis*], II, 10) also depicts this period as one in which reigned '*simplicitas mali nescia et adhuc*

astutiae inexperta' (MacDonald, *Creation and the Fall*, p. 147). These coincidents affect the originality of the Hebrew writings as little as the frequent resemblance of Mosaic and heathen laws. They teach us that all such narratives have a common source, that they are reminiscences of primeval traditions, modified by the different nations in accordance with their individual culture (Kalisch)."

§71. Propagation.

The world which God created was intended to be perennial, lasting, subject to cessation only by the divine choice and pleasure. Simple substances (*corpora simplicia*) were created in a condition that they should never be wholly destroyed. Thus the sky is not destructible, except by an act of God. Elementary substances which enter into the composition of mixed bodies, are subject to changes, but never perish utterly; while mixed bodies, which are perishable, resolve into the elements of which they are composed.

Mixed bodies become perennial through self-preservation. Each specie of animate creatures is endowed with the power of reproduction. Thus God made "grass and herbs yielding seed, after its kind, and trees yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after its kind," Genesis 1:11, 12, 29. And in blessing fishes and fowls, He said: "Be fruitful and multiply, Genesis 1:22. For this purpose reproductive organs were created both in plants and animals. Thus God continues to create mediately (*creatio continuata*) new creatures from those first created. This mediate creation of God is a natural process, however, it is only by the perpetual concursus of the

omnipotence of God, and by His faithfully adhering to the blessing which He had pronounced on His creatures that it is rendered possible.

1. That the sex relations and the sexual functions were embraced in the original plan of the creation of man, we have noted repeatedly in the preceding chapters, and in noting the contents of Genesis 2:18, 21-24; 1:27-28. Adam and Eve were fitted and ordained for the production of the human species through the institution of wedlock. The true end of wedlock is that man and woman "shall be one flesh," "shall be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth," hence "the preservation and propagation of the human race."

2. This end is obtained by the concurrent action of the creative power of God with the procreative powers of man. When God pronounced His blessing upon the first married couple, and all their successors, until the earth shall be replenished, He therewith promised them the attainment of the legitimate ends of wedlock. Mediately, therefore, children are created by God. Elihu (Job 33:4), indeed, tries to obtain the attention and careful consideration of Job, for what he is about to say to him when he declares: "The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life," but to say that Elihu in these words claims to speak by inspiration of God is not doing justice to his words. He utters a truth that is applicable to every other human being, and his sense is: "Though you may not wish to engage with me or any other man in debate any further; though you have already appealed your case to Almighty God, and hence may prefer to deal only with God, still, man, even man though I am, I am God's handiwork." Man may do all manner of things for himself, yet he cannot cause his own being, and those who are instrumental in causing

his being, cannot determine the individual qualities which he shall have. Back of the procreative action of husband and wife, is the unseen power of God in which all “live and move and have their being.” It is He who shapes men and infuses the breath of life in them. The psalmist’s praise in 139:14 has for its theme his origin. “I am fearfully and wonderfully made.” “The phenomena of man’s creation and birth, the wonderfulness of the human mechanism is so great, that if realized, it produces a sensation of fear,” or awe. “It has been said, that if we could see one half of what is going on within us, we should not dare to move.” And when the psalmist continues: “Marvelous are thy works,” he refers not to God’s works in general, but to the works which he has just named, viz. his own creation; for in the words immediately following our text he says: “My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret and curiously wrought. Thine eyes did see mine substance yet being imperfect, and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there were none of them.” Dr. Rawlinson (*Pulpit Commentary*) remarks: “The formation of the embryo in the womb seems to be intended. This remains as much a mystery as ever, notwithstanding the prying of science.” We would say not only “seems to be,” but “is” intended; and what remains to the scientist a mystery, is to the theologian a revealed fact. Histology and biology may never explain the transfusion of life from two beings to another being, and the weavings of the various tissues of the human frame, God has told us that His power attends this mysterious process. Luther has properly taught us to profess: “I believe that God hath made me.”

3. In the procreation of children, the parents transmit to their offspring their own substance. Genesis 2:24, “**vaha ju**

lebashar echad – they shall be unto one flesh,” is expressed by eis sarka mian, by the LXX rendering of this passage, and in Matthew 19:5. It does not, indeed, refer to a conjunction of bodies only, but to a higher union and communion besides; but that conjunction of bodies must not be ruled out of this text. “**Lebashar echad**” expresses the intended result of that union, one flesh produced from that union, which is of and from the flesh of parties joined. The new birth of the believer in regeneration is twice contrasted with the natural birth of a human being in generation by John 1:13 and 3:5. In the former passage the supernatural new birth is said to be different from the natural birth in this, that the latter is: 1) ex haimatoon, “from blood.” The use of the plural in this place led Augustine to regard it as a reference to the blending of the blood of both sexes in ordinary generation. Meyer, however, thinks that the plural “haimatoon” for the singular “haima” is quite common in classical Greek. However this may be, children are, by their natural birth, of the blood of their parents. 2) The natural procreation of man is “ek thelāmatos sarkos and ek thelāmatos andros (not anthroopos).” If any distinction is to be made between these two phrases, that of Dr. Reynolds (*Pulpit Commentary*) is quite plausible that “the will of the flesh here means the human process of generation on its lower side, and, ‘the will of man’ the higher purposes of the nobler side of human nature.... Special dignity is conferred by being the son of a special father, but however honored such may be, as in the case of an Abraham, a David, a Zacharias, such paternity has nothing to do with the sonship of which the evangelist is thinking.” On the common plane of God’s gracious dealings with sinners, also the blue-blooded can plead no privileges resulting from their natural birth. In the second passage (3:6)

the natural process of generation is plainly stated to produce “flesh from flesh,” that of the children being that of the parents.

Flesh and blood do not constitute the all of man. Man has a soul, and the question now arises: How does man obtain the soul which he brings with him at his birth? Two views have been advocated: 1) Creationism, which means that God creates each soul separately and connects it with the body at or some time prior to birth; 2) Traductionianism, which holds that the soul of the child, under the divine concurrence, is from the soul of the parents, just like its body is from theirs (*tradux traducere*, to lead over or transfer; example: one candle lighted at another). This question of the origin of the soul may be left an open question. The majority of the Lutheran theologians, for good reasons, incline to the second view. Baier cites, with approval, Luther, Wigand, Musculus and Chemnitz who had all favored the idea of not expressing a definite opinion on this matter. Luther, so Musculus relates, had declared that neither view ought to be affirmed and judgement ought to be suspended on the matter. He quotes Luther as saying: “*Ego quidem pro mea cedulitate sentio quod anima sit ex traduce, sed sciamus quod in ecclesia loquendum sit cum reverentia et timore Dei et vereri Deum, in cuius conspectu loquimur. Non facile est statuendum hoc, quod ignoramus.*” Wigand, after weighing both views carefully, winds up by exclaiming: “*Sed quo feror? Cum autem ista res tota adhuc obscura, et fortasse Deus singulari consilio eam quaestionem usque in alteram vitam distulerit nihilque inde periculi sit animae itaque in medio relinquere liberum est.*” Hunnius inclines to Traductionianism for this reason: “As Eve was taken entire, body and soul, from Adam, so the entire child is produced from its parents.” Quenstedt attacks Creationism on the following grounds: 1) If

the soul is created immediately by God, we must either reject original sin, or make God the author of it; either of which is absurd. 2) If the child’s soul is not from the parents, then the parents do not propagate their species, but only one part of it, and that, the less noble, the flesh; in fact, they do not produce a human being, for flesh without the soul is a “*homo sine forma.*”

4. Children are also created “in the likeness of their parents.” When Seth was born in the 131st year of Adam, he was begotten “**bidmuto cezalmo**,” i.e. in Adam’s likeness, after Adam’s image; “not the divine image in which he was himself created, but the image and likeness of his fallen nature” (Whitelaw). In 1st Corinthians 15:49 Paul speaks of what will happen at the second coming of Christ and the general resurrection. We shall then, in our new-resurrection bodies, bear “the image of the heavenly,” just as now, in our physical life we have the image of the earthly, which makes us appear like our fallen ancestor, Adam. The divine image in our first parents was not only a “*donum naturale*,” but also a “*bonum haereditarium*,” it did not only form part of the essence of man in the state of integrity, but it was also meant to be propagated. If Adam had not sinned, his children would have been born with that concreated spiritual knowledge and righteousness with which he himself had been created. After he himself had lost these qualities, he could not transfer them to anyone, for a person cannot give that which he himself has not.

§72. Fall of Man.

We now enter upon a study of that second state, from a moral point of view, in which a man exists, after the state of integrity was terminated, the *status corruptionis*. As the first state was marked by the presence, so this is marked by the absence of the divine image in man.

1. As regards the time of the fall: the state of integrity has existed only in the two first beings. The divine image was not propagated, for the conception of Cain took place after Adam and Eve had been expelled from Paradise. Eve was a virgin when she fell; and the first conception took place in the state of corruption, Genesis 4:4. The action by which the state of integrity was terminated, and the state of corruption began, is called the "Fall," *lapsus*, viz. from the former position of eminence to the degraded position.

2. 3. Who is to bear the blame that men are born sinners? "*Causa efficiens peccati originalis remota diabolos est, propinqua protoplasti, Eva et imprimis Adam*" (Baier). The remote cause of man's sin is the Devil, the proximate cause, man himself.

We shall, first, take up the story of the fall in Genesis 3:1-13, and study both causes in conjunction, then the Bible texts which name either cause separately.

Hanachash, the serpent - the article does not necessarily imply any particular serpent - appears as the *causa movens* in man's fall. The name is thought to be derived from "**nachesh**" - "to hiss," i.e. in Piel, whisper, "suggestive of the creature's wisdom"; others derive it from a noun which means "shining" like brass, "referring to its glossy shining appearance, and, in particular, to its bright glistening eye." Still others derive it from a root which means "to pierce, to move, to creep," so that "**nachash**" would be exactly the Latin "*serpens*."

This serpent was "**arum**," subtle. This term "describes qualities which in themselves are good, such as quickness of sight, swiftness of motion, activity of the self-preserving instinct, seemingly intelligent adaptation of means to an end, with perhaps a glance at the sleekness of its glossy skin." This serpent speaks. There is no greater miracle in this than in the speaking of Balaam's ass. Moses has not said in so many words that this serpent was being used by the evil spirits, and thus a good creature of God was being prostituted to wicked ends, but there is no doubt that the Hebrews to whom he delivered his record understood him. Throughout the Scriptures, serpent and dragon are accepted synonyms for the devil. That Eve was not startled by hearing a serpent speak can be explained by saying that she may not have been fully acquainted yet with the capabilities of the lower animals, and was not suspicious of any evil designs on the part of the animals, her innocence and inexperience did not predispose her to apprehend any danger. Milton has suggested that Eve desired to be independent, and had withdrawn herself out of Adam's sight, and that was the reason why the devil found her alone. Lange properly rejects this poetic fancy, because "it sets up a beginning of the fall before the fall itself."

The serpent approaches Eve with a question: "**aph ci**," "yea," i.e. "is it really so, that etc.?" Some take this as irony, others imagine that a discourse between Eve and the devil had already preceded this remark, and that the devil had already adduced many arguments to prove to Eve the severity of God, so that "**aph ci**" would have the force of *quanto magis* - "How much more is this a proof of God's unkindness!" The devil's question: "Hath God said: 'Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?'" might also be rendered: "of any trees" (**lo col** -

nullus). According to the first rendering, the devil simply seeks to impeach the divine goodness; according to the second he also aims at intensifying the divine prohibition. The second rendering seems to be supported by the fitness of Eve's reply.

"The tenor of the reptile's interrogation was fitted to excite alarm; and if, as some conjecture, Eve understood that Satan was the speaker, she should at once have taken flight; while, if she knew nothing of him or his disposition she should not have opened herself so freely to a person unknown. The woman certainly discovers some inadvisedness in entertaining conference with the serpent, in matters of so great importance, in so familiar a manner" (Whitelaw). "Eve tells the serpent: 'We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, "Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it"'. It has been pointed out that Eve omits the divine name when recording His liberality, though she remembers it when reciting His restraint, and that she fails to do justice to the largeness and freeness of the divine grant, ch. 2:16." It has also been noted that in reciting the divine prohibition she adds the words "neither shall ye touch it." It has been suggested that this may be due to her "inaccuracy in her understanding of Adam's report of the exact terms of the prohibition; but Delitzsch and Keil are nearer right by saying that the additional words are 'the result of a riding feeling of dissatisfaction with the too great strictness of the prohibition, and an indication that her love and confidence toward God were already beginning to waver'." In the closing words of Eve to the serpent "lest ye die," some have discovered doubt and hesitancy; they take "**pen**" in the sense of "*si forte*," "lest perchance." It has been said that Eve should be judged charitably and that one must not try to find some

proof of unfaithfulness in every word she utters. This is, of course, correct; but on the other hand, the sincere exegete must try to get the full meaning out of every word and must not permit his charity to becloud his judgement. Charity is not a principal of Bible-interpretation.

We come now to the devil's second onslaught: Eve had cited God's Word to him. Over and against this word the devil puts his own. Luther says: "As God had preached to Adam, so Satan now preaches to Eve.... The object of Satan was to draw away Eve by his word or saying from that which God has said." The devil replies to Eve's citation: "**Lo moth temutun.**" We have here the negative preceding the infinitive absolute. The devil's reply gives the lie direct to God. "Thus the second step in his assault is to challenge the divine veracity." Hence our Savior calls him a "liar," *pseustās*, and "a father of it," and says that "when he speaketh the lie, he speaketh of his own," John 8:44. The devil now proceeds to give a reason (**ci-nam**) for his audacious utterance, and the reason which he gives implicated God. "It is at the same time the reason which he imputes to God for having issued the prohibition. The serpent practically charges the Deity with: 1) envy of His creatures happiness, as if he meant to say, Depend upon it; it is not through any fear of your dying from the fruit that the tree has been interdicted, but through God's fear of your becoming rivals to your master himself; and 2) with falsehood: a) in affirming, that to be true which He knew to be false; b) in doing this while delivering His law; c) by pretending to be careful of man's safety while in reality He was jealous of His own honor." He cites the words which Eve has cited: "In the day that ye eat thereof." But this "ye," when he is addressing Eve alone, indicates that he means his words not for Eve only, but for her husband also. In the

original prohibition the singular is used. And the fact that the devil boldly handles the divine prohibition as he heard it from Eve is “a mark of growing aggressiveness towards the woman and of special audacity to God.” The devil declares: “God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, your eyes shall be opened.” “‘To open the eyes’ is the usual biblical phrase for restoring sight to the blind, and is also used to denote the impartation of power to perceive (physically, mentally, spiritually) objects not otherwise scrutable. Here it was designed to be ambiguous like all Satan’s oracles, suggesting to the hearer the attainment of higher wisdom, but meaning in the intention of the speaker only (their nakedness) the discovery of their nakedness. The same ambiguity attaches to the devil’s exposition of his own text.” He proceeds: “‘And ye shall be as God’, (**celohim**) – as the supreme Deity. This is ostensibly a promise of divinity, showing in what channels the devil’s thoughts were running for some time. As the Deity, he says, they would be ‘knowing good and evil’. As they knew this already from the prohibition the language must imply a fullness and understanding such as was competent only to **Elohim**.”

And now the woman, as Calvin says, casts upon the tree “an impure look, infested with the poison of concupiscence.” “The fruit of this tree may have been neither poisonous nor beautiful, or it may have been both; but sin has the strange power of investing the object of desire for the time being – whatever its true character – with a wonderful attraction” (Ingliš). The tree seemed to her: 1) good for food; and 2) “**taawah laenajim**,” literally, a desire, or lust to the eyes; it stimulated desire through the eyes; and 3) “**mechmad haez lehashkil**” – a desired or desirable tree, to make one. “This is the third time the charms of the tree are discerned and

expressed by the woman – a significant intimation of how far the divine interdict had receded from her consciousness. She took of the fruit thereof and did eat – thus sin became consummated. And she gave also to her husband, being desirous, doubtless, of making him a sharer of her supposed felicity. Here for the first time Adam is called Eve’s husband, or man; perhaps to indicate the complete perversion by Eve of the divine purpose of her marriage with Adam, which was to be a helpmeet for him, and not his destroyer. The words ‘with her’ are understood by some to indicate that Adam was present during the entire conversation between the serpent and Eve; but we would imagine, if that had been the case, we would have heard something about Adam interfering to keep Eve from sinning. Others think that he came to her, just as she had plucked the fruit, which was forbidden. But ‘**himah**’ is best regarded as a reference to their conjugal oneness” (MacDonald). “And he did eat; and so involved himself in the criminality of his already guilty partner. We must not imagine, as Milton suggests, that Adam was captivated with Eve’s allurements, that he was fondly overcome by female charms, but that he was likewise persuaded by Satan’s impostures, which doubtless had been related to him. This much is distinctly implied in those Scriptures which speak of Adam as the chief transgressor: Romans 5:12; 1st Corinthians 15:21, 22” (Whitelaw).

Such is the inspired record of “that first disobedience and Fall.” When the woman is afterwards arraigned before Jehovah, she seeks to sum up the cause of her discomfiture in the words: “The serpent tempted me,” “**hanachesh hishiani**.” “**Hishiani**” is either from “**nashah**,” to forget, hence, caused me to forget the divine prohibition, or from “**nasha**,” to err, hence,

caused me to go astray. As a matter of fact, Eve was correct, though her interpretation of her action is insufficient.

In Revelation 2:19 we hear of the “dragon,” so called because in v. 3 John has depicted him as the destroyer. This appellation takes up the story of “that old serpent” in Genesis 3. So in John 8:44 he is the destroyer (anthroopoktonos) from the beginning. And John now tells us distinctly that the dragon, or “that ancient serpent” of the past is called “the devil”; diabolos is the Greek rendering of the Hebrew “satan,” the accuser, the adversary. John now characterizes this Satan-devil as a being “which deceiveth the whole world.” That means, deception has been his practice and occupation as long as he is known to men. His recorded history starts with a case of deception and deception follows him ever since at his distinctive mark. “The deceits by which Satan cheated the world in oracles, sorcery, soothsaying, magic and other frauds are here especially noticed” (Wordsworth). His deception is mentioned again in 1st Timothy 2:14. “Äpathäthä” is the same word in meaning as “hishiani” in Genesis 2:13. The statement “Adam was not deceived” must be understood as referring to the sequence of events as recorded in Genesis 3. The deception did not start with Adam, though it ultimately involved him. Incidentally we may note that the Apostle gives this as the reason why women must not be permitted to preach. Thus Scripture is uniform in both Testaments in its statement on the *causa remota* of sin, the devil.

But likewise it fastens the sin on man. In Romans 5:12 Scripture takes us as far as man can be taken in his search for the old vexing question: “pothen to kakon.” Scripture offers no solution for this old insoluble problem. The existence at all of evil under the sway of the divine goodness in which we believe,

is one of the deep mysteries that have ever baffled human reason. All that is here touched on is its entrance into the world of man, the word “eiselthä” implying that it already existed beyond this mundane sphere. The reference is, of course, to Genesis 3 as the scriptural account of the beginning of sin in our own world. It is then attributed to the serpent, whom we regard as the mysterious power of evil, external to man, in which the primeval man in the exercise of his prerogative of free-will, succumbed, and so let sin in. It was thus “by one man’s disobedience,” i.e. by the personal choice of one man, the first man, that sin gained an existence on earth. Adam is here named as the author of sin, because he is “*communis parens totius humani generis, et radix ac principium activum illius*” (Baier, Romans 5:19).

Baier, in studying the causes of the fall, points out that there can be no physical efficient cause of the first sin, because sin is in its essence a deprivation of something, hence only the devil by his beguiling and Adam and Eve by their yielding are the true causes of sin.

4. We shall now have to study the immediate effects of the fall. By it our first parents fell from their primeval state. When “the fatal deed had been committed, the results which the devil had promised ensued, but not in the way Adam and Eve had looked for; nor did the anticipated blessings come to them. Genesis 3:7ff. states that “the eyes of them both were opened” [1] to perceive they were no longer innocent, and 2) the eyes of their bodies [were opened] to behold that [they] were not precisely what they had been. “And they knew that they were naked.” “They were so ‘spiritually’ and ‘corporally’ because they had lost that enswathing light of purity, which previously engirt their bodies. And they sewed, i.e. they

fastened by tying or twisting, fig leaves and made themselves aprons, i.e. girdles, "perizoomata," i.e. to wrap about their loins. This sense of shame which caused them to seek a covering for their nudity was not due to any physical corruption of the body" (Baumgarten), but to the consciousness of guilt with which their souls were laden, and which impelled them to flee from the presence of their offended sovereign, Genesis 3:8. They hid themselves "as unworthy to come into God's presence" (Ireneus). God had to call Adam. His absence was a clear proof that something was wrong. Hitherto he had always welcomed the divine approach. And God's question: "Where art thou," does not indicate God's ignorance of Adam's hiding-place, but is an indignant call and is meant [to] elicit from Adam a confession! He attributes his fear to the wrong cause – the voice of God – or his insufficient clothing. This was a sign of obduracy (Calvin) which Keil is inclined to explain psychologically by saying: "His consciousness of the effects of sin was keener than the sense of sin itself." Delitzsch notes that: "all that he says is purely involuntary self-accusation"; and Lange sees in his action "the first instance of that mingling and confusion of sin and punishment which is the peculiar characteristic of our redemption-needing humanity."

5. Our author notes as the second effect of the fall the loss of "the image of God." In the proof-texts we have Genesis 3:10 to show that a guilty fear had begun to possess Adam and that the sense of innocence and purity was gone from him. But he also lost his sinlessness and immortality and sin had entered the world, not as a foreign element to Adam. In that sense it had entered the universal Cosmos at the fall of the angels, and Eden when Satan first approached Eve. Sin had now entered the world of man, Adam himself had become its abode. "Kai

dia tās hamartias ho thanatos." Dr. Stoeckhardt says: "Aus dem ersten Satzteil ist hierzu nicht nur das Praedikat 'eis ton kosmon eisāltha', sondern auch das betont an die Spitze des Vergleichssatzes gestellte 'Di' enos anthroopon' herueberzunehmen. Durch den einen Menschen ist mittelst der Suende der Tod in die Welt gekommen. Adam hat gesündigt, und die Folge und Strafe seiner Suende war der Tod. Und in und mit dem Tod Adams ist der Tod in die Welt eingetroten, hat der Tod sein Erscheinen auf Erden gemacht, zu existieren begonnen. Der Tod Adams war der Anfang menschlichen Sterbens. 'Ho thanatos' bezeichnet zunaechst und zuerst den leiblichen Tod, dann aber auch oeffter das letzte schreckliche Geschick des suendigen Menschen, den ewigen Tod.... Der Tod ist, wie zum Beispiel Kremer sich ausdrueckt, einmal das Ende des Lebens, dieses natuerlichen Lebens, das andere mal das Gegenteil des Lebens, des wahren Lebens, des Lebens aus Gott und mit Gott, des ewigen Lebens. Wir reden wohl auch von einem geistlichen Tod, und dieser Sprachgebrauch hat Grund in der Schrift.... An unserer Stelle versteht Paulus unter 'thanatos' den Tod im Vollsinn des Wortes, die gesammte Strafe der Suende, beides in einem, den leiblichen Tod und den ewigen Tod, oder we koennen auch sagen den leiblichen Tod, welcher fuer den suendigen Menschen, welcher in deinen Suenden stirbt, zum ewigen Tod wird. Denn die beiden Bedeutungen liegen nicht aus einander, sondern in einander."

6-8. Our author expands the loss of "the image of God" along the three lines indicated by the term "thanatos," "im Vollsinn des Wortes"; man became a) entirely depraved in spiritual death; b) obnoxious to temporal death; c) obnoxious to eternal damnation, or eternal death.

6. The prohibition in Genesis 2:17 had also fixed the penalty for the transgression: "thou shalt surely die," and had named the time when it would be realized: "in the day that thou eatest thereof." That this sentence involved physical death, or the dissolution of the body, is indicated by the sentence pronounced on Adam in Genesis 3:19. But it is not doing full justice to the situation that the execution of the original penalty was stayed. There was a sense in which Adam died "in the day that he ate of the tree." Paul, referring to Adam's transgression and his immediate trial, says: "The judgement was by one to condemnation": "to men gar krima ex henos eis katakrima." God had been the Law-giver to Adam; now He becomes Adam's judge. There is to be a "krima" rendered on Adam's case, and that "krima" goes against Adam; it becomes a "katakrima." Adam is pronounced guilty; he is become a doomed man. Now what is it that God says concerning Adam when He renders His "katakrima"? Is it merely this, that God declares: "Adam has done something that he should not have done?" No. God declares: "I have found Adam who is a being capable of doing a thing which I had put it in his power not to do. He has slain that power in himself. He has died to goodness and has become alive to wickedness." This state of the heart Scripture in Ephesians 2:1 calls being "dead in trespasses and sins." This means, of course, not that the person is physically dead; to commit trespasses and sins, a person must be alive; and accordingly Paul in verse 3 speaks of a "conversation," i.e. a mode of living of those people, he speaks of their having desires of the flesh and of the mind, and of their "fulfilling them," i.e. carrying them into effect; all of which signifies the presence of physical, mental, intellectual, volitional life. And yet these people are dead amidst all their liveliness; dead to God and to

the true knowledge and worship of God. That life which God put into them when He created them after His own image, is wanting in them. When God beholds them they are to Him "tekna physei orgäs," "children of wrath by nature." His katakrima falls on them in a sentence of doom.

7. And furthermore, our attention is called to the fact, that in fallen man there is waste of physical life, Genesis 3:19. "The sweat of his face" is a sign of exhaustion, he has to struggle to "eat his bread." The means of sustaining physical life are not to ready for him as before, and he enters the struggle for his existence with a hopeless prospect before him. It is merely a question of time when, with all his labor and toil, his sweat and fatigue, he shall succumb after all. At the end of his working days there is the grave yawning to receive him. "Till thou return unto the ground" - the mortality of man is thus assumed as certain. "For out of it wast thou taken" - God adds. These words do not declare the reason of man's dissolution, as if it were involved in his original material constitution, but they remind him that in consequence of his transgression he had forfeited the privilege of immunity from death, and must now return to the soil whence he sprung. And hence the Apostle calls death the "oopsoonia täs hamartias," "the wages of sin," that which sin earns and which it gets, Romans 6:23.

8. That eternal death is included in the concept "thanatos" we noted in connection with Romans 5:12. V. 18 is merely a restatement of v. 16; the Apostle takes up an interrupted thought. Katakrima includes eternal damnation.

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The fall of Adam was a revolt from the Law of God. The conversation of Eve with Satan shows that she remembered

that Law, Genesis 3:3. Externally the fall was accomplished by the eating of the forbidden fruit. But this external act was preceded by several internal actions which were in themselves sinful: in the intellect of our first parents there appeared doubt as to the truthfulness and reality of the threat which God had uttered, and soon after that a more pronounced form of unbelief; in their will and affections there arose an inordinate desire of greater god-likeness. Thus they put the Law of God completely out of their minds. The fall was a personal act of man. This is implied also in the term “disobedience,” which denotes an act of the will. Hofmann has defined the sin by which Adam fell, not as an act of revolt and opposition to the express will and commandment of God, but as an overwrought love for a creature, and for the possession of this world. Sin – “Liebe des Geschoepfs anstatt des Schoepfers oder Sinnlichkeit.” “Nicht Verlangen nach Selbstvergoetterung, sondern nach Gottgleicher Welterkenntniss und Weltherrschaft.” Hofmann reasons thus: Eve simply desired something that pleased her fancy, and in so doing she put the commandment of God, which her memory recalled, out of her mind. Hence in Hofmann’s view, sin would be, not so much “*anomia*,” lawlessness, as rather an inordinate instinct. The story of the fall has shown that the devil proceeded in this way, that he began to question the meaning of God’s commandment, as Eve had understood it; next he minimized the importance of the divine threat. This shows that the devil understood full well that if he wished to succeed, he must remove the obstacle of the divine Law, and take the thought and recollection of that law out of Eve’s heart. Only after he had done this was sin consummated. This procedure is typical of every sin.

The question has been raised, whether God is not in this way a cause of man’s fall; that He withheld His divine influence from Adam and Eve, and thus [caused] their fall. The question is a mere assumption. God earnestly strove to prevent the fall. He had bestowed on man every power necessary to decline the sinful overtures which were made to him. Adam and Eve knew right from wrong, and for a time, resisted the inclination to do wrong. God did not impel or determine men to sin, either by a direct or an indirect intention. Moreover, after the fall had occurred, God addressed Himself to the task of overcoming its sad consequences. Luther: “St. Augustinus spricht: ‘So Gut ist Gott, dass er kein Boeses liesse geschehen, wo er nicht ein Besseres daraus machen wollte. Adam hat er lassen fallen, aber daraus ist kommen solch gross Heil, dass Gott ist Mensch und unser Heiland worden, und hat damit die menschliche Naturunmaesslich hoeher geehrt, wider sie der Teufel durch den Fall geschaemt hatte; wie St. Ambrosius singet: “*O, beata culpa, quae talem redemptorem.*”’ Nicht dass er das Boese lieb und gerne habe (sonst wuerde er das Gute nicht darauf schaffen, sondern das Boese also lassen bleiben und zunehmen), sondern dass er zu Verdruss des Boesen und dem Teufel seine Gute desto reichlicher erzeige zu seinem Lob und Ehren” (Walch, 14, 186ff.).

§73. Hereditary guilt and sin.

Concerning the subject which we approach now, our Smalkald Articles say: “This hereditary sin is so deep (and horrible) a corruption of nature, that no reason can understand it, but it must be (learned and) believed from the revelation of

Scriptures" (p. 321f.). Human reason knows from experience that men are drawn into evil by some strange inward impulse, and that they can only with great difficulty be trained to virtue. Hence the pagan Ovid has said: "*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*" But what human reason recognizes in this matter is only the *materiale* of this great evil in man, i.e. its actual outcroppings. But even this it misjudges from its rational principles. It can be shown that rational man, when asked to express an opinion on this wicked state of man's mind, has either suspended judgement on the matter or has denied it utterly and has claimed that men are born with a nature that is morally indifferent. But as to the *formale* of this evil, viz. that it is a result of the fall of our first ancestors, and that it is truly sin and subjects man to eternal damnation, human reason knows nothing, yea, it scouts this idea as most unreasonable. In all the Scriptures there is no teaching so humiliating to the pride of man as the teaching concerning *peccatum originis*, Erbsuende, "hereditary guilt and sin."

There is a purpose in the choice of the two nouns which our author employs at the head of the present paragraph; for what we know as original sin must be considered under the twofold aspect a) of a *culpa haereditaria* (Erbschuld), b) of a *malum*, or *peccatum haereditarium* (Erbverderben).

1. There is a "hereditary guilt." The "guilt of Adam was imputed to his descendants." It is this teaching which we know in its full extent and bearing from Scripture alone, against which reason rises in revolt and which it denounces most bitterly. Some theologians, even at this point reveal timidity in presenting the entire teaching of Scripture.

The classical passage of Scripture on the imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity is Romans 5:12-21, where the

Apostle exhibits in a marvelous parallel and contrast the work of the two Adams and its effect upon the entire race. The central thought of the passage is imputation. Just as the righteousness of Christ is imputed to sinful mankind, which has performed no part of that righteousness, so the guilt of Adam is imputed to mankind, although it did not commit the particular sin by which Adam fell. Either of these imputations is as real, serious and thorough as the other. They are perfectly balanced. "By the offense of one, judgement came upon all men to condemnation," Romans 5:18. In v. 12 we are told that death passed upon all men, "for that all have sinned," Luther: "dieweil sie alle gesuendigt haben." The prepositional phrase "eph' hoo" has been taken in a subjective or relative sense by some, meaning "insofar as." This view is held chiefly by the Pelagianists, who get out of this text the following meaning: "Death passed upon all men, insofar as they all imitated Adam in sinning." Augustine, who fought Pelagius, and the Lutheran, Scherzer, take "eph' hoo"- in whom, viz. in Adam, so that the meaning would be: "Sin entered the world by one man, by whom all have sinned, and death by sin, and so death passed on all men." This translation contains no false meaning, but it is not tenable on grammatical ground; for it is impossible to remove the relative so far from its antecedent. The best exegetes, therefore agree that "eph' hoo" has causal force and the meaning of the statement is: "Death passed upon all men because all have sinned, i.e. because Adam, the father of the human race, and representing the person of all his descendants, who by natural generation were to spring from him, have sinned, and he had been created after the divine image not for himself alone, but had received that gift of the divine image for all his descendants" (Gerhard). In v. 14 the

Apostle states that also those have fallen a victim to death, who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, that means, they did not take part in the actual sinful action of Adam, because they did not even exist at the time and hence, it is useless to argue against the imputation-doctrine; the fact that children and infants, who are still void of discriminating judgement cannot sin as Adam sinned. That is, indeed, true in a way, but it does not remove this text, which plainly teaches that all men sinned, "hämarton," in one. From that sin it flowed that all who were to be natural descendants of Adam, were to have not only their natural generation, but, together with that, his sin from their parent Adam, and thus each man was to bring into this world at his birth, as a sin of his own, the sin committed by Adam, as the root, source, head, and representative of all.

Seneca has said: "*Erras, si existimas, nobiscum nasci vitia; superaverunt, ingesta sunt.*" The Pelagianists have started the war on original sin in the Christian Church. They deny:

- 1) that any sin has been transmitted from Adam to his posterity;
- 2) that any man will be damned for Adam's sin;
- 3) that any sin is forgiven to infants in baptism, because they have none;
- 4) that Adam's sin passes over to his descendants in any other way than by their imitating him.

The scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages taught [that] original sin creates, indeed, a state of guilt (*reatus*) for Adam's descendants, but it produces no claim and corruption in them, hence, while we must say, original sin is an imputed sin, we must not say that it is more than that. Zwingli held that original sin, properly speaking is not sin, but merely a disease

and effect of sin. In the Calvinistic churches the covenant doctrine has been preached, viz. that the children of believing parents are born in the covenant of grace; this teaching removes original sin. The Socinians regard original sin as a myth. The Arminians hold that it is self-contradiction to speak of original sin, for this implies that there always was sin. They teach that children are born in a state of innocence like Adam before the fall. Anabaptists in Reformation times held that original sin had been destroyed by the death of Christ, and infants therefore need not be baptized. Hofmann claims that to believe in original sin, it is not necessary to point to Scripture, yea, that original sin cannot be proved from Scripture. "Auch die Schrift lehrt nicht, dass es Suende und Tod gibt, oder was der Begriff von Suende und Tod sei, noch auch dass Suende und Tod erblich sind, sondern fuehrt uns beide auf die erste sittliche Selbstbestimmung des Menschen zuruech.... Wir beduerfen ebenso wenig einer eigenen Aussage, dass alle Menschen von Geburt suendlich, wie dass alle von Geburt sterblich sind. Aber auch die Schrift lehrt weder das Eine noch das Andere, weder dass alle Menschen suendig und sterblich sind – denn sie muesste ebensowohl erstens als Letztens lehren – noch dass Suendigkeit und Sterblichkeit und die menschliche Natur sich verloren. Alles was man beitraegt, eine solche Schriftlehre zu erweisen, ist nur Erinnerung an eine sich von selbst stehende Tatsache" (*Der Schriftbeweis: Ein theologischer Versuch*, I, 425, 441).

2. There is also a "hereditary sin" (Erbverderben). Adam's "children and childrens' children have inherited from their first ancestor his corrupt nature." What God imputes when He imputes Adam's sin to his descendants is not a fiction, but a fact. God does not simply assume that Adam's

descendants shall be regarded as sinful, but He finds them actually sinful.

Cain's murder of the brother, Genesis 4:8 is the legitimate effect of his having been born without the divine image, Genesis 4:1. For Eve imagined him to be the promised Woman's Seed, who was to bruise the serpent's head. Hence Cain's conception and birth had taken place when his parents had become sinners and were looking for the Redeemer. The genesis of Cain's sin is told in Genesis 4. He is warned against his depraved flesh, and told that he must resist it. An evil condition extending even to the thoughts of man's heart is acknowledged in the race before, Genesis 6:5, and after the flood, Genesis 8:21. In Genesis 6:5 we are told that Jehovah, after a long period of patience, beheld "**raath haadam**," the loud rebellion, the tumultuous opposition, hence the wickedness of that being whom He had created "in His own image," and of his descendants. He also saw that their wickedness was great, "it was no slight iniquity, but a widespread and firmly-rooted and deeply staining corruption." And He beheld this wickedness in the earth. Not only was it found in the world which He had made, but it pervaded the world to such an extent, "that integrity possessed no longer corner." God saw that every imagination (**yetzer**) of the thoughts (**mashevoth**) of man's heart (**lev**) was evil. **Yetzer** from "**yasha** – to fashion like a potter, denotes the fashioned purpose (enthumäsis) as distinguished from the thought (**mashevoth** - ennois) out of which it springs." This wickedness had taken up its abode in the seat of the affections and emotions of the mind. "The feeling, or deep mother heart, the state of soul, lying below all, and giving moral character to all," had been seized with corruption (Lewis). And this wickedness,

the Lord saw, was going on continually, viz. every day. "If this is not total depravity, how can language express it?" Though the phrase does not mean "from infancy," yet the general doctrine of man's total and universal depravity is properly and consistently drawn from this text (Calvin). And from this contemplation of the state of man-kind there arose the determination in God's mind to destroy the world. The words in Genesis 8:21 are almost verbatim a repetition of Genesis 6:5. In this place they are given as a reason why God will not visit the world with another flood, while in the former place, they are given as the reason why the flood came. The true solution of this difficulty lies in the phrase: "from his youth," as if God meant to say that whereas formerly He had visited man with judicial extermination on account of his absolute moral corruption, He would now have regard to the circumstance, that [man] inherited his depravity from his birth. "This is merely a human fancy; but it is through that this text adds the element of the propagation of Adam's sin through natural generation. In Ephesians 2:3 the Apostle brings Jews and Gentiles together. 'We also, as well as you', he says, were all in the same condemnation, all in a miserable plight, not merely occasionally dipping into sin, but spending our very lives in the lusts or desires of our flesh, living for no noble end but in an element of carnal desire, as if there were nothing higher than to please the carnal nature. For these words: 'Among whom, also, we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh', mean: 'We Christians once spent our lives in the lusts of the flesh, just like the rest of the people, among whom we lived'. And the Apostle goes on: 'fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind'. 'Desires of the flesh' are the grosser and more carnal propensities; 'desires of the mind or thoughts', 'dianoioon', are

desires of the objects that we thought about, whatever they might be – the waywardness of our thoughts seems to be denoted, the random roamings of the mind, hither and thither, towards this pleasure, and that, sometimes serious, sometimes frivolous, but all marked by the absence of any controlling regard to the will of God. The life indicated is a life of indulgence in whatever natural feelings may arise in us – be they right or be they wrong. And so – the Apostle concludes – we were by nature the children of wrath, even as others. This is a substantive clause, standing on its own basis, a separate fact, not merely an inference from the previous statements. The life described would have exposed us to wrath; but beyond and before this, we were by nature children of wrath. ‘By nature’ denotes something in our constitution, in our very being; and ‘even as the rest’, denotes that this was universal, not a peculiarity affecting some, but a general feature, applicable to all. ‘Children of wrath’ denotes that we had belonged to a race which had incurred the wrath of God; our individuality was so far absorbed by the social body, that we shared the lot under which it had come. Dr. Blaikir remarks on this that: ‘If there be something in this that seems contrary to justice, that seems to condemn men for the sins of others, we remark: (1) that in actual life we often find individuals suffering for the sin of the corporation, domestic, social or national, with which they are identified; (2) that apart from this altogether, our individual offenses would expose us to God’s wrath, and (3) that the moral and legal relations of the individual to the corporation is a subject of difficulty and in this case makes a strong demand upon our faith. We should accept the teaching of the Word of God upon it, and leave our neighbors’ Judge to vindicate Himself” (*Pulpit Commentary*). In Romans 1:18 the

Apostle begins the argumentation of the epistle. The first position to be established is that all mankind without exception is guilty of sin before God, and therefore unable of itself to put in a plea of righteousness. When he has proved this, the need of the revelation of God’s righteousness, which he announced in v. 17 appears. He begins to speak of “the wrath of God.” “This expression denotes God’s essential holiness, His antagonism to sin, to which punishment is due.... This wrath of God is revealed from Heaven, ‘apokaluptetai ap’ ouranou’. The verb is in the present tense and seems to point to some obvious revelation now.... Is it what the Apostle proceeds so forcibly to draw attention to – the existing, and at that time notorious, moral degradation of heathen society, which he regards as evidence of divine judgement? This may have been before his view, and as he goes on to speak of it, it probably was so prominently. But the revelation of divine wrath against sin seems to imply more than this as the argument goes on, viz. the evident guilt before God of all mankind alike, and not only of degraded heathenism.... An ungodliness and unrighteousness (asebeian kai adikian) comprehend all evil-doing, in whatever aspect viewed, whether as impiety or wrong. The phrase ‘toon tñn alàtheian katechontoon’ is wrongly translated in the Authorized Version ‘to know the truth’... katechein denotes ‘to hold back’, or ‘restrain’.... The Apostle refers, indeed, to the innate knowledge of God, which all men are supposed to have had originally, but the idea here expressed is not their having it, but their suppressing it. ‘*Veritas in mente nititur et urget, sed homo eam impedit*’ – Bengel” (Bannby in *Pulpit Commentary*).

3. This appalling condition, we are told in John 3:6, ensues upon man’s birth. “‘Sarx’ is not the physical as opposed to the spiritual, or immaterial, nor is ‘sarx’ necessarily sinful, as

we see from ch. 1:14, but as it often appears in John's writings and Paul's, 'sarx' is the constituent element of humanity, as apart from grace – humanity (body, intellect, heart, conscience, soul, spirit) viewed on its own side and merits and capacity, without the divine Life, or the divine supernatural inbreathing. The being born of the flesh is the being born into this world, with all the privations, depravations, evil tendencies and passions of fallen humanity. Birth into the theocracy, birth into national or ecclesiastical privilege, birth that has no higher quality than flesh, no better germ or graft upon it, simply produces flesh, humanity over again. When the 'logos' became flesh, something more than and different from ordinary traduction of humanity took place. Destitute of any higher birth, than the birth of the flesh, man is fleshly, psychical, earthly, sarkikon, psychikos, choikos, and, more than that, positively opposed to the will and grace of God, lashed with passions, defiled with debasing ideas, in enmity against God" (Reynolds in *Pulpit Commentary*).

This state of hereditary sin and guilt the dogmaticians view: 1) as a "*privatio justitiae originalis*"; 2) as an "*inclinatio totius naturae ad prava*" (Baier). The former is the negative side and is expressed by the deadness of the soul in man to all that is good, which we noted before. The latter is the positive side, and is represented by the sinful vitality, the carnal vitality, with which the heart is teeming, and which leads to all manner of wickedness in actions. These elements represent a condition or state of the heart, which exists from the moment of man's birth. In the place of that original righteousness which belonged to Adam before the fall, there has now come an original unrighteousness – original because it adheres to him

from the first moment of his existence on earth. As man before the fall was good in kind, so he is now evil in kind.

As the *subjectum quo* of original sin, i.e. as that being who is called sinner on account of this sin, and in whom there exists a state of guilt and corruption, the dogmaticians name "*omnes homines ex primis parentibus per carnatem generationem descendentes*" (Baier). There is only one exception; by the miraculous operation of the Holy Spirit, Christ was conceived sinless by the Virgin Mary. Though the body of Christ was descended from flesh, that was descended from Adam, and though His line of descent, Luke 3:38 is traced to Adam, Adam is only the *caput naturale*, not the *caput morale* of Christ; for He is placed in opposition to the first Adam and called "the second Adam," because in Christ the original purity of the human nature reappeared on earth. Pope Pius IX, by a decree of Dec. 8, 1854 has declared the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. That means that Christ is not the Savior of Mary, and the Pope may claim that he has done more for Mary than Christ; Christ came to save all men, hence also His mother; the Pope has declared, she has no need of salvation. In publishing his decree, the Pope has said: "*Si qui secus, ac a nobis definitum est, quod Deus avertat, praesumpserit corde sentire, ii noverint ac porso sciunt, se proprio judicio condemnatos, naufragium circa fidem passos esse, et ab unitate ecclesiae defecisse.*" Now Mary has not given her consent to this piece of popish humbug; she is, no doubt, among those people who think differently on this subject of her conception than His Abominableness; and hence Mary will stand condemned as a heretic by the very Pope who declared her the greatest saint. Such is popery! The fine Italian hand!

The *subjectum quo*, or that in man, wherein original sin inheres, is, primarily, the soul, with its faculties of intellect and will, including the appetites, secondarily, the members of the body. Balsuin: "The *subjectum* of original sin is, indeed, man entire, with all his faculties; its primary seat, however, is the mind, and for this reason the apostle urges that this be renewed first in the regenerate." Again: "The mind rules the entire body, hence, if that is corrupt, the corruption will easily spread to the other parts." Eckhardus in an argument, called attention to the fact that the body, being in itself mere brute matter, is not capable of sinning and hence, cannot be the subject of original sin. "The body," he says, "viewed by itself, cannot come under the guilt of sin, but only insofar as it is a part of the nature of a human being." But the body is properly called the *subjectum secundarium* of original sin, for the Apostle, Romans 7:15: 'In my flesh dwelleth no good thing', and 1st Corinthians 6:15 calls the members of an unclean person the members of fornication; in 2nd Peter 2:14 we hear of eyes full of adultery and in Romans 3:13-15 the Apostle, in his appalling panorama of universal corruption, mentions the mouth, lips, throat, feet, eyes, as instruments which readily lend themselves to evil. We shall speak of this again when we study the effects of original sin.

4-9. In these sections the original sin is exhibited in detail.

4. teaches the universality and totality of original sin; universality, inasmuch as all men, not one excepted, have become victims of it; totality, inasmuch as in each individual human being the entire nature is depraved. In Romans 3:23 we read that all men, having sinned, have "come short of the glory of God" (*husterountai*). "This signifies, in Bengel's view, that

the glory of the living God, who gives that life, to which man would have been admitted, if he had not sinned, is gone from man. Man dropped out of the race for the goal which God had appointed for him, and never reaches it.... He is far removed from the glory of God, i.e. from the ultimate end of his existence. In Romans 7:8 the Apostle states a fact of his self-consciousness as a regenerated person (*egoo*), viz. 'that good,' i.e. moral willing and doing, consequently the opposite of 'hamartia' has not its abode (*ouk oikei*) in the 'sarx' of man, i.e. in his materio-physical phenomenal nature" (Meyer). Man, in his natural state of existence, is void of moral good, in other words, wholly corrupt. In Luke 11:13 "*ponäroi hyparchontes*" is a phrase expressing a confirmed state or permanent condition. In Job 14:4 the propagation of original sin is declared. *Speakers Commentary* is right in saying: "The fact of original sin is thus distinctly recognized" (IV, 61).

5. Our author now proceeds to show how this *malum haereditarium* affects our intellect. Man born in original sin is "totally blind of understanding in spiritual things." In Ephesians 4:17-24 the Apostle contrasts principles of Gentiles and Christian character. It is characteristic of the state of Gentiles that they have the understanding darkened (*eskotoomenoi tä dianoia ontes*). They are blind to all that is most vital – ignorance of God, of the way of salvation of Christ. "*Dianoia*" is the natural understanding, the reasoning faculty. This is in a state of occultation. (Note the perfect participle with "einai"!)

The Gentiles have not merely a weak and imperfect understanding of spiritual matters, but they possess none at all. It has been said truly, that the youngest scholar in a Sunday school, that has been taught the elements of the Gospel, has more light than the wisest of the heathen. Gentiles, moreover,

are apällotrioomenoi täs dzooäs tou theou, dia tän agnoian tän ousan en autois, dia tän pooroosin täs kardias autoon. Two causes are here given for their alienation, viz. ignorance and hardness of heart, this last being the ultimate cause. Through worldly living their hearts have become hard, callous, insensible to spiritual influences, perceiving no beauty in divine things, no preciousness in divine promises, no excellence in the divine image; this makes them ignorant, careless, foolish, and such being their state of heart, they are alienated from the life of God; cannot bear vital religion, hate the very idea of spiritual and holy service. A few verses further (ch. 5:8) the Apostle reminds the christian Ephesians that the afore described intellectual state of the Gentiles was formerly their own state: "äte gar pote skotos." And it should be noted that he does not say: "Ye were in darkness," but "ye are darkness." Darkness had taken up its abode in them to such an extent that they might be called "walking ignorance," or "spiritual stupidity personified." In 1st Corinthians 2:14 the Apostle portrays the "anthroopos psychikos," literally, "the soulish man," i.e. "the man who lives the mere life of his lower understanding, the unspiritual, sensuous and egoistic man." This man "ou dechetai ta tou pneumatos tou theou," he does not chose to accept them when they are offered. He judges them by the foregone conclusions of his own prejudice. Why? Because they are spiritually disarmed. The organ for the recognition of such truths, namely the spirit, has become paralyzed or fallen into atrophy from neglect. And that neglect reaches down through the ages to the first man. The fact whereby alone spiritual truth is discernable, is lacking in natural man. Spiritual things become to him what painting is to the blind, or music to the deaf. He simply is incapable of apprehending those things, "ou

dynatai gnoonai." In 2nd Corinthians 3:5 the Apostle applies this to the intellect of regenerated Christians. He is conscious that in ministering spiritual things to the Corinthians he has been no more than an agent. There has been "logisasthai" in him; he has indeed the capacity to form adequate judgements about his work, but it does not come from his own resources (aph' heautoon), or his own independent origination (ex heautoon). His "hikanotäs," sufficiency to form any true or right judgement, is of God.

Statements like these certainly justify the orthodox dogmaticians in saying that original sin, as regards the intellect, denotes: 1) "*privationem totalem lucis spiritualis*," so that natural man, because of original depravity, cannot rightly know, nor lay down a perfect rule for the worship of God, or embrace with a firm assent, what is revealed to him by God. His *lux spiritualis*, his reason, as regards this matter, is gone out. 2) Original sin, as regards the intellect, denotes "*pronitatem et temeraria et falsa de rebus spiritualibus judicia ferenda*," a propensity to pass rash and false judgements on spiritual affairs, yea, also an impotency to know God and to order one's life according to His pleasure. The Form of Concord (Article II, Solid Declaration, paragraph 9) says: "Although man's reason or natural understanding has still indeed a dim spark... that there is a God, as also (Romans 1:19 sqq.) of the doctrine of the Law; yet it is so ignorant, blind and perverted that when even the most able and learned men upon earth read or hear the Gospel of the Son of God and the promise of eternal salvation, they cannot, from their own powers, perceive, apprehend, understand or believe and regard it true, but the more diligence and earnestness they employ in order to comprehend, with their reason, these spiritual things, the less they understand or

believe, and, before they become enlightened or taught of the Holy Ghost, they regard all this only as foolishness or fictions" (p. 553).

6. The moral condition of mankind before and after the Deluge (Genesis 6:5; 8:21) was noted before. It was not only a condition of depraved understanding, but of "depraved" or "perverse appetites," for that is what "**yezer leb**" denotes. Through original sin there is in man's nature "concupiscence." Paul speaks of lusts, "epithumiai," which come from sin, "hamartia," that seeks to reign in our mortal body ("basileuetoo en too thnätoo hymoon soomati"). This means that it is in our present bodily organization that the lusts, tempting us to evil, rise. "*Cupiditates corporis*," says Bengel, "*sunt fomes peccatorum ignis*." Gentile life at Ephesus (ch. 2:3) had been in "en tais epithymiais täs sarkos." The Gentiles did not merely occasionally dip into sin, but spent their very lives in the lusts and desires of their flesh, living for no noble ends, but in an element of carnal desire, as if there were nothing higher than to please carnal nature. They were always fulfilling the desires of the flesh and the mind, "poiountes ta thelämata täs sarkos kai toon dianoioon." "Desires of the flesh are the grosser and more animal propensities; desires of the mind, or thoughts, denotes the object that we thought about, whatever that might be – the waywardness of our thoughts seems to be denoted, the random roaming of the mind, hither and thither, towards this pleasure and that, sometimes serious and sometimes frivolous, but all marked by the absence of any regard for the controlling will of God. The life indicated here is a life of indulgence in whatever natural feelings may arise in us – be they right or be they wrong." In Ephesians 4:22 the Apostle speaks of that mighty change, which ensues when a person is

become a believer. He then does not undergo a mere change of opinion or of religious observances, but of a life, habit and character. He "puts off the old man," quits the former principle of his actions. And of this "old man" the Apostle says, literally, that he is "rotting according to the lusts of deceit," "phtheiromenon kata tas epithymias täs apatäs." "The present participle, 'phtheiromenon' indicates continuance or progress in corruption. Sin is a disintegrating, dissolving thing, causing putridity, and in all cases, when unchecked, tending towards it. Deceit is personified; it is an agent of evil, sending out lusts which seem harmless, but are really ruinous, their real character is concealed; they come as ministers of pleasure, they end as destructive tyrants. Lust of power, lust of money, lust of pleasure, all have this character; they are the offspring of death." Baier, in describing in what way original sin affects the appetites' sensations, says that there is noticeable a "*privatio obsequii*," an absence of obedience to the higher faculties, and that the appetites rush by a certain impulse upon things that are pleasing to the senses, although they are forbidden by the divine law, and either do not wait for the judgement of reason at all, or repudiate it.

7. Hereditary sin affects the will in man in such a way, that the will of fallen man is "opposed to the will of God and only prone to evil." In Romans 8:7 "phronäma täs sarkos" is that which the mind chooses and delights to think upon, the lust of the flesh. This "phronäma" is "echthra eis theon"; it is antagonism to God and to His Law. For this reason, the work of Christ assumed the nature of a reconciling effort (ch. 5:10). Men were "echthroi," enemies of God, "enemies in their thoughts," and showed it by their wicked works. There was "active evil" in them; they were in a hostile attitude to God;

always going in forbidden paths, and corrupting themselves in all their actions. And this condition, too, was universal, Psalm 14:1.

The dogmaticians, in describing original sin in the will, note that there is: 1) *carientia sanctitatis originalis seu virium diligendi Deum super omnia, et exsequendi quae intellectus recte dictitant, itemque recte concendi appetitum*; 2) *quod voluntas ex adverso propendit ad opera peccaminosa*. It is not only when the intellect errs in judgement, that the will goes astray, but also when the judgement of the intellect is right. Experience, moreover, teaches that the will of man is very languid, even in things that represent what is naturally good and honest, not to speak of spiritual good, and that not only in rude persons, but also in those who have received ample learning in the humanities.

8. To sum up the entire condition which has resulted from original sin, our author says: "all... faculties" of man are "enslaved in the service of sin." Paul says, Romans 7:14: "Ego de sarkinos [Tischendorf] pepramenos hypo tän hamartian." For this reason he cannot rise at all to the moral height which the Law of God occupies. Sin in him has fettered him, has robbed him of his personal freedom. "He is in about the same condition as the Israelites in Egypt, or the captives in Babylon, who remembered Zion." And in Romans 7:23, 24 he expresses the condition even more strikingly. The Apostle makes an extraordinary use of the word "nomos" in this text. The Apostle speaks of the "law of his mind," by which he delights in the Law of God. "Nomos" – "*norma*"; the law of my mind means the normal (condition) constitution of my higher and better self, whereby it cannot but assent to the Law of God. Then there is "a law of sin in his members"; this means, in a similar sense, an

antagonistic rule or constitution dominant in the sarx. And this latter law proves stronger than the former; the Apostle succumbs to the body of his sin, i.e. to sin, which inhabits his entire body. Even before, he has spoken of "to sooma täs hamartias," Romans 6:6, of douloi täs hamartias, vv. 17-20 and "douleuein tä hamartia," v. 6. Yea, he had started out to declare, ch. 3:9, 10 that "pantas uph' hamartian einai."

To do full justice to this description which Scripture gives us of original sin, it is not sufficient to say that original sin is the absence of original righteousness, or a defect in man, but there is also the presence of something positively evil in man. The Apology (Article 2, paragraph 27) says in this matter: "Nor only the ancients, but also the more recent (teachers and scholastics), at least the wiser ones among them, teach that Original Sin is at the same time truly these, viz. the defects which I have recounted, and concupiscence. For Thomas says thus: 'Original Sin comprehends the loss of original righteousness, and with this an inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul; whence it is not pure loss, but a corrupt habit'" (*aliquid positivum*) [Jacobs, page 80]. Still original sin is not a substance existing by itself. In his controversy with the Synergists, Flacius endeavored to maintain the total depravity of man by reason of original sin and wanted to say that original sin belonged to the substance of fallen man. But he slipped in his phraseology and said that original sin belonged to the substance of man. His followers went a good deal beyond the position of Flacius. John Coelestius, Cyriacus Spannenberg of Mansfeld, and Christopher Ireneus, preacher at Weimar, asserted original sin is the very substance of man, his very heart, his very natural soul, so much so, that since the fall there is no longer any difference between the substance and nature

of man and original sin. Carpzov has sought to excuse Flacius. He says, his fault, and still more the fault of his adherents, was that, in their later writings, they tried to fortify a position which Flacius had taken, and to defend an expression which had escaped Flacius in the heat of an argument. He had not been speaking of man, absolutely considered, but of man as he exists now in concrete, namely of fallen man. Carpzov also vindicates other Lutheran theologians. He writes: "When some of our theologians have taught that original sin is not merely a privation, but also something positive in us, they wished to indicate that in original sin there is a twofold privation, one is the absence of good, the other the presence of evil, or a *defectus moralis* and a *pugnantia cum lege Dei*, so that the human nature is not only *non-iusta*, but also *iniusta*, nor only *non-sancta*, but also *prava*, as [the] Apology states. For in the intellect there is not only wanting light, but there is also indwelling in it great blindness and corruption; in the will there is not only wanting rectitude, but it is also unable to call forth from itself any good action, and is born headlong by its nature into evil.... Otherwise, sin in itself is not something positive."

9. Our textbook states as an ultimate affect of original sin that fallen man is "without any ability in any measure to work" his "own spiritual restoration." The restoration begins with a spiritual corpse, Ephesians 2:1, 5; Colossians 2:13; not even the first spiritual thought is man able to produce, 2nd Corinthians 3:5. This point is of the greatest moment in preserving the pure doctrine of divine grace, of Law and Gospel, of justification and regeneration. It is of the highest importance to rightly understand the consequences or affects of original sin. The teaching of any theologian on this point is determining his teaching on other points. Whoever teaches erroneous

doctrine in the article of original sin, will fail to teach correctly the work of Christ and the way of salvation. Baier has well sketched the effects of original sin thus: "1) There is in fallen man *ex parte animae*, as regards his soul, a) *defectus liberi arbitrii*, the loss of free will in spiritual matters; b) the weakening or infirmity of free will in natural, or secular matters; c) actual sin of many varying kinds, which all spring from the root of original sin; d) the absence of divine grace and the presence of God's wrath; 2) There is in fallen man *ex parte corporis*, as regards his body, a) all manner of disease and sorrow; b) temporal death; 3) There is in fallen man as regards both soul and body, the fear of eternal damnation."

Some of these points deserve to be more fully elucidated, especially the state of free-will in fallen man. When we speak of free-will in this business, we understand those qualities, which are requisite, partly in the intellect, partly in the will, for carrying out an action which is spiritually good, or the requisites for observing a correct conduct in spiritual affairs. By spiritual affairs we understand things which are beyond the pale of our senses and the light of natural reasoning, things which are hidden in God, who is a spirit, and which are revealed by Him to man in some manner. However, we include in our estimate also such natural and secular affairs which are treated in a certain spiritual relation. Thus understood, we deny that there is a man, infected with original sin, any power of intellect and will by which he can decide in favor of what is good in spiritual matters, without the special grace of the Holy Spirit and the bestowal of new and supernatural powers. Fallen man cannot by an effectual operation by means of his own natural powers, determine to accept a spiritual good which has been distinctly proposed to him, and which he has grasped with his

intellect. He can with his natural powers do only one thing: omit the action. Luther says: "Since sin has come, free-will is *res de solo titulo*, a mere name, and whenever man does what he is of himself able to do, he commits mortal sin" (*Propositiones* 13, Heidelberg, *anno* 1518). The Latin term for free-will (*liberum arbitrium*) takes in the two faculties of a rational soul: the intellect and the will. The intellect discharges its functions by perceiving, discerning, deliberating, and judging; the will by choosing and refusing. From the concurrence of both, there arises what is commonly called "*liberum arbitrium*," which is the faculty of the intellect and will, in such a way that the term *arbitrium*, refers to the mind, the term *liberum* to the will.

"We are frequently misunderstood when we deny the freedom of the will of fallen man in spiritual things. It is necessary, then, to state that there is a certain freedom of will, which must always be associated with the will, if the will is to be at all a will. When we wish to describe the *modus agendi* of the will, i.e. the manner in which the will acts, whenever it actually wills something, we must ascribe freedom to it. This means that in the very act of willing, the will as such acts under no restraint, and is not drawn away by some violent force, or propelled by blind instinct, but chooses or declines to do whatever is proposed to it by an internal determination of which it is master. In this sense 'free' and 'voluntary' are synonyms. If the will does not act thus it is not a will at all. For it would then will that which it does not will. This freedom of the will which necessarily and essentially accompanies every true act of willing, has been called '*libertas a coactione*,' or '*a necessitato*'. Inasmuch as this freedom is a natural property of the will; and the will has been endowed with this property by

the creator, it was not lost by the fall. In the fall, the substance of man, hence his rational soul, hence his will, hence this essential freedom of will, did not perish. The will is an essential faculty of the soul and the soul is nothing else than the sum total of certain essential powers and faculties in man. Accordingly, while the soul remains, those essential powers, the intellect and the will, remain also. Again, it is essential to the will to will freely and without coercion; hence while there remains a will at all, there remains also this power to will freely.... That there remains in man after the fall a free will in this sense, we finally believe and profess in confidential tones; so much so, that we join Augustine, who says, that he who denies free-will is not orthodox. Away, then, with those tragic accusations raised against our church by Bellarmine, who charges us with having abolished the freedom of the will, with having done violence to and destroyed the very nature of man, and with having reduced men, not only to the level of brutes, but with having made them brutes without reason" (Gerhard). In the controversy which our church has ever waged in regards to man's free-will, the question never was, nor is it today, whether man has any will at all, but the question is concerning the objects of his willing, that is, whether he can and does will just such and such things, or anything whatsoever with equal force. The question is not "*de libertate volendi*," but "*de libertate rectitudinis*"; whether fallen man is able to exercise his will-power with equal strength towards good and evil. "We acknowledge that some liberty remains to fallen man in regards to such actions as belong to what Luther had called: '*inferius hemisphaerium*', actions that are just by the standard of common morality, and of political and social rectitude. An unregenerate person has the power to govern his locomotion,

whichever way he pleases. He can place the movements of his limbs under the governing influence of his reason; he can, in a manner, achieve civil righteousness, and avoid grave offenses, which are at variance with good external discipline; yea, he can also hear the Word of God outwardly, and meditate upon it. This liberty, however, is frequently hindered by external and internal obstacles.... The entire question, then, is whether fallen man has a free will in regard to some object that is spiritually good, and in regard to actions which are spiritually righteous, and belong to the *superius hemisphaerium*, to the higher hemisphere, in regard to emotions which are spiritually good; in other words, whether man can, of himself, and by his own powers, begin such movements, accept the grace which is offered him, and perform anything that is pleasing to God. This we deny utterly. Sometimes such actions as hearing, reading, meditating are termed spiritual actions, and in this sense, because they are performed by the soul, which is a spirit. We acknowledge that fallen man has a free-will also in spiritual actions thus understood: he can read, or omit to read; he can listen or turn away his ears. Our whole contention is in regard to those spiritual actions, which are such in the proper meaning of the word, viz. to rightly know God and to read and hear the Word of God with profit to one's soul" (Quenstedt). The *hemisphaerium superius* embraces matters purely spiritual and internally sacred. With these matters, we also are members going to church for the sake of obtaining instruction from the Word of God, which is there preached, hearing and reading the Word of God with a mind to be advanced spiritually, and being drawn by a desire for information from the Word. All these things, when they occur in fallen man, we consider affects of grace.

"The argument of the Papists (Bellarmine) against this teaching proceeds as follows: 'If man can exert no free will in order to produce works of piety and even effect his conversion to God, then all commands, exhortations and invitations to perform works of piety and to convert himself will be in vain, etc.' We reply: 1) those Scripture texts in which such commands are issued, show, indeed, what is our duty, but not what is our ability, i.e. they signify, not what men are able to do in their own conversion, but what God has a right to require of them as a duty. These texts urge upon us what we owe, not what we can. Rules are not the measure of our strength, but the norm of our duty. The Law teaches us, not what we are, but what we were able to do.... 3) these texts, moreover, press home to us the right of God, viz. what God by right can demand of His debtors. The right of God, the creditor against His debtor does not cease because the debtor is insolvent. In His Law, God justly exacts from man, what man has unjustly lost by the fall of Adam. By issuing precepts, commands and exhortations, God teaches man what he is under duty to do, and from what condition he has fallen. 4) frequently God commands such things, which He Himself intends to affect in us; and thus His commandments are not only imperative mandates, stating what is to be done, but they are at the same time an active and effectual means, by which God accomplishes what He commands. It is not a vain command to say to a person whose feet have been tied, that he must run, if by that very command his fetters are loosed. It is not in vain to bid the blind see, if by those very words his eyes are opened. God's Words effect in us what He wants us to do. God commands what He wants, and gives what He commands. It is a common way which Scripture has, viz. that it says, that those things are done by us, which

God does through us. For He connects with His Word the efficacy of His Holy Spirit; God often commands what He wants to effect in us, and crowns and rewards His own works in us. In Deuteronomy 10:16 God says: 'Circumcise the foreskin of your heart'; but in 30:6 we are told who is to do this. 'The Lord will circumcise thine heart'. In Ezekiel 18:31 we read: 'Make you a new heart and a new spirit'; however, lest anyone think this is within the power of our free-will, God says by the same prophet, 36:26: 'I will take away the stony heart'. 5) there are not only legal exhortations which bring no grace, but also evangelical exhortations which are affective, persuasive, and draw to God. When the Lord invites man, saying: 'Come unto me, etc.', He by that invitation urges, induces us to come, and gives us grace that we can come. 6) When God enjoins and commands us to be converted, He wants that men should not willfully resist His grace.... 7) Although conversion itself is not in our power, still the external use of the means of grace is, in a way, in our power. For man can go to church and hear the public preaching of the Word, by which God wants to be efficacious" (Quenstedt). "The old fallacy, that commands that are addressed to us imply an ability on our part to carry out the commands, is easily refuted by the old axiom: '*A debito ad posse non valet consequentia*'. The command of Christ: 'Lazarus, come forth'! would be silly if it were to be understood in this sense: 'Lazarus has the ability to raise himself from the dead'. In every case where we meet with a command in Scripture, we have to distinguish between legal and evangelical commands. The former lay down a duty which we are to perform; the latter indicate what God is then and there about to do in or for us. Thus we must not draw this inference, that, because Scripture uses the expression: 'Turn ye, convert

yourselves'! therefore conversion is in man's power. A ship, too, is said to turn, when in reality it is being turned by the helmsman" (J. A. Osiander).

In regard to errors which have cropped out in the church on the subject of free-will, we may, with Quenstedt, distinguish two classes: 1) Those which err by ascribing too much to the free-will of natural man in spiritual affairs, *peccans in excessu*. Such were: a) Pelagius and the Pelagians. Among their tenets we find the following: Man is not in need of the grace of God, but can by his own powers of free-will believe the Gospel and accomplish all that is necessary for his salvation. Man, as he is, since his natural birth and prior to his conversion can safely, by his free-will avoid all sins, conquer the most serious temptations, love God, and perfectly fulfill the Law of God. b) The Semipelagians, whose leader was John Cassianus of Massilia, after whom they are also called Massilians. They held that some power must be acknowledge to reside in free-will; grace, they held, is not always necessary in order to produce spiritual acts. They taught "synergia," i.e. cooperation of man with God, and the strength with which man cooperates they regarded not as a strength that had been conferred on him by grace, but what he possessed by nature. c) The scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages followed in the steps of Pelagius: they claimed that man can by his natural powers know the true and highest good, dispose himself favorably to grace, prepare and apply for grace himself, avoid every mortal sin, keep the commandments of God, *quoad substantiam actuum*, i.e. in every essential point and love God above all things. d) The Papists, especially the Jesuits. The Council of Trent, in its sixth session, ch. 1, declared that free-will in unregenerate man is by no means extinct, although its powers

are lessened and bent. In the fifth chapter of the same session they anathematize all who think otherwise. What they wish to gain by this teaching is the defeat of the Lutheran doctrine of justification. They teach that after God has in conversion moved and roused the weakened feeble free-will of man, this roused free-will cooperates by assenting to God, who rouses and calls him, and thus he prepares himself, or disposes himself for the grace of justification. (In this connection we may note the following argument of Luther in his treatise against Erasmus: ""Dass die Freie Wille nichts sei," *de servo arbitrio*. Erasmus had argued there must be at least some strength in natural man, otherwise God would not issue such and such commands to him. Luther replied: "If Erasmus wished to argue in that way at all, he must infer from God's command, not that there is some strength, but all strength for doing those commandments in natural man; for when God issues those commands, He does not want men to do something, or as much as he can, but the commandment plainly orders him to do all. Thus the Semipelagian, and all kindred arguments defeat themselves. And if you meet a person who professes with pious reverence, that he does not believe – oh no! – that man can do all, in order to be converted and saved, still he must do something, you will upon closer investigation find that that something which the party has in mind, is no paltry trifle, but a real important thing, yea, the decisive factor in conversion. Scratch any Synergist and you will find a Pelagianist"). The Socinians teach, in general, that unregenerate man, when the divine revelation is brought to him, can do all that is necessary toward his own conversion; in particular, they hold that the intellect of natural man possesses such powers, that he can grasp, and approve, without the aid of the Holy Ghost,

whatever is proposed for his acceptance in the Gospel. e) The Arminians do not differ much from the Pelagianists. They hold that man possesses, not the entire, but a partial power to effect his own conversion, and faith is produced in man partly by the grace of God, partly by man's free-will. f) The Lutheran Synergists, so called because they taught a *synergian aliquam seu cooperationem* of the powers of man with the grace of God in conversion. The seeds of this very prolific error were sown by Melancthon in his various writings. He did not blush to carry his error even into the confessional writings of the Lutheran Church, which he issued in altered editions. In the eighteenth article of the Augsburg Confession, Pelagianism and Semipelagianism have been plainly rejected. In the altered edition, Melancthon made the Confession say that we are aided (*adiuvati*) in producing spiritual righteousness in ourselves. Likewise in the Apology, the statement was made that free-will and reason can do nothing (*nihil posse*) in spiritual matters, and that when men are regenerated in heart, soul and mind, this is done by the Holy Spirit alone, *solum Spiritum Sanctum*. In the altered edition those passages have been made to read: that free-will and reason alone can do nothing, and that when men are regenerated in heart, soul and mind, this is done by the Holy Spirit. In the first passages he had added, in the last he had dropped the word "*solum*." Everybody saw that this was done to favor the synergistic view of conversion. Two years after Luther's death, Melancthon issued the third edition of his "*Loci Communes*," together with his "*corpus doctrinae*." Into this edition he had admitted a definition of free-will for which Luther had attacked Erasmus: "*Liberum arbitrium in homine est facultas se applicandi ad gratiam; hoc est audit promissionem et assentiri conatur et*

abjecit peccata contra conscientiam." The treatise also contains these words, indicative of the synergistic propensity of the author: "Do you say, 'I cannot obey the voice of the Gospel, hear the Son of God and know Him as the Mediator'? You certainly can in a way, and while the voice of the Gospel supports you, you must pray that God may aid you." In his "*Examen Ordinandorum*," in the article on free-will, Melancthon declares that there are three causes of conversion; he says: "In conversion the following causes occur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit whom the Father and the Son send that he may enkindle our hearts, and our will which gives its assent and does not resist the Word of God." These synergistic views of Melancthon were afterwards taken up by Dr. John Pfeffinger and advocated in a still grosser manner. Dr. George Major, too, professed a cooperation of unregenerate man with the Holy Spirit in the conversion of man to God. The leading champions of this error afterwards became Victorius Strigel and Dr. John Stoessel. g) The synergistic error was later advocated in a softened form when the claim was set up that man's free-will was aroused by the Holy Spirit and then cooperates in the act of conversion. Under the presidency of Dr. George Calixt, John Latermann defended certain theses on predestination. Thesis 32 reads: "Now as to what is offered by grace, we shall demonstrate in the following manner, that, when this has been offered, it is in the power of man, through that grace, to perform what is necessary for his conversion and salvation, or, if he wants to yield to his wicked mind, not to perform the same." Thesis 33: "All could convert themselves if they would." Thesis 34: "It is within the power of man, to will, and not to will, to convert himself." Thesis 35: "Man converts himself freely." Thesis 42: "Since the exhortations (of

God) are not in vain, which they certainly are not, all will depend on the cooperation of man, i.e. that man, by virtue of the grace bestowed upon him freely operates (with the Spirit), freely believes, and freely perseveres (in faith)." The Strassburg theologians, in the opinion which they rendered on these theses, said: "He says nothing but what Bellarmine, Gregor de Valentio, and Becanus and others have asserted, who all were judged guilty of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism by the great majority of the theologians. He says nothing, but what the Synergists have said."

On the other hand, there have been errors in regard to the power of free-will in unregenerate man; 2) on the part of those who do not ascribe enough to free-will. The ancient Stoics, Marcion, Simon the Sorcerer, Hermogenes and the Manicheans taught the doctrine of fatal necessity. This teaching reappeared later in Calvinism, who believe in a certain necessity which results from their absolute decree of predestination.

At this point, too, the Missouri Synod divided from the Lutheran dogmaticians of Germany. Dr. Walther has justly placed Kahnis, Hofmann and Luthardt, leading dogmaticians of Germany in his day, in his antithesis. The same views still are held in Germany this day. Walther scores Kahnis for the following statements: "Mit Augustin hat auch unser Bekenntniss anerkannt, dass der Mensch, der in rein menschlichen Dingen Freiheit hat, menschlich gute Werke vollbringen kann (A.C., Art. 18, Concord[ienformel], S. 640, 657). Dies menschlich gute aber soll mit dem geistlich guten nichts zu tun haben. Allein diese Kluft ist gegen Schrift (!) Erfahrung und die Vernunft der Sache. Die Schrift lehrt auf das bestimmteste, dass das Evangelium an dies menschlich gute

anknuepft (A.C., 10, 35 (!), 1st Peter 3:1 (!); John 3:21 (!).... Es ist eine unstreitbare Tatsache, dass die schnelle Ausbreitung des Christentums auf den Boder der klassischen Welt sich nur aus der Verbreitung desselben auf Christum erklaren laesst, die wieder einen Anknuepfungspunkt des Christentums im natuerlichen Menschen voraussetzt" (*Die lutherische Dogmatik*, Band III, Seite 310). "Die Schriftlehre, dass durch Adam's Fall in allen Menschen die Suende die Herrschaft gewonnen hat, uebertreibt Augustin zu einer Doctrin von der gaenzlichen Verstorbenheit des natuerlichen Menschen zum Guten und von der massenhaften Verdamniss, welche gegen Schrift wie gegen Tradition und christliche Erfahrung ist. Die Schrift lehrt und die Erfahrung bezeugt, dass im natuerlichen Menschen ein Zug zum Wahren, zum Guten, zum Frieden ist, der zwar nicht im Stande ist, den maechtigen Zug des Fleisches nach unten zu brechen, wohl aber eine Anknuepfung fuer die Gnade sein kann. Mit demselben dualistisch raschem Sprunge, mit welchem Augustin den in der natuerlichen Menschheit herrschenden Zwiespalt zwischen den goettlichen und den menschlichen Willen sogleich zur voelligen Unfreiheit des Letzteren uebertreibt... lehrte nun auch Augustin, dass lediglich die Gnade dem ganz unfreien Willen zum Heil bringe.... Die erneuernde Kraft der Gnade gewinnt in dem Menschen seligmachende Gestalt nur dadurch, dass sie alle Kraefte in Bewegung setzt und zur Mitwirkung treibt" (*Dogmatik*, II, 137f.). "Melanchthon hatte durch die Lehre von der Mitwirkung des menschlichen Willens bei der Heilsaneignung (Synergismus), den rechten, evangelischen und zugleich traditionellen Weg betreten, die Substanz der augustinischen Lehre festzuhalten, ohne ihre Auswuechse" (*Dogmatik*, 530).

[Johann Christian Konrad von] Hofmann says: "Der Apostel redet (Roem. 2:14) von dem Felle, dass Heiden, ohne ein Gesetz, eine Offenbarung des fordernden Willens zu besitzen, dasjenige tum, was die in Israel geoffenbarte Gotteswille fordert, und sagt von solchem Tun derselben, dass es 'physei' (von Natur), geschehe.... So sehr achtet es der Apostel (Roem. 2:14) fuer moeglich, dass einer vermoege dieses Gesetzes im Stande sei, ob zwar nur im Einzelnen, goettlichen Forderungen gemaess zu handeln, dass er in Aussicht stellt, es moege etwa am Tage des Gerichts auch den durch das Zeugnis des Gewissens hervorgerufene Gedanken eine Selbstrechtfertigung vor Gott werden, die da gnaedig angenommen werden kann von dem, welcher sein Gericht durch Jesum Christum, dem Mittler der Gnade uebt" (*Der Schriftbeweis. Ein theologischer Versuch*, Band I, Seiten 494, 495f.).

[Christoph Ernst] Luthardt says: "Was... das Verhalten des Willens zur Gnade anlangt, so hat die orthodoxe Dogmatik im ganzen im Anschluss an die Concordienformel den goettlichen Factor in der Bekehrung (*conversio transitiva*) einseitig betont. Die Concordienformel laesst meistens (!) die Taetigkeit des eigenen Willens erst nach der Bekehrung eintreten" (*Kompendium der Dogmatik*, 1868, Seite 204). "Martensen spricht von einer anderschaffenden Gnade, welche mit der menschlichen Freiheit identisch in der Hingabe an die Gnade zum Durchbruch innerhalb des natuerlichen Willens kommt, Absatz 204, Seite 336. Die entschiedeneren kirchlichen Theologen weisen zwar diesen Synergismus zurueck, fordern aber doch (so Thomasius, Harless, Frank, etc.), dass nicht nur das aktive Verhalten in der Bekehrung auf Grund der innerlich befreienden Einwirkung der Heilsgnade betont, anderen auch

die Möglichkeit eines Vorbereitungsstandes auf die Heilsgnade auf Grund der allgemeinen Wirkung Gottes durch das Gewissen, u.s.w. anerkannt werde" (Seite 135).

§74. Actual Sin.

Original sin is not an act but a state, a condition, a habitude in man. "This sin is not like all other sins; but it lives, exists and enacts all sins, and is the essential sin that sins not for an hour or a season, but wherever and as long as the person exists." The fault lies in the entire state of the nature; its birth and its origin are corrupt and sin. This is original sin or the sin of nature, or the sin of the person, the truly chief sin. Luther: "However, from original sin flow sinful acts. If this did not exist, there would neither be actual sins." The term "actual" in this connection is not the same as real; for original sin is also a real sin, but actual as the result of an action. When Scripture denominates the natural man flesh, it refers to him as living in the state of original sin; when it speaks of him as "living after the flesh," and urges him to "mortify the deeds of the body," Romans 8:13, it refers to actual sins. "The Old Man" is original sin which is put off in conversion; "his," i.e. the "old man's" deeds, such as lying, are actual sins, Colossians 3:9. Thus "works of the flesh," Galatians 5:19, "works of darkness," Ephesians 5:11, are acts arising from man's inborn carnal and ignorant state.

The term actual implies an act in every form possible. Man is capable of acting with his internal faculties of intellect and will, and with his physical limbs. And as the Law not only restrains him from but also obligates him to certain actions, his

failure, internally and externally, to comply with the Law in either form, constitutes an act of disobedience, whether he fails to do what he should do, or chooses to do what he must not do. The refusal to act where action is due is as unlawful as the determination to act where action is prohibited. Hence not only such sins of commission as enumerated in Romans 1:23; 3:13-15; Galatians 5:19-21, but also such sins of omission as neglect, James 4:17, unthankfulness, Romans 1:21; heedlessness, Daniel 9:6; lack of usefulness, Romans 3:12; refusal to pray, Daniel 9:13, are charged against man as actual sins.

When the heart projects an unlawful thought, Genesis 8:21; or desire, Jeremiah 17:9; Matthew 5:28; 1st John 3:15, or volition, Matthew 7:21, 22 ("saying opposed to doing," i.e. willing not to will), that is an infernal sinful act. The heart in such an act "ouk estin eutheia," is not straight so as to conform to the norm of the Law; it has become distorted, Acts 8:21.

Mere gestures, such as gnashing the teeth, Psalm 37:12; wagging the head, Matthew 27:39; words, Matthew 12:34, 36; deeds, Matthew 5:21, 22, are placed under the divine censure and man is warned, that he will be held for them in the judgement as for particular offenses (*peccata cordis, oris, operis*).

A distinction is made between voluntary and involuntary sins. The sense is not that any sin can be committed without the will, for every act implies a volition. However, some sins are committed with a known purpose, with full determination and against better knowledge. Such a voluntary sin was the treason of Judas. Thus, too, the people of Sodom openly vaunted their vice and were void of shame to such an extent that they made no attempt to hide their wicked

intuitions, their purpose being stamped upon their very countenance, Isaiah 3:9. And of the heathen, whose profligate habits Paul has arraigned in Romans 1, he says in v. 31 that they consciously acted in opposition to their better knowledge of God's will and that it gave them pleasure to commit acts which they knew to be deserving of death eternal. Such voluntary acts reveal malice, and are done in defiance of the person's own conscience, and the light of his natural reason. Voluntary sins are also called sins against conscience, and four states of the conscience are distinguished: The correct, the erring, the probable and the doubting conscience. To act in opposition to a well-informed conscience is plainly sin. If the conscience is in error a person sins in obeying it in any matter which is prohibited by the divine Law. An idolater, who is persuaded that the moon is a god, sins against the first commandment by worshipping; against the conscience by not worshipping. For by disobeying the conscience he shows that he will not respect God, who gave him his conscience for the regulation of his conduct. In an indifferent matter, a person disobeying his erring conscience sins, while a person obeying it does not sin. 1st Corinthians 8:7, 8 shows that those Christians who were persuaded that it was wrong to eat meat that had been offered to idols, sinned by eating, while those who refrained from eating committed no sin. A Quaker who goes to war, sins. A probable conscience is shown, e.g. in the case of a physician, who, in a desperate instance, administers a drug, which may save a patient's life, but may also kill him. A doubting conscience would be that of a Lutheran servant, who is ordered to accompany his Roman Catholic master to mass, and who would sin by going with his master and by not going. A motive for an involuntary sin is shown in the instance of Peter at the

denial of his Lord. Peter was swayed by fear. Involuntary sins are those which come from ignorance, Numbers 15:22, 24, or from infirmity, such as a sudden passion or inability to exercise judgement, as in the case of infants. However, sins of this kind must not be extenuated; they had to be atoned for in the Old Testament, Numbers 15:22, 24ff., and must be forgiven in the New Testament. In our form of baptism, the words: "and which (namely, sins) he had added thereto" (und die er selbst dazu getan hat) should not be dropped, lest the impression be created that children are without real sins. Besides, the efficacy of baptism is to be exerted throughout the life of a baptized person.

Dominant sins are wicked habits which have obtained a strong hold on a person through being repeated often. They "reign," Romans 6:12; "have dominion," Psalm 19:13, over a person, forcing him to yield to their craving (obey, Romans 6:12). Nearly every sin can become a dominant sin. Those most frequently observed are cursing, neglect of preaching, envy, drunkenness, personal uncleanness, petty stealing lying.

As regards the object that is affected by a person's sinning, sins are divided into sins against God, a fellowman, and oneself. Of the first kind are atheism, Psalm 14:1; idolatry, Romans 1:21-23; blasphemy, Exodus 20:3, 7; Proverbs 8:36; of the second kind, every trespass against the second table of the Law; of the third kind, such as debase a person's character and injure his body, 1st Corinthians 6:18; Ephesians 5:18. Also the sins committed against a fellowman and against oneself are sins against God, however, in an indirect way. Thus is illustrated the example of Joseph, who was kept from crime not only by regard for his employer, but rather by his reverent fear of God, Genesis 39:9. The lie and fraud of Ananias is designated

a crime against the Holy Ghost, not against the man Peter, because Ananias despised the ministers of the Holy Ghost, who had also wrought his conversion.

A person can sin by his own effort (David, 2nd Samuel 12:7; Adam and Eve, Genesis 3:12, 13), and also by concurring in the effort of another. Hall: "A person concurs by efficacious intention in the sin of another, when he commands, consults with, consents, connives at, does not oppose, or gives information, and thus is the moral cause of the sin of another. God holds both the doer of an unlawful act, and the accomplice or his accessory culpable and hence forbids men to have fellowship with (synkoinoonein, Ephesians 5:11; Romans 18:4), or to be partakers (koinoonein, 1st Timothy 5:22; symmetochon ginesthai, Ephesians 5:7) of the sins of others.

"Distinctions of this kind have been multiplied by the dogmaticians (venial and mortal, crying sins and such as God endures through His long-suffering, dead and living, remaining and remitted, condemnacious and wayward, pardonable and unpardonable sins). These distinctions often cross each other, and are for that reason inconvenient for popular use.

"The unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost is a sin that has been sinned not at the third person of the God-head, but against His office, and against His testimony in the heart, and His blessings, hence His work of illuminating men through the preaching of the Gospel, coupled with a determination to blaspheme the saving truth. It is an intentional denial of the truths of salvation which a person had known, approved and accepted, and now rejects, attacks, slanders and vilifies against his better knowledge and conscience. When all these features jointly can be proven against a person, and the person, moreover, remains impenitent of his voluntary apostasy and

blasphemy until the end, he is said to have committed that sin, which shall not be forgiven either in this world, or in the world to come, Matthew 12:31; Mark 3:28, 29; Luke 12:10; Hebrews 6:4; John 5:16. This sin is irremissible, not through any want of divine grace or inadequacy of the atonement of Christ, or inefficiency of the work of the Holy Ghost, but on account of a wicked rejection of all the means of grace, and by reason of final impenitence" (Hall). Baier holds that this sin can be committed not only by such persons who were actually regenerated and had professed the truth, but also by such who had the truth brought sufficiently near to them, so that they could perceive it, and then turned against it, heaped such blasphemies upon it, as the Pharisees did, who charged Christ with being in league with the devil, and to Christ spoke of this sin, plainly charging them with it. Quenstedt holds that only truly regenerated persons can commit this sin. Many Calvinists ascribe this sin only to the unregenerate, because they hold that no truly converted person can ever fall from grace, i.e. put himself outside of the decree of election. It should be noted that final impenitence is not the form of this sin, but only an accompanying circumstance, however, one that always accompanies this sin. "*Difficile est de homine adhuc vivo, velut a priori et ex causis pronunciam, quod peccit in Spiritum Sanctum*" (Baier). "*Hodie nemini temere, tantum scelus debet impungi, cum de nullo debeamus desperare*" (Quenstedt).

§75. State of Wrath.

From the sin which Adam transmitted to his posterity, and which cropped out in Adam and his descendants in a host

of actual sins, there has resulted a condition which God views with extreme disfavor. Men are “by nature children of wrath,” “tekna physei orgäs,” Ephesians 2:3. The position of the dative “physei” is emphatic. God charged the state which has grown out of Adam’s sin to all men, and that in accordance with His justice. For: 1) God was not in any manner the cause of Adam’s sinning, since He had furnished man with the knowledge necessary to enable him to understand the sinful character of his action, Genesis 1:31, and had also warned him of its consequences, Genesis 2:16, 17. Adam, though he tries to throw the blame for this act on his wife, does not so much as hint that God is in any direct manner responsible for his disobedience, Genesis 3:12. His own conscience riveted his guilt upon himself and his wife. And God likewise fixes the guilt upon both when He condemns Adam for having listened to his wife and when He deprives him of the earthly blessings intended for him at his creation by cursing the earth which God had beheld with delight, Genesis 1:31, and by stating that this curse is issued for Adam’s sake, Genesis 3:17. With like distinctness Scripture traces all actual sins (a) to “one man” who has caused all after him to sin, Romans 5:12; (b) to the prime author of evil, the devil, with whom sinning has become such a confirmed habit that it is his nature to sin and he is said to “speak of his own” (ex toon idioon) whenever he lies, John 8:44. He has superinduced that spiritual blindness which has settled like a pall upon mankind, and in which he rules as the king of darkness and the god of the world, 2nd Corinthians 4:4; (c) there is a third cause to which human disobedience is charged; it is that sin, which is active in men (kateirgasato, Romans 7:8), projecting new sins in ever varying forms, stiffening the intellect and the will of man in opposition to the

divine Law, rousing the dominant passions to fresh acts of ungodliness, Romans 7:8, drawing man and enticing man by all manner of lust, James 1:14, and deceiving and slaying even the regenerate’s new mind, Romans 7:8. These positive statements as to where the guilt of man’s sinning rests are reinforced, 2) by emphatic denials that God is in any way in a causative connection with a sinner’s trespasses.. His very character, His essence forbids such a thought: “God is light,” absolute purity and holiness, “and in him is no darkness.” It is not possible that unholy motives can be harbored by such a Being, 1st John 1:5. He abhors the workers of iniquity, Psalm 5:5. How could He do that if He had instigated their iniquity? In that case He would have to regard them as His obedient servants. Accordingly, James sets out to wrestle with a perverse notion, which pagan philosophy had spread in the world. Christians ever grew impatient, because they observed that they were constantly sinning. This notice inclined some to the pagan belief, that the Higher Power incited them to evil. James urges patience, and in order to show what good reasons they had to be patient, he enters upon the question: “Does evil originate with God?” This question he negatives. Not with God. To believe that, we would have to assume that God Himself were reasonably sometimes incited to evil, drawn into sinning, and that hence He would incite others to evil. But both assumptions are wrong. God is “apeirastos,” untemptable, and he does not tempt (peirazei de autos oudena), James 1:13.

God is not responsible for the guilt which men have incurred, because 3) He cannot be charged either with man’s inability to remove his guilt. The spiritual death, which has ensued as an effect of sin, man’s utter incapacity to rehabilitate himself in the divine favor, are themselves objects of God’s

displeasure. This impotency of sinful man to work his own regeneration is charged to him, as justly as a confirmed drunkard is charged with his moral paralysis, Ephesians 2:1-3; John 3:5, 6. God who had no connection with man's sinning, has no connection either with the effect.

All these statements serve to justify the attitude of God toward the sinner world. God is justly angry with the fallen race. His righteous curse has fallen upon apostate mankind. And this curse means temporal and eternal woe. The evil which men have sown ripens into a harvest of corruption, Galatians 6:8, here in time and hereafter in eternity. Men bear the consequences of their sinning in their natural life, both in the body and in the mind, and reap a still more appalling retribution when the unappeased wrath of the just God consigns them ultimately to "olithron aioonion," eternal perdition.

§76. The Law.

The divine instrument by which the consciousness of sin is roused in every man is the Law. The Law is the revelation of the holy will of God. It determines the moral character of any action. An act is sin when it contradicts the Law. Without the Law, any action would be morally indifferent, neither good nor bad. In order that a conviction for sin may take place, the application of the Law is necessary. The personal experience of Paul (Romans 7:7) shows this. He had not been conscious of the fact that the promptings of nature which he had obeyed were sinful; for he had not known the law against lust (epithymia). The ninth and tenth commandments convicted him. What he states in Romans 7:7 with reference to himself

he really exhibits as a rule applying to all men, and has stated as a principle rule: "By the law is the knowledge of sin," Romans 3:20. This has always been observed; so soon as men perceived that they had departed from the divine precepts, so soon they were made to acknowledge that they had "sinned," committed iniquity, had done wickedly and had rebelled, Daniel 9:5. This then is the foremost function of the Law, to argue sin against sin. "Everything that reproves sin is and belongs to the Law, whose peculiar office it is to reprove sin and to lead to the knowledge of sins" (Luther cited in Formula of Concord, [Solid] Decl., V, 17, p. 592).

The Law determines not only the sinful character of particular acts, Daniel 9:5, but reveals also man's sinful condition by nature, Romans 7:7.

Consciousness of sin is developed in the heart by means of the Law through the conscience. The conscience in man is distinct from the natural Law: the latter states what duties are to be performed; the former is the censor, who determines whether these duties have been performed or not. The conscience in man either approves or disapproves, either praises or condemns, either excuses or accuses the doer. The censorship of the conscience however is exercised according to the norm of the Law. When the Law has stamped any act as unlawful, the conscience follows up this decision of the Law by entering a protest on the doer of the act, by fixing the guilt resulting from the act upon the doer. It arraigns sinful man before the holy God, and in this prosecution, the Law is the witness by which the conscience proves man's guilt. Accordingly, this is a further function of the Law, by the aid of the conscience to rob man of his assumed righteousness, to disturb his carnal security, to destroy his pretended innocence,

and, *per contra*, to exhibit the holiness of God who has had no share in the sinner's wrong-doing, Romans 2:12, 14, 15; 3:19.

A wrongful act is punishable and the Law which determines the moral character of the act also declares what its consequences must be. The anger of God is voiced to the law-breakers by means of the Law. The Law is the instrument by which God hurls His curses against the offenders of His holy will, Exodus 20:5; Daniel 9:10, 11. The office of the Law, then, is with the aid of the conscience to terrify man and fill him with remorse, Psalm 51:3, 4; Romans 3:19.

It is due to the state of corruption in which man lives by nature that the aforementioned functions of the Law are now the chief purpose which the Law serves. The positive injunctions of the Law, which inculcate various manifestations of a virtuous conduct, only deepen the sense of guilt in man, and increase his fear of God's anger, for the Law convinces the sinner of his utter inability to achieve these virtues.

Hollaz: "The divine Law is either universal and perpetual or particular and temporary. The perpetual Law is divided into the natural and the moral, strictly so called. The natural Law of God is the divine injunction impressed by nature upon the minds of all men, by which they are informed and obligated to do those things which are, in themselves, right and honorable, and to eschew those things which are, in themselves, iniquitous and disgraceful, to the praise of God the Creator and the conservation of the civic order. The moral Law is the divine injunction which was superadded to the natural Law by the revealed (Word of God). It was often repeated since the beginning of the world through His Word, and was finally promulgated in a solemn manner on Mt. Sinai and reduced to writing. It clearly enjoins what is becoming and prohibits what

is unbecoming; it regulates all external and internal acts, and obligates all men to render most perfect obedience, or in default thereof, to suffer most exquisite punishment. The temporary Law is that which God gave to the Israelites only, and by which He obligated them to obedience. With the decay of the Hebrew Government, the Law became defunct. It is either ceremonial or political. The ceremonial Law is the divine injunction by which the supreme Lawgiver obligated the people of the Old Testament and prescribed to them, through the agency of Moses, a certain external form of worship, to the end that He might make them mindful of their sins, and hold up to them the Redeemer when they were contrite; also that He might apply and seal to them His covenant of grace by means of two sacraments and various sacrifices. The political Law is the divine injunction by which the Israelites were obligated in the time of the Old Testament, and a certain form of government was prescribed to them by Moses, to the end that external good order might be preserved among them as a civic society, and the Jewish Commonwealth, in which Christ was to be born, might be kept distinct from the civic societies of other nations."

In the following paragraphs (§77-85) moral Law is set forth in detail in its sin-revealing power according to the interpretation of Luther's small catechism. Inasmuch as the Law must be applied to sinful man, it is here shown from its prohibitory and condemnatory side only, its mandatory power being implied. "*Decalogi praecepta negativa includent contraria affirmativa et affirmativa includent contraria negativa*" (Baier).

The natural Law and the conscience in man differ in the same way as the statement of a moral truth differs from the

faculty of applying the truth. The natural Law is the statement, the conscience is the faculty. The natural Law furnished man with a natural, innate, habitual knowledge of right and wrong, the conscience determines the agreement of particular acts with, or their or their discrepancy from the Law; it establishes the lawfulness or unlawfulness (*ennomia* or *anomia*) of particular acts. The natural Law issues commands and holds out either rewards or punishments for compliance or non-compliance with its commands. The conscience does not issue commands or hold out rewards or promises, but it fixes the moral quality of any action past, present or future, contemplated, begun or accomplished; the conscience renders a decision whether an action was, is or will be a compliance or non-compliance with the Law, and consequently, whether the actor deserves blame or praise, reward or punishment. The Law is the code, the conscience the judge who decides according to the code. It is to be noted that this distinction is not strictly observed in popular speech.

§77. First Commandment.

The moral law has been given its divine expression in the Decalogue. "*Summa legis moralis in decalogo comprehenditur*" (Baier). In the form in which we find it in the Decalogue, it embraces the two cardinal precepts of love to God and love to our fellow-men. Baier is one of the dogmatists who draws an inference from the word of Christ: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The inference is this, that self-love is also commanded in the Decalogue, hence, in the moral Law. This is a prevalent idea in modern times. We

hear much of "geordnete Selbstliebe," "proper self-respect," "charity begins at home," and the like. It is, therefore, necessary to look into the words of Christ to the lawyer. Luther says: "It is to be noted that some of the fathers have conceived from the words of this text the notion, that ordered love begins at home. For, they say, love of self is prescribed as a rule by which we are to regulate our love of our fellow-men. I shall give you my opinion of this matter, too; it is this: I understand this commandment to mean, not that we are to love ourselves, but only that we are to love our neighbor. My first reason is, because love of self exists and is dominant in all men prior to any command. Again, if God had wished that to be the order, He would have said: love your neighbor as yourself, i.e. to love him as you are even now loving yourself without any special commandment. Accordingly, the Apostle in 1st Corinthians 13 states as one of the characteristics of love, or charity, that she seeketh not her own, and with those words utterly denies self-love. In like manner Christ commanded us to deny ourselves and to hate our own lives, Mark 8:35. Also in Philippians 2:4 He says clearly, that no one is to look upon that which is his own, but that each man is to look upon that which is another's. Lastly, if man had a proper love of self, he would not now need the grace of God. For such a love, if it be of the proper kind, loves its owner and the neighbor; nor does the Law inculcate any other love than this. But, as I said, the Law presupposes that a person has self-love, and when Christ in Matthew 7:12 says: 'Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you', He clearly indicated that there is in men even now self-will and self-love, and He issues no command at all that they should so love themselves, as you see yourself. Hence as I understand the text, it seems to speak of perverse love, which causes a

person to forget his neighbor and to think only of what is useful and advantageous to himself. This love becomes regulated when a person forgets himself and serves only his neighbor. This is indicated, too, by the members of our body, which serve each other even at dangerous risks. For the hand fights for the head and receives wounds by so doing; the feet walk through mud, dirt and water in order to relieve the entire body of that unpleasant task. Moreover, if self-love, which Christ wished to abolish entirely by this command, is made the order, the inclination to self-interest will be greatly nourished."

The Sentence of the Legislative Justice of God on the Deeds of Men. Paragraphs §77-85.

I. Deeds of men against the Divine Being, 77-79.

A. Against the Existence and Essence of the Divine Being, 77.

1. Internal manifestations of a false relation of man to the Divine Being, 77, 1-5.

a. pure atheism, 77, 1, 2.

1) ignorance of the true God, 77, 1, 2a.

2) denial of the true God, 77, 2b.

b. implied atheism, 77, 3-5.

1) lack of reverence, 77, 3. }

2) lack of affection, 77, 4. } for or in the true God.

3) lack of trust, 77, 5. }

2. External manifestations of a false relation of man to the Divine Being, 77, 6-7.

a. gross forms, 77, 6.

1) idolatry and polytheism, 77, 6a.

2) angelolatry, 77, 6b.

b. finer forms, 77, 7.

1) idolatrous fear, 77, 7a.

2) idolatrous affections, 77, 7b.

3) idolatrous trust, 77, 7c.

B. Against the Name or Revelation of the Divine Being. 78.

1. Positive offenses, by misuse or misapplication. 78, 1-8.

a. blasphemy and profanity, 78, 2.

b. imprecations of evil, execrations, 78, 3.

c. perjury and irreverence in making oaths 78, 4.

d. employment of the divine name and revelation for magical purposes, 78, 5.

e. heretical teachings set up contrary to the divine name and revelation, 78, 6.

f. religious dissimulation, 78, 7.

g. declared or tacit apostasy, 78, 8.

2. Guilty inaction by non-use or non-application, 78, 9-12.

a. failure to invoke God, 78, 9.

b. failure to acknowledge the glory of God, 78, 10.

c. failure to express gratitude to God, 78, 11.

d. concealment of religious convictions, 78, 12.

C. Against the regular worship of the Divine Being, 79.

1. Offenses committed in private worship, 79a.

a. superficial Bible-reading, 79a.

b. contumacious Bible-reading, 79a, b.

c. insufficient Bible-reading, 79a, g.

2. Offenses committed at public worship, 79a.

a. irreverent and dispirited church-attendance, 79b, a.

b. irreverent and contumacious attitude during preaching, 79b.

c. neglect of public worship, 79b, c.

d. failure to retain the impressions of the divine Word, 79b, d.

e. neglect of the ministers of the Word, 79b, e.

1) by contempt of their teaching, 79b, e, a

2) by non-support, 79b, e, b.

3. Offenses committed against the ordinances entering into evangelical worship, 79c.

a. contempt of the sacraments, 79c, a.

b. refusal to receive ordered instruction, 79c, a.

c. refusal to disseminate the true worship, 79c, b

d. establishment of false forms of worship, 79c.

II. Deeds of Men against Men, 80-85.

A. Against divinely established Authorities in the society of Mankind, 80.

1. Offenses committed by subjects, 80, 1-4.

a. unauthorized submission to the authorities of the Church or State, 80, 1.

b. disrespect within the sphere of filial relations, 80, 2.

c. disrespect within the sphere of pastoral relations, 80, 3.

d. disrespect within the sphere of civil relations, 80, 4.

2. Offenses committed by those in authority, 80, 5.

a. by those in parental authority, 80, 5a.

b. by those in pastoral authority, 80, 5b.

c. by those in civil authority, 80, 5c.

B. Against Human Life, 81.

1. Offenses committed through non-supply of physical relief, 81, 1

2. Offenses committed through bodily injury, 81, 2.

3. Offenses committed through malignant dispositions, 81, 3.

C. Against the Sexual Status, 82.

1. Unnatural cohabitation, 82, 1-3.

a. masturbation, onanism, 82, 1.

b. sodomy, 82, 2, 3.

2. Illicit cohabitation, 82, 4-6.

a. fornication, 82, 4.

b. cohabitation within forbidden degrees of relationship,

82, 5.

c. adultery, 82, 6.

3. Interrupted cohabitation, 82, 7-10.

a. divorce, 82, 7, 8.

b. cruelty, 82, 9.

c. breach of betrothal, 82, 10.

4. Acts of sexual defilement, 82, 11-13.

a. lewdness and indecency in acts, 82, 11.

b. lewdness and indecency in speech, 82, 12.

c. lewdness and indecency in desire, 82, 13.

D. Against Human Possessions and Property, 83.

1. Direct acts by which the neighbor becomes dispossessed of property, 83, 1.

a. theft, 83, 1.

b. fraud, 83, 1.

c. usury, 83, 1.

d. aleatory devices, 83, 1.

2. Indirect acts by which property is withdrawn from the neighbor's use, 83, 2-5.

a. covetousness, 83, 2.

b. prodigality, 83, 3.

c. idleness, 83, 4.

d. carelessness, 83, 5a.

e. refusal or neglect to aid a neighbor in distress, 83, 5b.

E. Against Truthfulness and Uprightness, the Main Support of the Mutual Social and Civil Relations of Men, 84.

1. Malicious attacks upon the civil reputation and the social good-standing of men, 84, 1-2.

a. evil suspicions, 84, 1.

b. lying, 84, 2.

2. Acts of pretended affection, 84, 3-4.

a. flattery and dissimulation, 84, 3.

b. breach of promise, 84, 4.

3. Acts of treachery, 84, 5-8.

a. failure to advocate the cause of the innocent, 84, 5.

b. tale-bearing, 84, 6.

c. slandering, 84, 7.

d. lack of charity towards the sinning, 84, 8.

F. Against the Fundamental Principle of Unselfishness, 85.

1. Covetousness and unlawful cravings for specified objects, 85a.

2. Innate carnal-mindedness and corruptness, 85b.

§86. Natural Law and Conscience.

The effects of sin have been extended to and are observed in the diminished energies of the moral principles in man, the natural moral Law and the Conscience. The natural [Law] in fallen man has become like script dulled with age; like a broken tablet with a mutilated inscription. Immediately after the fall its clear light had become dimmed to such an extent, that Adam did not at once behold his personal share in the fall

to the full extent and did not correctly estimate the wicked character of his answer to the Lord, which was a dishonest evasion, practically a falsehood, Genesis 3:12, 13. In the generations after Adam, Cain's reckless answer to the Lord, Genesis 4:9, the bold idolatry of the pagan world, Romans 1:21; Galatians 4:8, the lascivious morals of the Gentiles, Ephesians 2:3, 4, 22; 5:8-13, show that the power of the Law in man had become, to a very appreciable degree, nullified, and the voice of the conscience, too, had become hushed. Yea, [man] had become erring to such an extent, that men regarded as god-pleasing what God must abhor, as the fanatical zeal of the Jews in suppressing the Gospel of Christ shows, John 16:2; Acts 22:3, 4; 26:9; Romans 10:8. Still these affects have not been so great as to destroy the moral principles in man utterly. Four thousand years after the fall Paul still speaks of man, yea, of all the world, being under the Law, and he means a subjection to the Law of which men are conscious, for he declares that the Law is speaking to them and that they understand its import and feel its force, so much so, that they are cowed by it: Their mouth is stopped and they have a sensation of their guilt visited upon them by means of what the Law declares to them, Romans 3:19. For their sinful acts the same Apostle brands them as "children of disobedience," Ephesians 5:6; Colossians 3:6. Disobedience implies an effort of the will. Fallen man is conscious and can be made to perceive that he is arrayed by his own choice against right and truth. He still has a conception and a judgement of these matters. The work of the Law (to ergon nomou), i.e. those actions which the Law inculcates are indelibly imprinted upon his heart, Romans 2:15. And hence the Law can be preached to natural man. Such things as the Apostle mentions in Ephesians 5:5, 6; Colossians 3:6 can be held

up to him without fear that he will fail altogether to understand their character and also the purpose for which they are being held up to him. Yea, a sense of duty to avoid certain acts and to perform certain contrary other acts is plainly observable even in the low stage to which pagan morals had sunk. In the midst of corruption, they have done by nature things contained in the Law and have thereby acknowledged instinctively their moral obligation even by their feeble attempts at righteousness, Romans 2:14. Adam felt the sensation of shame and fear after the fall, Genesis 3:7, 10, 11, and Adam's sons, though void of the divine image which had adorned their parents, Genesis 5:3, still showed by their religious acts of worship, that the Law had been transmitted to them, Genesis 4:3, 4, and Cain understood the warning which the Lord administered to him prior to the killing of his brother, Genesis 4:7. And in the centuries which followed, sacrificial offerings for the purpose of atoning guilt, submission of citizens to their rulers could be made a matter of conscience, Hebrews 10:2; Romans 13:5. The arraignment of Cain after the murder of Abel, his wail of despair, the ordeals to which the natural man has been subjected in moments when his conscience was roused and begins to afflict, which instances have been witnessed in ancient and modern times, prove that even the obscured and obliterated Law and the impaired, perverted and benumbed conscience in men possess sufficient energy to argue man's guilt, to rivet upon him the sense of responsibility and to compel him to acknowledge that his condemnation is just.

This observation is of vast importance in the labors of ministers of the Word of God with unconverted men. There is, indeed, no natural innate predisposition in these people for the

Gospel, but there is still an innate sense of right and wrong and a voice in them which responds, be it ever so feebly, to the declaration of the perfect Law. The minister of the Word makes connection with the unregenerate by means of what remains in them of the natural moral Law and the conscience. He need not fear that such concepts as guilt, and retribution pass the comprehension of his unregenerated hearers. He can upon this basis set up his argument for the sinner's need of a savior and make the Law the sinner's schoolmaster to bring him unto Christ.

The self-confident attitude of the Pharisee, who thanked God that he was not like other men, Luke 18:11, and whom the Lord on that account charges with self-exaltation, v. 14, is nothing but the sad evidence of the perverted judgement of natural man, who is so blind, that he imagines the chaff, which he offers to God, to be good wheat. He has made a false application that Law to himself which, when properly applied, must unfailingly condemn him.

Accordingly, the Law can hold to the sinner none but a threatening and condemnatory attitude. The fact that it still issues its orders to fallen man as it did to man in his innocent state, is no proof that man can fulfill it, "*a debito ad posse*," N. V. C. The fact that men still acknowledge the power of the Law and regulate their actions by it is no proof that they are fulfilling it. *Distinguendum inter materiale et formale bonae actionis*. Man is altogether incapacitated for any truly good work. The free-will which he seems to exercise in these matters is a delusion. He has no free-will towards God and divine matters.

§87. Universal Condemnation.

It was stated in the preceding paragraph on the strength of Romans 2:14 that there is, in a manner, a performance of the duties which the Law imposes, observable among the unregenerate. In the passage quoted, the Apostle speaks of the Gentiles. The same is true with regard [to] the unregenerate Jews, who had, besides the natural law, the Sinaitic Decalogue, and respected it in their way. The Ten Commandments, published to Israel by Moses, are virtually a summary, a recapitulation of the natural Law, *summa legis moralis*. For when they are stripped of what was purely temporal and accidental, of those portions which clearly refer to historical circumstances at the time being, there remains a set of injunctions and prohibitions, the force of which is universally recognized by all men. Accordingly, Christ has expanded the Law of Moses in the sermon on the Mount in such a manner as to bring out its universally binding force. (Emp. Exposition of Fifth and Sixth Commandments, Matthew 5:21, 22, 27, 28). The Jewish features of the Law were abrogated by Christ, but not the natural moral Law. He declared, with regard to the latter, that His mission was not to destroy but to fulfill, Matthew 5:17. And Paul shows that when God introduced the Decalogue, His intention was not to publish a new law, but to revive the old, to the end that sin might be truly known, Romans 7:7, and the sense of guilt might be quickened in man, Romans 5:20.

Now it was seen, Paragraphs §75, §76, that the natural Law and the Sinaitic Decalogue, in so far as it is but the codification of the original moral Law, places all men under the wrath of God, because it condemns both the state and the conduct of every man. But if Jew and Gentile have done the

things contained in the Law, if Christ urges a certain young man to do the Law, Matthew 19:18, 19, and apparently grants the young man's claim that he has complied with the Law, vv. 20, 21; if He introduces the praying Pharisee, Luke 18:11, as claiming to have performed certain works commanded by the Law, and apparently does not deny his claim – in a word – if men do the Law, why does the Law still condemn them? Christ argued against the Scribes and Pharisees of His day that their fulfillment of the Law was not a fulfillment. He opened up views of the essence and spirit of the Law which seemed to be unknown to them. He showed them that their understanding and practice of the Law was most superficial, Matthew 5:21, 22, 27, 28. The episode of the young man and that of the Pharisee serve to reveal the state of mind of certain would-be righteous people in the days of Christ, and prove that Christ, in the sermon on the Mount, had not misjudged the spirit of the rulers of the nation: these people did believe that they had fulfilled the Law, yea, had even performed good works in excess of the Law's demands, if they had accomplished the mere external act named in a certain commandment. But outward conformity with a Law, which is addressed to the mind, the heart, the soul, all the powers in man, is no conformity. It may look as if it were, but to consider it such would be a delusion.

We must distinguish in every action of a rational being, endowed with intellect and will, between the external and the internal side, or the *materiale* or *formale* of the action. A parrot can be made to repeat a prayer which some saint has spoken; a clay modeler can fashion a human form as the Creator did; an organ can chant the same chorus which the choir chants. The performance is the same outwardly in each case, but when the parrot or the organ act, the action is an automat or mechanical

performance, without intelligence and without conscious purpose. And the result is the same outwardly in each case. But when the sculptor plans the statue on the pedestal, it is a lifeless block of stone; it has eyes that see not, while the Creator produces a living being which thinks, wills, acts, is responsible for its actions. What Scripture grants in Romans 2:14 in reference to the accomplishment of the works of the Law by Gentiles; what the Lord grants in the instance of [the] young man, Matthew 19:20, 21, and of the praying Pharisee, Luke 18:11, is the performance of the *materiale* of certain legal acts, but no more. In consequence of original sin the powers of intellect and will in man have become paralyzed, dead, and incapable of performing the *formale* of any work, which God could pronounce good by the rule of His divine Law.

It follows, then, that the very law which the persons aforementioned had imagined themselves to have obeyed, had in truth been disobeyed by them in the most important, yea, the essential part. Therefore, the justification which they had sought to obtain by the Law is no justification. The Lord demands of the true followers of God a righteousness that shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, Matthew 5:20. "Perisseuein" refers to both quality and quantity. The Jewish teachers had not only reduced the extent, but also had disregarded entirely the intent of the Law. Therefore, their legal service does not render them fit to enter heaven. "In no case" shall one, whose righteousness does not advance beyond the goal fixed by the Pharisees, enter heaven. The law does not justify, but condemns them. That is the meaning also of the Lord's remark at the at the conclusion of the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. "Justified rather than the other," Luke 18:14, means that the publican was

justified but not the pharisee. For justification does not admit of degrees. A person is either guilty or not guilty. And justification by the Law can take place only on condition of a perfect fulfillment of the Law, James 2:10, and of a full atonement of the guilt contracted, unto the "uttermost farthing," Matthew 5:26. Nor is the absence of the knowledge and consciousness of guilt in a person a proof that such person has actually fulfilled the Law, 1st Corinthians 4:4. This explains why Paul in the same epistle can say of the Gentiles: "they do the things contained in the law," Romans 2:14, and also "all have sinned and come short of the glory of God," Romans 3:23. "Hysterountai" signifies: "they remain behind," like a runner in a race who thus loses the race, they are void of the glory of God. "Doxa tou theou" is not the glory which God possesses, His divine majesty. For no human being was ever supposed to attain to that. But "tou theou" is the objective genitive, and the phrase denotes the glory which man ought to have before God. No work which a sinful man performs in accordance with the Law is of such a character that he could glory in it at the throne of the Discerner of hearts.

§88. *Materiale* of Good and Evil Acts.

Fallen man is still a creature of God. His life, with all its manifestations, depends upon the same First Cause, which gave him breath and being. It is of fallen man that the Apostle says: "In him we live, and move, and have our being," Acts 17:28. The same divine wisdom, omnipotence and goodness, which, according to Paragraph §58, preserves the irrational and inanimate part of the Cosmos, support also rational man in his

actions. These actions bring evil. The question arises: Does God do evil by supporting man who in his natural state does evil continually? The essential holiness of God, Psalm 145:17, which is observed in all His ways and works and furthermore manifests itself in His abhorrence of iniquity, Psalm 5:5, and also His immutability, James 1:17, by which He is ceaselessly the Dispenser only of good and perfect gifts, forbid us to assume that God cooperates in the evil works of man, in so far as they are evil. The omnipotence of God supplies indeed the energies of intellect and will, and the physical strength which are necessary for any human action, but the sinful quality of the action is not from Him. This strikingly is set forth by Jeremiah, Lamentations 3:35-38. The prophet grants that injustice is practiced by men, but declares that the Lord does not approve of it. Still he continues, unless the Lord willed, nothing that man proposed can be accomplished. (Compare Proverbs 16:9.) And he adds: "Out of the mouth of the Lord proceedeth not evil and good." If the injustice that is done does not proceed from the Lord, and still the injustice could not have been accomplished unless the Lord had willed, the meaning can be no other than this, that the Lord willed that there should be in a certain person the power to act and the ability to use it, but not the motive to act as he does, nor the result in which the action terminates. All activity of men would simply have to cease if the Creator should withdraw His sustaining hand, Job 34:13-15. For God to withdraw or to withhold the power from men to act would be tantamount to giving man over to death and dissolution. The distinction already noted between the *materiale* and the *formale* of an act (§87) aids us also in this case. God cooperates, or concurs only in the *materiale* of evil acts, not in the *formale*. The power by which men sin is indeed

from Him, who is the Source of all life and of all strength, but He does not bestow it for the purpose of sinning. In this sense, any evil that occurs anywhere may be traced to the Lord, Isaiah 45:7; Amos 3:6; Deuteronomy 32:39.

Quenstedt: "Concurrence is an act of providence by which God through a general influence upon the actions and the affects of second causes (connects Himself) as such..." "*Concurrentia est actus providentiae, quo Deus influens generali in actionis et affectus causarum secundarum, quales, immediate et simul cum eis et iuxta indigentiam et exigentiam unius cuiusque suaviter inf.*"

God is *causa prima*, every force of nature being derived from Him is *causa secunda*. However these two do not operate separately, but in union (hence *cooperatio*, *synchoorāsis*), and the divine concurrence works simultaneously with the physical energy.

Quenstedt: "God not only bestows the power to act on second causes and conserves them, but in an immediate manner enters into the action and the effect produced by a creature, so that the same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God, partly by the creature, but is produced at the same time by God and the creature by one identical, total efficacy, viz. by God as the universal and first cause, by the creature as the particular and second cause."

Divine concurrence is asserted as taking place also in such created things as possess the faculty of motion in themselves. To explain this concurrence by saying that at the Creation in the beginning God had bestowed on natures of this class the power to act, and that explains their action, is really denying God to that extent. Still, on the other hand, this divine

concurrence is not to be extended to such a point that the creature is regarded as effecting nothing whatever, while God does all, for this could not be done without impiety. Accordingly, the correct view of this matter is to acknowledge a concurrence of the Deity with all movements and actions of creatures, however, not in such a way as to deprive the creatures, or second causes, of that power to act, which they possess in themselves.

§89. Divine Government of Evil.

While divine concurrence cooperates with the sinner in the *materiale* part of an evil act, the providence of God is at the same time engaged in opposing the sinner and in defeating his wicked purpose. This is called the divine government of evil. Three modes of this government may be distinguished: before, during and after the sinner's action (*actus antecedentes, coincidentes, consequentes*). Governing acts of God antecedent and concomitant to the commission of evil, are: 1) God's prescience of the evil contemplated (see §33 and Psalm 139:1-4); 2) God's interference before an evil act is conceived or executed. In a manner which we cannot observe in an empirical way, but which is in keeping with His power and goodness God prevents many evil deeds which might suggest themselves to men from entering their mind. Again, when the evil design has formed in a heart God interposes before the execution. Thus the lewd Sodomites were thwarted in their lusts, Genesis 19:11. The contemplated adultery of Abimelech with Sarah was not affected, Genesis 20:6; Laban had to desist from his wrathful design upon Jacob, Genesis 31:24, 29;

Pharaoh was arrested in his pursuit of the host of Israel, Exodus 14:28; the curses in Balaam's heart found no way to his lips, Numbers 22:12; Jeroboam was smitten and rendered powerless to apprehend the Judean prophet, who spoke against him at Bethel, 1st Kings 13:4; Isaiah 37:36; the invasion of Judah by Sennacherib came to a sudden stop. In these instances God revealed to the parties His disapproval of their design or foiled them in their endeavor by an extraordinary and miraculous use of His omnipotent power, Isaiah 37:36. This mode of the divine government of evil is so common with God that the Psalmist declares: "The Lord bringeth the council of the heathen to naught; he maketh the devices of the people to none effect" (Psalm 33:10). Concomitant acts of God by which He governs evil refer to such evil deeds as He permits. In a manner which we cannot understand by observation, but which comports with His righteousness, holiness and goodness, God engages to dissuade the sinner from committing his sin even while the latter is engaged in it and to erect barriers which the sinner cannot pass. Jesus would have been slain sooner by the Jews if God had permitted them, John 7:30, and the trials of many Christians would become unbearable if God did not time their occurrence, temper their violence and provide for their cessation, 1st Corinthians 10:13. Consequent acts of God by which evil is governed are directed toward the effect of evil already committed. The sale of Joseph by his brethren and his removal as a slave into Egypt was neither suggested nor effected by God, who concurred merely in the *materiale* of the act. The act was evil in itself, Genesis 50:20, and a distinct sense of guilt was visited upon the evil-doers on several occasions, Genesis 43:21, 22; 44:16; 45:4ff.; 50:15ff. But the design which they had had in selling Joseph was so completely changed by

the course of events in Joseph's life in Egypt, and another design of which neither Joseph or his brethren had been aware at the time of the sale was put in the place of the wicked design of the brethren, that Joseph's removal to Egypt is represented later as serving a divine purpose, and Joseph himself ascribes it to God, Genesis 45:5; 50:20. In like manner Christ was sent to the people of Israel as their promised Messiah and was by many wonderful acts of God exhibited to the Jews as such. With tears in His eyes He assured the Jews at the gate of their capital city, eloquently He told them in Nazareth and elsewhere that the time of their gracious visitation had arrived. The news which the angel's host had published at the birth-hour of the Messiah was absolutely correct. God harbored none but thoughts of peace towards His elect people. When later their wicked rulers murdered Christ, they meant to accomplish their own wicked purpose of destroying this prophet and His teaching and God permitted them to do so because He had determined before that Jesus should die for the world. But it was His counsel of mercy that went into effect when Jesus died, not the wicked plans of the Jews, Acts 14:27, 28. The Jews killed the Redeemer and thereby became unwitting agents in rendering Him truly the Redeemer of the world. Their own sin in committing this violence was visited upon them afterwards by the testimony of the Apostles, the destruction of their city and the dispersion of their race. God employs also wicked agents to accomplish blessed ends and makes the wrath of men praise Him. Luther rightly says: "When God wills, even the devil must run His errands." Accordingly, Paul lays down this truth as a general rule: "All things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose," Romans 8:28.

§90. Means of Government.

The concluding paragraphs on the chapter of Anthropology describe the agencies which God has established throughout the world for the government of evil before, during and after its commission. There are five permanent institutions serving this purpose:

1. The Moral Law, §91.
2. Matrimony, §92.
3. Civil Government, §93.
4. The Laws of Nature, §94.
5. Temporal Death, §95.

By all these agencies God permits the commission of evil, sets up metes and bounds against its spread and overrules its effects for His own beneficent ends.

§91. Moral Law a Curb or Bar.

It was seen in Paragraph §86 that the activity of the human conscience has not utterly ceased in consequence of the fall. Its accusing voice is still heard in men's bosoms. The terror and agony which it inflicts are wholesome, in so far as they prevent the commission of many a crime, even though the parties desist from no righteous motive, such as the fear of God, but from purely selfish motives, such as injury to themselves, their lives, property and honor, or even from a

dread of eternal damnation. Now the conscience requires as a basis on which to render its decisions the divine Law. Conscience cites the prohibitory statements and the curses of the divine Law against the sinner and thereby places an effectual obstacle in the sinner's way whenever he designs evil. It shuts up the evil passions in him in his own heart and bolts the cage by means of the divine Law.

Moreover, this divine law has passed into the legal codes of nations. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action of a citizen in this world is determined by the laws of his country. These laws are often arbitrary and sometimes temporary, but the very order of legislation and the groundwork of all laws rests ultimately on the eternal principles of right and wrong which are innate in man and which was reiterated in the Decalogue of Israel. Secular laws, indeed, do not govern the motives which lie back of men's actions and do not aim at the glory of God and the eternal welfare of man, but they regulate outward conduct in the society of mankind; they determine the limits of personal freedom in a person's public actions, and are instrumental in shaping conditions under which men can follow pursuits which tend to their physical, moral and religious happiness. They are beneficent institutions through which much evil is prevented. And the measure of security which they afford mankind owes to the silent authority of the divine moral Law, which is, in a manner, embodied in them.

§92. Matrimony.

Among the means by which God curbs the sinful inclinations of men we note, secondly, matrimony. It is no argument against the correctness of this view of matrimony to say that matrimony was instituted in the sinless state and hence cannot have been intended as a curb to sinful passions. True the state of matrimony existed originally independent of sin. So did the moral Law which was implanted in the heart of the original man. Nor did the incoming of sin change the purpose for which God had given the moral Law and instituted matrimony. But [with] sin entering, the usefulness of either was increased in a negative way. The wedded life of the sinless state was continued in opposition to sin in the sinful state and contingently became a means for overcoming sin.

The subjects for matrimony (*materia matrimonii*) are one male and one female. Matthew 19:4-9 proves that monogamy is the divinely ordained form of matrimony. The Lord reverts expressly to the original order recorded in Genesis 2:24, and argues, in response to the queries of the Pharisees that it is adultery to marry a woman wrongfully divorced during the life of her husband. (Compare Matthew 5:31, 32.) The argument of the Lord loses all force if polygamy is regarded as sanctioned by God. For the reason why no one may marry a divorced woman is plainly this feature: If a husband cannot put away his wife for any cause and marry another, and nobody can marry the divorced woman without committing adultery, then the divorcing husband is still the husband of the divorced wife, by the divine Law, and matrimony can rightly exist only in the monogamous form. Again, in 1st Corinthians 7:4, both the married woman and the married man are said not to have disposing power over their own bodies (tou idiou soomatos ouk exousiazai). Wilke paraphrases "exousiazein" thus: *dominari*

corpori, i.e. *jus plenum atque integrum in corpus habere, seu corpus suo arbitrio subjectum habere*. The disposing power of each is in this passage credited to the other. Hence it follows that neither has a right to admit a third party into matrimonial relation with himself, whether this be done with or without the consent of the other. For this passage does not imply that if the other party consents, bigamy or polygamy becomes proper, because the statement: “not to have power over one’s body” evidently rests upon that statement made at the institution of matrimony “**wehaju lebashar echad**,” they shall be unto one flesh. It is for this reason that neither party has power over his own body, because, for married intercourse, his body is the other’s with whom he is one flesh and he cannot give away that which is not his.

Instances of polygamy even among the saints are recorded merely as matters of history, and to show that the Scriptures impartially account the truth as it has happened and exhibit both the innate sinfulness even of believers, and the patience of God in bearing with them. There is not a passage in Scripture which even remotely endorses polygamy as existing in accordance with God’s plan, but wherever Scripture speaks of matrimony as instituted by God, it speaks of monogamy. As to example of the saints, we recall the well-known adage: *Exempla non probant*. Luther: “Granted that polygamy was lawful in the times of the patriarchs and Moses, though this can never be proven, still those people had the Word of God which gave them permission. God suffered and tolerated in the Jews things which He regarded as wrong otherwise, e.g. such as the ‘trial-water’ (Numbers 5), taking usury from pagans, hating an enemy, writing a letter of divorce, which latter practice Christ condemned, Matthew 19. Christ interprets the Law of Moses

so as to show that the practice was not legalized but was merely a dispensation, and that, not for the weak and needy, but for the hardened, obstinate and licentious rogues. Now there is quite a difference between a law and a dispensation, sufferance and tolerance” (“Against Bigamy,” 1542, XXI b./1269, *Antwort auf das Buch des Nebulo Tulrich*, No. 2870).

The matrimonial union is affected by the parties contracting marriage (*causa conjugii sunt ipsi conjuges*), and the manner in which it is effected (*causalitas causae*) is mutual consent. This is apparent from the first marriage. God brought the woman to the man and by that act proposed to these two individuals that they should, with His good pleasure, however, with their own agreement, enter into this state. The consent of the man is clearly expressed in Genesis 2:22-24, while the consent of the woman is included in the words: “God brought her to the man.” A case of a woman consenting is clearly stated in Genesis 24:58, while 1st Corinthians 7:12, 13 treats the consent of either party as equally necessary. But this mutual consent according to 1st Corinthians 7:5 is required not only for the establishment but also for the sustaining of the status of marriage. Having once been mutually given or pledged, it cannot be withdrawn, except upon mutual agreement, and that for a season, wedlock – wed (pledge) and lac (offering, from lacan – to offer).

The mutual agreement of the parties contracting marriage is called *forma seu ratio formalis* of matrimony. The agreement establishes the marriage bond (*vinculum coniugali*), and constitutes the male party a husband, the female a wife. It obligates the man to render unto the woman the *maritalia*, the duties of husband, and the woman to render unto the man the *uxoria*, the duties of wife. The contract is binding as soon as the

agreement has been effected, and its enactment can by mutual agreement be deferred, but does not alter the essence of the contract (1st Corinthians 7:5). “*Revera non differunt obligatio mutua coniugum et vinculum coniugale*” (Baier). The promise of marriage, namely, is given upon the basis of the divine institution, and though the consent is left to the free-will of the parties consenting, still, when given, it is given in accordance with the will of God, and cannot be withdrawn without a moral fault, unless it can be shown that the consent itself was given in opposition or defiance of God’s will.

The consent of the parents of the parties contracting marriage is required for a valid marriage contract, because of Deuteronomy 7:3; Exodus 22:16, 17. Articles of Smalcald: “Unjust also is the law which in general approves all clandestine and underhanded betrothals, in violation of the rights of parents.” “*Patris potestas praestat*” (Kuester). “Was zusammen kommen ist und sitzt in oeffentlicher Ehe bei einander, das soll bleiben, und sich mit nichten scheiden als aus Ursachen der heimlichen Verloebniss” (Luther, X, 767).

The consenting parties are said to be joined together by God, Matthew 19:5; Mark 10:17, and men are solemnly warned not to sever a union which has received the sanction of God, Matthew 19:6. Men, however, means all men, the contracting parties themselves included. Accordingly, the marriage-bond, when properly established, is indissoluble.

It is for this reason that the married state has been termed matrimony. “*Dicitur matrimonium a fine coniugii, sive procuratione liberorum, per quam mulier mater fit*” (Baier).

That to which the parties to the marriage contract consent is: a) legitimate sexual intercourse, the constant, faithful and mutual rendering of the *debitum coniugale*, and the

procreation of children. This is the proximate end of matrimony (*finis cuius proximus*). It is expressed as the end by “**al cen**,” accordingly, for this reason or purpose (anti toutou, Ephesians 5:31) and by the blessing of fruitfulness bestowed upon the first twain and upon all their successors, until the immense scope of the blessing (“replenish the earth and subdue it”) be attained.

Both husband and wife have passed under a common yoke, and their relation is aptly called *coniugium*. The authority which the husband has over the wife is not the same as the authority which he exercises over his children, or servants. For he is one flesh with his wife and only in this union is he called the head of the wife. Balduin therefore calls the exercise of the husband’s authority over the wife an aristocratic form of government and explains his meaning as follows: “Aristocracy is a rule of such a kind as pertains equally to all, but is exercised only by one. Thus husband and wife share all things equally, but the husband is at the head of the things which both share. Accordingly the status of domestic government is aristocratic, but the administration of the government is monarchical, and thus viewed, matrimony bears resemblance to a monarchy rather than to a democracy, as Chrysostom writes in his 34th Homily on 1st Corinthians.”

The marriage contract is entered into for life, Romans 7:2; 1st Corinthians 7:39. The husband shall cleave unto his wife (“**dabaq** – proskolläthasetai), i.e. he shall, as it were, become agglutinated to her, Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:6. As if He wished to show the force of this verb, the Lord significantly adds the warning, “What God hath joined, etc.” The only end for which matrimony is entered into, viz. the procreation, nurture and admonition of children, and mutual aid and

protection, forbid a severance of the marriage tie. Emphatically the Apostle, therefore, in the two places quoted, that the wife is bound to her husband by law (dedetai nomoo), during the life of the latter. Marriage is properly terminated as it is properly begun, only by divine interposition. God still regulates the affairs of those who fear Him, and, in His providential manner, brings to each husband his wife and sanctions their betrothal and union, and God releases them in His providence from the bond of marriage by death. While both are living, they are under a moral, not only under a social obligation, to dwell together. For the "nomos" to which the Apostle refers is the divine Law. The terms commonly employed to describe a severance of the marriage tie aptly describes a complete rupture of the union, for divorce, from *divertere*, signifies the turning in opposite directions and away from one another of two parties, who were formerly walking side by side. The Greek: "apoluein" (Matthew 5:32; 19:7) predicated of the husband, and "apo choorizesthai" (1st Corinthians 7:10ff.) predicated of the wife, signify essentially the same thing; the former term is more aptly applied to the husband when he takes the initiative, because he is the party vested with greater authority.

Scripture recognizes as legitimate causes for divorce: 1) Adultery, Matthew 5:32; 19:9. Both passages express not what must, but what may be done in a given instance. The innocent party is at all times at liberty to condone the offense, however he cannot be compelled to do so. The wrong done may be forgiven by the innocent party and at the same time the reestablishment of the marriage relation broken by the guilty party may be refused by the innocent party without detriment to the latter's christian standing. In such a case the guilty party

must bear the refusal of the innocent as the effect of his sin just as he would bear the effect of other sins; and the refusal of the innocent party cannot be cited as proof that his forgiveness was not genuine. For the phrases "parektos logon porneias," Matthew 5:32, and "ei mä epi porneia," Matthew 19:9, enable us to resolve the rule which the Law lays down into these two distinct statements: Whosoever dismisses a wife not guilty of fornication and marries another, commits adultery, and whosoever dismisses a wife guilty of fornication and marries another does not commit adultery. This constitutes a clean grant from the Lord to the innocent party to seek and to obtain a new marriage after the first marriage has been broken up without his fault. If it can be shown, however, that there was collusion between the innocent and the guilty party; or if the innocent party connived at the adulterous acts of the guilty party, the innocent party cannot be considered innocent, but must be regarded as adulterous himself, because his silent or expressed assent is an adulterous action and constitutes him a fraudulent suitor in an action looking to divorce. Likewise if the innocent party was aware of the adulterous action of the guilty party, and nevertheless consented to cohabitation with him, the right to sue for divorce is forfeited, because there can be no sure proof of the forgiveness of the original wrong than cohabitation, and a wrong once forgiven cannot be used again against the party guilty of that wrong. (The Smalcald Articles, page 351, paragraph 78, denounces as "unjust the tradition which forbids an innocent person to marry after divorce.")

2) Malicious desertion, 1st Corinthians 7:15, i.e. willful and continued refusal of the guilty party to cohabit with the innocent party. Not every "choorismos" is to be regarded as malicious desertion. (Compare, e.g. verse 5.) A person cannot

be regarded as a deserter if he is detained from his spouse against his will. Malicious intention must be proven and every proper means to break down that intention must have been exhausted before the innocent party can be declared maliciously deserted and free to enter into a new marriage.

The passage 1st Corinthians 7:11 treats of temporary disturbances and separation arising between married people from some cause other than adultery (probable desertion). In such a case the Apostle does not give the deserting party the option of one of two courses: either celibacy or reconciliation, but he enjoins only the latter and holds out the former as a threat if the latter does not take place. His meaning is: when husband and wife have separated in a passion and because of some real or imaginary wrong inflicted by one upon the other, they must by all means seek reconciliation. If they are so stubborn, however, as not to yield to entreaty, they shall not be permitted to marry again, as a punishment for their irreconcilableness. The separation from bed and board (*separatio a thoro et mensa*) granted in some of our states comes under this head and is in very many cases a wise measure much more in accordance with Scripture than most of the divorces granted by our courts.

This divine institution of matrimony, now, is a means by which the providence of God governs evil among men. 1) It curbs the licentiousness of sexual desires. The Apostle counsels marriage “dia tās porneias,” 1st Corinthians 7:2; i.e. as our english version properly renders: “to avoid fornication.” This is a contingent blessing of marriage, due to man’s original depravity. Throughout this section in 1st Corinthians, the Apostle, indeed, urges upon the unmarried and the married first of all the virtue of continency (egkrateuontai, verse 9;

apostereite allalous, verse 5). However, this must not be extended beyond a due limit. Very few persons possess the virtue of chastity in such a degree as to be safe morally in a state of celibacy. (Compare Matthew 19:12.) Those who are not eunuchs by nature or by grace are bound to obey the Apostle’s warning: “kreisson eston gamasai ä purousthai,” verse 9. This statement is an extension of the original “**lo tob hejoth haadam lebado**,” spoken in paradise in the state of innocence. What was good at that time for the main purpose of marriage, the propagation of the race, is good in the state of corruption for another purpose besides, that of enabling men to lead a chaste and decent life. Matrimony is, therefore, one of the mainstays of personal purity and public morality. “Timios ho gamos en pasin,” says the Apostle in Hebrews 13:4. Where the marriage ties are treated lightly in a nation, that nation is on the brink of physical, moral, social and religious disaster. The reasons here stated, why men should marry, apply of course, also to remarriage. Even the guilty party in a suit for divorce may enter into a second marriage with a different party than the first spouse, if the first spouse has become married again or refuses to marry the offender, provided only the original wrong has been repented of and forgiven.

2) Domestic life fosters a number of other virtues among men. The support which the husband must provide for his wife and both together for their children, necessitates that they be industrious, frugal in their habits, sober, not easily turned from their purpose, but persistent and persevering so as to accomplish their ends, economical in the use of their means, averse to all influences which might disturb the peace of their home, and hence forbearing and forgiving towards one another. All these are virtues which the divine Law enjoins, and

when these virtues are cultivated in the fear of God, the fireside of a married couple becomes a sacred place, and in the case of Christians, hallowed by the presence of the Lord and blessed with His daily kindness and His gracious bounties. It is a beautiful idyll which the Psalmist pictures, when he recounts the happiness of a God-fearing husband and his pious wife and his troop of well-trained children, Psalm 128:2, 3; 127:4, 5. There is in wedded life a cheer, comfort and good-fellowship that is not found anywhere else. Also in a moral view the old Anglo-Saxon saying: "My home is my castle" is right. And the American poet who says: "There is no place like home," has, in his way, voiced a truth which we know still better from Scripture. The Lord Himself has written on the Christian home "**ashrecha wetob lach.**"

§93. Civil Government.

Civil government may be considered in the abstract as an institution, or ordinance, of a certain character, determined by laws and serving a certain end, or it may be viewed concretely in the person, or persons, governing who have become vested with lawful authority, and are exercising their authority in an official capacity. In either respect, civil government is a divine institution and the Triune God and also Christ according to His human nature is the author thereof. For it is through a natural instinct implanted in man, that all nations, guided by the light of natural reason, have constituted themselves civil bodies for the purpose of conserving public honesty and tranquility. Luther in the Larger Catechism derives every form of authority from that of parents ("Large

Catechism," *Jacobs*, p. 410f., paragraphs 141-142.). With the approval of God the growing families of the earth were led to the erection of common governments at a very early time. The law against murder, Genesis 9:6, is a direct reference to the existence of such a government. And the New Testament impresses also upon the righteous who are under grace and who require no law for the regulation of their conduct, the duty of submitting to the higher power. True, Peter calls these governments "*ktisis anthroopinä*," a human creation, 1st Peter 2:13. However, not because men are the efficient cause of government in the abstract, but because their particular governments are erected and graded by them and are carried on through them and for them. But he demands submission to them "*dia ton kyrion*," and thus shows that the ordinance of man of which he has spoken exists by divine sanction, and is really a "*ktisis*," namely, a work of Him who is "*ktistās*," the Creator. God not only establishes governments, but also endows governors with the wisdom and knowledge necessary for the discharge of their office, Daniel 2:21. Christians, accordingly, pray also for their government, 1st Timothy 2:12, and God is pleased to accept such prayers, verse 3. Peter's Lord had acknowledged (John 19:11) the authority of the Roman governor who afterwards sentenced Him to be "*dedomenon anothen*," given from above, whence every good and perfect gift descends to us, James 1:17. The "*exousiai hyperechousai*," Romans 13:1, are authorities which are at the head. No such authority exists except "*apo theou*," i.e. as descended or derived from Him; those that exist or such as are in existence (*hai de ousai*) have been set up by God (*hypo theou tetagmenai*). The individual, therefore, in whom the governmental authority is vested, is called "*theou diakonos*,"

Romans 13:4. And the rise and fall of earthly rulers is not chance occurrence, but [a] providential act of God, Proverbs 8:15; Daniel 2:21. The Triune God is the author of civil government because the wisdom, authority and goodness of God, from which civil governments draw their origin, belong to the three persons alike, and are shared also by the incarnate Son of God, who accordingly approved the office of Joseph of Arimathea, Mark 15:43, and of the centurion, John 4:47, 53.

Governments have been set up by a direct and mediate act of God, as in the instance of Moses, Joshua, Saul and David. They are now placed in power mediately, either through a voluntary choice or election of the governed, or by hereditary succession, or by lawful occupation. It is to be noted that Romans 13:1, 7 demands recognition for the powers that be regardless of the manner in which they have acquired the possession of the government. The Apostle's statement gathers peculiar force when it is remembered that in his time it applied to such a profligate heathen prince as Nero. Plainly the Apostle enjoins upon Christians the duty to respect even such governors who have come into possession of power by unjust means, so long as these governors exercise the true governmental functions. In a world in which sin reigns also the path to the throne has become corrupt through the ambition, greed and violence of men. There is hardly a government which holds its title to authority absolutely without dispute. Might has often superseded right. If no government were to be respected, against whose tenure of office contradictions are raised, the society of mankind would speedily be reduced to anarchy and to universal civil war. Therefore God urges men, in particular His Christians, to submit to and not to resist any

power which is in practical and actual discharge of governmental authority.

The domain of civil governments is this present earthly life in the flesh, with its temporal and physical interests. Christ separates "ta kaisaros" from "ta tou theou," Matthew 22:21, and commands subjects to render to each jurisdiction that which properly belongs to it, neither less nor more. There is a domain to which the authority of earthly governments does not extend, and in which men must refuse obedience to an earthly prince on the grounds stated, Acts 5:29: "peitharchein dei theoo mallon ä anthroopois." Civil government has no jurisdiction over a person's relation to God, his conscience and his spiritual interests. In accordance with Scripture, the basic confession of the Lutheran Church states: "Seeing, then, that the ecclesiastical power concerneth things eternal and is exercised only by the power of the word, it hindereth not the political government any more than the art of singing hinders political government. For the political government is occupied about other matters than is the Gospel. The magistracy defends not the minds, but the bodies and bodily things against manifest injuries; and coerces men by the sword and corporal punishments, that it may uphold civil justice and peace. Wherefore the ecclesiastical and civil powers are not to be confounded" (Augsburg Confession, Article XXVIII, paragraphs 11-13). And in the Apology, Article XVI, the confessors state: "The entire topic concerning the distinction between the kingdom of Christ and a political kingdom has been explained to advantage (to the remarkably great consolation of many consciences) in the literature of our writers (viz.), that the kingdom of Christ is spiritual, to wit, that it is in the heart the knowledge of God, and fear and faith in God, beginning eternal

righteousness and eternal life; meanwhile it permits us outwardly to use legitimate political ordinances of every nation in which we live, just as it permits us to use medicine or the art of building, or food, drink, air" (paragraph 54, page 227). In matters which God has determined in the Holy Scriptures the magistrates are bound to submit just as well as the subject. They can refuse to obey God for their own persons, and do so on their own peril, but they have no right to demand that their subjects shall disobey the King of Kings, in deference to an earthly king, nor can they enforce obedience to God's will by a civil statute. For a person submitting to a divine ordinance because an earthly government compels him to do so, does not by such enforced service worship God, but merely obeys Caesar and renders that which is God's unto Caesar. Luther held accordingly: "Magistrates must not prohibit people from teaching or believing whatsoever they wish, no matter whether it be the Gospel or lies. It is sufficient if magistrates prohibit the teaching of rebellion and sedition" (XVI, 64). In a letter of 1530 to the Elector, Luther denied the right of the prince as such to abolish private mass (Winkelmesse), XVI, 1711. When rulers attempt to coerce the conscience of their subjects they forfeit the right of being obeyed. The subjects in such a case should take steps to redress the wrong done them by lawful measures and in an orderly way, just as they redress other wrongs. They may also as a last resort take up arms against a government which has become absolutely tyrannical, for such a government has by its own acts of violence cancelled the contract which bound the subjects to obedience. Rulers who defeat the very end of civil government by their disregard of the rights of the governed may be deposed or expelled and thus the government may be restored to its correct uses. However, in

matters which do not concern their conscience, subjects must show themselves submissive and also be willing to suffer wrong patiently, which Christians are enjoined to do for the glory of God, 1st Peter 2:12, 13, 19, 21.

The proper domain in which civil governments are to exercise their authority are the *res civiles*, i.e. all affairs of men which pertain to the physical, secular or temporal well being of the individual, the community and the commonwealth. Governments are to secure and maintain for their subjects jointly and severally the possibility "to lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty, 1st Timothy 2:2. Among the rights of individuals which the government is to protect, Dr. Graebner names "life, health, honor, property, civil status, lawful pursuits and other legitimate interests." By "civil status" is meant the relative position which a subject occupies under given circumstances, e.g. as the status of a minor, a married person, a party litigant, a voter, etc. Among "other legitimate interests" may be mentioned a person's right to educate his children, to join a church, and to publish his religious convictions, etc. Lawful societies and communities are such as have been organized and constituted with the consent, approval and in compliance with the regulations of the government. Towards these the government has the duty of protecting their existence, possessions, peace, order and other civil rights, e.g. the right to sue in a court of law. Municipalities and states look to the government to secure for them public peace, prosperity and security.

The instrument by which the government accomplishes all these ends is laws. The government has the authority to make, apply and enforce laws (*officium nomothestikon, dikastikon, ekdikon*). This authority is assumed in Romans 13:1

and Titus 3:1, which passages enjoin “hypotagä,” submission or obedience and in Romans 13:3, 4, where governors are called “phobos toov kakoon,” a terror to the evildoer, and “ekdikos eis orgän,” an avenger to execute wrath. The passage also names the lawful instrument of this government for this purpose, the sword, and says that it is not borne in vain, i.e. not as a badge of honor but as a necessary tool.

On the other hand, subjects owe to their government respect (“Honor the king,” 1st Peter 2:17; “speaking evil of dignities,” Jude 8). Obedience, Romans 13:1, the payment of taxes, excises, tributes, Romans 13:6, 7; also the personal service of their limbs and their mental attainments for discharging some governmental office, and, if need be, the sacrifice of their lives, whenever the government requires that for the suppression of disturbances of the peace, Matthew 22:21.

Civil government, now that sin has entered the world, must be engaged chiefly in suppressing evil. The murderer, the thief, the fraudulent, the lewd, the slanderer, are kept in constant dread by the authority of government. God employs the sheriff’s mace and the executioner’s axe to overcome vice. Lawmaking bodies, judges of courts, jailors are God’s servants whom he uses in His government of evil in this world. Great is the dignity, great is also the responsibility of earthly governors. Scripture calls wise and righteous governments a blessing to the nation, but also reminds us that governors can become a curse and a blight to a land. The christian subject commends his rulers to God for due guidance. The Christian is the true patriot.

§94. Laws of nature.

In the article of creation, we noted a distinction between immediate and mediate creation. In the same manner God preserves the created world both immediately and mediately. God has fixed the natural qualities of all created things and also the relation of each to the other. In every branch of study of the physical world, in chemistry, botany, zoology, minerology man is confronted with a certain rigid order and fixed rules which it is absolutely impossible for him to break or change. This has forced upon man the conclusion that the universe is governed by laws, and that God, in preserving created things, acts ordinarily in accordance with these laws. Seneca has spoken of nature and her laws. Augustine says: “*Omnis naturae cursus naturales habet leges.*” And in so far as these laws produce certain regular effects we call them causes, namely, second causes, God Himself being the First Cause, who concurs with these second causes in producing a given effect. Thus a sunrise occurs by a natural law of this kind, but still God is said to make the sun to rise; rain clouds form and scatter their burden upon the earth according to another natural law. Still God is said to send rain, Matthew 5:45.

In his efforts to subdue the earth, to make it tributary to him and subservient to his purposes, man always reaches a limit. He can harness the forces of nature and set them to work for him whenever he has discovered in what particular way they will work, but he cannot guide their forces at will, nor has he absolute control of their energies. The forces and laws of nature are always greater than man, who employs them. The Creator has made them so in order to teach man his

dependence upon Him, the Creator of all order and force, and to guide man's activities in conformity with the divine will. Upon the entering in of sin, these laws, moreover, have become a bar to the bold, daring, reckless pursuits of wickedness. The perverse will of man runs against these laws and in a passion, may, as it were, beat its head against them as against a rock, but he cannot remove them. His intemperance, greed, ambition ultimately reach the point where these silent laws mutely say to his mad endeavors: Hitherto! He may, like Xerxes, whip the sea, which wrecked his ships, but his frenzy is the impotent rage of a dwarf against a giant. The wisdom and power of God has chained the devil in man also by these laws.

§95. Temporal Death.

The divine government of evil is exercised lastly when God terminates the earthly career of a wicked person by death, i.e. by removing from the body, which was the agent and instrument of evil, the soul, which inspired and prompted that evil, Luke 12:20. Although death is universal and inevitable, Hebrews 9:27 ("apokeitai" – it is settled), 2nd Samuel 14:14, it cannot be called a law of nature, because it was not ordained at the beginning of created existence and had no place in the state of innocence, when man was immortal, but was contingent upon the entering in of sin among men, Genesis 2:17; Romans 5:12. However, since the fall, all have become subject to death; moreover, the process of dying is a change which passes over and affects the nature the nature of a human being and can be explained by natural causes. In view of this, death may be called "*lex communis*," the course of nature.

The concurrence of God in the death of a human being appears from Psalm 90:10. God has fixed the duration of life for every human being, not only by His prescience, but also by His power, by which He regulates nature and the working of second causes through which the death of the individual is brought on. Death is referred in Scripture also to other causes, viz. sin, Romans 5:10, and Satan, John 8:44. But the causative relation of these two to death is not the same as that of God, which is the primary cause of all that occurs. Sin causes death because God has decreed that it shall be so and Satan destroys life by divine permission. Both sin and Satan are avengers dependent upon the will of God. In the matter of death, we may distinguish between a dispensing and a permissive providence of God. The death of Simeon, Aaron, Moses and of many men who die from no violent cause that is apparent to us may be called a dispensation or an event which occurs agreeably to God's will and His disposing hand. But the death of Saul, Judas, Ahithophel and of many who die by their own imprudence, wickedness or by the violence of others or by retributive justice, is an event which God might prevent if He were to interfere with or suspend the working of second causes, but He refrains from hindering for reasons sufficient to Him. Such deaths He permits. Hence our theologians defend the thesis that it is not absolutely necessary that each person should die just when or how he dies. "When inquiring regarding the end of life we must distinguish, first of all, between death viewed absolutely and *per se*, and between the hour [and] manner of death. Death viewed in itself is after the fall inevitable to man according to the ordinary state and course of corrupt nature. Hebrews 9:27: 'apokeitai', it has been ordained and appointed to man once to die. However when

the question is regarding the mode and hour of death we must be careful not to become merged either in the Scylla of Epicurean rashness or in the Charybdis of Stoic necessity” (Gerhard). That is, we must neither claim that our death is a mere accident, nor believe that we are unalterably fated to suffer a certain death. Baier warns against curious inquiries regarding the death of particular persons and points to John 21:22, and Romans 11:33. Dannhauer affirms that the end of a person’s life is a fated matter. However, he embraces under the term “fated” both absolute and conditioned fatalities. To establish the former he points to Job 14:5; Matthew 10:29, 30; Ecclesiastes 3:2; Genesis 9:6. By conditioned fatality he understands either one of a physical nature and which is regulated by the course of natural causes, as when the average limit of a person’s life is fixed at 70 years, Psalm 90:10, or one of a moral nature, as when longevity is promised to David provided he honors his parents and leads a godly life. In view of such conditioned fatalities, Dannhauer holds that the end of a person’s life becomes a moveable point: it can either be moved forward, and thus life be extended, when a person observes temperate habits, a rational diet, receives medical attention, leads a pious life or receives an extension of life by a special act of God, as did Hezekiah, 2nd Kings 20:1ff.; Isaiah 38:1, or it can be moved backward and life can be shortened by intemperance, the neglect of proper physics and medical care, impiety, like that of Absalom, or by an especial act of God’s vindictive justice as in the case of Hananiah, Jeremiah 28:16. Dannhauer adds that if this were not so, promises of longevity and prayers for [the] same (Exodus 20:12; Deuteronomy 5:16, 33; Ephesians 6:3) and the threats to the opposite affect, Leviticus 26:25; Psalm 55:24, would be meaningless, yea, carnal

security would rush in upon us with inflated sails, because if the end of a person’s life is a fated, i.e. an unalterably and absolutely fixed event, a person would render himself ridiculous by fleeing from any danger or by seeking remedies for preserving life. For whatever occurs according to some necessity plainly unavoidable cannot be procrastinated nor hastened by any means whatever.

The various contingencies however upon which the event of the death of an individual hinges are all subject to divine providence, and only help to show that God can indeed employ death in very many different ways to cut short the evil which a person was perpetrating or to forestall whatever evil he might yet have perpetrated.

Christology

§96. Definition.

Christology (“logos peri Christou”) is an orderly statement of all that Scripture declares concerning the Messiah of God, i.e. the divinely appointed Redeemer and Savior of mankind. These declarations pertain:

A. To the person and the personal aspects of the Redeemer in His earthly and in His subsequent heavenly life, §97 - 121.

B. To the official acts of the Redeemer while on earth and after His removal from earth, §122 - 129.

Under the first head are noted: 1. the natures of Christ; a) in their distinction; b) in their union, §98 - 100; c) in their communion, §101 - 106. 2. the states of Christ, §107; a)

humiliation, with its five stages, §108 - 114; b) exaltation, with its five stages, §115 - 121.

Under the second head, §122, are noted: 1. the sacerdotal office of Christ, §123, 124; 2. the prophetic, §125; 3. the regal office, §126, with the three kingdoms over which Christ rules, §127 - 129.

In other words, Christology treats 1. of the Redeemer, 2. of the Redemption (Quenstedt).

All that Scripture states on any of these matters exhibits Christ as the Restorer to our race of that righteousness, which had been lost in the fall, and which [was] in accordance with God's eternal decree of redemption (see §50).

The Person of Christ.

§97. Natures of Christ.

The Redeemer of mankind bears two names. Both are divinely chosen for Him. "Jesus" is the Hebrew "**jeshuah**," contracted out of "**jehoshuah**," derived from "**jashah**," to help, save, Matthew 1:21. "Christ" is the Greek "christos" – Hebrew "**mashiach**" from "**mashah**," to anoint, Matthew 2:4; 16:16; John 1:20, 25, 41. The two names express:

- a. the Redeemer's work;
- b. His qualification for that work.

Jesus is really His proper name; Christ, in many cases preceded by the article has the force of a title appended to the Redeemer's proper name. (Compare "läsous, ho christos," Acts 5:42; 9:34; 1st Corinthians 3:11; 1st John 5:1; "läsous, ho legomenos christos," Matthew 27:22; 1:16.) However this

distinction is disregarded very often, yea, in most cases. Christ, too, is used as a proper name, with or without the article, Matthew 1:17; 11:2; Romans 1:16; 6:48, and is even followed by the name Jesus as an apposition ("Ho christos läsous," Acts 17:3; 18:5; 19:4). There is no essential difference between the two formulas, Jesus Christ or Christ Jesus. The New Testament writers use the one as frequently as the other, and there is no apparent reason why they should, in a given instance, use one formula rather than the other. The two names appear to have coalesced so as to form one compound proper name.

The Redeemer is declared and speaks of Himself as being "huios tou theou" and "huios tou anthroopou," Luke 22:69, 70. These appellations are so far from being rhetorical epithets, that they are actually used as substitutes for the name Jesus Christ, John 5:20; Revelation 2:18; 1:13. They represent real aspects of the Redeemer; they express actual facts of His personality: the former His divinity, the latter His humanity. For Scripture predicates of the Redeemer not only the bare names "Son of God" and "Son of Man," but also that for which these names stand, namely, the essence expressed by these names. The divinity or divine nature of Christ is established by a vast array of Scripture texts, which may be divided into four classes:

1. The divine name is applied to Him without qualification or reservation (*argumenta onomastika*); a) He is called by such essential names of the Godhead as **Jehovah**, Jeremiah 23:6; "theos," John 20:28, and "kyrios," Luke 2:11. That this is not done in a metaphorical way is seen from Romans 9:5 where the term "theos" applied to Christ (verse 4) is reinforced by "oon epi pantoön," and by "eulogätos eis tous aioonas," the former expressing His unlimited sovereignty, the

latter His worshipful dignity; moreover, the solemn affirmation “amān” is affixed at the end of this statement. In 1st John 5:20 the noun “theos” is emphasized by “aläthinos,” and Christ is called “very God,” God in truth and reality. By His statement to Philip, John 14:9, the Redeemer declares that there is no essential difference between Himself and the Father.

b) The Redeemer is furthermore given divine names which express His personal attribute within the circle of the Holy Trinity, i.e. His eternal generation from the Father, “ho idios huios,” Romans 8:32; “ho monogenäs huios,” John 1:18; 3:16. And the Father Himself expresses the eternal relation in which He stands to the Redeemer as His Son, Hebrews 1:5. This passage is a quotation from Psalm 2:7. Its significance is enhanced by the context in which it occurs in the Epistle to the Hebrews; for that Epistle is an elaborate treatise on the work of the Redeemer, the historic Christ and His historic atonement. This well-known person is He, of whom the Father had spoken these words in Psalm 2:7, which were recorded even before He came into the world.

2. The divine attributes are ascribed to the Redeemer (*argumenta idioomatika*).

a) He possesses the quiescent attributes of the Godhead: immutability, Hebrews 13:8; infinity, both as regards time, John 1:1, 2; Hebrews 1:11, and space, Matthew 18:20; 28:20.

b) He possesses also the operative attributes of God: omniscience, John 21:17; Colossians 2:3; omnipotence, Matthew 28:18.

3. This fact is further evidenced by the divine works which are ascribed to Him (*argumenta energätika*). Works of divine power, such as creation, John 1:3; preservation, Hebrews

1:3; Luke 7:14; Luke 18:31-33, and of divine grace, such as absolution, Matthew 9:2, 6, are ascribed to Him.

4. Finally divine honor and worship are accorded Him (*argumenta latreutika*), John 5:23; Philippians 2:10.

On the other hand, Scripture predicates of Christ all essential marks of a true perfect and entire humanity: a) human name, 1st Timothy 2:5; Luke 23:47; b) the parts constituting a human being, Hebrews 2:14; John 10:15; Luke 23:46; c) human attributes, Luke 10:21; John 4:6; d) human operations, Matthew 4:12; Acts 10:41; e) human descent, Matthew 1:1-17.

Accordingly Christ possesses a twofold consubstantiality, one with God, the other with man. He is thus enabled to be “mesitäs,” a mediator, a link between the parties which had become separated by sin, 1st Timothy 2:5. In accordance with His two natures we note also a twofold birth, one by the eternal act of God (*generatio aeterna*), the other by His extraordinary conception and birth of the virgin Mary (*generatio generalis*). Hence we speak of Christus asarkos and Christus ensarkos. Christ shares neither His eternal nor His temporal birth with any other being. The eternal birth constitutes a distinctive difference between Him and the Father and Spirit; His temporal birth is an individual prerogative (*proprietas individualis seu praerogativa*, “hyperochä”) which is not accorded to any other human being. Thus the eternal birth constitutes Christ both consubstantial with and distinct from the Father and the Spirit, and the temporal birth constitutes Him consubstantial with and distinct from man.

§98. Personal Union.

The Redeemer who has been described in the preceding paragraph is remarkable not only for the two aspects which He presents, but also for this that He presents these two aspects not successively, not alternately, not in two individuals, but one. Under circumstances which determine personal identity the Redeemer in the territory of Caesarea Philippi refers to Himself as “the Son of man,” and in the same place accepts Peter’s earnest avowal that He is the “Son of the living God,” Matthew 16:13, 16. (Confer Luke 22:69, 70.) Still more strikingly Paul speaks of the Son of God, Jesus Christ, our Lord, “kata sarka” and “kata pneuma,” Romans 1:3. He has in mind the eternal Son of the Father, the second person of the Trinity, and of this person he predicates: 1) a human descent lineally from David; 2) a solemn installation as the “Son of God in power,” according to a new mode of existence, that of the spirit world. In other words, he presents to view the Son of God in His eternal, His temporal, and again in His eternal existence; or prior to His incarnation, and during and after His incarnation in the states of suffering and glory. The two events of the incarnation and resurrection, however, do not represent two metamorphoses. The English rendering “was made” for “genomenos” is not a happy one. Luther’s “der geboren ist” is better. This statement, then, does not declare the eternal Son of God to have been made into or transformed, or reduced to a son of David, but it declares that the person who draws an eternal descent from the Father, draws also a temporal descent from David. The person of Jesus Christ received something in the incarnation which it had not before, but lost nothing in the incarnation which it had before. Again, the expression “The

Resurrection from the Dead,” by its native force implies that there must have been a human body and a human soul, which had been severed in death and now became reunited in the resurrection; hence that the risen Christ must be a human being. This being, however, is declared to be “horisthentes,” i.e. is constituted as being “hyos tou theou en dynamei,” the Son of God in power, or the powerful, the sovereign Son of God; and that “kata pneuma hagioosunäs,” in a spiritual, holy mode of existence. The incarnate Christ the historic Jesus, after passing through suffering in His flesh, has in His flesh entered into the glory, which He possessed before He was incarnate in the flesh. In so doing, He has not put off what He had before, His human nature, but has taken it with Him and elevated it to the full exercise of divine majesty.

On the basis of such declarations of Scripture we believe, teach and confess that in Jesus Christ, the Redeemer, there are not only two natures, but a union of two natures in one person, and this person is known as the “God-man. (See Athanasian Creed.)

The union of these two natures is dated from the moment of Christ’s conception, in accordance with Hebrews 2:14. The subject of “parapläsioos meteothen toon autoon” (“haimatos kai sarkos”) is He who has been declared in the preceding context to be not an angel, but “apaugasma täs doxäs” and “charaktär täs hypostaseoos theou,” the brightness of God’s glory and the express image of His person (chapter 1:3). In John 1:3 “egeneto” were better rendered “became” (Luther: “war”), not “was made.” [Note: In verses 1, 2, and 4, the Luther Bible of 1545 uses “war.” In verse 3 this Bible uses “ist gemacht” three times, not “war” at all.] Its subject is “ho logos.” This is shown by verse 1 to be the eternal Word, who

was with God, personally distinct from the Father, and Himself God (theos än logos).

The union of the two natures, once effected, remains forever inseparable. Peter says of the risen Christ that He is gone into heaven and is at the right hand of God, i.e. the Son of man who had declared Himself to Peter as such, He has entered the endless existence of the Deity and exercises the divine functions, 1st Peter 3:22.

The fact of the personal union is expressed and described by such aphorisms as these:

1. *Persona Christi constat duabus naturis.*
2. *Est in Christo naturarum dualitas et personae unitas.*
3. *Christus constat ex duabus et in duabus naturis.*
4. *Duae naturae personaliter unitae sunt unus Christus*

(Gerhard).

§99. Duality of Natures.

The union of the natures in the person of Christ has not destroyed their distinct qualities. The God-man is not a product of a fusion in which each element fused has sacrificed essential parts or properties. A perfect man and the true God are united in the person of the God-man in such a manner that each nature in Christ is at all times free to exert itself after its own, unaltered fashion. Within the person of the God-man there are properties and attributes truly and essentially divine which never become human and, in fact, cannot become human without ceasing to be divine; again, there are in the person of the God-man properties truly and essentially human which never become divine and, in fact, cannot become divine

without ceasing to be human. Each nature in the God-man has, retains, preserves and manifests unalloyed and unchanged its own proper and distinct intelligence and will. The divinity of the God-man is never His humanity, nor a part of the same. The humanity of the God-man is never His divinity, nor a part of the same. See Formula of Concord, VIII, 7-10, page 675f.

When Christ says to the Jews: "Before Abraham was, I am," John 8:58, He predicates eternal existence not of His human form and life but declares His divinity. The Word which was in the beginning, John 1:1, was the "logos asarkos," without His human nature, which had a temporal origin. Again, when Scripture traces the descent of Christ, who is God over all, Romans 9:5, it is careful to add the restrictive phrase "concerning the flesh," thus indicating that the origin referred to in this text is predicable only of the human nature. The risen Redeemer calls attention to the fact that He has hands and feet, and remarks that a spirit has not flesh and blood, Luke 24:39. But God is a spirit, properly speaking, therefore, the unction at Bethany could extend only to the body of Christ, Matthew 26:12. When Christ contrasts His own will with that of the Father, Luke 22:42, and then wills what He is manifestly loath to will, He exhibits a twofold will, one genuinely human, the other genuinely divine.

In view of such texts as these the church has held that the personal union, which constitutes the second person of the Trinity, the God-man, has taken place "asugchutoos kai atreptoos," *citra commixtionum seu confusionum et conversionem*. By commixtion the elements uniting cease to be what they are and form a *teritum quid*, a new substance, a mixture. By conversion or transformation, one of the two elements uniting is absorbed by or converted into the other.

The technical terms adduced above were employed in the controversy of the orthodox fathers with Eutyches and Nestorius. Their scope and intention was to declare that also after the union of the God-man has been accomplished, each nature in this union retains its essence and properties. Gesner answers the question: "How are the two natures united in Christ?" thus: "St. John explains this by the following statement: 'the Word was made flesh', John 1:14. In the first place it is manifest that the Word and flesh were united, because matters and substances which are not united in any manner whatever, cannot be joined in one proposition in such a way that one is predicated of the other, and that it is stated that one is, or has been made the other. Accordingly, since the Word was made flesh, and was actually united with the flesh, so that flesh can truly be predicated of the Word and vice versa, flesh and the Word must have been made one, must have been united. In the second place, John also shows the mode of union in a twofold manner; first in a general way by the verb 'was made' (egeneto), then by adding a specific difference by which he defines the union (sarx). What is the meaning of the verb 'egeneto' in this place? By the principle of contradiction this verb can only have one of two meanings. When one entity (*unum singulare*) becomes, and is another, it becomes such either by a change (kata metabolän) so that one is converted into the other as water becomes wine. This mode occurs in natural generation. Or it becomes such without any intervening change (kata ametabläsian), so that one substance is joined to and united with another in some manner. Thus the dove is the Holy Spirit, the flames on the heads of the Apostles are the Holy Spirit, the blessed bread is the body of the Lord, however, each in its particular manner. Now the Word does

not become flesh by a change so as to cease being the Word and to become converted into flesh. For John says also after the incarnation that the Word abides and dwells among us and has caused His glory to be seen. Nor, on the other hand, does the Word become flesh in such a manner that the flesh is absorbed in the Word, and after incarnation has taken place, is no longer flesh but merely the Word. For John eloquently proves, with the arguments before propounded, that the human nature in Christ is entire also after the incarnation. Hence since neither the Word is converted into flesh, nor the flesh into the Word, and yet, in the statement: 'the Word was made flesh'. the flesh is predicated of the Word, it follows necessarily that the Word and the flesh are one, united 'kat' ametabläsian', i.e. so that neither the Word has been changed into the flesh, nor the flesh into the Word. And thus we understand why Christ can apply to Himself in one breath the twofold designation 'Son of Man', and 'Son of the living God', Matthew 16:13, 16."

§100. Unity of Person.

The result of the union of two complete and distinct natures in Christ is one person. The term "eis" in 1st Timothy 2:5 has the same force when placed in apposition to "theos" and to "mesitäs." It signifies not only one and no more, but also one unit. There is no other God besides the true God and the true God is one undivided and indivisible entity. In like manner there is no mediator besides Christ and this mediator is one individual, one person. The union of the natures in Christ is not an alliance of two beings who have entered into an agreement

to coexist, say like the two kernels of an almond in a common shell. The divine and the human natures are not two equal parts contained in the theanthropic person as the containing or surrounding medium. Gabriel, when announcing the conception of the Redeemer applies to the matter to be conceived the name of the Son of God, Luke 1:35. Hence has arisen the aphorism: "Hama sarx, hama logou sarx" which really signifies that the flesh or human nature of Christ at no time had a personal existence of its own. The Word did not unite Himself with a human being having individual life and personality even in the most primitive stage, but from the first moment of the conception the Word assumed the flesh and constructed that into a temple which He filled with His divine majesty. *Animam creando assumpsit et assumendo creavit*. The human nature in Christ is therefore said to be "anhypostatos" not "anthypostatos." The person of the Word assumed not the person of a human being which had existed before, but the nature of a human being. The Word which has personality from everlasting supplies its own personality also to the human nature of Christ, "logou hypostasis amphoteroon physeon hypostasis" (453). However, with this difference, that the personality of the God-man is and always remains the personality of the Son of God in the strict sense, and in a sovereign manner (kyrioos kai prootoos) and is the personality of the human nature in a secondary and subordinate sense (deuteroos kai kat' allo). This truth has been condensed into the aphorism: there is in Christ "allo kai allo," but not "allos kai allos," i.e. two distinct natures, but not two distinct persons.

The incarnate Son of God refers to His Father, John 5:21, 27; 17:5, and to the Spirit, John 15:26 as distinct from Himself. Accordingly, the incarnation has extended not to the entire

Trinity, but only to one person in the same, and that the second person. Dannhauer offers pious reasons to show that it is agreeable that only the Son of God should be incarnate: 1) The Son of God from eternity becomes the Son of Man in time. 2) He who is the Son of God by essence makes men sons of God by adoption. 3) The Creator of all things becomes the Restorer. 4) The central person of the Trinity takes up a mediating position between God and man. But these reflections explain no part of the mystery, and Luther rightly counsels reason to forbear speculating upon this matter and to simply accept the statements of Scripture.

§101. Communion of Natures.

The paragraph before us is an extension of §98 and §100. The effort to forestall a confusion of the two natures in Christ and to preserve the distinct qualities of each nature, also within the personal union, must not be carried to a point where the two distinct natures would seem to merely coexist (synapheia of natures) without any active communion and intercourse with one another. This would be a new error, of which Nestorius, Calvinistic and Roman theologians, and among modern dogmaticians, Hofmann, have become guilty. The statement of Nestorius, viz. that the man who was born of the virgin is the Word only by a mode of speech, (*appellatione sola*); the claim of Calvinists that the Logos exists as well without as within the human nature of Christ, that in the incarnation, the person, but not the divine nature were united to the human nature, and that there is between the two natures no communication except a nominal one (*nominalem*

et titularem solum); the contention of Romanists, especially of the Jesuits, that the natures and their properties neither have been nor can be communicated, either in fact, or in name (*nec re, nec nomine*); and the declaration of Hofmann that Christ ceased to be God in order to become man – all these teachings destroy the personal union, and run counter to the plain sense of Colossians 2:9. “Pan to plärooma täs thootätos” expresses the unlimited, undivided, perfect and complete divinity, and justifies the statement that the Logos who, united with the human nature of Christ ever since the union, exists wholly and altogether in the human being known as Jesus Christ of Nazareth, in whom [He] dwells bodily (katoikei soomatikoos), i.e. after the manner of a physical existence in bodily shape, form and manner. It is impossible in the face of this text to believe that the divine Logos, since the incarnation, exists anywhere without the sooma of Christ. “Katoikei” is in the present tense and Paul penned the text after the resurrection and ascension of Christ. It signifies continued existence. “Soomatikoos” qualifies the action of “katoiei.” Now the fullness of the Godhead dwells in a divine spiritual manner in God Himself, i.e. it is God Himself; it dwells in believers by the mystical union, but in neither case “soomatikoos,” so that it employs a human body for its entire existence, manifestation and activity. In His bodily existence in Christ the Godhead has performed all its redemptive and proprietary acts and still performs them. And the Redeemer cannot be approached by us except as He is “soomatikoos” in the historic Christ. The righteous branch of David, this last scion of his royal house, who shall execute judgement and justice in the earth, shall reign and prosper, shall save Judah and make Israel to dwell safely (note the continued action expressed by these verbs!), shall be called

by the name **Jehovah**. This is to be “His” name, His proper designation, Jeremiah 23:5, 6. The language of the Lord at the end of this text is very emphatic and preemptory. God is in full earnest in this command. Without qualification He applies to the Root of Jesse, to Mary’s child, the essential name of the Godhead (**jehovah**). It is doing violence to the word to interpret the language of this text as a mere courteous action on the part of God. The human Christ is and acts as **Jehovah**. That is the reason why He must be called by that name.

The divine nature is, therefore, the nature not only of the second person of the Godhead, but also of the Son of man. On the other hand, He who is the “express image of the Father,” “meteochei,” i.e. shared flesh and blood after the manner of infants, Hebrews 2:14, and when He had been made flesh and dwelt among men after the fashion of men, people beheld a glory in Him, which was “the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,” John 1:14. Hence the human nature is the nature not only of the Hebrew child born at Bethlehem in the reign of Caesar Augustus, but also the nature of the Son of God. Either nature has united with the other so as to share the other without becoming the other.

The relation into which the two natures in Christ enter in by the personal union, has been expressed by the term “perichooräsis,” penetration, or “koinoonia,” communion. Both designations are applied to the divine nature in the active sense, to the human nature in a passive. The divine nature is said to penetrate, or to receive the human; the human nature is said to be penetrated or received by the divine. However, this penetration must not be understood in a physical manner, as if the divine nature becomes diffused gradually through successive parts of the body of Christ until it has filled the entire

extent of the body and then is contained within physical limits. Since the Logos is a spirit, His permeation is a spiritual and undivided act. Instantaneously the entire Logos penetrates, actuates and perfects each and every part of the human nature and the entire human nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part of it. On the other hand, the human nature, which is limited by time and space, does not exist locally in the Logos, because the Logos, in His eternal and divine existence, is superior to all limitations. Hence its presence in the Logos is not a natural, physical, earthly or local presence, but an illocal, spiritual one.

The communion (sometimes, though rarely, called communication) of natures is said to flow from the personal union. This is said according to our mode of thinking. In reality the personal union and the communion of natures do not differ. The term communion only expresses the manner or form in which the union is manifested, also that the union is not a mere, inoperative and mutually unaffected combination, but a very lively, intimate and mutually affecting union. It is based, however, on the fact that the personality of the Logos is at the same time the personality of the human nature. The personality of the Logos, again, practically does not differ from His divine nature. The sum of what has been stated may be condensed in the words of Gerhard: "The Logos is present with the flesh and the flesh is present with the Logos in such a manner that the Logos is not outside of the flesh, nor the flesh outside of the Logos, but wherever the Logos is, there He has most closely present with Him the flesh which He received into the unity of His person; and wherever the flesh is, there it has most closely present with it the Logos, into whose person it was received. As the Logos does not exist outside of His divinity, of

which He is the person, so He is neither outside of His flesh, which is, indeed, finite as regards its essence, but still subsists in the Logos as regards the person."

The union of the soul with the body and the example of [iron and heat] cited as illustrations of the union and communion of the natures in Christ.

Anything that is, admits of being expressed: *Modus praedicandi sequitur modum essendi et dici aliquo requirit inesse* (Quenstedt). As the union of the natures in Christ has given rise to the expression God-man, so their communion gives rise to certain statements which are called *propositiones personales seu inusitatae*, because they apply only to this one person and are altogether without parallel. Such disparities as God and man cannot be joined in one clause, so that either is the subject while the other is the predicate. But in Christ this unusual thing is possible. In Matthew 16:16: "Thou" is [the] subject and refers to Christ who in verse 13 had called Himself the Son of man. The predicate is "art the Son of the living God." This declaration contains the simple statement: Man is God. Compare 1st Corinthians 15:47. The declaration: "The Word was made flesh," John 1:14, yields the simple statement: God is man. It is to be noted that only concretes, not abstracts are predicated of one another. It would be wrong to say that the divine nature is the human nature. Calvinists and Jesuits, while rejecting a real communication of natures themselves, demanded that Lutherans, if they believed such a communion, must be willing to say: The divine nature is the human, and vice versa. But such language would express that a transformation, or an absorption of one nature by the other had taken place. Therefore the personal propositions are properly restricted to the *concretum* of each nature. The *concretum* in this case is the

person or individual which possesses the nature as its *abstractum*. Thus God denotes an individual possessing the divine, man an individual possessing the human nature. Now because in the God-man the individual named God is identical with the individual named man, notwithstanding the two natures remain distinct, therefore we may say, God is man, or vice versa, but not, Divinity is humanity, or vice versa.

These personal propositions are not found in so many words in Scripture, but are necessary deductions from scriptural teaching, and have been adopted, in order to express the reality and intimate character of the personal union. These propositions are not figurative (they contain neither metonymy, irony, metaphor, nor synecdoche), but are to be understood in their proper meaning. For Scripture declares that the personal union in Christ is so close, that when Christ was born in Bethlehem, the Lord was in the City of David, Luke 2:11.

§102. Communication of Attributes.

This paragraph with the three that follow does not state a matter essentially different from that contained in the preceding paragraph, but merely applies what was there stated and exhibits it in actual operation. The communion of natures is not a philosophical idea but a practical fact, because that which is peculiar (*proprium*, "*idiooma*") to each nature in Christ is shared by the other. We may not only say, in a general way, God is man, but also in a very special way. The Almighty dies (confer Acts 3:15), or a human being possesses all power in heaven and earth (confer Matthew 28:18). Now Scripture has

been at pains in other passages to indicate a particular nature according to which a certain event has taken place, e.g. "put to death in the flesh, quickened by the Spirit," 1st Peter 3:18, "made of the seed of David according to the flesh," Romans 1:3. These phrases are called *particulae* "*diakritikai*," *distinctivae*, "*pros diorismos*." They indicate that a certain property or act belongs formally to one nature, but "*kat' allo*," or by appropriation to the other nature, and vice versa. This shows that neither nature changes its properties when participating in the acts of the other.

§103. Genus Idiomaticum.

Following the lead of the Formula of Concord, the theologians of our church have pretty generally distinguished three forms of the communication of attributes. Some, however, have assumed four, by dividing those passages in which a human attribute is predicated of the Son of God from those passages in which an attribute of either nature is predicated of the entire person of Christ. Our textbook disregards this distinction and groups both classes of Scripture statements under the first genus. This genus is called *genus idiomaticum*, or "*antidosis*," or "*tropos antidosis*," because the attributes of either nature are shown in this genus to be mutually predicable of the entire person or of the *concretum* of one nature. Accordingly, we have in this genus three varieties.

a) The entire theanthropic person is indicated in John 21:17 by the pronoun "Thou," and omniscience is predicated of the entire person; in Hebrews 13:8 by the term "Jesus Christ,"

and eternity and immutability is predicated of the entire person.

b) The *concretum* of the human nature is indicated in John 3:13 by the term “Son of Man,” and a divine mode of existence is claimed for Him in Matthew 9:6 by the same term and the divine prerogative of pardoning sinners is ascribed to Him; in John 6:62 by the same term an eternity is predicated of Him.

c) The *concretum* of the divine nature is indicated in Romans 8:32 by the term “His,” i.e. God’s “Son,” and a human death is predicated of Him; in Galatians 4:4 by the same term, a human birth and human submission to the Law is predicated of Him; in Acts 3:15 by the term “Prince of Life” a human death and human resurrection from death are ascribed to Him.

This genus, then, rests in part on the unity of the theanthropic person, in part on the true and real distinction of the two natures in this person.

Within this class may be grouped also such statements as these: The Son of God is eternal; the Son of man has suffered. Because although in these statements the *concretum* of only one nature is expressed, and an act agreeable to that nature is predicated, the entire person is understood from the context.

§104. *Genus Majesticum.*

The Formula of Concord places this genus third, for practical reasons, namely because it had to be treated more copiously owing to controversies which were staged at the time concerning this genus. Our text book, in accordance with the

usage of most theologians, follows the natural order and presents first those genera which show how the communication of attributes applies to the person; next that genus which shows how it applies to the office or work of the Redeemer.

In this genus there occurs no reciprocity, no mutual participation, but the divine nature is represented as imparting its attributes to the human, so that the latter receives an increase of glory (*genus auchematicum sive majesticum*). Various designations have been adopted for this genus: “beltioosis,” *meliorativ*, “prosthäkä megalä,” *magnum augmentum*, “hyperypsoosis,” *exaltatio*, “metadosis,” *collatio*, “doxasis,” *glorifatio*, “metaläpsis theias axias,” *participatio divinae dignitatis*, “metochä theias dynameoos,” *participatio divinae potentiae*, “theoosis apotheoosis theopoiäsis,” *deificatio*. Scripture refers to this genus also by the designation “unction,” Acts 10:38 (John 3:34).

According to Colossians 2:9 (pan to plärooma täs theotätös) “all the divine properties and perfections and the honor and glory thereto pertaining” are truly communicated to the human nature of Christ. It is said of the Son of man that He is in heaven, John 3:13; that He “filleth all things,” Ephesians 1:23, and when standing bodily before His disciples at His departure He promised that He would be with them always, even unto the end of the world, Matthew 28:20. Hence the human nature of Christ possesses the attribute of omnipresence. Again, after the first cleansing of the temple it is stated of Christ that He knew all men and required no information regarding the spiritual condition of any one’s heart, John 2:24, 25. Peter acknowledges this divine attribute in the risen Lord who conversed with him at Lake Tiberias, John 21:17.

Hence the human nature of Christ is omniscient. Lastly, “all power,” Matthew 28:18, “power over all flesh,” John 17:2, [the] ability “to subdue all things unto himself,” Philippians 3:21, hence omnipotence, is ascribed to the human nature of Christ.

It will be noted that our textbook cites proof texts which accord to the human nature of Christ chiefly the so-called operative attributes of God, and none (Ephesians 1:23?) that ascribe to it the quiescent attributes, such as simplicity, eternity, immensity. This is not to be taken as an indication that the quiescent attributes have not been communicated. The operative attributes have been cited particularly because in the Scripture account of the work of the Redeemer these stand out prominently and there is more frequent occasion to note them; but the expression “all the fulness of the Godhead” in Colossians 2:9 embraces also the quiescent attributes. However, to avoid a gross misconception in this matter, our theologians have made a distinction as regards the manner in which the operative, and that in which the quiescent attributes of the Godhead have been communicated to the human nature of Christ. The former are said to be communicated directly or immediately, the latter mediately, namely through the medium of the operative attributes. For God is a unit, undivided, indivisible, and when one divine attribute is communicated, all the rest are also communicated. This distinction is made for the purpose of overcoming such difficulties as this when it is said, Christ according to His human nature is immeasurable. At first sight a statement like this would seem to destroy the very essence of the human nature. Accordingly we prefer to say: Christ is omnipotent according to the human nature, i.e. He possesses the eternal and immeasurable omnipotence of the Godhead. Scherzer says correctly: Those properties have been

communicated in an immediate manner to the human nature of Christ which are necessary for the attainment of the end of the personal union (which end is to be determined from their use in the office of Christ), and which do not subvert the origin and reality of the human nature. And Quenstedt says: “It is correctly stated: All divine attributes have been communicated to the human nature; likewise, some have been communicated; likewise, none have been communicated. All have been communicated as regards their dwelling in and their possession by the human nature; only some, namely those which imply activity, have been communicated in such a manner that they can be predicated directly of the human nature; none have been communicated in the sense that they have been transfused from one subject into another.” And the Formula of Concord says: “This communication or impartation has not occurred through an essential or natural infusion of the properties of the divine nature into the human, as though the humanity of Christ had these by itself and apart from the divine essence, or as though the human nature in Christ had thereby (by this communication) entirely laid aside its natural, essential properties, and were now either transformed into divinity, or in and by itself, with such communicated properties, had become equal to the same, or that now the natural, essential properties of both natures are of one kind, or indeed equal” (Solid Declaration, Article VIII, paragraph 62, page 635f.).

It should be noted too that when Christ ascribed to Himself, e.g. omnipotence while in the body (Matthew 28:18; 11:27), He uses the expression “is given me.” The Formula of Concord calls attention to this, and says: “There is a unanimously-received rule of the entire ancient orthodox Church that what Holy Scripture testifies that Christ received in

time he received not according to the divine nature (according to which he has everything from eternity), but the person has received it in time, by reason of, and with respect to, the assumed human nature" (Solid Declaration, Chapter VIII, paragraph 57, page 634).

Christus ut Deus dat omnia, ut homo accepit omnia (Kromayer).

§105. *Genus Apotelesmaticum.*

This genus is placed second in the Formula of Concord and by some theologians. It takes cognizance of the gracious purpose of God from which the incarnation of the Son of God flows. The God-man is the Redeemer. All His operations as God-man are redemptive acts, performed in His official capacity as the Redeemer. ("Apotelesma" means the intended effect or result of a person's official action.) This genus, then, deals not so much with attributes as with works of Christ. It is really the logical result of the second genus. For the operative attributes of God were communicated to the human nature of Christ, in order that they might operate, as their name indicates, and that in union with the human nature. All the acts of the Redeemer are divine-human, theanthropic. The Redeemer always acts as a unit. Redemption has been accomplished: a) not by the human nature alone, b) nor by the divine nature, c) nor partly by the human, and partly by the divine, d) but by the entire person of the God-man. "Christ died," 1st Corinthians 15:13, means the entire Christ died. "Christ hath given himself for us," Ephesians 5:2, means the whole Christ was made a sin-offering. The sacrificial death of

the Redeemer, while strictly predicable only of the human nature, is ascribed to the entire person. The consummate willingness and power to accomplish this tremendous feat of atonement, while predicable only of the divine nature, is ascribed to the entire person. Hence "the entire person has performed and performs what either nature has performed or performs." This indicates mutual concurrence of the two natures in the person of the God-man towards His each and every effort for the attainment of the purpose of the incarnation. This concurrence extends to the minutest details. The conception of the Redeemer ("seed" Genesis 3:15; 22:18) and His birth from a woman was the conception and birth of the Son of God, Galatians 4:4, 5; 1st John 3:18, and therefore such mighty results as the overthrow of Satan and the restoration of lost mankind accrue from it. The human obedience which Christ rendered to the Law (Galatians 4:4) was the obedience of the Son of God (1st John 1:7), and therefore has purchasing, i.e. redeeming power, Acts 20:28. When Jesus Christ died, the Son of God died, and therefore His death has atoned for man's guilt and saved them, Romans 5:10, 11. The mediation of the exalted Redeemer which is constantly going on now rests on what He has done while on earth, 1st Timothy 2:5, 6. The intercession of our Advocate with the Father is also a theanthropic act.

However, these redemptive acts which Scripture ascribes to the entire person are also predicated of a particular nature; Romans 8:32. "The man, Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all," 1st Timothy 2:5, 6. Confer Matthew 20:28. This indicates that the Redeemer's natures act distinct, but not divided from one another. Each nature performs what is proper to itself, but performs it in communion with the other.

The *genus apotelesmaticum*, then, embraces all the propositions in which the predicate is some operation pertaining to the office of Christ, and the subject a concrete noun denominating Christ either according to both natures or one, and also those propositions in which the very name of His office is predicated of the person of Christ *in concreto*, Isaiah 40:10, 11; Galatians 3:13; 1st Corinthians 15:25.

In conclusion the remark of Kromayer is worthy of note. He says that some christological statements of Scripture, especially such as fall under the third genus, might be referred to several genera. E.g. 1st John 1:7 can be treated in all these genera according to the view which one takes of this statement, or the truth which one wishes to bring out from it. For this text predicates 1) an "idionoma" of the human nature ("blood") of the person of Christ and thus falls under the first genus; it predicates 2) an "auchama" of the divine nature (power to cleanse) of the human nature and thus falls under the second genus; it predicates 3) an "apotelesma" of Jesus Christ (the cleansing from sin) of His person and thus falls under the third head.

§106. Impeccability of Christ.

The Redeemer is not His own Redeemer, Hebrews 7:27 ("he needeth not"). It would be contrary to Scripture to extend the consubstantiality of Christ with man, so far as to include sinfulness in His nature.

a) Original sin is not in Him. At His conception His human nature is designated as "to gennoomenon hagian," "that holy thing which is born." Three views have been

advanced as regards the origin of the sinless ovule from which the Redeemer sprang: Some hold that it became sanctified by a special act of the Holy Ghost (*purificatio*, "katharsis," "hagiasmos"); others that it had been transmitted in a sinless condition through all generations since the innocent state of the first family in Paradise (*conservatio*); still others hold that a new ovule was created specially at the time of the incarnation (*creatio*). The two last views are fantastic; the first view comports with the sober account of Scripture and will be studied in connection with §110.

b) Original sin in man is the cause of all actual sins. (See §74.) Where the cause is wanting, the effect too must be wanting. The sinless origin of the Redeemer is followed by a sinless life. The second Adam retained His original purity. He was "chooris hamartias," Hebrews 4:15; "kechoorismenos apo toon hamartooloon," Hebrews 7:26, i.e. He belonged in a category by Himself; though truly man in every other respect, He cannot be grouped with men in this. He was "hosios," Hebrews 7:26 (*qui nullum nefas commisit et omne fas religiose servat*, Wilke). "Hosios" differs from "hagios"; the latter denotes a state or condition of purity, the former, active religious piety and strict conscientiousness in the performance of every duty. He was "akakos," Hebrews 7:26, i.e. void of guile or malice, arglos. Confer 2nd Corinthians 5:21: He "knew no sin," i.e. He had no practical or experimental knowledge of sin, such as people have who commit sin. He was "amiantos," Hebrews 7:26, i.e. unpolluted (*integer vitae scelerisque purus*). And Christ was conscious of his sinlessness, John 8:46.

c) The last temporal effect of sin is death. The Redeemer's claim, that He is immune from mortality, John 10:18, must be understood as a logical consequence of His

sinlessness. Personally Christ did not have to die. His death was a voluntary act of obedience and, moreover, was accompanied by a manifestation of His sovereign power over death, namely, His resurrection, Hosea 13:14; John 10:18.

d) The sweeping statement “hamartia en autoo ouk estin,” 1st John 3:5, declares the absolute “anamartäsia,” impeccability of Christ.

But impeccability embraces more. In regard to the freedom of Christ from actual sin, a difference exists between the older teachers of our church and modern theologians. The former defended not only the actual sinlessness of Christ but also denied the possibility of Christ’s sinning (*non potuit peccare*). The latter affirm only this *potuit non peccare*. In view of the “adynaton pseusasthai theon,” Hebrews 6:18, the latter view is untenable. It was possible for Christ to be tempted and He was tempted in all points as we are, Hebrews 4:15. But these temptations were not for the purpose of testing His constancy, etc. but for the purpose of revealing His aim, the overthrow of Satan. The work of redemption was at no time a doubtful venture on the part of God. There was never the possibility of a miscarriage. But success in the Redeemer’s merciful enterprise was a foreordained conclusion. He was not first constituted the Redeemer by His victory over the tempter of the grave, but these events took place in order to reveal the impotency of the serpent in the struggle with the Woman’s Seed, in order to truly represent us, and last but not least, in order to make due satisfaction to God’s justice.

Accordingly, the impeccability of Christ means, not only that He did not sin, but also that He could not sin.

§107. States of Christ.

The doctrine of the States of Christ describes the condition of the God-man during His life-work on earth and after the completion of that work. Some dogmaticians (Hase) treat it after the doctrine of the Office of Christ. The Catechism of the Mo. Synod adopts the same order. However, the order adopted in our *Outlines* (and by Baier) is preferable, because the entire office of Christ has been executed in His two states and a proper understanding of the States enables the mind to grasp accurately the particular agencies which are seen to be at work in the official acts of Christ.

Through the communication of attributes the human nature in Christ participated in the divine glory. Yet the record we possess of the earthly life of Christ shows that this glory was not always equally manifest. There is a distinct period in the life of the Lord when His majesty is seen only occasionally, and there is a fixed point at which this condition changes into another in which the divine majesty is fully asserted (“mechri” [Philippians 2:8], Philippians 2:11!). Scripture recognizes these facts, Philippians 2:8. It speaks of Jesus Christ, the God-man, and says of Him 1) “heauton ekenoose” and 2) “ho theos auton hyperypsoose.” Both events are predicated of the incarnate Christ, i.e. of that entire person in whom the divine and the human natures were united when He became incarnate. This person humbled Himself and was exalted. Humiliation and exaltation accordingly are something distinct from the incarnation. The incarnate Christ is always incarnate, but He was not always humiliated, *formam servi post resurrectionem deposuit, humanitatem retinuit*, not always exalted. In point of time the humiliation starts with the incarnation, but it is not

logically the same thing. By His incarnation Christ did not abdicate His divine glory, but brought it with Him and filled His body with the fullness of the Godhead. But by His humiliation He put aside the glory and made Himself of no reputation.

§108. State of Humiliation.

Scripture refers to the state of humiliation when it declares that He humbled Himself, Philippians 2:8; when it refers to “the days of his flesh,” Hebrews 5:7, and to “Christ after the flesh,” 2nd Corinthians 5:16, i.e. to the time when Christ lived as a man among other men, indicates that this state is now terminated, 2nd Corinthians 5:16 (“no more”).

While the entire Christ (*subiectum quod*) was humbled and exalted, the human nature (*subiectum quo*) alone was affected by these acts. The divine nature is not capable of undergoing a change, Malachi 3:6; it cannot receive an increase nor suffer a decrease. Therefore, Scripture predicates suffering and death of the flesh of Christ, 1st Peter 3:18, and refers His increase to the human part of His being, Luke 2:52, just as the lowering below the state of the angels and His subsequent coronation is predicated of Jesus, Hebrews 2:9, i.e. of His whole person, but in verse 6 of the man Christ. Luther illustrates this matter by referring a person who has become wounded in some limb, and of whom we say, Mr. So and so has been wounded. “Alles, was von Christi Erniedrigung und Erhoehung ist gesagt, soll den Menschen zugelegt werden, denn goettliche Natur mag weder geniedrigt noch erhoeht werden” (Luther). *Altissimus non potest exaltari. Non altissimus sed caro altissimi*

exaltatur. Non assumentis sed assumpti est provectio” (Kromayer).

Humiliation is a voluntary act of Christ. The entire state is ascribed to Him as [the] agent (Philippians 2:7, 8). In humiliation Christ was not acted upon, but acted. The chief event in this state, His death, Christ expressly declares to be voluntary, John 10:18 and 2nd Corinthians 8:9; and Hebrews 12:2 represent humiliation as a deliberate device on the part of Christ.

Humiliation is a redemptive, hence an official act. It enabled Christ to perform His ministering acts, to effect the vicarious atonement, Matthew 20:28, and His self-imposed want and privation having been undergone in our place, have become a rich spiritual asset for us, 2nd Corinthians 8:9. In this state Christ has paid our debt. He cast His everlasting glory in the balance for our sake.

The form or process of humiliation is described, Philippians 2:7, 8: a) negatively by “heauton ekenoose.” The subject is not the “logos asarkos,” the eternal Son of God, but the “logos ensarkos,” Jesus Christ, the God-man, to whose example Paul appeals as to that of a well-known historic personage. Of this person Paul says He was “en morphē tou theou,” i.e. He possessed that by which God is seen to be God, all the divine attributes, the entire majesty. The incarnate Christ was a divine and glorious being, yea, He was equal with God. And His divine coequality was not something which He had wrested to Himself in order to make a vain show of it like thieves do of their ill-gotten spoils, but it was His own natural property. *Nihil divinum a se alienum putavit*, we might say. “Morphē theou” is not the divine nature, because there is an unmistakable connection between this term and “ekenoose,”

which [the] latter signifies He made Himself void of it. But Christ never made Himself void of the divine nature, else He should have ceased being the God-man. His kenosis consisted in not ascribing the qualities of the divine nature His unlimited majesty. The Apostle, then, in this part of the text claims for Christ the full possession of the divine majesty and denies that He made full use of the same. Instead of exhibiting the "morphä tou theou," He took upon Himself "morphä doulou," the form and appearance of a lowly person. "Morphä doulou," does not signify the human nature, for it is not essential to man to be a slave, but that is merely a condition which may be superinduced to the essence of a human being; and assuming the form of a servant is not a description of the incarnation, which is properly expressed by "logos sarx egeneto," but it is a description of the condition in which the incarnated Christ was found. The Son of God, who had become man, might have shown Himself at all times as a wonderful human being by the use of those powers which dwell in Him; but He did not; He chose to conform to men such as are found in the lower strata of human society, among the serving class. In their likeness He was made. "Anthroopos" in this text has the peculiar force of the Hebrew "enosch," meaning an abject, miserable man. This phase of the state of humiliation is known as the exinanition.

b) "Heauton etapeinoose," this may be termed the positive side. Christ underwent shocking humiliations during His earthly life which culminated in His infamous mode of execution.

The humiliation, then, affects not the possession ("ktäsis"), but the use ("chräsis") of the divine majesty. The possession was actually shown in every miracle of Christ (passages under §5). The use which Christ made of His majesty

during His humiliation was not a hidden one ("krypsis") but constant and plenary, but it was public whenever it occurred, hence occasional and partial. Christ had not only masked His glory, but had really laid it aside, in a manner incomprehensible to us, so that He actually prayed for its restoration, John 17:5. His poverty, helplessness, ignorance, suffering were real events, not imaginary, 2nd Corinthians 8:9; Luke 23:35; Mark 13:32; Mark 1:12, 13.

§109. Stages of Humiliation.

The stages, grades, modes or important events (moments) of the state of humiliation are those prominent facts in the life of Jesus on earth which exhibit most strikingly His activity as Mediator. They are not to be viewed as an Iliad of calamities, or a tragedy of woe, such as befell Job.

They have been differently numbered by different dogmaticians; Gerhard names 4, Calov only 3 stages. The order adopted in our *Outlines* follows the Apostle's Creed, and has been in use since Hollaz.

§110. The Conception of Christ.

The introduction of the conception of Christ among the stages of humiliation might create surprise, because this event, which united the divine nature with the human, may be viewed also as a glorious occurrence by which a human being was raised to indescribable distinction. Moreover the manner of this conception was so extraordinary that Quenstedt rightly

calls it "*miranda conceptio*." But we [are] asked now to consider the conception of Christ not *per se*, not in so far as by it the personal union of the natures in the God-man was effected, but we are to consider the humiliating form and features of this conception. In other words, we are to distinguish between the fact and the mode of the incarnation. Gerhard remarks pertinently that the assumption of the human nature by the Son of God could have been effected by an act of immediate creation, as God created the body of Adam immediately and breathed into him the breath of life. That Christ entered, abode in and passed through a woman's womb, and was subject to the infirmities attendant upon gestation is plainly a humiliating feature. Hase, from a desire to reserve for the term conception only a glorious meaning, suggests that this stage should be named "*status in utero*." But this might be misleading. The very act of the conception was humiliating and hence humiliation as a state must be dated from it, from the first moment of Christ's entrance into a life according to the flesh. See *Outlines*: "was the beginning of... a sinful woman."

These views have been propounded as to the origin of the human nature of Christ. The conception of Christ is referred to a divine agency in Luke 1:35, 38. The Holy Ghost, or the "Power of the Highest," i.e. the third person of the Trinity, approached Mary through the divine word spoken by the angel Gabriel. She conceived in the moment in which she accepted the message. There was no physical organ of generation applied, nor did God, as Socinus blasphemously held, supply the paternal function in this act. The act was supernatural and the result accordingly; "dio kai" informs Mary that she must look upon and treat her child as God, because it has come to her from God.

The conception did not destroy Mary's virginity. Scripture designates her as a virgin when she conceives (Isaiah 7:14), when she is with child (Matthew 1:23) and when she bears the child (Isaiah 7:14).

Notwithstanding these miraculous features the conception was a real, true conception. The Son of God was in a woman's womb, and is called "the fruit of the womb," a fetus, Luke 1:31, 42.

The conception refers only to the second person of the Godhead. The passage in Luke distinguishes Him from the Holy Ghost, Galatians 4:4, from the Father, who sent Him into the world. The child in Mary's womb is "el," receives the essential name of the Deity; He does not cease to be "el" by His conception, but by that act becomes "immanuel," God among us, with us, Isaiah 7:14; Matthew 1:23.

Galatians 4:4 says that the Son of God was "made of a woman." The term "make" cannot be applied to God in the passive tense. He existed as Son. He held a personal relation to the Father before that act. He was the "logos asarkos." In the conception He was "made"; He became the "logos ensarkos," He was made a woman's seed, Genesis 3:5, flesh and blood were formed for Him in a woman's womb, Hebrews 2:14, a woman became His mother, Luke 1:43. All this means that by the act of conception the flesh of Christ was produced from the corporal mass of His mother, and the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, became consubstantial with man (*primum esse nobis consubstantiale accepit*, Hollaz).

The mother conceiving the Son of God was a sinful being. She was flesh born of flesh, and her subsequent acts, Luke 2:48, 49; John 2:4, place her at a wide moral distance from her child. But the child itself was "hagion," "a holy thing."

“Whatsoever is born of flesh is flesh.” This sinful mother could produce a sinless infant only by the interposition of the divine agency before noted.

The conception of Christ has redemptive value. The Nicene Creed states that it occurred “*propter nos et nostram salutem*,” and Hebrews 2:14, 15 connects His conception with that of every man. Christ willingly submitted Himself to the humiliating infirmities which attend man’s cursed conception and birth in order to remove the stain of our generation and as [this passage] remarks, procure salvation also for children who are still in their mother’s womb.

§111. Birth of Christ.

1. The birth of Christ is expressed in Scripture by those verbs which commonly note the act of parturition: “tiktein,” Luke 1:31; 2:7; “jalad,” Isaiah 7:14; 9:6. The fruit of Mary’s womb, after the customary months of gestation, was ushered into the light of day. It was a truly natural birth. “*Mariae parturienti usu venerunt ea, quae alias in partu fieri et partum commitari solent*,” says Quenstedt (Mary, during her confinement, experienced what is ordinarily experienced by a woman in child-bed). Luther says: “Der Fluch *Havae* ist nicht ueber sie gegengen, der belautet: ‘In Schmerzen sollst du Kinder gebaeren’, sonst ist ihr geschehen allermassen, wie einem gebaerendem Weibe geschieht.” (“The curse hurled against Eve, which reads: ‘In sorrow thou shalt bring forth children’, did not pass over her; in every other respect there happened to her what happens to every woman in childbirth.”) Of the idea that Mary gave birth to her son *clauso utero*,

Scripture says nothing. Luther passes by this notion, but holds that it is not against Scripture to imagine that Mary bore her child with joyful emotion and in holy reverency.

2. The birth of Christ was attended by external marks of poverty (Quenstedt: *pauperrima nativitas*). The humble garments and the crude cradle of our Lord, the want of proper shelter at His very first home of life on earth (Luke 2:7), are still in the memory of His great apostle 60 years later, and he calls attention to the vast lapse from wealth to a beggar’s lot, “eptoocheusen plousios oon,” which happened to the Lord in His birth, 2nd Corinthians 8:9.

3. The birth is the birth of the God-man, the union of His natures having already been effected in and by conception. The human infant was “el”; “el” among men, Isaiah 7:14. The Son of God had been made of a woman, Galatians 4:4. Mary had become the mother of “kyrios,” the Lord, Luke 1:43, and had been directed with all other men to call her child “the Son of God.” The birth, then, has for its *subiectum quod* the entire person of the God-man, for its *subiectum quo*, His human nature.

4. Royal honors would have been due the Lord at His birth, for He came as a prince, lineally descended from David, Israel’s greatest king. But Hebrew royalty was a thing of the past. Gentiles were in possession of Judah’s earthly throne and were administering the affairs of government. God’s nation had become the vassal of pagan rulers, Matthew 2:1; Luke 2:1, 2. The Hebrew infant, who was the Lord of heaven, came to share also the political degradation of His nation and probably was enrolled in the Roman census lists, which were being prepared in those days, with his countrymen. This however was the appointed time for His birth, Genesis 49:10. The

fullness of time was come: Israel had fulfilled her measure of wrath, Israel's Shiloh, the Peace-prince, came to "finish the transgression and to make an end of sins," Daniel 9:24.

5. The capital of the country, where Judah's kings had walked, and where Jehovah had His fire and furnace, was not chosen for the birthplace of God's Son. In David's town, once glorious, but now a despised hamlet, within the borders of the smallest of the twelve tribes, Christ saw the light of day, Matthew 2:1; Luke 2:4, 6. Many of its lawful inhabitants, it appears, had forsaken this place. Joseph and Mary, who belonged there, had set up their home far from their native place. God chose this forsaken spot to inaugurate the greatest event in the world's history there, as He had foretold, Micah 5:2; Matthew 2:4-6. Christ came with His earthly breath to share the lot of the lowly and despised. But in arranging for the birth of His Son at this particular place, God employed the power of the greatest monarch then living. While His Son knowingly and willingly bowed to the decree of Caesar Augustus which had gone out in those days, Caesar Augustus unwittingly obeyed the sovereign will of the Lord of hosts.

6. Mary's birth was a virgin birth, "parthenogennäsis." Mary was a betrothed virgin. When she understood the import of Gabriel's message, she exclaimed with holy amazement: "poos estai touto, epei andra ou ginooskoo," Luke 1:34. She uses the term "ginooskoo" in its well-known force, as denoting conjugal intercourse. What she was in that moment, she remained "till she had brought forth her first-born son"; for Joseph "ouk eginoosken autän," Matthew 1:25. Whether Mary had children from Joseph afterwards, Scripture does not state. The "heoos hou" in Matthew 1:25 negatives her intercourse with him only prior to His birth. But it is erroneous to claim, on

the strength of this term, that Mary must have had children from Joseph. "Heoos" in Greek and "had" in Hebrew may also express only the time when a certain event is complete, without saying anything regarding what follows that event. Confer Psalm 110:1; Isaiah 46:4; Deuteronomy 34:6; 2nd Samuel 6:23. The perpetual virginity of Mary is no article of faith; but if anyone wishes to hold it as a theological view, there is nothing to forbid. There is required only that Mary was a virgin at the moment of her confinement. *Sufficit prodiisse Christum salva virginitate*, says Quenstedt.

7. The Son of God is the Law-giver. Together with the Father and the Holy Ghost He wrote into man's heart the natural law and He published to Israel the Decalogue and ordained all its statutes, rites and ordinances. In His union with the flesh the Lawgiver becomes subject to the Law which He Himself has made, "genomenon hypo nomou," Galatians 4:4, and as the positive laws of Israel extended even to the newborn infant, demanding from every Jewish male-child the sacrifice of his foreskin, the infant God-man submits to this requirement and is circumcised, Luke 2:21.

8. 9. Thus already at this dawning hour of His young life the God-man appears in that form which characterizes His state of humiliation, the "morphä doulou," and bears the "homoiooma toon anthroopoon." The force of Philippians 2:7 plainly extends to the record of His birth in Luke 2.

10. The end of His birth, as that of His entire humiliation, is propitiatory. Its fruit to us is "hina tous hypo nomou exagorasä," that He might redeem that were under the law. "Exagorasä" is a commercial term. The sacrifice of the use of His glory is regarded as a price paid down. It is ransom-money paid down for the liberation of slaves. And the affect of

this “exagorasä” is “hina tän hyiothesion apolabomen,” Galatians 4:4. The Lord became a serf, that the serf might become the Lord’s children and heirs of the Lord’s glory. His poverty acquires everlasting wealth for us. The infant in Mary’s lap is a gift, God’s gift to the sinner. As such it expresses God’s love, John 3:16. And it is a grand gift, intensively because of the excellencies of this divine child, and extensively because it is offered to the whole world, and though addressing its offer of love first to God’s ancient covenant people, it extends its healthful government also over renegade Ephraim and Samaria, Isaiah 9:9. The child Jesus is the Redeemer of Jew and Gentile alike, and claims to be such because of His birth.

* * *

After the birth Hollaz inserts as the third stage of humiliation the circumcision of the infant Christ, which took place on the eighth day by the sanguine amputation of the foreskin.

After the circumcision, Carpzov inserts the flight into Egypt as a stage and Buddeus the purification.

After these details Baier places what in his arrangement is the third stage, viz. the education of the boy Christ in a carpenter’s home.

As a particularly humiliating feature of this stage, he mentions the fact recorded, Luke 2:48, viz. that Christ was exposed to the unseasonable and unwarranted rebuke of His mother while He was wholly innocent. Hollaz defines this stage thus: “The education of Christ consisted in this, that during His boyhood He was trained to a mode of living such as became an Israelite, and became apprenticed to the trade of a carpenter.”

As the fourth stage, Baier mentions the visible conversation of Christ among men, during which He submitted to the ordinances of the civil magistrates, permitted Himself to be treated as on a level with or even inferior to other men, had to eat or drink in order to satisfy the craving of hunger or to assuage thirst; had to sleep from exhaustion and fatigue; had to undergo the hardships of toil and travel; had to expose Himself to danger; had to suffer temptation; had to experience grief; had to feel the limitations which poverty imposes; had to endure slander and reproach, etc. Hollaz more briefly describes this stage thus: *Conversatio Christi fuit sanctissima ipsius consuetudo in diebus carnis suae cum vaniis, etiam contemptissimis hominibus, plena molestiis, incommodis, periculis.*

Our text book refers to all these matters in the collection of proof-texts that are found partly under the conception, partly under the suffering of Christ.

§112. Suffering of Christ.

Under this stage our theologians, as a rule, comprehend the so-called passio magna or extrema passio of our Lord, that conflux of fierce sufferings which He underwent towards the end of His life, especially during the last two days.

1. Also in this stage we have before us as the subiectum quod the God-man. Of Him, as viewed from His divine side, Scripture predicates facts that require the presence of His human side: surrender to death of the essential Son of God, Romans 8:32, murder committed upon the sovereign Lord of all

life, Acts 2:15, the shedding of the blood of God, Acts 20:28, the shameful crucifixion of the Lord of glory, 1st Corinthians 2:8.

The *subiectum quo* is also expressed in 1st Peter 4:1: His human nature. But that the divine nature actually participated in this suffering is shown when the same apostle predicates this suffering simply of Christ, i.e. of the entire person, 1st Peter 3:18.

2. The suffering of Christ was real suffering. It was no sham. In Psalm 31:10-12 we hear the wail of the agonized Redeemer. He describes His condition: He has become aged with grief. The harrowing experiences, especially of the last days have consumed His strength, and destroyed His comeliness. He feels that He looks wan, wasted, haggard, like a decrepit, broken old man. There is a lot of significant meaning in Pilate's "Behold, the Man!" From Psalm 69:2-4 we gather details of His physical suffering: there is feverish nervousness in Him; the fire of excitement had dried up the natural moisture in His lacrimal and salivary glands. But this text pictures chiefly His soul-suffering, by comparing it to the horror which seizes a person who is drowning in a morass, is being gradually buried in quicksand, or sinks in deep water, and also by hinting at the keen sensations which cut the pure and innocent heart of a good man who is being vilely slandered, hated and injured. Psalm 40:13; Matthew 26:38 and Luke 22:42-44 exhibit the terrible smitings from the hand of God, under which Christ writhed and groaned like a person in final despair. We must understand these passages of the relentless chastenings and rebukes of sin in the conscience, the unspeakable dread of God's fierce anger, and the infliction of the infernal torments the ravagings of the worm which dieth not, and of the fire that is not quenched. The physical phenomenon of blood oozing

from the pores of a suffering person is not unknown to medical science. It is literally true and no hyperbole. It was necessary for Him to be "strengthened," revived, as it were, under this ordeal. Christ passed through the "agony" of a dying man; He felt the "pains" of death, i.e. the snapping of the silver cord, the dizziness and giddiness attendant upon the ceasing of pulsation, the choking of the breath in the throat, etc. "Prison and judgement," "Angst und Gericht," Isaiah 53:8, calls this ordeal the sum total of afflictions such as a culprit must submit to at the bars of justice, in the dungeon and on the scaffold. The risen Christ still speaks of these things as sufferings, Luke 24:26.

Our theologians name as the climax of Christ's suffering His being forsaken by God, the *derelictio*. The exclamation of Christ on the cross does not express that the bond of the personal union in Him had become severed; nor that He had been rejected by God so as never to be received again into God's favor; nor that He gave Himself over to despair in the proper sense of the word. It signifies that in the mighty onrush of evils which engulfed His soul Christ felt the wrath of God on account of the sins of the world, which He bore by imputation, to such a degree that God had become a stranger to Him while He faced God as the sinner's representative, and that He drew no comfort in that hour from the fullness of the Godhead which dwelt in Him. This condition is also expressed by saying that Christ suffered the pains of hell, the *dolores infernales* (Baier).

In sections 3 and 4 we have details a) of the physical; b) of the spiritual sufferings of Christ. These statements extend what has been said in section 2.

5. The suffering of Christ was redemptive work. Christ surrendered His own will and pleasure utterly during His trials.

“Ouch hoos egoo theloo” – that was His guiding principle, Matthew 26:39. “Kathoos eneteilato moi ho patär, hutoos poioo,” John 14:31, that was the explanation which He gave to His disciples who were amazed at His martyr’s zeal; that was the reflection with which He quieted His own heart. From the Father’s hand the cup of woe was presented to Him, and He recognized the impossibility of declining it and still gaining the purpose of His coming into the world. Obedient to the last demand, “genomenos hypäkoos mechri thanatou,” Philippians 2:8. He died breathing the humble prayer: “genäthätoo to theläma sou,” Thy will be done, Matthew 26:42.

6. Scripture writes across the story of the passion of our Lord in large letters the words “hyper hymoon,” “for us,” Galatians 3:13, i.e. in our place, as our proxy, substitute, representative, vicar. The passion of Christ is the passion of mankind, “oomacobenu sebalam / chalaenu hu nasa,” “he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows,” that is Isaiah’s interpretation of this spectacle. In Him we behold the effect, in ourselves we look for the cause, Isaiah 53:4. And his interpretation is introduced with a solemn “acän,” “verily,” “forsooth,” “in truth.” Thus Isaiah would answer in advance Cowper’s query:

Was it for crimes that I had done
He groaned upon the tree?

The answer is: “Verily!” He faced our judge, the judge who had cursed our race in Adam. Christ had become “a curse for us,” “genomenos hyper hymoon katara,” Galatians 3:13. The transfer of our guilt to Him was not a theatrical performance, without any serious intention, but it was made in

dread earnest. The Son of love had become the child of perdition – for us.

7. Beyond the cross of the Lord gleams a crown of glory; behind the dark pall that shrouds the cursed tree the sun shines brightly in the kingdom of the Father. The Captain of our salvation enters the shades of death, made perfect through sufferings to bring many sons to glory, Hebrews 2:10. The fate of the prodigal children hangs on the outcome of this fierce battle of justice with mercy. The divine qualities of this sufferer turn the balances in our favor. Sonship (“hyiothesia”) is the reward of His pain, Galatians 4:5; sonship, not for Him who always was and never ceased to be the Son, but sonship for the strayed wayward children whose cause He had taken upon Him. By this suffering Christ is become “aitios sootärias aioonion,” the Author of eternal salvation to all that obey Him, obey His word by believing that all this was done for them, Hebrews 5:9.

§113. Death of Christ.

We now approach in the development of the humiliation of our Lord a stage so mysterious that Gerhard says: *“omnem angelorum et hominum captum excedit”*; the death of the God-man. Joseph begs the body of Jesus of Pilate and Paul tells us that the person who here died was God’s Son, Romans 5:10; God’s own blood, Acts 20:28, that occurred on Golgotha. The death of Jesus was attended by marks of public infamy: the place chosen for it was the place of public execution, Matthew 27:33ff. Jesus was led thither in a public procession, as an object of detestation. No custom that usually accompanied a public execution in those days was spared Him. He had to bear

the instrument of His death; He had to travel in the company of criminals; He had been numbered with the transgressors; jibes and insults were hurled at Him, and the cruel scorn of the world even decorated His cross with a sneering inscription.

His death under these circumstances was not a natural occurrence. Scripture says, Isaiah 53:12: "**haheraph lamaveth naphsho**," "he poured out his soul unto death." The Hebrew word "**haraph**" is from a kindred root with the Latin "*rapio*," "*carpo*," and the German "*raffen*," "*raufen*," and denotes violence. Christ suffered Himself to be stripped of life by His spoilers. The verb "*apokteino*" is used to describe the action of His enemies, Luke 18:33; Acts 3:15, and in Isaiah 53:8, 9 the verb "**gazar**" is used, which means to cut, to cut down, as trees and wood, or to devour, to slaughter quickly. Christ is in this passage represented as a malefactor, whom the swift arm of justice has overtaken, and who is hustled off to the execution. On the strength of such language of Scripture we are justified in speaking of the murder of Jesus.

The force of these statements is not weakened by those texts which represent Christ's death as a voluntary act. He "laid down his life" ("tithämi tăn psychän mou"), John 10:17; He "gave his life" ("dounai tăn psychän"), Matthew 20:28. In these violent measures adopted by men the eternal counsels of God's mercy were being realized. God employed the wrath of men for His purpose of love. But that does not make the murder of Christ by His enemies a meritorious act. His death is nevertheless as Quenstedt calls it, an "*ignominiosa mors*."

It was a true death, the same physiological phenomenon that is observed in the dissolution of a human being: the soul of Christ became separated from His body. "Pater, eis cheiras sou paratithämi to pneuma mou," was

Christ's expiring groan. He "gave up the ghost," "*exepneusen*," Luke 23:46. This means that His body was a lifeless corpse; the soul had flown, it was not united with the body.

Here the great difficulty sets in which has caused even orthodox theologians to stumble. In Christ dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead "*soomatikoos*," "bodily," Colossians 2:9, through the personal union. Now if it is denied that in the death of Christ there occurred a real and true dissolution of the body and soul, the reality of His death is denied. On the other hand, if the union of the "*logos*" with the body and soul of the dead Christ is denied, the personal union has been disrupted, and there is a period created, during which Christ was not the God-man.

B. Meisner at one time defended the thesis that Christ, at the time of His death and burial was not, for three days, a true man, in the common acceptation of the term. But when approached by Drs. Hoe, Menzer and Gerhard, he dropped his contention. Luetkemann and Grauer discussed the question, whether Christ, during the three days of His death, was a true man, and left it undecided. Thuminus denied that during that time the soul of Christ was locally separate from the body.

L. Osiander asserted that the soul of Christ during the three days was in His body, and that the body was in paradise with the penitent thief. Thus trusted teachers of the Church have stumbled at this point. Now it must be held that the personal union of the two natures in the God-man did not cease and was not suspended in the hour of death; that His body and soul remained personally united with the divine nature of the Son of God. For speaking of His death, the Messiah in Psalm 16 connects Himself distinctly with both His body and soul, and Peter cites this text in Acts 26:31 when He speaks of the

murdered Jesus. Colossians 2:9 extends also to the *triduum mortis* of Christ. And so must with equal force assert, both the true dissolution of the essential union of body and soul of Christ in the hour of His death, and the perpetual, permanent duration of the personal union of the Logos with the soul and with the body of Christ. His death did not affect the *unio personalis*. Hollaz states this teaching in the following form: "*Christus fuit verus homo in triduo mortis, non physice ex vinculo unionis naturalis, quod disruptum erat, sed theologicè et aestimate fidei ex vinculo unionis personalis, quod triduum mortis illaesum reliquit.*" Into the details of the working of the personal union descend no mortal mind. All attempts at explanation are baffled, because we have to do here with a being that is altogether *sui generis*. Implicit faith in and reiteration of the statements of Scripture alone can save us from stumbling at this point.

§114. Burial of Christ.

The reality of the death of Christ was further evinced by His burial. That Christ was buried "etaphä" Paul asserts as an undoubted fact, 1st Corinthians 15:4. That exinanition had taken place was the firm testimony of the Roman guard under the cross. The spear-thrust of one soldier had moreover made assurance doubly sure. What Joseph asked for, what Pilate granted and his helpers handled, was "to sooma" of Christ, Matthew 27:58-60; Luke 23:55; John 19:38. The burial was witnessed by women from Galilee, Luke 23:55, and the fact that He had been buried was solemnly and officially attested by the great seal of the synagogue being affixed to His tomb. The

further precaution of placing a guard at the tomb was not taken from any doubt of the genuineness of Jesus' death, but to prevent the perpetration of a fraud by the disciples. Neither the friends nor the enemies of Jesus doubted that He was really and truly dead.

While the body of Christ was in the grave His soul was in paradise in fulfillment of the promise which He had made to the penitent thief.

During His stay in the sepulcher the body of Christ did not become decomposed: That is the meaning of "**ledeoth schachath**," "to see corruption," in Psalm 16:10; for Peter so expounds "**schachath**" ("diaphthora") in Acts 2:31. The exception taken by Gesenius (that "**schachath**" merely denotes putridity in Hebrew) is therefore irrelevant.

Baumgarten has termed the burial of Christ a dishonorable one. Over and against him Hase rightly cites the statement of Hollaz: "The burial was a glorious and a fruitful one; glorious 1) because of the body entombed, which was the temple of the Godhead; 2) because of the honorable attendants at this funeral. There were present at the interment as representative of the body politic Joseph of Arimathea, a god-fearing, honorable and wealthy senator; as representative of the Church, Nicodemus, a teacher in Israel, who had first been a nightly visitor of the Lord, had then vindicated the Lord's innocence in a meeting of the Jewish church council and had now publicly espoused Christ's cause and became His disciple; as representatives of the domestic estates, god-fearing women from Galilee who were animated with sincere love of Christ. 3) The burial of Christ was honorable, because of the dignity of His place of burial; and 4) because of the glorious effects resulting from this burial, viz. the canceling of our sins, our burial with

Christ in daily renewal, and the hallowing of our own graves as chambers of rest until the great awakening.” These words of Hollaz may remind us at the same time that the burial of Christ, while it bears the humiliating features of the state of exinanition, also shares its atoning virtue. The person buried is our Savior and He is that because He was buried.

Baier closes his account of the state of humiliation with the words: *Atque ita, si moram in sepulcro addas usque ad resurrectionem, clauditur status exinanitionis.*

§115. State of Exaltation.

The term “exaltation,” like that of “humiliation,” is employed in an ecclesiastical usage, to denote the incarnation of the Son of God, and in a biblical sense to denote the elevation of the incarnate and humbled God-man to divine glory. The chapter before us treats of exaltation in the latter sense (*exaltatio glorificationis*).

1. The act of exalting is indicated by the terms “hypsoosen,” Acts 5:31; “hyperypsoosen,” Philippians 2:9; “doxan didonai,” John 17:24; “doxä kai timä stephanoun,” Hebrews 2:7, 9; “charisasthai onoma hyper pan onoma,” Philippians 2:9; “kathestamai epi ta erga toon cheiroon theou,” Hebrews 2:7; “panta hypotassein hypo poda Christou,” Hebrews 2:8; “col schatah tachath raglav,” Psalm 8:6; and “anabainein hyperanoo pantoon toon ouranoon,” Ephesians 4:10. In all these passages, Christ is represented as the object that is being exalted.

In Psalm 110:7 the expression “**jarim rosch**” represents Christ as the agent in the exalting act. The former passages

refer to the human nature, which is the recipient, the latter to the divine nature, which is the bestower of the glory which comes to Christ in the exaltation.

Nothing can be given to the divine nature, and that nature cannot be elevated, because it is in itself perfect, supreme and sovereign. Nothing could have been given to the human nature either of the incarnated Christ, for by reason of the communication of attributes (*genus auchaematikon*) the human nature in Christ had been raised to equality with the divine nature. But a voluntary abdication of the use of the communicated glory having taken place in the state of humiliation, an elevation of that nature to the use of the majesty which it has voluntarily laid aside is possible; and this is what is meant by the statement, Christ was exalted. As the humiliation could refer only to the human nature, so the exaltation, which is its counterpart.

By the act of exalting, God raised Christ, according to the human nature, to a permanent state in which Christ continuously exercises certain glorified functions, Hebrews 2:7-9; Ephesians 4:10, and receives divine worship, Acts 5:31; Philippians 2:9.

The act of exaltation is connected with the previous suffering of our Lord, Philippians 2:9; Psalm 110:7. These passages show that Christ passed immediately from one state over into the other. There seems to be even a logical connection indicated between the two states by “dio,” in Philippians 2:9 and “**al-cen**,” in Psalm 110:7. These particles seem to express cause and effect. In Luke 24:26 we have the same connection expressed by “houtoos” and in 1st Peter 1:11 by “meta tauta.” Hence it is best to understand “dio” and “**al-cen**” to express mere sequence and order, not consequence.

The elevation to the full use of the divine majesty did not come to the human nature as a reward of merit, but as an act of divine grace; hence “echarisato,” in Philippians 2:9. Still dogmaticians, as, e.g. Hunnius, have called the divine majesty, which the human nature of Christ received in the exaltation “*praemium atque fructum passionis*” and have pointed to the two texts above quoted as the basis on which they ground their claim. But they are careful to point out that Christ possessed the divine glory already at His incarnation. However, since His incarnation took place for the purpose that He might suffer and die, in other words, since it was decreed, that immediately after the union of the natures, the God-man should for a season, suspend the plenary use of the majesty in order to be able to suffer and die; hence, since the incarnation only leads up to the passion, and the passion leads over into the full use of the divine glory, therefore the use of the divine glory is connected directly with the passion of Christ.

2. The state of exaltation consists a) negatively in the removal of the infirmities of the flesh. These Christ lays aside. In this state Christ is immune from death. What holds good in regard to His death must of course hold good likewise with regard to all other ills, evils and afflictions. All the sufferings to which Christ was voluntarily subject in the state of humiliation can no longer touch Him.

3. The state of exaltation consists b) positively in the resumption of the full and constant use and manifestation of the divine attributes communicated to His human nature, personally united with His divine nature. It is not a new power, new virtue, new majesty that Christ receives in this state, not something that He did not possess before, but it is simply the use of that majesty which was communicated at the

incarnation, that Christ receives. And even this statement must be limited: Christ has the use of the divine majesty also in the state of humiliation, but it was not a full and constant use. It becomes a full and constant use the moment that He enters upon the state of exaltation. He then “resumes” not “assumes” that use. Divine sovereign power to do as He pleases (“exousia,” John 2:18), the infinite glory of the eternal Godhead (“doxa,” John 17:5), equality with God in the government of the universe (Ephesians 1:20) has now been given Christ, not only to have and to hold, but also to use and to exercise without limitation.

§116. Stages of Exaltation.

Of our older dogmaticians Gerhard and Calov assume only two stages of the state of exaltation; on the basis of Philippians 2:9 they divide as follows: “1. the actual exaltation of Christ, according to the human nature; 2. the gracious bestowal upon Him of a name above every name.”

Koenig, Quenstedt, Baier and Hollaz number four stages, leaving out the return to judgement. Buddeus and Carpzov have five stages by making the vivification of Christ in the grave prior to His descent into hell a special stage. The possibility of making the “dzoopoiäsis” a separate stage had been noted already by Calov. He states his opinion thus: “True, the ‘dzoopoiäsis’, according to the account in 1st Peter 3:18 precedes every other event in the state of exaltation; for Christ could not have gone to the spirits in prison unless He had been first revived. However, this vivification is not properly a grade of exaltation, but merely the deliverance of Christ from the

bonds of death, and introduces properly the subject of the exaltation, which is not a dead person, but one that has come to life again.” Baumgarten first introduced the return to judgement as the fifth grade of exaltation. But his plan, though it follows the order of the Creed, has not found general acceptance. Hase urges a practical reason against it; the return of Christ to judgement is properly an eschatological matter and should be treated in the last chapter on the Last Things. Our author treats the return to judgement both in connection with the state of exaltation and in eschatology (§180, 182). The treatment is different in each case.

In the state of exaltation we are to study those significative acts and events in the life of the glorified God-man which exhibit Him as the successful Champion of the sinner’s cause. Also in His exalted state the God-man is the Redeemer and our representative. His glory is ours now in faith, hereafter in fruition.

§117. Descent into Hell.

We may speak of a descent of Christ into hell in various senses. In His agony in the garden and on the cross Christ experienced the terrors of hell, was in hell, and His suffering is described as infernal. Again the virtue of His suffering, the affect of His passion may be declared by a statement like this: Christ atoned for us by descending to the state of the damned and suffering the terrible lot of castaways from the grace of God. In both these instances there would be an improper or figurative use of the phrase “descended into hell”: the former is metaphorical, the latter metonymical. When we speak of the

descent of Christ at which He suffered and which occurred prior to His death, we speak of events that still lie in the state of humiliation. There is a descent into hell which happened after He had declared all His work finished; which occurred after His death and burial. It is of this event that we speak now.

There is only one text in Scripture which in the unanimous opinion of all interpreters of Scripture and dogmaticians teaches what we know about this event. This text is 1st Peter 3:18-20. In this text we have direct and plain statements free from allegory and metaphor. Some dogmaticians also claim that the descent is also taught in Ephesians 4:9, e.g. Hurlsemann. But Hase rejects this, as he does also Psalm 16:10; Acts 2:27; 1st Timothy 3:16. It is sufficient for all purposes of this doctrine to study 1st Peter 3:18-20.

The subject of the entire statement is “Christos”; the predicate is “epathen.” Christ the Sufferer is here placed before us, but Christ not as one who is to suffer, but as the one who has suffered. “Epathen” [ἐπάθη] is in the aorist tense. His work has been finished. The predicate is qualified by “hapax peri hamartioon,” by “dikaioi hyper adikoon,” and by “hina hymas prosagagē too theoo.” By one vicarious and atoning sacrifice He has completed the salvation of the unjust. What Peter is about to relate concerning Christ is of a different character from the foregoing. Throughout this epistle Peter has set forth the truth that for the Christian the path to glory leads through shame, that the crown follows the cross; confer chapter 1:3-9; 2:11, 12; 3:9, 16; 4:12-14, 19; 5:3, 5, 6, 10. This truth he now proceeds to illustrate by an event in the life of the Lord Himself. Christ suffered, and when that

was over He descended into hell for a manifestation of His glory.

The subject "Christos" of course, denotes the entire Christ according to both natures; for He is our Redeemer by suffering not as man alone, nor as God alone, but as the God-man. This subject "Christos," the entire Christ, now is taken over into the dependent clauses which are attached to it by the two participles "thanatootheis" and "dzoopoiätheis"; Christ, the entire Christ, was put to death; Christ, the entire Christ, was made alive again. Each of these two participles is qualified by a noun in the dative: "thanatootheis" by "sarki," "dzoopoiätheis" by "pneumati." These two nouns evidently form a contrast just as much as the two participles to which they have been joined. They are both in the dative, and the dative must have the same force, express the same relation, in each case. The question is: which is that relation? Our English version renders "sarki" by "in the flesh," "pneumati" by "by the spirit," thus making the first the dative of reference, the second the dative of instrument. This is inadmissible. Both datives by every rule of interpretation must express the same sort of relation. Now the two datives cannot be made to agree by making "sarki" to be the dative of instrument; inasmuch as Christ was not put to death "by the flesh," viz. by His own flesh (which would virtually mean that He committed suicide), and "sarki" must apply to Christ's own flesh, not to that of His executioners. Therefore, we must make the two datives agree by making "pneumati" the dative of reference, just as "sarki," and rendering "in the spirit," or, better still, both datives had better be rendered "according to the flesh" and "according to the spirit," or "as regards the flesh" and "as regards the spirit." But what is meant by "sarx" and "pneuma"? Some have

explained "sarx" to mean the human nature, "pneuma" to be the divine. The interpretation would yield the following truths: Christ the Man was put to death; Christ the God was made alive. Hence something was made alive which was not put to death, and something was put to death which was not made alive. This is nonsense. Both the death and the vivification of Christ were by the union of the natures in Him participated in by the human and the divine nature. Christ the God-man died and Christ the God-man was quickened. We noted before that the subject of the whole clause is "Christos," the entire Christ. We must, accordingly, find a different meaning for "sarx" and "pneuma." These two nouns express the two modes of existence through which the God-man has passed. He existed for a certain number of years in a fleshly form of existence. He had a body and lived and acted in that body. While in that body, in that corporeal mode of existence, He was put to death, i.e. the entire Christ was put to death while He was in the flesh. His death was an event in His terrestrial, natural mode of existence. After His death, Christ resumed life in the grave and also resumed His body. But that body was now fitted for a new mode of existence, namely in the world of spirits. It was the resurrection body which all flesh shall assume when this corruptible shall have put on immortality. In His transformed glorified body Christ was a "pneuma," lived and acted, moved about, came and went as a spirit would. In this new mode of existence the "dzoopoiäsis" occurred. Christ, the God-man, was made alive again as regards this spiritual phase. His quickening was an event in the new glorified state.

After thus describing the person of Christ, Peter proceeds to state His first act in the glorified state. He puts this statement in a relative clause. "En hoo" connects with the

noun nearest to it, which is "pneuma." In this new, spirit-life as a being who had now become a spirit though retaining His flesh and blood, however, in a glorified form, Christ went, etc., i.e. the entire Christ descended, etc.

However, actions like being made alive, going, etc. must be referred directly to His human nature, to which they belong naturally, the divine nature participating in them by reason of the personal union.

Thus we have now the following facts, drawn from our text:

1. – the *subiectum quod* of the descent into hell is Christ, the God-man in His glorified state.

2. – The *subiectum quo* is His human nature.

3. – The time of the event was immediately after His reanimation in the tomb ("*momentum illud, quod intercessit inter 'dzoopoiäsin' et 'anastasin'*," Quenstedt). The descent is placed between His burial and His appearance on earth. Virtually, His quickening, with the descent immediately following, should be called the resurrection of Christ. But we reserve the term resurrection for another purpose, namely, for the manifestation of the risen Christ to His disciples on earth. Before Christ's rising from the dead was published on earth, it was proclaimed in hell.

It remains, now to study the act of the descent itself. Peter says "poreutheis," He went. This means that Christ had quitted the place where He had been and proceeded to another place. Hollaz rightly says: "*Eo temporis puncto, quo hic descensus contigit, non iacuit in sepulcro.*" The tomb was empty during the descent.

How are we to understand the action expressed by "poreutheis"? The verb expresses locomotion, and its force in

this connection certainly is to state that a movement took place when Christ descended. "Poreutheis" states the *forma descensus*, as the dogmaticians say. But we must bear in mind that the agent in this *descensus* is no longer in the sarx, but in the "pneuma," and His movement, though a true, actual, real movement, is a movement such as pertains to the existence of a person as "pneuma"; hence not a natural movement of gradual progress from point to point, but a supernatural movement of a glorified, spiritualized body. Moreover, the being who descended was not only a glorified man, but also the omnipresent God. When "poreutheis" is predicated of such a being it cannot mean anything else than His manifestation in a certain "pou," in a certain locality. By His divine power and in His glorious qualities the risen Christ manifested His presence suddenly when He visited His disciples on earth after His resurrection, and just as suddenly quitted their presence. The "poreutheis" in our text signifies such an act. Presently Christ was in hell. The devils had not seen Him coming. His approach had not been observed by spies and announced before. In His majestic power He suddenly stood among them, as He stood among the disciples on Easter Eve. "I am he that liveth, and was dead; and, behold, I am alive forevermore, Amen; and have the keys of hell and of death" (Revelation 1:18) – this saying of the glorified Redeemer finds a proper illustration by His descent.

The place to which Christ went is called "phylakä," the prison, the abode of beings who must be kept in check, incarcerated, evil, malicious beings. Scripture has various designations for hell, "hadäs," "geenna," "tartaros." This is one of them. It is altogether vain to take "phylakä" for grave. For the grave contains only bodies, but this "phylakä" to which Christ went contains spirits; and that spirits who were at one

time disobedient (apeithāsasin pote), refractory, rebellious spirits who had to be confined on that account. Rightly Quenstedt paraphrases “phylakä” thus: “*carcer infernalis seu receptaculum et ‘pou’ damnatorum spirituum.*” Modern skepticism has enervated the language of the Second Article of the Creed by explaining the words: “He descended into hell” as equivalent to “He went into the grave.” That would be meaningless redundancy; for that fact has been expressed by the preceding statement, “He was buried.” In a terse, condensed statement like the Creed is, we would not look for such tautologies. “He descended into hell” refers to an act utterly different from that expressed by “He was buried.” We repeat, moreover, that the grave contains no spirits. The dogmatists call hell the *terminus ad quem*, the grave the *terminus a quo* of the descent.

However, the chief action about which the descent of Christ turns is not expressed by the participle “poreutheis” but by the main verb “ekäryxen.” His going was only preparatory to His preaching. “Kärysoo” has not necessarily the meaning to preach the Gospel, though it is frequently used in that sense in the New Testament. Its original meaning is to make a solemn announcement. The idea of authority, dignity, majesty is always connected with this word. To imagine that Christ preached to the disobedient spirits in prison the Gospel for their conversion would contradict all those passages of Scripture which make the doom pronounced upon the devils in their fall final, and which limit the time of grace to a sinner’s natural life here on earth. Quenstedt connects “kärysoo” with the events mentioned in Colossians 2:15 where we are told that Christ, as a victor over hell and its legions, triumphed over them and made a show of them publicly. Their utter discomfiture

and the justice of the divine judgement upon them was brought home to these rebellious spirits by the preaching of Christ. We must understand this “käryssein” as we did “poreuesthai” before in a manner that comports with the glorious state in which Christ appeared in hell. He spoke as a spirit to spirits, not necessarily in articulate speech, but so as to make them comprehend His victory. It was a solemn, singular act. Quenstedt calls it an *actus theatricus*. With divine force, Christ impressed upon these spirits the truth that grace had conquered over sin and with His majesty cowed these rebellious minds. The entire act was a manifestation of Himself as victor over the Serpent and of His work as a permanent and abiding victory over sin. There was no comfort in this “käryssein” for these spirits, but the “käryssein” was the final confutation of their damnable error and stubborn resistance to God, which covered them with utter confusion. Baier paraphrases “ekäryxen” thus: “*coram et ipso opere ostendit se esse illum, qui iam contrivuit caput serpentis ac dissolvit opera diaboli.*” Our text book represents the descending Christ as a herald of the judgement of the disobedient spirits and of His own victory. Those who imagine that “ekäryxen” in this text is equal to “euaggelise” point to chapter 4, verse 6 as a parallel text. But this is a mistake; in the latter passage “the dead” are those spiritually dead people to whom the Gospel was preached while they were still living.

The view now propounded removes another erroneous view which Quenstedt has noted, viz. that Christ descended into hell in order to complete His suffering also in that place and to pay the full ransom for our redemption. It is rightly pointed out over and against this view that Christ had declared before His expiration on the cross, that His work was finished, and,

moreover, the price of our redemption was not to be paid to the devil, who himself was held captive as the chief malefactor, but only to God.

A controversy arose about the descent in the Lutheran Church about the middle of the sixteenth century. Aepinus, the superintendent of the churches at Hamburg, taught that only the soul of Christ descended into hell and there suffered the infernal torments. Aepinus, accordingly, numbered the descent as belonging to the state of humiliation. This teaching caused the insertion into the Formula of Concord of Article IX.

The ablest treatise on this matter is K. A. Gerhard von Zezschwitz: "*Petri apostoli de Christi ad inferno descensu sententia*." The treatise maintains the old Lutheran doctrine.

§118. Christ's Resurrection.

After His majestic manifestation in hell, Christ proceeds to publish the fact that He has returned to life to men on earth. He has quitted the grave already for the purpose of His descent to hell. Hence a resurrection had actually taken place prior to His descent. But Scripture generally designates by the term resurrection that event which occurred on the morning of the third day of His death, when the earth shook, an angel descended to roll away the stone from the grave and the soldiers fled in consternation from the tomb to carry the news of the resurrection to the high-priests. This is the "anastasis" of Christ.

1. The *subiectum quo* of the resurrection, i.e. the person rising, is the same as that of the descent, the entire Christ; the entire theanthropic person. For to the being who

draws His lineal descent from David and at the same time is designated as "our Lord" (Romans 1:3, 4), to the same person that was buried (Romans 6:4), to the same person that had suffered the "pains of death" to "hold" Him, the resurrection is ascribed.

2. But essentially the resurrection was a human act; only that which can die can be raised again. The *subiectum quo* of the resurrection, therefore, that side to which the act of rising must be strictly ascribed, was the human nature. The divine nature participated in this act because of the personal union of the natures in Christ. Moreover, the act of rising out of death cannot be ascribed to the entire human nature, namely, not to the immortal part of it, the soul, but only to the body which had died. Hence the dogmaticians say that the human nature of Christ is the *subiectum quo remotum*, the body of Christ the *subiectum quo proximum*. The soul which had become severed from the body in death and had been in paradise, was reunited with the body, and this reunited being left the grave. Scripture indicates the *subiectum quo* of resurrection when it announces the historic Jesus of Nazareth (Mark 16:6) as the one who is risen, and when it connects His murder (Matthew 17:23), His crucifixion (Matthew 28:5), His death (Romans 8:34; 2nd Corinthians 5:15), His burial (Matthew 28:6) with His resurrection.

3. Hollaz describes the act of the rising thus: *corpus suum animae redunitum e sepulcro eduxit*. The risen Christ is recognized by His disciples, John 20:27; hence His body was numerically the same, the same built, the same distinctive features which the disciples had known their Lord to possess. And it was a true body of flesh and bones, with all its limbs, Luke 24:39, 40. There was still the spear-mark in His side, John

20:25, which the soldier's lance had inflicted. This body had occupied space in Joseph's tomb and that space was now vacant, Matthew 28:6.

4. But the condition of the resurrection body of our Lord had changed: He now came and went not by physical locomotion as before, but at His will He exhibited Himself present or absent, Luke 24:31. The qualities of the glorious state into which He had now entered were manifesting Himself, Luke 24:23. Scripture calls this the "sooma tās doxās," the glorious body of Christ, Philippians 3:21. The expression, namely, is a Hebraism, the noun being placed for the corresponding adjective for the sake of emphasis. The qualities of this body are further described in 1st Corinthians 15:40ff. It was due to these qualities that Christ rose from His closed tomb. The rolling aside of the stone was not for the purpose of enabling Him to come forth, but in order to show to men that He had gone forth.

5. The resurrection of Christ occurred for a number of blessed purposes. The dogmaticians distinguish between a *finis cuius* (*finis* "hou") and a *finis cui* (*finis* "hoo"). Under the former head are recounted the certain ground truths which receive a solemn confirmation by this act; under the latter are enumerated a number of glorious blessings which accrue to sinners from this event. In the first place Christ was "declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead," Romans 1:4. He had constantly asserted His divine sonship during His lifetime. This claim would have been miserably shattered, if death had holden Him. He would have been nothing but a powerless mortal. The act of rising, then, is an effect of "dynamis," divine power. But the question now is, of whose power? Scripture says both: Christ was raised by the

Father and Christ rose. It is proper, says Hollaz, that the resurrection is ascribed to God the Father because He is the fountainhead of the Deity, and because the atoning sacrifice of Christ had been offered to Him; hence, by raising Christ, He acknowledged the sufficiency of the sacrifice. But it is just as proper, says Quenstedt, to predicate the power to raise Himself to Christ. For Christ was God and man, and His divine nature communicated its unlimited power to the human nature. He had power to take His life again, after He had laid it down. If Christ had not risen *propria divina virtute*, if He had required the assistance of the angel in quitting His grave, Paul could not claim that by His resurrection He was declared the Son of God with power. And the power which He employed in His resurrection must have been the essential attribute of omnipotence, which belongs equally to the three persons of the Godhead. It was this fact, moreover, that Christ was God in His death, His burial and His resurrection, that made His atonement salutary and enabled Him to conquer in His strife.

Scherzer rightly claims that if Christ had not raised Himself, He would have failed to perform that miracle which He had announced, John 2:18, 19; He would not have raised up the broken temple of His body. His resurrection would, indeed, be a miracle still, but a miracle of God who raised Him up, not His own miracle.

The question has been propounded, whether it would be proper to say that the body of Christ raised itself. Hunnius makes answer as follows: "Inasmuch as during Christ's sojourn in the grave the state of exinanition was still enduring and had reached its worst stage, I could not say that the body of Christ raised itself up, but that the Logos did this by that virtue and power, which had, indeed, been truly communicated to the

body of Christ, but had been laid aside, as far as its use was concerned, during His death and internment. Meanwhile I do not hesitate to affirm, that the soul of Christ, which was always alive, concurred with the Logos in the reanimation of His body in a manner and by reason of the personal union, so that by reentering the body, the soul of Christ effectually animated that body. However, the principle agency in the resurrection should be ascribed to the Logos. This understood, we may say that Christ rose by His own power, all the more because the Logos who raises the body is not a person distinct from the body from which He had become separated but forms with Him one theanthropic person."

6. Another feature of the *finis cuius* has already been indicated: the resurrection of Christ is the public declaration of the completeness and sufficiency of His atonement. Christ was delivered for our offenses. That was the wages of sin that was meted out to Him as our substitute. If the grave had held Him, all that we would be justified in saying is that He had the noble intention of removing our guilt, but did not succeed. Without His resurrection, His entire work would be a failure. His resurrection, therefore, is represented as our "dikaioosis," Romans 4:25, the universal absolution of the race. No accuser can rise against the sinner, now that Christ rose, Romans 8:34; no fear need disquiet any heart in view of His empty tomb, Mark 16:6. His resurrection proves His work a glorious success.

7. In His atoning work, Christ suffered the humiliation of entering into a conflict with forces lower than Himself. Sin, death and the grave triumphed over Him. In His resurrection, Christ turns the tables on His enemies. Like a victorious hero, as Paul Gerhard pictures Him, He stands upon His grave. He has stripped His contestants of their arms and holds them up to

contempt. He lives, never to die anymore. His enemies are gone down to utter and hopeless defeat (Colossians 2:15; Revelation 1:17, 18; Romans 6:9).

8. 11 & 12 – Christ is the High-priest of our profession; His vicarious work is His chief work. But Christ also came to teach and His whole teaching aimed at inculcating the saving virtue of His atonement. His teaching would have been a gross deception, both of Himself and others, if He had not risen, 1st Corinthians 15:14-18. Therefore the angel announcing His resurrection, studiously points His disciples to the fact that His resurrection was in accordance with His previous statements, Matthew 28:16; Luke 24:44. Christ has been shown a true prophet, a reliable teacher of men, and His doctrine, the safe and sound basis of men's belief, by His resurrection. This all the more, because He had specifically pointed His hearers to the singular feat of His coming death and resurrection (passages under 11, 12).

9. We now approach the study of the *finis cui*. The truths which have been confirmed by the resurrection of the Lord, might in themselves be regarded and counted as blessings to mankind. The *finis cuius* may be said to contain a hidden *finis cui*. We know now that we have a divine Redeemer, a sufficient Redeemer, a truthful Redeemer, and so on. But we embrace under the *finis cui* as a rule certain blessings which Scripture states to have accrued to believers from the resurrection of the Lord.

Christ is called "aparchē toon kekoimēmenoon," "the first-fruits of them that slept," 1st Corinthians 15:20. The wonderful events which occurred about the grave of Christ on the third day after His death are only the beginning of a general resurrection of all believers. Christ had coupled His new and

glorious life inseparably with that of His followers, John 14:19. At the tomb of His friend Lazarus He had declared Himself "hă anastasis kai hə dzooă," John 11:25, and had invited Martha and all men to overcome the power of death by faith in Him, for believing in Him, He said, men would not see death, taste death, verse 26. All this connects the resurrection of Christ with that of the believers, making the former the cause of the latter. So Paul, 1st Thessalonians 4:14, and Peter, 1st Peter 1:3, represent the connection. – That is an element in the *finis cui*. The rising of Christ assures to us our own resurrection unto life everlasting. While the general resurrection of all the dead is embraced in the immortality with which man was created in the beginning and which the entering in of sin did not overthrow, the resurrection of Christ renders this general resurrection a blessed event to all who accept Him as their Redeemer. Without His resurrection, the resurrection of all the dead is a fearful event; for it occurs only in order that divine justice may mete and consign retribution to sinners.

The reason why the resurrection of Christ insures the blissful resurrection of believers lies in the fact that Christ also in this act performs vicarious or representative work.

God who is faithful to His redemptive decree and to His promises is pleased to credit the work of Christ to the clients of Christ, and by raising their Vicar from the dead to give them a strong ground for their believing hope that when they fall asleep in Jesus they do not perish but shall wake again unto life everlasting.

10. The company of believers in Christ, the Church, needs for its existence in this world the wise and powerful guidance and protection of her Master. A dead Master could not have afforded her this protection. To the living Christ, now

in glory, Scripture directs the trustful glances of the imperfect struggling saints of Christ in this world. He is their Shepherd, they are the sheep of His pasture. Shepherd and sheep share each other's lot. God, by bringing again from the dead that great Shepherd, the Lord Jesus Christ, showed Himself "the God of peace," Hebrews 13:30. He is at peace with Christ, consequently also with those whose cause Christ had championed. The daily justification of believers, the peace of mind and conscience which characterize the spiritual state of believers rests on the resurrection of Jesus. The open tomb proclaims to each believer ever and anon the full pardon for his every slip and fall. With the reflection: *Vivit!* He lives! Luther used to quiet his disturbed heart. The resurrection of Christ is a never-failing source of comfort to all who tremble at the perception of their own unworthy state. The Shepherd who lives continues to shield His sheep against the just anger of the righteous Judge.

Calov remarks: The resurrection of Christ, strictly speaking, does not bear the same relation to our justification as His death. For the death of Christ was the *causa meritoria* of the expiation of our sins, just as our sins were the *causa meritoria* of His death. On account of our sins Christ was given over to death, in our place, in order that by His death we might be delivered from sin and its punishment, death. But we cannot affirm in the same manner concerning the resurrection of Christ that by it He has earned righteousness for us, because the complete righteousness had, in accordance with His own dying statement on the cross, been earned when He exclaimed: "It is finished." Accordingly Scripture speaks in diverse manners of the death and the resurrection of Christ. It says that Christ died both for us and on account of us (*pro nobis et propter nos*), but

He rose only on account of us (*propter nos*). Hence when our theologians call the resurrection of Christ the *causa meritoria* of our justification, they employ the term “meritorious” in a general sense. – In what particular ways the resurrection of Christ was required for our justification has been aptly explained by Gerhard, viz.

The Church is maintaining its existence in the midst of hostile surroundings. A dead Master could not shield her against the angry assaults of devils and men. But the live Redeemer can and will. For He is in such an intimate union with His followers, that Scripture calls Him the head and His followers His body. He has been given charge of all the affairs of His church, and He ministers with sovereign power and exceeding grace to all her needs. The hope of ultimate victory which animates the church in her struggle with unbelief and vice, draws its strength from the resurrection of the Lord. *In hoc signo vinces!* is the motto which she has described upon her banner and under this parole she marches on to victory, Ephesians 1:20-23.

The head regulates the body. Every impulse unto god-pleasing thought and action that courses to the member is formed by the head. Christ the Head causes His members, the believers, to grow up in Him. His divine life assimilates them, raises them to god-likeness, purifies and ennobles their lives. A dead Redeemer could not do these things. The living Lord is the vital principle in the daily renewal and sanctification of believers. By Him and with Him they are able to do and suffer all things.

Thus the resurrection of Christ blesses the present and the future life of His followers. It is the fountain of strength, which rejuvenates a dying world.

In the order of events enumerated in the Creed the resurrection of Christ is followed by His ascension. But between these two events lies a space of 40 days during which Christ was not yet ascended. This is called “the forty days’ sojourn of the glorified Christ on earth.”

During this time – to speak in the words of Gesner – Christ was in the condition of the heavenly life. For He had Himself stated, John 16 and 17, that He was leaving the world and going to the Father, i.e. that He was quitting His earthly and visible conversation to enter upon a heavenly and invisible one. And in Luke 22:16 He says: “I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God shall come.” After His resurrection He said to His disciples: “These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you,” Luke 24:44. Accordingly at that time He was with His disciples and not with them. He was with them in this sense, that in the free exercise of His unfettered will and in His glorious body He could be wherever He wished. In this celestial condition, then, He was, whether He manifested Himself to His disciples or withdrew His presence from them. It is one thing to go to the Father into the state of the celestial and invisible life, and it is another thing to ascend to heaven. The ascension did not take place without a change of place. However, the return to the Father does not admit of a movement through space, because the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, John 14:10. It would be audacious presumption to desire to know more about this matter. It is not known, says Thomas, in what place Christ was locally during the interval between His resurrection and His ascension, because Scripture has not revealed this and the dominion of Christ is everywhere.

§119. Christ's Ascension.

In defining this event our author states:

1. the *terminus a quo*. From this earth and out of His accustomed association with men Christ rose. He effected a separation between Himself and men. "He parted from them," "diestä ap' autoon," Luke 24:51; "he was taken up from them," "analämptheis aph' hymoon," Acts 1:11.

2. Our author states the mode of the ascension. Christ was "carried upward," "anaphereto," Luke 24:51; "he went up," "epärthä," Acts 1:9. The disciples had their eyes fixed on Him, "atenizontes äsan," Acts 1:10 and saw Him travel, "poreuomenou autou," higher and higher, up to the clouds, until a cloud intervening, He was shut out from their sight, "nephelä hypelaben auton apo toon ophthalmoon autoon," Acts 1:9. When all was over they had seen Him go into heaven, "etheasasthe auton poreuomenon eis ton ouranon," Acts 1:11. All this signifies that a true, real movement had taken place in the presence of human witnesses, who were in a condition to observe and could not but trust their senses. The ascension was not a mere "aphanismos," a mere disappearance or vanishing, but up to a certain point in space it was progressive locomotion, inch by inch, like a bird rises higher and higher. It was therefore a natural movement, however, not such as takes place in a natural, but in a glorified body. It exhibited to the disciples the wonderful qualities of the resurrection body, the "sooma täs doxäs." It was not by some necessity that Christ adopted this mode of parting from His disciples; for by reason of His glorified state, He might have withdrawn from them in the twinkling of an eye, suddenly, and might have occupied heaven at once. It pleased Him to adopt this mode of a gradual

movement, in order that the disciples might have a plainer proof of His ascension and might testify to the same with a greater degree of confidence. Hence Hollaz says: We gather (from the statements of Scripture) that Christ ascended as far as the clouds by a movement through space, however, not locally or in a physical manner. After the clouds had closed in behind Him, He proceeded invisibly, in fact, He was forthwith in heaven. Baier adds: We must not inquire too eagerly, nor seek to define exactly according to our natural views, the ascension of Christ, nor must we, in affirming His elevation to heaven, deny His presence on earth. For He ascended not only to heaven, but above all heavens, that He might fill all things.

3. We note the *subiectum quod* of the ascension. Mark says: "The Lord was received up into heaven," "kyrios aneläphthä eis ton ouranon" (chapter 16:19). Christ ascribes the act to the Son of man, "ho hyios tou anthroopou anebabäken eis ton ouranon," John 3:13. The entire Jesus Christ, the God-man ascended.

4. But inasmuch as an action of this sort pertains essentially to the human nature, the latter is called the *subiectum quo* of the ascension. The divine nature participates in the event by reason of the personal union.

5. The place to which Christ ascended (*terminus ad quem*) is variously named in Scripture: "ouranos," "ta dexia tou theou," Mark 16:19; "hyperanoo pantoon toon ouranoon," Ephesians 4:10; "hä basileia hä apouranios," 2nd Timothy 4:18; and the heaven of glory, John 17:24. The dogmatists have distinguished between a *terminus ad quem communis* and a *terminus ad quem proprius*. By the former they designate the heaven of bliss, or paradise, the mansions of the perfected saints, where Christ exhibits Himself to the beatific vision of the

perfected saints. This is not the natural heaven of ether, or the heaven of grace, the Church on earth, but the heaven of glory. The *terminus proprius* is the *coelum maiestaticum Dei*, the immediate presence of the Deity, the heaven above all heavens. Hollaz claims that both the *terminus ad quem communis* and *proprius* belong to the ascension, but Quenstedt differs, claiming that the latter belongs properly to the chapter following, the sitting at the right hand of God. The heaven of the saints, the "pou" *beatorum* is characterized by *gloria finita*, the majestic heaven by glory *infinita*. The distinction is unessential and refers only to dogmatic method.

6. 7. Our author names the *finis et effectus* of the ascension, and first as it concerns us. The Formula of Concord strenuously asserts the presence of the ascended Christ in the midst of His believers on earth. This is done on the strength of the Lord's utterances, who in the very act of ascending, says to His disciples: "Lo, I am with you, etc." Matthew 28:20. The Church militant is, by the omnipotent power of her Head, connected with the Church triumphant, and receives succor and direction from Him. He is gone to heaven to prepare a place for His followers. Quenstedt says: "By His passion and death He merited, by His ascension He opened heaven for us." Over the path which He has traveled the souls of believers are carried in their dying hour on angel's hands.

But there is also a personal gain accruing to Christ Himself from His ascension. He receives the glory and the adoration of the angels and the saints. He is enthroned in power and majesty. His humble state is past, Revelation 5:6. And when He shall return, visibly, as He ascended, this glory will be displayed to all the world, Matthew 25:31. To the ascended

Lord we lift the hymn of adoration: "All hail the power of Jesus' name! Crown Him Lord of all!"

§120. Christ's Sitting at the Right Hand of God.

It is necessary before entering upon a discussion of this matter, that we be reminded of a certain manner in which Scripture speaks of God. Scripture, which presents God as the infinite Spirit, not confined in space, not excluded from any locality, still says of God that He dwells on high, that He is in heaven, that from His throne He looks upon the children of men, etc. No one, observes Gerhard, gathers nor can gather from such language of Scripture that God rules only in a certain locality of heaven. By such expressions as heaven, on high, the right hand of God, when applied to God, the Holy Spirit defines not the sublimeness of the place, but the ineffable exaltation of the heavenly glory and majesty of God.

Luther, in declining a fantastic view of certain enthusiasts which he calls childish and carnal, says: "Scripture teaches us that the right hand of God is not any one locality in particular in which a body might exist or would have to exist, as, e.g. a golden throne, but it is the almighty power of God which can be nowhere at the same time, and yet must be everywhere. I say the divine power can be nowhere in any particular place, for if it were to exist in any one locality it would have to be confined and comprehended in that locality; just as any one thing that exists in a certain locality is confined and circumscribed within the limits. For it is incomprehensible and immeasurable; it is outside of and above all existing things. Again the divine power must be essentially present in all places,

even in the smallest leaflet on a tree; for this reason: It is God who creates, effects and preserves everything by His omnipotent power and His right hand, as we profess in our Creed. For He does not detail officers or angels when He desires to create or preserve something, but it is the peculiar work of His own divine power to create and preserve. Now if He is to create and preserve things He must certainly be present and must shape and preserve His creature as well in its most internal parts as in its most external. Hence He must be personally present in every creature, in its most internal parts, in its most external parts, all around it, all through it, above it, before it, behind it, so that nothing can be more truly present more intimately connected to any creature, than God Himself with His power. For it is He that makes the skin; it is He that makes the bones; it is He that makes the hair on a person's head; it is He that makes the marrow in the bones; it is He that makes every particle of a hair, and every atom of marrow. Verily, He must make all, both the whole and the parts. Consequently His hand must be present to fashion all. Of this there can be no doubt."

In accordance with an exposition such as this, our Lutheran Confessions state: "The right hand of God... is no fixed place in heaven, as the Sacramentarians assert without any ground in the Holy Scriptures, but is nothing else than the almighty power of God, which fills heaven and earth" (Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, VIII, paragraph 28, page 629). And again: "God's right hand is everywhere" (Formula of Concord, Epitome, VII, paragraph 12, page 512).

The term "right hand" is used instead of the term "heaven." Confer Mark 16:19 and Acts 3:20. It is used in two distinct ways in Scripture. Sometimes it is in opposition to the

left hand and denotes the place of honor (confer Matthew 20:21; 25:33). Sometimes "the right hand" denotes strength, might (confer Psalm 118).

The term "sit" is used with reference to God, Psalm 9:5, to express His activity as a ruler or judge. It is not a sitting of idleness or ease, but an official sitting. When the king occupies the throne, or the judge his seat, that is the signal for weighty business about to be transacted.

Now it is said that Christ, after ascending to heaven, has sat down on the right hand of God, Hebrews 1:3; that the Father commanded Him to sit at His right hand, Psalm 110:1, that is, Christ has entered upon the discharge of that majestic government which God exercises. He occupies the place of honor next to God and He exercises the power of God. Sitting as He does like a king or a judge in His official place, He is to be recognized and respected in the same manner as men worship God. Luther says: "What else can 'sitting at my right hand' mean than to sit in equal rank with God? For He does not sit at His head, nor at His feet, nor below Him, but at His right hand, as His equal, so that heaven is His throne and earth His footstool, even as He says, Matthew 28:18: 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth'. Christ's sitting at the right hand of God is therefore nothing else than the exercise of the universal dominion over all creatures."

The exalted Christ is seen by the martyr Stephen to be standing at the right hand of God, Acts 7:56. By an act of divine grace the faithful witness was vouchsafed a comforting vision which was to assure him that the Lord whom he had confessed was deeply interested in his confession and that He had already risen and assumed the attitude of a warrior who is about to come to the aid of His comrade. No argument is to be drawn

from this incident to prove that Christ is locally confined in heaven. Gerhard turns the argument which the Sacramentarians had drawn from this passage to ridicule by a counter argument: How could Stephen, he says, have seen Jesus at such a distance if Christ were only locally and physically in heaven as He was here on earth? For His body would have been infinitely smaller than the minutest star specks which we can barely discern, and the heaven to which He is gone is beyond the ether-heaven. No, this Christ who exhibited Himself to Stephen by a peculiar revelation in a certain locality, is at the same time invisibly present with His power and majesty in all places.

2. The sitting down of Christ at the right hand of God is an event which has taken place in time after His death on the cross, Philippians 2:9; Hebrews 12:2; after His resurrection from the dead, Ephesians 1:20, Christ, while still in His state of humiliation, looked forward to this event, Luke 22:69. Moreover, it is said that Christ suffered this elevation, received this honor, Philippians 2:9-11, and that at that time all things were made subject unto Him, 1st Peter 3:22. All these statements have no reference to the eternal divinity of Christ, to the "logos asarkos." Referring to this sitting at the right hand of God, which took place immediately after the ascension, Quenstedt says: "Christ sits at the right hand of God not from eternity nor from the beginning of the world, because this session cannot be predicated of Him according to His divinity, but according to His humanity." And hence Christ calls Himself "the Son of man" in the very moment when He speaks of His impending elevation, Luke 22:69.

3. The government which the exalted God-man has begun to exercise immediately after His ascension, is both

general and special. Every creature in heaven, earth and hell, Philippians 2:9-11, everything without exception is made subject to Him, Hebrews 2:8. God rules the world through the Son who redeemed the world.

4. The special government of Christ is exercised in behalf of His Church. He is the head, the believers are His body, Ephesians 5:23. In their behalf He manifests His power on earth in the spread of the Gospel, Acts 2:30, and in the conversion of sinners, Acts 5:20. The fortunes of His Gospel are in His hand.

5. The power and divine majesty which Christ assumed when He sat down at the right hand of God, He had, indeed, possessed and exercised from eternity as the Son of God, when He started on his mission to redeem the world, Psalm 45:7, 8; Hebrews 1:8; John 17:5.

6. The eternal majesty of the "logos asarkos" had also been communicated to the human nature of Christ in the incarnation. In the body which Christ had assumed dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead, Colossians 2:9. The lowly Christ was nevertheless "in the form of God" and "equal with God," Philippians 2:6, 7.

7. But Christ had for a season voluntarily abstained from the full and constant use of the majesty communicated to His human nature, until His redeeming work should have been completed, Philippians 2:5-9. In the moment when He sits down in the glorified humanity at the right hand of God, He lays aside all infirmities, all the vestiges of His kenosis and begins to exercise in His humanity, fully and unintermittingly, that majesty which He might have exercised all the time from the moment of His conception.

§121. Christ's Coming to Judgement.

The fact that Christ, according to His own statement, Matthew 28:18, is exalted to the full use of the divine majesty, is manifested to the faith of His followers in an invisible manner by the government of the universe and especially of His Church on earth. It requires to be manifested also in a visible manner. This will be done by a second appearance of Christ for the purpose of judging all mankind. The event will represent the culmination of His state of exaltation.

The incidents which shall accompany this event are properly treated in the chapter on eschatology. A reference to this event is necessary here only so far as the glory of the exalted Redeemer is exhibited through the same.

1. In the presence of all created rational beings, angels and man without exception, including both the good and the evil, Christ will appear in His transcendent heavenly majesty and summon all before Him, that He may pronounce the final verdict upon them and forever seal the fate of each and every one, Matthew 25:31, 32.

2. The presence of the holy angels and the authority which Christ publicly exercises over them in dispatching them upon His errands, and in receiving their worship and adoration, the awe which will overspread the countless multitudes gathered before His tribunal, will establish Him in the conviction of all men, as the supreme God. The Christ who was dead and rose will be seen to be far above all principality and power and might and dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, Ephesians 1:20-22. Hence the communication of the divine attributes which occurred in the moment of the personal union

was abdicated for a season so far as its use is concerned, will be seen to be real, unlimited, and permanent. The Return to Judgement will therefore be the climax of the mystery of godliness, the *ultima ratio* of the *genus maiestaticum*.

3. The fact that Scripture in announcing these events employs such terms as "He will come," "He will sit upon a throne," "He will separate men," already indicates that He will appear in a human form. This is stated still more plainly when the designation which He bore while on earth, viz. "the Son of man," is applied to Him in connection with this event, Matthew 25:31; Luke 21:27, 36, and when it is said that men shall "see" Him, i.e. recognize Him, not only see somebody, but Him the well-known Christ who was a sojourner among men.

4. At His return Christ will reverse the cruel and unjust verdict rendered against Him at His trial in Judea; the abject criminal who was sentenced to death by human authorities, both in the Church and in the State, will Himself occupy the judge's seat and His judges will be clients at His bar of justice.

5. By an act of His omniscience He will, without minutely examining into the case of every individual client, assign each a place of honor or of shame, Matthew 25:32-34.

6. 7. By an act of His omnipotence, justice, holiness, and truthfulness, He will unalterably fix the eternal fate of each angel and each man, either in bliss with Himself or in torment away from Him, Matthew 25:41, 34.

§122. The Office of Christ.

We agreed to divide, with Quenstedt, all the truths of Scripture which belong in the chapter of Christology, under two

main heads: 1. *De Redemptore*, 2. *De redemptione*. In other words we agreed to study first the person of the Redeemer, secondly, His work.

We completed the first part of our study and found that Christ is a truly wonderful person, because of the union of His two distinct natures in Him, which are never confounded, and because of the communion of attributes in His wonderful theanthropic person. We also beheld, in our study of the states, in what a wonderful manner our theanthropic Redeemer has acted and is still acting.

We now wish to take a survey of His work and an inventory of the blessed results of His work. He is such a wonderful person because He is to accomplish a wonderful work: He is to be the Mediator between God and man, consubstantial and coequal with each, 1st Timothy 2:5, and by mediating between God and man He is to save men. Luke 19:10 states this as His mission: "The Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost."

All that Christ, the incarnate Son of God, has done and still does to save men, is called the office of Christ, *officium*, or *munus*, or *opus Christi*. The term "office" signifies an aggregate of duties which have been laid upon a person and which a person has assumed also the authority and ability to discharge those duties. The fact that He holds this office is expressed in His very names Jesus and Christ, whose saving signification has been stated in Matthew 1:21; John 1:41; 4:42. These names have rightly been called *evangelium in nuce*, the Gospel in a nutshell. The name Jesus (from **Jahah**: soodzein) emphasizes His work as rescuer from the most appalling danger to which man is exposed. The name Christ expresses the fact that He is duly, fully and solemnly qualified for carrying out the rescue

mission; for Christ means the Anointed One, i.e. a person who has rightfully been appointed and is perfectly qualified. It refers to that solemn act of inauguration by which in olden times certain persons were installed in office. *Ideo unctus, ut salvaret*. The question has been propounded: What are we to understand by the anointing, or unction of Christ? An old Greek axiom states the answer in a condensed form: "ha theotas chrisis täs anthroopotätos," the divinity is the unction of the humanity. This means that the incarnation or the union of the Logos with the human nature is at the same time the anointing of the human nature with the divine. It is only necessary to remember here the *genus maiestaticum* (auchaematikon) of the communication of attributes. By the union of the natures the human nature received an increase of glory, for it was made to share the glory of the divine nature. This same fact is expressed by saying, the human nature of Christ was anointed with the divine. And this anointing took place for the purpose of fitting Christ for the discharge of every function which might belong to His saving office.

Hence the unction of Christ, or His actual entering upon His office must not be dated from His baptism in Jordan. By that act He simply signaled His public entry upon His official activity. The unction coincides with His incarnation, and that again coincides in point of time with His humiliation. Christ was a Christ for us, not only from the moment when He announced Himself as such by His public ministry, but even at the moment of His conception, birth, circumcision and during the years of His filial obedience at the home of His parents. This fact was brought out in our study of each one of the stages of humiliation. It is well to remember it here as a part of His official activity. Luther, before others, has understood the

glorious import, even of those early acts in the Redeemer's office, and the following exposition which he has given of them, deserve to be read and pondered, viz.: in the sermon for Xmas day in the Church Postil, XI, 124, 127; sermon for Holy Eve, XI, 2022ff.; in the sermon on Circumcision of Christ, XI, 291; and in the House Postil, XIII, 1534f. The question has been raised whether we may not say that Christ's incarnation is such a glorious event and exalts and ennobles the race of man, whose brother He became, so greatly, that it would have taken place also in the event that man had not sinned. The church father Irenaeus and the philosophical school of the Scotists championed this view in the Middle Ages, and many theologians have adopted it in modern times (Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Dorner, Ebrard, *et alii*). One answer to this question must be: Scripture does not favor this view at all; for it mentions no other purpose for which the Son of God became incarnate than this: that He might save men, 1st Timothy 1:15; Luke 19:10; Galatians 4:4, 5. And since Scripture mentions no other purpose, no one ought to imagine any other. Augustine rightly says: *Si homo non periisset, filius hominis non venisset*. We regard this idea of the Scotists and others as a dangerous philosophical speculation, because it lessens on the one hand the sin of man, which needed an incarnate Redeemer, and on the other hand the grace of God, which gave us the incarnate Son for our redemption. Another *quaestio curiosa* which men have cast up in this connection is: Why did not God send His Son into the world immediately after the fall? Why did He tarry 4,000 years? One might venture to suggest a few probable reasons *a posteriori*, i.e. now that the incarnation has occurred 4,000 years after the fall; e.g. one might say: It pleased God to first crush His people by means of the Law in

order to rouse in them a greater desire for the Redeemer. But this answer would be nothing but a pious guess. The safest answer is: It pleased God so to do, that is all we know about it – so Kromayer answers this question.

We may now inquire into the details of the official acts of Christ. Our textbook divides them all under three heads: the sacerdotal, prophetic and royal. The reason for this division is because all the passages of Scripture which describe the office of Christ can be conveniently arranged into three groups, according as they represent the official activity of Christ as a reconciling, instructing or governing activity. Both Testaments recognize these divisions. His priestly activity is stated in Psalm 110; Matthew 20:28; 2nd Corinthians 5:18, 19; Romans 5:12, etc. His prophetic activity in Deuteronomy 18:15; Luke 4:18; John 1:18; Hebrews 1:1; Luke 13:33; and His royal activity in Psalm 2; Psalm 72; Matthew 1:21; Luke 1:31; John 18:33-36; Ephesians 1:20ff; 1st Corinthians 15:27. These activities correspond to three distinct needs of our human race: as enemies of God we need a Reconciler; as blind and ignorant of divine matters we need a teacher, and as helpless over and against our enemies we need a Ruler and Protector. Accordingly the teachers of the church from the earliest times, as Musobias states in his history, page 8, have accepted a *munus Christi triplex*. Since the days of Gerhard and Quenstedt this threefold division is common in Lutheran dogmatical treatises. Hutter, before Gerhard, has only two divisions: the sacerdotal and royal, because he embraces the prophetic in the sacerdotal office, since according to Malachi it was one of the duties of the priests to teach the people. There is accordingly no natural difference between Hutter and Gerhard. In the reformed church the threefold division has been accepted since

the days of Calvin. A question has been raised regarding the proper order and sequence of the three kinds of Christ's official acts. The usual order has been to place the prophetic office first, next the sacerdotal, and last the royal. Our author deviates from this order for two reasons: 1) because long before Christ began to teach men, He had already begun to shed His blood for them, or to sacrifice Himself for them; 2) because when He began to preach to sinners, He offered them the grace which He had so far procured and was still procuring for them by His self-sacrificing labors.

It must be borne in mind, however, that no matter what order and sequence for the various phases of Christ's official acts we adopt, we must not commit the mistake to think that these phases follow in succession one upon the other. They are all parallel and contemporaneous. E.g. Christ is King also in the state of humiliation, as He stated to Pilate, John 18:37; yea, He is a born King, Isaiah 9:6, 7; Matthew 2:2, 11. There are numerous objections raised by Socinians, rationalists and modern theologians against this method of presenting the entire office of Christ under three distinct aspects; but those objections in reality are not against this method of teaching, so much as against the matter taught, and hence we could not please the objectors by simply changing the method. What they really want us to do is to quit teaching that Christ is our divine teacher, our divine Reconciler, our divine Ruler.

§123. Christ the Priest.

In His priestly activity we shall behold our Redeemer engaged in procuring for us all those blessed things which we

shall hear Him proclaim and see Him distribute in His prophetic office. The sacerdotal office is therefore the basis and foundation for the prophetic.

1. All the priestly acts of Christ are operations theandrikai, acts of the Godman. This applies really to the entire office of Christ also to the prophetic and royal, as we shall see anon. We remember that this fact was already placed before us in our study of the *genus apotelesmaticum*, in the chapter on the communication of attributes. In all His official acts, Christ acts not as God alone, nor as man alone, but as God and man, each nature contributing to the performance of each official act *quod suum est*, that which is proper for it to contribute. Any person who denies that the official acts of Christ are theanthropic acts, nullifies completely the purpose for which the Son of God was incarnate; for a Redeemer who was God only could not have acted as man's representative; and a Redeemer who was man only could not have saved man. Accordingly, as regards the priestly office we find such priestly acts as "reconciling the world," "purchasing the church of God," "cleansing from sin"; and the very name of "High priest" ascribed to Christ according to His divine nature, 2nd Corinthians 5:19; Acts 20:28; 1st John 1:7; Hebrews 4:14; and again such equally sacerdotal acts as "suffering, mediating, ransoming" are ascribed to Christ according to His human nature, Hebrews 5:8; 1st Timothy 2:5; Matthew 20:28.

It is necessary right here on the threshold of our study of the priestly office that we impress upon the mind the fact that there is a concurrence of both natures in Christ in every priestly function. "*Concurrunt ad sacerdotium Christi duae Christi naturae*," Baier. Take, e.g. only the sacrifice which Christ rendered in this office: this would have been simply impossible

if He had not possessed something that He might offer up, viz. a human body and life. For God is *per se* impassible.

Hence to exclude from His sacerdotal acts the operations of the human nature deprives those acts of their human reality. They become virtually a sham like the acts of a playwright in a drama, or the visionary doings of an apparition which we behold in a dream. On the other hand the sacrifice would lack in value if it had been a mere man's sacrifice. Man is ever a finite being, and his acts are likewise finite and limited in their effects. On the sacrifice of Christ depended the fate of all mankind. We might conceive the equableness of a sinless man offering himself up for another man who is a sinner. The two lives would be perfectly poised and balanced against one another. But we cannot conceive the equableness of setting the life of one sinless person over and against the sinful lives of unnumbered multitudes. But if the sinless person who offers his life for all other men is at the same time God, we no longer question the equableness of the transaction. When the infinite God is placed in the balance He outweighs the sin and iniquity of the whole world. Hence to exclude from the sacerdotal acts of Christ the operations of the divine nature means to deprive those acts of their infinite value and virtue, to depreciate them, like precious coins become debased if the precious metal is taken out and only the baser metal left to remain. The redemption of the world could not have been purchased with counterfeit money.

Accordingly, when Gerhard begins to explain the sacerdotal acts of Christ he issued this notice: "*Repetendae hoc loco causae, propter quae mediatorem nostrum Deum et hominem esse oportuit,*" and proceeds, "*Deus esse debuit ob magnitudinem mali abolendi et magnitudinem boni*

adducendi." He offers the following reasons in detail: 1) *ob lytrou sufficientiam et perfectionem*; 2) *ob irae divinae portationem*; 3) *ob malorum remotionem*; 4) *ob bonorum reparationem*; 5) *ob decreti divini patefactionem*; 6) *ob ecclesiae defensionem*; 7) *ob partorum donorum conservationem*; 8) *ob precum exauditionem*.

On the other hand he offers the following reasons why Christ "*etiam verus homo esse debuit*": 1) *ob divinae iustitiae constitutionem*; 2) *ob naturae humanae restitutionem*; 3) *ob nostram cum Deo reconciliationem*; 4) *ob fidei nostrae confirmationem*; 5) *ob naturae nostrae cognitionem*; 6) *ob sustinendam tentationem*; 7) *ad confirmandam exauditionis promissionem*; 8) *ad requisitam loge redemptoris conditionem*; 9) *ob nostram adoptionem*; 10) *ob nostrae resurrectionis certificationem*.

Likewise Calov after an elaborate presentation of Scripture texts concludes: "*Nulla actio theandrikä, qualis erat modiatio, satisfactio, passio pro mundi vita, impletio vicaria pro toto genere humano, proficisci poterat a solo homine, sed antheathroopoo ortum habuit. Proinde opus fuit, ut Deus homo fieret, ut unaquaeque natura, quem admodum concilium Chalcedonense habet, sic ageret, quod suum est, cum communicatione alterius.*" In the Lutheran church Andreas Osiander erred in claiming that Christ is our righteousness only according to the divine nature. The Roman church, following Stancarus, especially the party of the Jesuits, claims that Christ is our mediator only according to the human nature. They accept the axiom of Lombardus: "*Christus mediator est in quantum homo.*" Among the Calvinists many refuse to accept this axiom: "*Nomina officii competunt Christi secundum utramque naturam.*"

2. Our textbook declares that Christ “was and is our High Priest.” This makes the sacerdotal office a permanent and ever-enduring function. Yea, it causes this office to reach back to the beginning, as well as to reach out to the end of time. Hebrews 5:6 quotes Psalm 110:4, and declares Christ to be 1) a priest forever, “**cohen leholam**,” “hiereus ton aioona”; 2) a priest after the order of Melchisedec “**hal-dib-rathi Malci-tse-dek**,” “kata tñn taxin Melchisedek.” The second statement serves to explain the first. Christ had been set forth by the apostle in the preceding verses as the exalted King. How can a king be at the same time a priest? Answer: “kata tñn taxin Melchisedek.” Melchisedec was certainly a king; even his name indicates that. But Melchisedec just as certainly performed priestly functions. “He is evidently a true priest, though prior to the Aaronic priesthood, uniting in himself according to the system of the patriarchal age the royalty and the priesthood of his race: as a true priest he blest Abraham and received tithes from him,” Barnsby. But the priesthood of Christ exceeds that of His Old Testament prototype, in that His is eternal, “aparabatos,” Hebrews 7:24. There is an eternal personality connected with the priesthood of Christ. “He continueth ever.” The contrast here is between mortal men who succeed each other in the office of priesthood, and One who has the office inherent in Himself forever. The word “aparabaton” (translated “unchangeable”) is taken by some in an intransitive sense, as in the margin of the Authorized Version, meaning “that does not pass to another,” equivalent to “adiadochon,” Barnsby. Hebrews 7:26 shows why this perpetual, non-transferable priesthood belongs only to Christ: He alone possesses the qualifications for it.

3. That Christ has no compeers in His office, no assistants, and that there are no supplementary forces employed to render His sacerdotal work complete, hence that He is our only High priest, will be shown in extense in §124.

4. After learning to regard all the priestly acts of Christ as theanthropic acts, and that the priestly office of Christ has a past and present phase, our textbook declares Him our only High priest. However since this matter is treated in a separate paragraph (§124), I shall pass on to explain the force of that term, in which Scripture expresses the general character of all the priestly work of Christ, the term “mediating” or “mediation.”

Baier says: *Sacerdotale officium in eo consistit quod Christus inter Deum et homines, a se invicem dissidentes, medias partes tenet.* Baier then identifies the entire priestly office of Christ with His mediating. He says: *Coincidunt enim mediatorium et sacerdotal officium Christi.* Our textbook shares this view, for it says: Christ “was and is our High Priest... inasmuch as He... mediated.”

The Standard Dictionary gives as one of the definitions of “mediate” when used as an intransitive verb: “to interpose between two parties in order to harmonize or reconcile them; act as a mutual agent or friend, intercede, arbitrate, as: to mediate between two hostile states.” The term “mediate” then implies the existence of strife and strained relations, and the object of the mediator is to remove these unpleasant conditions. It is not always necessary that the mediator be a priest. We have, in our secular affairs, all sorts of mediators. In a sense the ancient prophets of Israel mediated between God and the people. When the Law was given to Israel, it was “ordained in the hand of a mediator,” i.e. Moses, Galatians

3:19. But in the present instance it was necessary that the mediator act as priest. For the parties at variance with one another were God and man; and the action which had put them apart was man's transgression of the Law of God. For this transgression, satisfaction had to be offered; the wrong had to be atoned for; the crime expiated. And for this purpose God had already in the Old Testament instituted the priesthood, which was merely to foreshadow the priestly work of Christ. Accordingly the two texts which our textbook quotes not only name Christ directly "Mediator, mesitäs," but they also mention priestly functions which He had to perform as the interceding agent: He had to give "himself a ransom," 1st Timothy 2:6; He had to offer His blood for the purging of guilty consciences, Hebrews 9:14, 15. This latter text moreover emphasizes that just for "this reason," "dia touto" He is the Mediator.

By the union of the two natures in Him, Christ connects personally with the two parties between whom He is to mediate. His twofold consubstantiality, the one with God, the other with man, fits Him for this work of mutual agent or friend.

In two points the mediation of Christ differs from any other mediation that we have record of: 1) As a rule the mediator is chosen by the two parties at variance. Christ was chosen for His mediation by God alone. Man thought of no mediation and desired none. 2) An ordinary mediator pleads with either party to the strife, tries to induce each side to recede somewhat from his position, since usually each side has erred. If he does not succeed in this, his work is ended. He can do no more as mediator. But Christ could not parley with God; for God had nothing to take back in His controversy with man. And man was by nature so hostile and full of enmity to God that

he wanted to take back nothing. There was only one way open to Christ for mediating, viz. He had to actually take the place of the parties between which He was to mediate. He assumed man's place, and His mediation was carried on by Himself assuming man's entire case. This is a mediation without a parallel.

5. Our textbook accordingly, proceeds to describe the mode of Christ's mediating by naming the "active obedience" of Christ. The expression "*obedientia activa*" is a technical term of the old dogmaticians by which they intend to set off one phase of Christ's mediating work from another, which will be named later. Mentzer paraphrases "*obedientia legis*" by "*conformitas cum ipsa lege*." It is expressed in Scripture by "poiäsai to theläma theou," Hebrews 14:7; "pläroosai ton nomon," Matthew 5:17; "hypotassomenon einai," Luke 2:51; "hypakoä," Romans 5:19; "ginesthai hypo nomon," Galatians 4:5. The will of God and the Law are practically identical terms. To be under this will signifies to assume the same position which God has assigned to man to whom He gave His Law, that he should do, keep, and fulfill it, to the least tittle and iota.

The Law has a positive and a negative side; it issues injunctions and prohibitions. Fulfilling the Law, then, signifies complying with all its demands, and abstaining from all that it forbids. Baier: "*Ut plene faceret quae lex tota praesipit ut plene et penitus abstineret ab omnibus, quae lex prohibet.*"

And since the Law is a spiritual affair which is addressed to the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind of man, a mere outward performance of the material of a legal action would be of no value. The active obedience of Christ must be performed from that motive which the Lawgiver seeks in every action of His servants. This, He has Himself stated, is love,

which is “the fulfillment of the Law.” Scripture has, therefore, noted that in what Christ did while engaged in His work under the Law, He was always actuated by love. John virtually sums up His earthly career when he says: “agapāsas tous idious tous en too kosmoo eis telos ägapäsen autous” (13:1b). And the serving act of the feet washing which John recounts is an indication of the great self-abasement which characterizes His entire life of serving love among His fellowmen. He truly loved them with a sincere and perfect love, and no fault can be charged against Him on the basis of the 2nd table of the Commandments. But John also records the fact that Christ on the eve of His death declared: “agapoo ton patera” (14:31), and that out of love to His Father He would do His commandment. Also from the first table no charges can be constructed against Christ. His active obedience is a flawless, faultless one. In the endeavor to render this obedience He spent His life, and in order to have a truly human life to spend: He passed through all its phases from infancy to manhood.

6. The active obedience of Christ was vicarious; it was rendered “in man’s stead.” This is indicated chiefly by Romans 5:19 and Galatians 4:5 which deduce from the fact that Christ was “made under the law,” and from His “obedience” this fact that we “receive the adoption of sons”; that we are “made righteous.” The mediator has substituted His active obedience for our lack of the same. Quenstedt: “*Agendo culpam, quam homo iniusto commiserat, expiavit.*” God views the active obedience of Christ as the equivalent of what He had demanded of man. Quenstedt: “*Haec ipsa impletio et obedientia in iustitiam nobis imputatur.*” Objections have been raised to the teaching that the active obedience of Christ is part of His mediating work. The Calvinists, notably Piscator, argue

that Christ’s active obedience was rendered as a man’s obedience. To such an obedience Christ was Himself obligated because He was Himself a man. The Creator had a claim on Christ’s obedience just as He has on any other man’s obedience. Moreover, Christ was member of the Jewish church, and as such was under the Law of Moses like any other Israelite. His active obedience, was therefore, rendered for Himself, not for others. The Socinians deny the vicarious meaning of the active obedience of Christ on the ground that no man can fulfill a moral duty for another. If He were ever to attempt to do that, it would be itself an immoral action. The Arminians challenge us to show one passage of Scripture which declares that the personal innocence of Christ is a cover for our guilt. And one of their leaders, Episcopus, has gone so far as to question Christ’s innocence, claiming that it was possible for Christ to sin, not to obey. The Lutheran theologian Parsimonius (Simon Karg) at first held similar views, but recanted them in 1570. [Johann Gottlieb] Toellner [who died in] 1774 held this view. Modern theologians of the Lutheran church in Germany as a rule, side with this error. Philippi is a solitary exception.

Those objections all overlook one fact: that the human nature of Christ has no personality of its own, is “anhypostatos.” If Christ, as man, had been a common human personality, nothing more, the argument would stand. But now the human nature exists only in conjunction with the personality of the Logos, who is God, and as such superior to the Law, because He is Himself the Lawgiver. By the personal union also the human nature of Christ was removed from under the Law. It was an act of self-humiliation, self-imposed, that Christ became as under the Law. These objections, then, deny that the official acts of Christ are theanthropic acts.

Another objection of the Reformed theologians is that the active obedience of Christ cannot have been rendered for us because Scripture teaches that we were redeemed by the suffering and death of Christ. Our answer is that Scripture teaches our redemption both by the life and death of Christ, and the passages in which this is done must not be placed in opposition to one another, but must be used to support and strengthen one another. That the suffering of Christ is so often mentioned in connection with our redemption is because Christ's entire work reached its culmination in His death, but did not exclude or nullify all that had preceded His death.

A third objection raised chiefly by the Calvinist Piscator, but also by the Arminians and modern theologians, is sheer sophistry. It is this: If Christ fulfilled the Law for us we are no longer obligated to fulfil it. Our answer is: this statement, We need no longer fulfil the Law, contains an equivocation, a double meaning. If it means that we need not fulfil the Law in order to be saved by our fulfilling the Law, it is correct. If it means that since Christ fulfilled the Law we may live as we please, it is false. For no one accepts Christ's fulfilment of the Law as rendered for him, and determines to lead a life of sin. Faith and sinning cannot coexist. There are nowadays a great many self-appointed guardians of morality, who throw their hands up in holy horror when they hear the teaching: Christ fulfilled the Law for us, and exclaim: Hush! You must tell the people no such thing, or else they will sin still more boldly. These people do not know the sin-overcoming power of true faith.

In the Lutheran church of our own generation the meritorious quality of the active obedience of Christ has been denied by many of the leading theologians in Germany. To

quote only one, Kahnis says: "Das Hauptargument aller, welche den taetigen Gehorsam bekämpft haben – des Parsimonius des Piscator, der Socinianer, Toellners – ist, dass der Gehorsam nicht verdienstlich gewesen sei. In der beweist der Grund der alten Dogmatik, dass Jesus als Sohn Gottes der Erfuellung des Gesetzes entheben war, zu viel.... Ein Verdienst kann Christus nur als Mensch erwerben. Alles aber, wozu Christus als Mensch moralisch verpflichtet war, involviert kein Verdienst. Man kann Christus nichts zum Verdienst rechnen, dessen Unterlassung ihm Suende gewesen waere. Es ist unzulaessig, den Gehorsam welchen Christus seinen Eltern leistete, mit Hilfe der goettlichen Natur Christi zu einem Verdienst zu erheben, indem man sagt: als Sohn Gottes war Christus zu diesem Gehorsam nicht verpflichtet. So kann man auch den Gehorsam Christi in Erfuellung des goettlichen Gesetzes nicht dadurch zum Verdienst erheben, dass man sagt: Der Sohn Gottes stand ueber dem Gesetze. Jesus Christus war als Mensch zur Erfuellung des goettlichen Willens verpflichtet. Wozu er nicht verpflichtet war, das war die Erfuellung des theokratischen Gesetzes (das nur dem juedischen Bundesvolke gegeben war). Unterzog sich Christus diesem, so tat er es nicht um seine willen, sondern anstatt der Menschheit, um ihr seine Gerechtigkeit zu zueignen" (*Die lutherische Dogmatik*, Band III, Seiten 399ff.).

7. Scripture speaks of an obedience of Christ "unto death, even the death of the cross," Philippians 2:8, and indicates in the same passage that His entire humiliation tended to this suffering obedience as its culminating point. That is the force of the phrase "mechri thanatou," with the additional remark for emphasis "thanatou de staurou." In his description of the passion of Christ, John (14:31) notes a remark

of the Lord which shows that He had reached the climax of His life of suffering in the night of the betrayal, and that He was conscious that also in this suffering, yea, particularly by His suffering, He was executing the commandment of His Father. This is the essence of any act of obedience, to do the will of another. Hence it is both scriptural and reasonable to speak of an *obedientia passiva*.

9-12. The passive obedience of Christ was exhibited to us in detail in paragraph §112, where we studied it as one of the grades of this state of humiliation. The texts here cited may be classified as follows: 9) names of physical sufferings ("scourged," Luke 18:33; "wounded, bruised, chastisement, stripes," Isaiah 53:5, 6); 10) gives instances of the mental sufferings of Christ ("mocked, spitefully entreated, spitted on," Luke 18:32; "derision, mockery, railing," Luke 23:35-39; the sham coronation, at which again He was spitted on and smitten on the head, Matthew 27:27-30); 11) states the awful and solemn fact of His dying ("suffering of death" and "tasting death," Hebrews 2:9; and His actual death, "died," Romans 5:6, 8; "laid down His life," 1st John 3:16; "poured out his soul unto death," Isaiah 53:12). This phase combines physical and spiritual sufferings. 12) names the profoundest depth of all His sufferings, physical, mental, spiritual, the so-called *derelictio magna*, His being utterly forsaken by God, Matthew 27:46. All these four sections refer to the *passio magna* of Christ, that conflux of fierce pains and agonies which overwhelmed Christ at the end of His earthly life. It is understood that His passive obedience includes also those sufferings which went before, His whole humble life on earth being filled with suffering.

It is to be noted that also the passive suffering of Christ is an action; for He willed to submit to those sufferings. The

distinction of active and passive can therefore, refer only to the form in which His obedience was executed. Every affliction of Christ is a priestly act, in which He carries on the great work of redemption. Menzer criticizes this popular distinction between active and passive obedience. He says: "The punishment which, in the most righteous judgment of God, is inflicted on sin, justly follows a violation of the Law, but is not itself the Law, nor a fulfilling of the Law, but only a vindication of the Law against a violation thereof. Hence we may judge how this popular distinction between active and passive obedience ought to be received, viz. with a grain of salt and with careful discrimination. For active obedience is conformity with the Law itself, and is therefore properly and expressly called obedience *per se*. However passive obedience is usually termed the suffering of punishment inflicted on a violator of the Law. If this is called obedience, it is called thus in a wider sense and by consequence. Men surely do not conform with the very law by mere passive obedience, without the concurrence of active obedience; and most men suffer even the most just punishments unwillingly. Hence the conventional saying: The law obligates either to obedience or to punishment, is not well quoted in this connection. For 1) in that saying obedience is distinguished from, and placed over and against punishment; 2) the first part of the quotation (obedience) is understood *per se* and independently, the last part (punishment) is understood only mediately, viz. because of the violation of the law. Hence there is here no accurate opposition of terms. And the threat which is added to the Law, must be distinguished from the Law itself, although it is closely connected with it.... Who would say that the damned angels and men in hell are rendering God obedience? Still less can this

view be admitted in this matter, because the suffering of Christ derives all its meritoriousness from the dignity and holiness of the person suffering."

8. The passive obedience of Christ was rendered by Him "as man's substitute," "*patiendo poenam, quam homo iuste perpessus erat, Christus sustulit*," Quenstedt. With noonday brightness this conception of the suffering of the Godman, the "**ebed jehovah**," appears from that remarkable passage in Isaiah 53, which contains the quintessence of New Testament teaching. To allow one, who is not a Lutheran, to speak to us on this text, I shall outline to you the comment of George Rawlinson, Canon of Canterbury and professor of ancient history at Oxford. He paraphrases verse 4 thus: "Surely they were our griefs which He bore. The pronouns are emphatic, having set forth at length the fact of the servant's humiliation (verses 2, 3), the prophet hastens to declare the reason of it. Twelve times over within the space of nine verses he asserts with the most emphatic reiteration, that all the servant's sufferings were vicarious, borne for man, to save him from the consequences of his sins, to enable him to escape punishment. The doctrine thus taught in the Old Testament is set forth with equal distinctness in the New Testament (Matthew 22:28; John 11:50-52; Romans 3:25; 5:6-8; 8:3; 2nd Corinthians 5:18-21; 8:9; Galatians 3:13; Ephesians 1:7; 1st Peter 2:24; etc.) and forms the hope, the trust, and the consolation of Christians. 'He carried our sorrows'. Christ's sufferings were the remedy for all the ills that flesh is heir to. 'Yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God'. They who saw Christ suffer instead of understanding that He was bearing the sins of others in a mediatorial capacity, imagined that He was suffering at God's hands, for His own sins. Hence they scoffed at Him and reviled

Him, even His greatest agonies (Matthew 27:39-44). To one only and him not one of God's people, was it given to see the contrary, and to declare, aloud at the moment of His death: certainly this was a righteous man (Luke 23:47). 'But he was wounded for our transgressions, etc.' This verse contains four asseverations of the great truth that Christ's sufferings were for us, and constituted the atonement for our sins. The forms varied but the truth is one" (*Pulpit Commentary*).

9. It is a pity that the vicarious character of Christ's suffering which was witnessed by many of God's ancient chosen race, who also knew this text in Isaiah, was not understood by them, but by a poor heathen centurion. There lies in that an omen of what would be the fate of this teaching in the ages to come. The scribes of our day all scoff at the idea of the Christ suffering as our substitute. And yet this very fact, that Christ "dous heauton antilytron hyper pantoon," 1st Timothy 2:6, is to be the record, that is to be published concerning Him. The text, 2nd Corinthians 5:21, I expounded to you at some length in our study of the Catechism [W.H.T. Dau, *Notes for Lectures on the Catechism* (no place: mimeographed, 19--), pages 52f., 89f.], and showed from it the two imputations on which the salvation of man rests: 1) the transfer of man's sin to Christ who bears them as His own by assumption; 2) the transfer of His righteousness to us who appropriate it by faith. This text too teaches the substitutive suffering of Christ *luce clarius*. But [however] warily and gingerly a person can talk on this strong text, when he does not wish to emphasize the vicarship of the great sufferer too much, can be seen in the comment of Dean Farrar on this text: "Paul speaks with definite reference to the cross. The expression is closely analogous to that in Galatians 3:13 when it is said that

‘Christ has been made a curse for us’. He was, as St. Augustine says, *‘delictorum susceptor, non commissor’*. He knew no sin: nay He was the very righteousness, holiness itself, Jeremiah 23:6; and yet for our benefit, (!) God made Him to be ‘sin’ for us, in that He ‘sent Him in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin’ Romans 8:3. Many have understood the word ‘sin’ in the sense of sin offering (Leviticus 5:9), LXX; but that is a precarious application of the word, which is not justified by any other passage in the New Testament. We cannot, as Dean Plumptre says, get beyond the simple statement, which St. Paul is content to leave in its inexplicable mystery: ‘Christ identified with man’s sin; man identified with Christ’s righteousness’” (*Pulpit Commentary*). The same lukewarmness in confessing the doctrine of the vicarious suffering of Christ we find in the comment of Prebendary Huxtable of Wells Theological College on Galatians 3:13: “‘genomonos hyper hämoon katara’ having become on our behalf a curse. The position of ‘katara’ makes it emphatic. The form of expression ‘become a curse’ instead of ‘become accursed’ is chosen to mark the intense degree in which the Law’s curse festooned upon the Lord Jesus. Compare the expression ‘made Him on our behalf sin’ in 2nd Corinthians 5:21. Probably the form of expression was suggested to the apostle by that found in the Hebrew of the passage of Deuteronomy which he proceeds to cite. The preposition ‘hyper’, for, on behalf of, may possibly mean ‘in place of’ as perhaps in Philemon 13, but this idea would have been more distinctly expressed by ‘anti’ and the strict notion of substitution is not necessary to the line of argument pursued” (*Pulpit Commentary*).

Since the question is raised whether the Greek preposition in texts like those quoted may express the idea of

substitution, we must inquire of the lexicographers. Milke-Grimm give as the second meaning of “hyper” the Latin “*pro*,” in the sense of *pro alicuius salute, in alicuius commodum*, or the German “*fuer*.” He adds the following remark: “*cum quod in alicuius commodum agitur, non raro fieri non possit nisi ita ut eius vice et loco agitur (quem admodum ex apostolorum doctrina mors Christi propterea saluti nobis vertitur, quod expiatorii sacrificii vim habet et nostro loco appetita est) facile intelligitur, cum ‘hyper’ ut latinum ‘pro’ et nostrum ‘fuer’ etiam significat loco, seu vice (quod definitus dicitur ‘anti’, inde utrumque adverbium alternatur ab Irenaeo, etc.)*.” “Hyper” and “anti,” then, when occurring in passages that speak of the suffering of Christ, are used interchangeably, and the earliest Christian writers so use these terms. The reason is because the benefit which Christ intended to obtain for men by His suffering could not be obtained in any other way than by His assuming their place under the Law’s vindictive statements and submitting to its punishment in their stead. We noted this fact when we spoke about the Mediatorship of Christ. Any theologian who is in earnest when teaching the benefit of the suffering of Christ for men, will not shrink from teaching that those sufferings were vicarious. If he shrinks from teaching this latter doctrine, it is doubtful to say the least whether he can show any real benefit to men to have resulted from the sufferings of Christ. Also at this point objections have been raised. It is questioned whether the voluntary death is a moral act. The argument that Christ intended His own suffering and death, that He purposely surrendered to His captors, that He did nothing to stay the oncoming of death, took no medicine and did not employ His divine power to check mortality, yea, that He expired when He was not exhausted – all these details

are used to discount the value and merit of His dying. It is held that Christ was under the common obligation to preserve His life; His self-surrender, then, is a sort of suicide, although He did not lay violent hands on Himself. This argument, appalling in its very conception, commits the same fallacy that we noted in connection with Christ's obedience (active): it views Christ as a mere man, and overlooks the fact that Christ, being God, had sovereign power over all things, hence also over life and death. He could dispose of His human nature and human life as He chose. Moreover the argument forgets that the very death of Christ was embraced in the eternal council of God for man's salvation, and hence could not be avoided without thwarting the entire plan of redemption.

It is furthermore held that to punish one person for another, particularly to punish a righteous for a guilty person, is an unjust action of which the just God could not become guilty. In order to remove this difficulty, we must distinguish between a person who voluntarily undertakes to suffer for the guilt of another, and a person who yields to violence which lays another man's guilt on him against his will. When a person of his own free will and accord offers to take upon himself the guilt of another with the intention of rendering satisfaction for the same, such a person does not suffer wrong when punishment is inflicted on him. When the death penalty is imposed on a person who not only did right himself, but also shows in every possible way that he is unwilling to suffer for another, then the judge would act wickedly who would force the reluctant party to undergo punishment and who would slay the innocent in the place of the criminal party. It is a faulty conclusion, therefore, that is drawn from the violent imposition of the death penalty, which would be wicked, to the voluntary assumption of the

death penalty, which is an honor both to the equity of the judge, and to the love of the party assuming the penalty. Both kinds, then, of the obedience of Christ were vicarious, and both were necessary for our redemption. Quenstedt: "*Agendo culpam, quam homo iniuste commisserat, expiavit, et patiendo poenam, quam homo iuste perpessus erat, Christus sustulit.*" Quenstedt expatiates on the reason why both kinds of obedience were necessary as follows: "Since man was to be not only freed from the wrath of God, his just judge, but was also in need of righteousness, that he might be able to stand in the presence of God, and since he could not obtain this righteousness unless the Law were fulfilled, therefore Christ assumed both obligations, and not only suffered for us but also rendered satisfaction to the Law in all points, in order that this very fulfilment of the Law and His obedience might be counted to us for our righteousness."

13. All that Christ has done and suffered for us is now placed before us as a "vicarious sacrifice." We are to study Christ the priest as Christ the victim. Baier represents the "*sacrificium*" of Christ as the central and cardinal fact of His sacerdotal or mediatorial office, when he says: "*sacerdotale officium in eo consistit, quod Christus inter Deum et homines, a se invicem dissidentes medias partes tenet, ita quidem, ut pro hominibus Deo reconciliandis sacrificium et preces efferat.*" The work of offering up sacrifices is an acknowledged function of the priestly office, so much so that no one can be considered a true priest without it. In numerous passages the Epistle to the Hebrews parallels Christ, the High priest of the new covenant, with the ancient high priests of Israel, and proves that the sacrifice of Christ was necessary, not only as the antitype of the sacrifices of animals in olden times, but also as their

complement, from which those old sacrifices derived their sacred importance and virtue. Baier succinctly states the points of difference and the points of agreement between the sacrifices in Israel and that of Christ thus: "The sacrifice of Christ excels the sacrifices of the priests of the Old Testament, because the latter were the types and shadows of the former and had to be frequently repeated; but the sacrifice of Christ is the antitype and possesses in itself expiating virtue, and that without limit, nor did it have to be performed but once." The idea underlying a sacrifice was this: The man for whom an atoning or expiating sacrifice was being offered, was forced to confess that he was guilty and had deserved the wrath and punishment of God. Obeying the ordinance of sacrifices, which God Himself had instituted, the guilty person caused some animal to be slain in his place. In his heart he thought at the same time of the future Messiah who was to be slain like a victim and was to die for the sins of all men, and in view of whose sacrificial death God meanwhile suffered that typical action, by which some brute was slain and offered to Him in accordance with His own institution and ordinance, to please Him in such a way that on account of the virtue of the antitype Christ. He regarded the person for whom the sacrifice was made by the priest as worthy of His grace and pity. Quenstedt explains the twofold "*finis ac usus*" of sacrifices, the legal and the evangelical. "The legal use of sacrifices was that there was in them a remembrance made of [sins], Hebrews 10:3, viz. that sinful men might by the sacrifices be reminded of the gravity, atrocity, and guilt of their sins. Thus the sacrifices were the means for rousing contrition.... Their evangelical use was that they might loftily exhibit that singular propitiatory sacrifice which was to be offered for us some time on the altar of the

cross, and that they might reconcile penitent sinners with God, Leviticus 1:2, 3, 9, 13, 17; 2:1, 2, 9, 12; 6:15, 21; 17:11; Genesis 8:21.... However these sacrifices had expiating and reconciling virtue as types, namely insofar as the bodies of the animals were substitutes and representatives of that victim which in the fullness of time was to be offered for the sins of the world. However, those animal sacrifices were signs to illustrate a truth, *nuda signa sāmantika*, but they were divinely ordained instruments, which were to exhibit to sinners the Messiah, who was to be God incarnate and in His assumed humanity offered Himself in His own time as a sacrifice to the Father for the sins of the whole world. They were also to offer, apply, and seal to sinners the fruits of the bloody obedience of Christ. No power and efficacy to expiate sin must be ascribed to the levitical sacrifices *ex se et per se*, or because of the exalted station of the person offering them or because of the work performed and on account of the mere external act of rendering the sacrifice without repentance or faith on the part of the person rendering it. This is what Hebrews 10:4 refers to when we read that it is 'impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin'. Still the power and efficacy to expiate sin must not be denied of those sacrifices, when they are considered as types and shadows, and insofar as they were substitutes and representatives of the victim which was to be offered for the sins of the whole world in the fullness of time." This remark of Quenstedt removes the seeming contradiction between Leviticus 17:11: "It is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul," and the text just cited from Hebrews (10:4). Dannhauer adds: "The levitical sacrifices were not salutary in and by themselves, without faith; the sacrifice of Christ is salutary in and by itself, and does not receive the power to save

from faith but gives blessings to faith; though only those who by faith embrace the victim Christ become actual sharers of His salvation. The Socinians and Grotius, therefore are outside of the teaching of Scripture when they contend that it was not by sacrifices, but by the priests in the Old Testament that the Jewish nation or its members were expiated, and that this was moreover done, only for sins committed in ignorance, or from weakness. Everything, then, in the old economy of grace which God had set up among the chosen race pointed to a sacrificial offering which the great High priest of all time was to make. The New Testament Scriptures indicate this sacrifice in a host of passages. We have there such statements as these: "edookēn heauton hyper hāmōn," Titus 2:14; "hē sarx mou hyper tās tou kosmou zooās," John 6:51; "heauton prosānegken," Hebrews 9:14; 7:27; "paredookēn heauton hyper hymōn prosphoran kai thysian too theō eis osmān euodias," Ephesians 5:2. The Baptist sees in the Christ who is entering His life-work "hō amnos tou theou," John 1:29; and Hebrews 5:7 reminds us that His sacrificial acts must not be limited to His death on the cross; for "deāseis te kai hiketārias pros ton dynamenon sozein auton ek thanatou meta kraugās ischyra kai dakryōn prosenegkas." The vicarious character of Christ's sacrifice is once more indicated by "hyper toon idioon toon tou laou (hamartion)," Hebrews 7:27; and the effect of the sacrifice by "kathariei tēn syneidāsēn hymōn," Hebrews 9:14. Thus the New Testament is ringing with a sonorous echo everywhere with the solemn truth so strikingly uttered in Isaiah 53:5-7. The slaying of Christ, which was to the Jews and Gentiles a horrible crime, was to Christ a priestly event and most acceptable to God. In every true sacrifice offered by a priest there is, if the sacrifice consists of an animate creature,

1) a slaughtering, or destruction, of the victim; 2) the offering up or consecration, of the victim to the honor of God. In the text cited before Christ Himself is mentioned as the victim of His own sacrifice, and Hebrews 9:12 places "the blood of goats and calves" in contrast to "his own blood," showing that the slaughtering of the victim had taken place, and states that with His own blood He "entered into the holy place," showing that the consecration of the victim to God had taken place. The death of Christ then is viewed in Scripture as a true sacrificial death. This sacrifice, according to another testimony of Scripture, Hebrews 7:27, took place but once. "*Christus est sacerdos Novum Testamentum monadicus*," Andreas Osiander. His sacrifice is never repeated. The sacrifice of the mass in the Roman Church pretends to be an unbloody repetition of the bloody sacrifice of Christ. The Papists have also invented the ingenious distinction between a propitiatory and an oblatory sacrifice, the former, they say, is not to be repeated, but the latter is, because by it the blessings of the former are conveyed to individuals. They also contend that the texts in Hebrews cited afore do not state any more than this that Christ offered Himself once, and that by one offering He accomplished His priestly mission, but they do not state that this offering cannot be repeated in a substitutive or emblematical manner. We reply to those Papistical arguments by saying: 1) the distinction between propitiatory and oblatory sacrifices amounts to nothing, a) because the Papists must grant, what even their own theologian Vasquez grants, viz. that for a true sacrifice the physical destruction of the thing offered is required; b) because Hebrews 9:22 states that without the shedding of blood there is no sacrificial remission of sin; hence the shedding of blood would be required also for their oblatory sacrifice, which they

term an unbloody one; c) because we find in Scripture no trace of an unbloody sacrifice, unless it were metaphorically and improperly so termed. 2) The distinction between propitiatory and oblatory sacrifices amounts to nothing, because there exists no obligatory or applicatory sacrifice. The application of the blessings of the sacrifice is made by means of the word and the sacraments, not by another sacrifice, for that might again need a sacrifice to make it applicable, and so on *ad infinitum*. There is also a difference between the application of a blessing by means of faith and by means of a sacrifice; the former is necessary; about the latter we do not find a word in Scripture. 3) The term "ephapax," once, denotes not only the singularity, but also the perfection of an act, as in Hebrews 6:4, when we read of "those who were once enlightened." If the term "once" is not to exclude the idea of repetition in this case, who will hinder us from claiming that it must not have that force when used in connection with the birth of Christ, and His temptation, which occurred once? Lastly, we hold with Hebrews 10:2 that figurative, or representative acts of worship were characteristic of the Old Testament which had to foreshadow things to come; but there is no place for such figurative acts of worship in the New Testament which has the substance of things.

The Socinians have minimized the importance of the sacrifice which Christ made of Himself on the cross by claiming that His death was merely a preparation for His priestly office; that His priestly office was not performed on earth at all, but is now being performed in heaven; that He had, indeed, begun His offering up while on earth, but had perfected it first in heaven. But they have an altogether peculiar view of the priestly office. "*Munus Christi sacerdotale*," says their dogmatician Crellius, "*in eo situm est, quod potestate sibi a Deo*

data poenas peccatorum a suis auferat, eorum que salutem procuret. Proinde hoc munus idem est re ipsa cum regio Christi munere et ratione tantum quadam ab eo distinguitur." We have here an idea expressed that has cropped out again and again in later times, viz. that salvation is effected by an exercise of the royal sovereignty of Christ. Sins are removed by an arbitrary "*fiat*" of the mighty God, not by a legal procedure of the just and merciful God. While people who hold this view may still talk of the death of Christ, the historical reality of which they cannot deny, they have entirely set aside the sacrificial and expiatory meaning of the death of Christ for our sins. We shall learn anon that the Socinians and their followers also deny the vindictive righteousness of God.

Our text-book now proceeds to point out to us sundry effects that have resulted from the sacerdotal sacrifice of Christ, the so-called *finis cuius sacerdotii Christi*. This is expressed by a number of synonymous terms and phrases: "rendering full satisfaction to divine justice," #14; "making atonement and expiation for sins," #15; "reconciling the world with God," #16; "propitiating God in our behalf," #17; "redeeming all men," #18. The particular force of each of these terms must now be studied.

14. The term "satisfaction" is placed before all the rest as the most comprehensive term. The term itself does not occur in Scripture in the sense in which the dogmaticians use it; it has been deduced from such statements as Psalm 69:4: "I restored that which I took not away"; Isaiah 53:4f.: "he bore our griefs"; from the force of the term "redeem" in Matthew 20:28 (lytron), and 1st Timothy 2:6 (antilytron); "propitiation" in 1st John 2:2; 4:10 (hilasmos), and Romans 3:25 (hilastarion); "reconciliation" in Romans 5:10, 11 and 2nd Corinthians 5:18f.

(katallagä); “redemption” in Ephesians 1:7 and Colossians 1:14 (apolytroosis), in 1st Peter 1:18, 19 (lyutroosis), in 1st Corinthians 6:20 (ägörosis), and in Galatians 3:13 (exägorasis). In all these statements there is contained the idea that the justice of God required some satisfaction for the offense which man had offered to the divine righteousness by sinning. This satisfaction has been rendered by the vicarious sacrifice of Christ; for according to Romans 3:25, “God hath set forth” Christ “to be a propitiation,” i.e. He wants Christ to be looked upon as a being who has propitiated God, and in whom God now declares “his righteousness for the remission of sins.” God declares that He has nothing more to exact from sinners; He is fully satisfied with what Christ had done, and is now free to remit sins.

Socinian theology virtually denies that there exists in God such an attribute as the *iustitia vindicativa*, avenging justice. We meet with an argument like this: Any person is free and permitted to remit any offense. Should God have less rights than a man? We challenge this sweeping claim that any person is free to condone, or remit any offense. When Eli condoned the wicked acts of his sons, and failed to assert his parental right and authority, he sinned against God, 1st Samuel 2:24, 29. In the same manner King Ahab sinned when after the battle at Aphek, he failed to put to death the Syrian King Benhadad, 1st Kings 20:42. A person may remit something of his own right, provided nobody else’s rights are thereby violated. A person may and should remit as much as he could demand to satisfy his private vindictiveness, but he cannot remit the satisfaction due the laws and the public interest. In a word a private person may and should remit offenses, however, without violence to the right of God; but God, because of His

eternal and unchangeable justice, cannot remit without satisfaction being rendered Him.

When we say this we do not say that God can do less than man. Even a man cannot always condone offenses that have been inflicted on him, without due satisfaction, although he may and ought to forgive them so far as his desire for revenge is concerned. Not to be able to condone an offense without satisfaction is proof of the highest moral perfection, namely of natural sanctity and righteousness, not of impotence and imperfection in a person (Quenstedt).

15. The English word “atonement” occurs in Romans 5:11 for “katallagä,” and in Leviticus 23:28 for “**kipphurim**”; in 2nd Samuel 21:3 for “**caphar**.” The English term is compounded out of “at” and “one,” and signifies making two parties who had been divided to be at one again. The lid on the ark of the covenant on which the high priest sprinkled the blood of atonement on the annual festival is called the “**kapporeth**.” The English word expiation is derived from *ex-piare*, to appease thoroughly, i.e. to remove the anger directed against a being hated, to make that being to appear pious. In the texts quoted under this section we find in 1st John 2:2 the term “hilasmos” from “hilaskomai,” to make gracious or friendly. The two texts of 1st John 1:7 and Titus 2:14 express that a companionship has been established between God and sinners, because of the sacrifice of Christ which cleanses them from sin.

17. Virtually the same effect is expressed by “katallassoo” and “katallagä” in 2nd Corinthians 5:18, 19, and Romans 5:10; “apokatalassoo” in Ephesians 2:16 and Colossians 1:20. The verb “allassoo” is derived from “allos” and denotes: to make someone to be another, i.e. to change his character or relation to another. The compounds merely

intensify the action expressed by the simple verb. The English "reconciliation" is derived from "re" and "concilium," and signifies that parties are sharing one another's councils and fellowship again after a season of estrangement. In 2nd Corinthians 5:18, 19, the reconciliation of God to the sinner world is traced to four causes: 1) God reconciled the world unto Himself (*causa impulsiva*), man being dead in sins would make no overtures to the offended Deity, looking toward his restoration to the divine from His divine philanthropy, the Father became "*principium et origo huius reconciliationis*." 2) He reconciled the world by Jesus Christ, *causa meritoria*. 3) He reconciles the world by the word of reconciliation, the Gospel ministry, which He has committed to men, *causa instrumentalis ex parte Dei*. 4) We are being implored to become personally and individually reconciled, viz. by believingly accepting the word of reconciliation, *causa instrumentalis ex parte hominis*.

18. "Apokatallassein" is placed alongside of "eirānopoiein" in Colossians 1:20 and the grammatical relation of the two verbs is such, that the action expressed by the latter precedes that expressed by the former verb. The sacrificial blood of Christ is a peace offering made to God, who accepts that offering, and thus becomes reconciled to the parties for whom the peace offering is made. The same though underlies the statement in 1st Thessalonians 1:10: the "orgā erchomenā." God is angry at the sinner and will reveal His anger on the day of judgement. To appease the wrath of God, Christ died. The angry God and the loving God are paralleled in Romans 8:32: 1) God "delivers" Christ "up for us all," visits all His righteous fury upon His Son; then, He freely gives us all things, viz. for the sake of the sacrifice which Christ made to Him. Thus Christ had become our "hilasmos," 1st John 2:2; our

"hilastärion," Romans 3:25. His work is the perpetual appeasement of God's anger, and represents the mercy seat of the new covenant, the **kapporeth** of the Israel of faith. In the Church of Israel, the lid of the ark concealed the tables of the Law. These tables were regarded as the inexorable witnesses against the people because of their transgressions. The lid of the ark with the spreading wings of the cherubim overshadowing it and the blood of the atonement sprinkled upon it every year, and covering it, hid the guilt of the people from the eyes of God and subdued His anger.

Also against this teaching men have protested. The Socinians and their modern followers profess themselves shocked by the idea that God should be a wrathful being who harbors thoughts of revenge, and must have His anger changed to love. In Germany, they are denouncing this teaching as "Bluttheologie." Calov's reply to the Socinians still answers every important argument of the other side under this head. He takes up the argument that we do not find it written that Christ had reconciled God to us, but only that we have been reconciled to God by the death of Christ, and says: "It amounts to the same thing, whether we say that Christ has reconciled God to us, or us to God; for He has in either case removed the enmity which existed between us and God. For, while man was an enemy of God, God was offended at man because of man's sin; and this enmity had to be laid aside on either side, in order that a reconciliation might be effected among them. However, the reason why it is said "we to God" rather than "God to us," [is] because God is the offended, man the offending part. However, he who offends is said to become reconciled to him whom he has offended. Thus we are commanded in Matthew 5:23 to be reconciled to him whom we have offended, and the

wife is commanded in 1st Corinthians 7:11 to become reconciled to the husband whom she has offended; in the same sense Christ is said to have reconciled us to God, because we have offended God, and against our wickedness the anger of God is revealed from heaven. But whichever view we take it amounts to the same thing, especially when it is granted that both sides, not only one side, had a heart full of enmity. For then it will be manifest of itself that the reconciliation has been effected, not only with reference to one of the two parties but with reference to both. The divided parties in this case are God and man who must be reconciled. Nobody questions that man is opposed to God before he is reconciled. However we have proven from the holiness and righteousness of God, as well as from clear statements of Scripture that before a reconciliation with man is effected, God hates man because he is a sinner, Psalm 5:6; 45:8; Romans 1:18, 32; Galatians 3:13. Again it is quite evident from Scripture that Christ has removed the cause of God's anger, i.e. the wrath of God. Accordingly He has effected the reconciliation, not only in this way that He reconciled man to God, but also in this way that He reconciled God to man."

The love of God is urged against the teaching that God had to be reconciled. In Romans 5:8 – so Socinus urges – the love of God is commended in that Christ died for us. This commendation, or praise, of God's love would be diminished by our view of the satisfaction and reconciliation. Against this argument Calov declares: "The love of God is in no way decreased by the teaching that God has been angry at the human race, but since Scripture exhibits both facts (the love and the anger of God), both must be reverently received, and explained according to the analogy of faith. The love of God is

located in this fact that He has loved us as the work of His hand that was once created in His image. However, God's anger consisted in this, that God held us fettered by the might of His justice as transgressors of His law, under sin and guilt. It was the love of God that, when we had to die, gave us Christ for a mediator and had Him to die in our stead. It was the wrath of God that punished our sins in His Son, and surrendered Him to the most shameful death to atone for our sins." There is, however, one term that deserves special study in this connection. It is the term "redemption and redeem," with which we meet in this paragraph, subdivisions 4, 19. The Scripture terms that have been rendered by these words "apolytroosis," Hebrews 9:15; 1st Corinthians 1:30; "exagorazoo," Galatians 4:5; 3:13; "lytroo," Titus 2:14; 1st Peter 1:18; and "gaal," Hosea 13:14. But the Scriptural terms that have been rendered by "ransom" or "give ransom" belong under this head, because they express the same idea: "lytron dounai anti," Matthew 20:28; "antilytron dounai hyper," 1st Timothy 2:6; "padach," Hosea 13:14. Likewise the terms that have been rendered by "purchased," peripoieomai," Acts 20:28; "buy," agorazoo, 2nd Peter 2:1. In all these terms and phrases there lies the thought of the paying down of a price for the liberation of a captive. Baier: *redemptio solutionem pretii, quod satis est, pro captiva, denotat*. Quenstedt: "By inherent force the word 'redemption' denotes a new or repeated, buying, and the recovery for a certain price of something that a person had once possessed, but that had been transferred to the ownership of another. It is called in Hebrew: '**geulah, pheduth, pedin**', in Greek: 'lytroosis, apolytroosis, agorasis, exagorasmos'. We do not deny that sometimes the word "redemption" is taken in an improper and metaphorical sense,

to denote simply liberation without the intervention of any real ransom; but we do deny over and against the Socinians that the word is taken in this sense in the Scriptures whenever there is mention made of the redemption accomplished by Christ. In their proper signification these words denote always liberation through some intervening ransom. In this sense the noun **'geulah'** is taken eight times in Leviticus 25 alone (confer Ruth 3:13), and the verb **'gaal'** if we examine its native force and biblical usage denotes redemption properly so called, and implies the ransom or price of redemption, which must intervene in a purchase of this kind. Or we may say it denotes not a mere liberation, but one that costs something and is based on blood relationship. Nor does it simply denote this costly purchase, but also an obligation to redeem another which arises from consanguinity (Blutraecher, blood avenger). And thus it properly denotes to assert possession of, and to claim for oneself, upon the right of relationship and consanguinity, a thing that has become alienated from us and has, as it were, past over to someone else. And thence has sprung the noun **'gaal'**, which denotes an avenger, who on the one hand, is joined by blood relationship to the parties to be redeemed, and hence has the authority to redeem, and who, on the other hand, pays down some price for the redemption, Numbers 35:12; Leviticus 25:29, 33; Ruth 3:9, 12, 13; 4:1, 5, 6, 8, 14. Also the verb **'padah'** occurs in the sense of redeeming by means of ransom; and hence it signifies to get something back by right, to get it out of another's possession by violence, Exodus 13:13, 15; 34:20; Psalm 49:8; Hosea 13:14. The verbs **'agorazein'** and **'exagorazein'** have the same meaning. Hence this rule is to be noted, when the term 'purchase' is taken in the sense of 'liberation', no matter whether the verb **'agorazoo'** or

'exagorazoo' is used, it always denotes acquiring something or setting someone free, by paying down the price of the ransom. Now the redemption by which Christ the Godman has set free the human race... is a true redemption, properly so called.... This statement is proved by the following arguments: 1) by the proper signification of the word redemption. In this great mystery, which rests only on the revelation made of it in Holy Scripture, we must not without urgent necessity depart from the proper meaning of a term and have recourse to tropes and figures; 2) from the emphasis and the propriety of the words **'padah'** and **'gaal'**, when [it] applies to the redemption of Christ.... 3) from the mention of the **'lytron'** and **'antilytron'** in Matthew 20:28; Mark 10:45; 1st Timothy 2:6; 4) from the description of the **'agorasmos'** and **'exagorasmos'** of Christ in 1st Corinthians 3:20; 7:23; Revelation 5:9; Galatians 3:13; 4:5.... 5) from the declaration of the **'peripoiäs'** of Christ in Acts 20:28 when it is said that God, viz. the God who had 'his own blood', hence the incarnate God, Jesus Christ, has purchased (bought) the church with His own blood. This redemption is quite properly and satisfactorily called a redemption by purchase, because it is made by means of the price of Christ's blood. In Ephesians 1:14 we are told that by Christ we have the **'apolytroosis täs peripoiäseoos'**, the redemption of the possession, i.e. the acquired or purchased, or plenary redemption; 6) from the plain declaration of the ransom by the payment of which we are redeemed, 1st Timothy 2:6; (Christ Himself) Matthew 20:28; Mark 10:45 (the soul of Christ); 1st Peter 1:18 (the blood of Christ); Ephesians 1:7; Colossians 1:20, 22; Hebrews 9:12; Revelation 5:9; Hebrews 9:15 (the death of Christ and the offering up of His body.)"

The doctrine of the vicarious atonement, satisfaction, and reconciliation of Christ has been one of the most fiercely contested points in Christology in all ages down to our times. Dr. Warfield of Princeton in the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia*, 1, 350ff., reviews the five chief theories of the Atonement that have appeared in the history of the church. 1) "The triumphatorial theory conceives the work of Christ as terminating upon Satan, so affecting him as to secure the release of the souls held in bondage by him." This theory had many representatives in the patristic age down to St. Bernard. Warfield finds it also in Luther. "The idea runs through many forms, speaking in some of them of buying off, in some of overcoming, in some even of outwitting the devil." Warfield rightly adds: "It would be unfair to suppose that such theories represent in any of their forms the whole thought as to the work of Christ of those who made use of them, or were considered by them a scientific statement of the work of Christ. They rather embody their author's profound sense of the bondage in which men are held to sin and death, and vividly set forth the rescue they conceive Christ has wrought for us in overcoming him who has the power of death." This is certainly true in regard to Luther and the Lutheran church. Quenstedt: "God, the supreme Lord and righteous judge, had concluded us under sin, Romans 3:19; 11:32; had assigned us to eternal punishment, and by reason of His justice demanded that we be punished, Romans 1:32. He therefore, it is who really and principally held the human race captive because He upon His own authority can and does inflict the extreme punishment. To Him alone, therefore, not to the devil the ransom had to be paid." 2) A second view of the atonement which shades off into many varieties is the mystical. "This conceives the work of

Christ as terminating physically on man, so affecting him as to bring him, by an interior and hidden working upon him, into participation with the one life of Christ. The fundamental characteristic of the mystical theories is their discovery of the saving fact, not in anything which Christ taught or did, but in what He was. It is upon the incarnation rather than upon Christ's teaching or His work that they lay stress, attributing the saving power of Christ, not to what He does for us, but to what He does in us." These tendencies appear already in the patristic age. "In the Reformation age this type of thought was represented by men like Osiander, Schwenkfeld, Franck, Boehmer, Wiegel. In the modern church a new impulse was given to essentially the same mode of conception by Schleiermacher, Rothe, Schoeberlein, Lange, Martensen, among whom what is known as the 'Mernsburg School' will be particularly interesting to Americans, e.g. J. W. Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, Philadelphia, 1846. Here belong: F. D. Maurice, *Theological Essays: The Doctrine of Sacrifice*; B. F. Westcott, *The Sacrifice of the Cross*; H. Clay Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant*; the theory which has been called 'salvation by sample' or 'salvation' by gradually extirpated depravity also has its affinities here (Swendenborg, Edward Irving, D. F. Barnet. The essence of this theory is that what was assumed by our Lord was human nature as He found it, that is, as fallen; and that this human nature, as assumed by Him, was by the power of His divine nature (or of the Holy Spirit dwelling in Him beyond measure) not only kept from sinning, but purifies from sin and presented perfect before God as the first fruits of a saved humanity; men being saved as they become partakers (by faith) of this purified humanity, as they become leavened by this new leaven. Certain of the elements which Hofmann built into this

complicated and not altogether stable theory – a theory which was the occasion of much discussion about the middle of the nineteenth century - reproduce some of the characteristic language of the theory of the ‘salvation by sample’” (Warfield).

3) “Moral influence theories.” Theories which conceive the work of Christ as terminating on man, in a way of beginning to bear on him inducements to action: so affecting man as to lead him to a better knowledge of God, or to a more lively sense of his real relation to God, or to a revolutionary change of heart and life with reference to God. The essence of all these theories is that they transfer the atoning fact from the work of Christ to the response of the human soul to the influences or appeals proceeding from the work of Christ. The work of Christ takes immediate effect not on God but on man, leading him to a state of heart and mind which will be acceptable to God, through the medium of which alone can the work of Christ be said to affect God. At its highest level this will mean that the work of Christ is directed towards leading man to repentance and faith, which repentance and faith secure God’s favor, an effect which can be attributed to Christ’s work only mediately, i.e. through the medium of repentance and faith it produces in man. Accordingly, it has become quite common to say in this school that it is faith and repentance which change the face of God; and advocates of this class of theories sometime say with entire frankness, “there is no atonement other than repentance.” (Auguste Sabatier, *La Doctrine de l’expiation et son evolution historique*, Paris, 1903; English, London, 1904, page 127). Theories of this general type differ from one another, according as, among the instrumentalities by means of which Christ affects the minds and hearts and actions of men, the stress is laid upon His teaching or His example, or the impression made

by His life of faith, or the manifestation of the infinite love God afforded by His total mission. The most powerful presentation of the first of these conceptions ever made was probably that of the Socinians (followed later by the rationalists both earlier and later: Toellner, Bahrot, Steinbart, Eberhard, Loeffler, Henke, Wegscheider). They look upon the work of Christ as summed up in the proclamation of the willingness of God to forgive sin, on the sole condition of its abandonment; and explained His suffering and death as merely those of a martyr in the cause of righteousness or in some other non-essential way. The theories which lay the stress of Christ’s work on the example He has set us of a high and faithful life, or of a life of self-sacrificing love, have found popular representatives not only in the subtle theory with which F. D. Maurice plied out his mystical view and in the somewhat amorphous ideas with which the great preacher F. W. Robertson clothed his conception of Christ’s life as simply a long (and hopeless) battle against the evil of the world to which at [last He] succumbed; but more lately in writers like Auguste Sabatier, who does not stop short of transmuting Christianity into bald altruism, and making it into what he calls “universal redemption by love,” i.e., anybody’s love, not specifically Christ’s love for [us, but] everyone who loves takes his position by Christ’s side, as, if not equally, yet as truly, a Savior as He. (See citation above. See also Otto Pfleiderer, *Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens, in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung*; Horace Bushnell, *The Vicarious Sacrifice, Grounded in Principles of Universal Obligation*: “Vicarious sacrifice was in no way peculiar.”) In this same general category belongs also the theory which Albrecht Ritschl has given such wide influence. According to it, the work of Christ consists in the establishment

of the kingdom of God in the world, i.e., in the revelation of God's love to men and His gracious purposes for men. Thus Jesus becomes the first object of this love and as such its mediator to others; His suffering and death being, on the one side, a test of His steadfastness, and, on the other, the crowning proof of His obedience (*Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii, par. 41-61). Similarly also, though with many modifications, which are in some instances not insignificant, such writers as W. Hormann (*Der Veikehr des Christen und Gott*), J. Kaftarr (*Dogmatik*), F. A. B. Nitzsch (*Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*), T. Haring (*Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben an Christus*), where he sought to corrupt Ritschl's view by the addition of the idea that Christ offered to God a perfect sorrow for the world's sin, which supplements our imperfect repentance. E. Kuehl (*Die Heilsbedeutung des Todes Christi*), G. A. F. Ecklin (*Der Heilswort des Todes Jesu*). The most popular term of the "moral influence" theories has always been that, in which the stress is laid on the manifestation made in the total mission and work of Christ of the ineffable and searching love of God for sinners, which, being perceived, breaks down our opposition to God, melts our hearts, and brings us as prodigals home to the Father's arms. It is in this form that the theory was advocated (but with the suggestion that there is another side of it), for example by S. T. Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*), and that it was commended to English-speaking readers of the last generation with the highest ability by John Young of Edinburgh (*Life and Light of Men*), and with the great literary attractiveness of Horace Bushnell, and has more recently been set forth in elaborate and polemic form by W. N. Clarke (*Outlines of Christian Theology*), J. Vincent Tymms (*Christian Idea of Atonement*), J. B. Stevens (*Christian Doctrine*

of Salvation), C. M. Meade (*Irenic Theology*). The professors of Andover Seminary have made an attempt (George Harris) to enrich the "moral influence" theory of the atonement after a fashion quite common in Germany, with elements derived from other well-known forms of teaching. In this construction Christ's work is made to consist primarily in bringing to bear on man a revelation of God's hatred to sin, and love for souls, by which He makes men capable of repentance and leads them to repent revolutionarily. By this repentance, then, together with the sympathetic expression of repentance by Christ, God is rendered propitious. Here Christ's work is supposed to have at least some (though a secondary) effect upon God; and a work of propitiation of God by Christ may be spoken of, although it is accomplished by a sympathetic repentance. It has, accordingly, become usual with those who adopt this mode of representation to say, that there was in this atoning work, not indeed a "substitution of a sinless Christ for a sinful race," but a "substitution of humanity plus Christ for humanity – Christ." By such curiously compacted theories the transition is made to the next class.

4) Theories which conceive the work of Christ as terminating on both man and God but on man only primarily and on God only secondarily. The outstanding instance of this class of theories is supplied by the so-called "rectoral or governmental theories." These suppose that the work of Christ so affects man by the spectacle of the sufferings borne by Him as to deter men from sin; and by this deterring men from sin, enables God to forgive sin with safety to His moral government of the world. In these theories the sufferings and death of Christ become, for the first time in this conspectus of theories, of cardinal importance, constituting indeed the very essence of

the work of Christ. But the atoning fact here too, no less than in the moral influence theories, is man's own reformation, though this reformation is supposed in the rectoral view to be wrought not primarily by breaking down man's opposition to God by a moving manifestation of the love of God in Christ, but by inducing in man a horror of sin through the spectacle of God's hatred to sin afforded by the sufferings of Christ, through which, no doubt, the contemplation of man is led on to God's love to sinners as exhibited in His willingness to inflict all these sufferings on His own Son, that He might be enabled, with justice to His moral government, to forgive sins. Representative: Hugo Grotius, as an attempt to save what was savable of the established doctrine of satisfaction from disintegration under the attacks of the Socinian advocates of the "moral influence" theories. It was at once adopted by those Arminians who had been most affected by the Socinian reasoning, and in the next age became the special property of the better class of the so-called supra-naturalists (Michaelis, Storr, Mones, Knapp, Strudel, Reinhardt, etc.). It has remained on the continent of Europe to this day, the refuge of most of those, who, influenced by the modern spirit, yet wish to present some forms of "objection" that is of Godward atonement – F. Godet.

19-27. The extent of the spiritual blessings which result from the mediatorial work of Christ can be viewed a) negatively, as a deliverance from all those harmful elements which stood in the way of the sinners' union and communion with God. Christ redeemed men 1) from the Law, and that in a threefold [sense]. The injunctions of the Law were laid upon sinful man as a "yoke of bondage," Galatians 5:1, and man was treated as a servant, Galatians 4:7, not as a son, so long as he

was still at enmity with God. Now that reconciliation has been effected, the relation of the sinner to God is not determined by the Law, but by the Spirit of Christ, who dwells in believers and initiates them into a state of spiritual liberty, which Christ has procured for them, because He was placed under the Law as their substitute. Also the verdict of the Law is changed towards believers. The Law cannot hurl its curses against a person who has complied with its demands. Christ has deflected the curse of the Law upon Himself, Galatians 3:13. The Law cannot be inflicted upon the redeemed. It is an old maxim that no one shall be punished twice for the same offence. The punishment which Christ underwent was in reality our punishment, Isaiah 53:5, hence, we are immune. Christ redeemed men 2) from sin. Scripture uses as equivalent for the term "redeem" such terms as "purging," Hebrews 1:3; "bearing," Hebrews 9:28; "cleansing" our sin, 1st John 1:7; "washing" us from sin, Revelation 1:5. These terms represent in their unity and variety the complete removal of our trespasses from us in the sight of God. The blood of Christ is the sinbath which God applies to the world. As redeemed by Christ men are sinless. Hence it follows that Christ has redeemed men 3) from death, the direct consequence of sin. A) A threefold kind of death may be distinguished: the spiritual death, i.e., the extinction of those spiritual perfections, with which man was created in the beginning, the loss of the divine image; B) the temporal death the dissolution of that physical bond which unites body and soul; C) the eternal death, the endless state of torment, the constant dying without being dead, which is the fearful lot of those who have been cast away from God, the fountain of life. The work of Christ removes spiritual death, because it quickens men unto an unselfish life in the service of Christ, 2nd

Corinthians 5:15; it removes temporal and eternal death, because it takes away the horror which sinners have of dying, the grave and hell. The redeemed may look upon temporal death as an empty terror, Hosea 13:14, a mere physical process that brings them no harm but only everlasting gain, Hebrews 2:9, 15. And lastly, Christ has redeemed men 4) from the devil, the author of sin and God's executioner to the sinner. The devil's power was wielded over men through the instrumentality of death, Hebrews 2:14, 15, the certain expectation of which fills the hearts of men [with] fear and dismay. When death has been destroyed, the devil's power is gone, and his slaves quit their tyrannical master. However, the mediational work of Christ brings us positive blessings, which fit us for the fellowship with God here and hereafter. These are: 1) righteousness, dikaiousynä, that condition which God requires in the moral and intelligent beings whom He created after His own image. The obedience of Christ is the basis of this righteousness, Romans 5:19. The redeemed are given the assurance that the full merit of Christ's legal acts is theirs, that in Christ they are made "the righteousness of God," 2nd Corinthians 5:21. 2) Life and eternal bliss. The work of Christ restores sinners to the kind affections of God, who is love, 1st John 4:8. His cross is the tree of life and the burden of that cross has power to heal those who have been bitten by the hellish serpent, John 3:14-16. Looking unto Jesus, as the afflicted Israelites in the camp in the wilderness looked to the brazen serpent on the pole, brings solace to the terrified conscience and the assurance of heaven and its joys.

28-30. Among the mediational acts of Christ one remains to be noted: His intercession. In the days of His flesh Jesus offered up strong prayers with crying. He prayed for the

conversion of the ungodly, Luke 23:34, and for the confirmation in faith of the godly, John 17. This was a true priestly function in which we see also the ancient Jewish high-priest engaged. Every other mediational work of Christ ceased when He died; but the work of intercession goes on after His resurrection – yea, this work is now become the prominent feature of His eternal priesthood. The intercession of Christ in the state of exaltation consists in this, that Christ exhibits as perfect the sacrifice which He rendered. He appeals to this sacrifice as the evidence that men's guilt cannot be visited upon them anymore. This intercession in glory therefore differs from the intercession which Christ made in the state of humiliation in that state He was in the form of a servant and by His obedience was striving to effect the sinner's reconciliation. The present intercession is a glorious act. Christ does not on bended knees and with tears streaming from His eyes, humbly beseech God to be merciful; but He submits the full value of His merit with the confident assurance of a victor to the inspection of the just God and thus obtains the sinner's pardon.

§124. Christ our only High priest.

"Christus est sacerdos Novum Testamentum monadicus," Andreas Osiander. The claim of Christ to exclusiveness in His sacerdotal functions rests on His qualification for these functions. The central fact in the priestly activity of Christ is His obedience. This obedience is shown to be a) a sovereign action, because it is an action of the Lawgiver Himself, who is superior to the Law to which He submits; b) a free involuntary and voluntary action, because there is no

constraint placed upon Christ in His obedience except such as He chooses to place upon Himself; c) a perfect action, because there is nothing in the person who renders this obedience to cause any deficiency; d) a truly human action, because by reason of His self-imposed exinanition the divine qualities of this high-priest did not hinder Christ from, but merely supported Him, in rendering also a sullering [sic] obedience; e) a representative or substitutive action, because the merit of the obedience which Christ rendered to the Law was not needed by Him for His own justification; f) an invaluable action because it was the obedience of God Himself. Therefore Paul emphasizes that there is "heis mesitäs, and Peter declares that salvation is in none other than Christ, Acts 4:12.

§125. The Prophetic Office of Christ.

This paragraph may be subdivided as follows: 1-4 state the personal qualifications of Christ for the prophetic office, and His surpassing excellency in this respect over all other beings who have discharged prophetic functions. 5-7 describe the functions immediate of the prophetic office of one Lord, i.e. all those actions in which He personally engaged and those measures which He personally adopted or erected while on earth for carrying on His prophetic work. 8-11 describe the *functiones mediatae* of the prophetic office of Christ, i.e. those acts, measures and ordinances by which Christ provided agents for the continuation of His teaching.

12. The concurrence and cooperation of the exalted Christ in glory with those persons who carry on His prophetic

work after Him, and with those measures which serve to carry on His work.

I.

1. The prophetic office of Christ, or Christ as prophet, has been a theme of the inspired writers. Through Moses God sewed the seeds of promise into the hearts of His nation by pointing them to a future progeny of their race, who they must expect to rise up among them by divine order, and having a divine mission and commission, because He would come with Jehovah's words in His mouth, and speak with the authority of Jehovah's command, Deuteronomy 18:18. To aid the Israelites to form a proper conception of this "**nabi**" of the future, Moses compared Him to himself, "**Bkamocha**," i.e. the prophet was to do for them as remarkable things as Moses had done at Sinai, when he brought them the statements of the holy and righteous will of God. Baier finds points of coincidence in Moses and Christ, because of their "*familiarius consortium*," more familiar intercourse with God, which was accorded them above other prophets, also because like Moses Christ was not only doctor but also *dux* to His people. Dannhauer points to the intercession of either with God, but this would be better referred to the priestly office. That Christ, however, was also superior to His ancient type Moses, will appear from the entire chapter. The *tertium comparationis* is the mediatorship of both.

The promise made in Moses' day was remembered in the days of Christ, when men declared: "houtos estin aläthoos ho prophäetäes ho erchomenos eis ton kosmon," John 6:14, and when Peter in his discourse at the beautiful gate cited the prophecy of Moses and asserted that it had been fulfilled by Christ, Acts 3:22. Yea, God had Himself introduced the world

to this prophet by His witness from heaven at the transfiguration; the "akouete" in Matthew 17:5 simply takes up the other injunction in Deuteronomy 18:19. And Paul looks back upon the earthly career of Christ, and views it chiefly as that of a prophet, for "euāgelisato," he proclaims good tidings, Ephesians 2:17.

2. The **nabi** in ancient Israel was "*interpres Dei apud homines*." God communicated to him what He was to communicate to men. In dreams and visions, often times darkly figuring a certain truth, he received his information, and in dark sayings and typical actions he set forth to people what he had received from God. The prophet of the future was expected to be clearer and more distinct in his teaching, leaving out all types, and symbols, and figurative speeches and teachings.

This condition was met by the personal qualities of Christ. He was "wisdom," "**chokma**" personified ("**Ani**"), Proverbs 8:12. He was with God "before the beginning of his ways, before his works of old" (verse 22). And when He came to dwell with men, He left not His personal qualifications behind, but brought them with Him. This strange text in the Old Testament depicts, indeed, not with New Testament clearness and precision, still with sufficient distinctness the eternal Logos in His relation to God and men. He is, upon entering this nether world, the embodiment of all that is wise and prudent.

3. The incarnate Son of God declares, John 14:6: "Ego eimi alātheia." The entire statement in this text really is a description of the prophetic office of Christ. "It supplements the former utterance. The disciples may best understand the way He is taking when they grasp the fact that He is going to the Father to prepare the place for them, and so becomes 'the

Way, the Truth, the Life' for all who are coming after Him, 'following Him afterwards' to the Father. Grotius sums up this great saying by regarding Christ as 'the *Exempium, Doctor et Dator vitae aeternae*'; Luther speaks of it as referring to the past, present and future; Calvin, as the '*Principium, medium et finis*, and Augustine '*vera vitae Via*', but each term means more than this. The way of approach to God is constituted by His simply being the incarnate Logos, by His revealing the mind and nature of God, by His laying down His life for the sheep that He might take it again. It is not easy to say why our Lord should have added 'the Truth and the Life'. The two further terms used by Himself are probably introduced to throw light upon the way to the Father. Thus there are numerous assurances that He is the Truth Himself, i.e. the adequate and sufficient expression of divine thought. All the promises of God are yea (i.e. uttered) and Amen (i.e. are confirmed) in Him! He is 1) the absolute Truth about God['s] nature: 2) the perfect exponent of God's idea of humanity; 3) the Light of the world; 4) the expression of the reality touching the relations between moral beings and God – all the relations, not only those of saints and angels, but those of rebels and sinners, whose destiny He has taken upon Himself. He is the way because He is the whole truth about God and man, and concerning the way to the Father" (H. R. Reynolds, D.D. in *Pulpit Commentary, ad locum*). "In Matthew 11:27 Christ claims for Himself complete perception (epigignoskai) of the Son and the Father, i.e. all that is embraced in the idea of sonship and fatherhood. He has spoken in the preceding verses of a knowledge that is hidden from men. Men do not always understand God, because He has not revealed to them all that He is, or does, or the reasons for His actions. But such impossibility to understand God does not

exist with Christ. 'You may think it strange', thus He virtually says, 'but I alone have that knowledge of God, which enables me to understand His ways: I alone, yet others also, through me, viz. if I reveal it to them'" (A. Lukyn Williams, M.A. in *Pulpit Commentary*). "Apokalupsai" is a designation of His prophetic activity; so that we have in this text both His qualification for the prophet's office and the chief function of that office stated.

4. While the texts under 2 and 3 express chiefly the eternal wisdom which Christ possessed by the eternal generation from the Father, hence as Christus the text now before us shows that the incarnate Christ, Christus "ensarkos," is filled with immense, grand and sublime gifts which equip Him for the purpose for which He becomes man. "Upon Him, the last scion of Jesse's royal line, there 'rests the Spirit of **Jahweh**', '**nachah halav ruach jehovah**'. The human nature of our Lord required, and received abundantly, the sanctifying and enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit. Those influences were not in Him transient, or occasional, as in too many men, who more or less 'resist the spirit', but permanent and enduring. They 'rested upon Him; from the first to the last, never quitted Him and never will quit Him'. The influences of the Holy Spirit are manifold, effecting the entire complex nature of man. Here three pairs of graces are set forth as specially manifested in the Messiah through the power of the Spirit: 1) 'wisdom and understanding', '**chokmah ubinah**', or intellectual and moral apprehension ('eusynesia'), the ability to perceive moral and intellectual truth; 2) 'counsel and might', '**ezah ugeburah**', or, the power at once to scheme and originate, and also to carry out thought into act; 3) 'the knowledge and the fear of God', '**daat wejireath Jehovah**', or acquaintance with the true will of God, combined with the

determination to carry out that will to the full. All the qualities existed in the greatest perfection in our Lord," George Rawlinson, M. A. in *Pulpit Commentary*. Paul declares that in Christ "pantes hoi thäsauroi täs sophias kai gnoseoos apokryphoi," "all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid," Colossians 2:3. "Bengel, Meyer, Alford and others make the relative pronoun, 'en hoo', neuter, referring to 'mystery'; but 'Christ', the nearer antecedent, is preferable. In Him the apostle finds what false teachers sought elsewhere, a satisfaction for the intellect as well as for the heart –treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and unsearchable mysteries to exercise the speculative reason. 'Hidden' is therefore a secondary predicate: 'in whom are these treasures – as hidden treasures' (Ellicott, Lightfoot)," G. G. Findlay in *Pulpit Commentary*. And when the same apostle states in 1st Corinthians 1:30 that Christ "egenäthä sophia hämin apo theou," he means to state that of the prophetic fullness streams shall flow forth unto us. In fact, He is wisdom to us; we are wise if we but know Him.

Thus Christ is placed before us as the Sage of Ages. He is the foundation of the truest, greatest, most blessed knowledge that can come to man. He is the divine answer to all the perplexing and vexing riddles of life. Hence Christ was not trained for His prophetic office in Heaven, nor by special revelation, but He had received infinite knowledge by the personal union. Upon Him the Spirit had descended without measure, John 3:34. The Socinians, accordingly, err when they claim that during His 40 days' fast in the desert Christ was caught up into heaven, and was there informed and installed as prophet

II.

We now enter upon a study of the activity of Christ as a prophet "in the days of His visible conversion on earth," or the *functiones immediatae* of His prophetic office. The seven distinct points mentioned in our text-book under this head are all related to the order and means of salvation: the first three (5-6) show how Christ taught salvation, the last four (8-11) what measures He adopted to perpetuate His own teaching among men, after His visible sojourn on earth should have been terminated. The teaching of salvation, then, may be said to be the great object of the prophetic office of our Lord.

5. We have in Isaiah 61:1 with its New Testament parallel, Luke 4:18, the official program of the prophetic Christ. The phrases "**ruach adonai jehovah halai**" and "pneuma kuriou ep' eme" exhibit His commission and place Him before us as ordained to the functions which He proceeds to name. These functions are all expressions of that mercy which succors sinners in their spiritual distress. In prophetic language they are all expressed in striking imagery: 1) "**lebaser anwim**," "euangelizesthai ptochois," to preach good tidings unto the meek, to preach the Gospel to the poor; 2) "**lahabosh lenischlech leb**," "iasasthai tous syntetrimmenous tñn kardian," to heal, to bind up the broken-hearted; 3) "**likro leshbujim derur**," "käryxai aichmalootois aphesei," to proclaim liberty to the captives, to preach deliverance to the captives; "**lasurim pekah kur**," the opening of the prison to them that are bound; 4) "typhlois anablepsin," recovering of sight to the blind; 5) "aposteilai tethrausmenous en aphesei." The captivity, the wounded condition, the blindness, etc. here spoken of, are of a spiritual nature, and the activity of our Lord who wrestles with these conditions is likewise a spiritual activity, for which only spiritual means and agencies are

employed. It is the removal of the effects of sin from the human heart which this prophet has set Himself to effect. Elsewhere His activity is described by "käryssoon to euangelion tou theou," Mark 1:14, "käryssoon to euangelion tās basileias," Matthew 9:35. The Gospel of God, or of the Kingdom, is the cheering message that God, in spite of the sinner's offensiveness to the holy Being is willing to set up His gracious rule in their hearts. Christ acted as the herald of God for this message. In a still more general way His prophetic activity is described by "didaskoon," Matthew 9:35, and "exägäsato," John 1:18. The former expression represents Him as the Instructor of the ignorant, the Tutor of the rude; the latter as the skilled interpreter who leads forth into light the hidden mysteries of God.

The evangelical activity of Christ has been placed at the head of the *functio immediata* in our textbook; this was the essential feature of His prophetic office. But Christ proclaimed also the Law of God, by showing its true meaning, which had been buried in His day beneath the traditions of the elders, and by applying it fearlessly to all sorts and conditions of men. However, the teaching of the Law was only an auxiliary work, which was to aid Christ towards His real work. The knowledge of sin is necessary to the sinner to the end that a sensation of guilt may be visited upon him, and he may be led to understand the necessity of a Helper greater than himself who is to bring him out of his misery. Seb. Schmidt, accordingly, remarks correctly: "*Non propterea in mundum venit, ut legem suam veterem explicaret aut perficeret, sed ut evangelium adferret et ad hoc accipiendum homines per legis explicationem praepararet.*" "“Prootos’ evangelium, ‘deuteros’ legem et quidem propter evangelium docere debebat," Kromayer. And

the extent and quality of the legal teaching of Christ is rightly summed up by Kromayer: "*Christus quidem fuit legis doctor, sed non legislator.*" He offers these three reasons: 1) *Moses legifer et Christus salutifer*, John 1:17, *sibi opponuntur*; 2) *doctrina Christi, prophetae magni*, Deuteronomy 18:18, *opponitur terribili voci legis*; 3) *Christus de lege quaestus, non aliam quam Mosis profert*, Matthew 22:37-40; 4) *Novae leges quas a Christo latas putant adversarii, in lege Mosis continentur.*

It is one of the chief errors of our age that Christ is proclaimed as a distinguished teacher of morals, who promulgated new laws, by obeying which man is to be saved. This is merely the old papistic leaven which has entered the Church through the teachings of Rome and has been finally settled in a fixed form by the Council of Trent: "*Si quis dixerit Christum Jesum a Deo hominibus datum fuisse ut redemptorem, cui fidant, non etiam ut legislatorem, cui obedient, anathema sit.*" To what sad extremes men can be led when they have begun to study the prophetic activity of Christ from the view point of a legislator, can be seen from the remark of the Socinian Crellius, who held that the ancient philosophers had explained the functions of virtue in this life in a far more perfect way than Moses. The Arminians hold that Christ is altogether a legislator and that His Gospel is a *nova lex*.

5. Our textbook names as the second immediate function of the prophetic office the predicting of future events. The repeated foretelling of His passion, which was to culminate in His crucifixion and His resurrection on the third day, Luke 18:31-33, of the place and manner where His disciples were to find the animal that was to bear Him into the city at His entrance into Jerusalem, Matthew 21:2, 3, of the destruction of

Jerusalem and the signs preceding the last day, Luke 21:5-35, are cited in evidence. In the popular sense these things are considered the leading functions of a prophet; and they were certainly important and necessary acts in the prophetic work of Christ. They exhibited to the hearers His vast store of knowledge. But they were only one of the seals which God had attached to His divine mission, and as such might be grouped with the matter mentioned in –

7. the manifold miracles which Christ wrought in His own power. All these things were meant as a confirmation of the divine authority of His doctrine. The lordly command, spoken at the bier at Nain: "Neaniske, soi legoo egerthäti," Luke 7:14, is on a par with the miracle at Cana and explains the confession in the prolog of John: "Tautän epoiäsen täñ archän toon sämeioon ho lāsous en Kana täs Galilaias kai ephaneroosen täñ doxan autou kai episteusan eis auton hoi mathätai autou," John 2:11. The term "arc" in this passage points to a long series of similar events; the expression "ephaneroosen täñ doxan autou" states the immediate impression which the miracle produced upon the witnesses; and the statement "episteusan eis auton" names the ultimate effect, which, no doubt, was the intended effect of the miracle. No one can be a successful teacher unless he impresses his pupils with the perception of his ability. Power, efficiency, ability have always been essential to the teacher. That Christ was an able teacher just for this reason that He wrought miracles, we gather from the confession of Nicodemus: "Rabbei [Tischendorf], oidamen hoti apo theou elälythas didaskalos, oudeis gar dynatai tauta ta sämeia poiein ha sy poieis, ean mä äi ho theos met' autou." And years after, Peter, looking back upon the wonderful career of Christ in Israel calls Him "andra

apodeidegmenon apo tou theou [Tischendorf], and gives as the reason why He was thus approved “dynamesin kai terasin kai sameiois hois epiäsen di’ autou ho theos,” Acts 2:22. Many, indeed, are the occasions plainly indicated or remotely mentioned in the Gospels, where the people, who have listened to the teachings of Christ, gave Him credence, not only because of what they had heard, but also because of what they had seen. Christ, accordingly, was shocked at the unbelief of the leaders of His nation, who rejected His teachings in spite of the mighty testimony of His works. He argues, that if His mere teaching had not convinced them (“eipon hymin kai ou’ pisteuete,” John 10:25), His marvelous power, exhibited in His miracles should have convinced them, “ta erga ha egoo poioo en too onomati tou patros mou tauta martyrei peri emou,” John 10:25. He considers them His corroborative witnesses and appeals to the force of their testimony: “ei ou poioo ta erga tou patros mou, mä pisteuete moi; ei de poioo, kan emoi mä pisteuete [Tischendorf] tois ergois pisteuete [T.],” John 10:37, 38. And He holds that these works prove chiefly His intimate connection with God, yea, His Godhead: “hina gnoote kai ginooskäte [T.] hoti en emoi ho patär, kagoo en too patri [T.],” John 10:38. And a graver charge He does not know to prefer against the Pharisees than this: “heoorakate (me [Lachmann]) kai ou’ pisteuete,” John 6:36. Hence, on the one hand, the unparalleled teaching, the consummate wisdom, the matchless information, offered by Christ, and on the other hand, His astonishing power over the forces of nature, etc., that impressed the people with the perception that He was indeed “a teacher come from God,” John 3:2. Matthew and Mark, accordingly have recorded the fact that Christ taught “hoos exousian echoon,” as one having authority and not as do the

scribes (Matthew 7:29; confer Mark 1:27 and Luke 4:32, “kat’ exousian”). Baier gives the reason for this popular impression correctly thus: “*Quod duo nomine et pro auctoritate, ut aiunt credenda pariter atque agenda proposuerit huius cumque animos obligaverit et moverit ad assensum et obsequium sibi praebendum, additis subinde miraculis, quibus mentes illorum percellerentur.*”

When Christ quitted the scene of His earthly activity, He could truthfully claim that He had withheld nothing from His hearers, which it was necessary for them to know in order to be saved. He had proclaimed the entire counsel of God for man’s salvation.

His activity as a prophet of the divine counsel of mercy is world-embracing. As far as the clouds rove over the earth and the dawn of the morning spreads its wings, there are beings to whom He must minister the tidings of divine grace. To the end that this might be done continuously, even after His removal from earth, He provided certain measures by which His prophetic activity might be perpetuated through others (*functiones mediatae*).

8. The erection of the apostolate is such a measure. Christ had gathered the Twelve about Him that they might be witnesses of His activity as a Teacher” “hymeis martyres toutoon,” Luke 24:48, that had been His object from the very moment that He called them to be with Him: “kai hymeis de martyreite, hoti ap’ archäs met’ emou este,” John 15:27. And for witness-bearing throughout the world He equipped them after His departure to the Father, by sending them the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the promise of His Father, and endowing them with power, Acts 1:8; Luke 24:49.

9. While the apostolate is restricted to eye and ear witnesses of the Lord's activity during His sojourn on earth, Christ has made it the common duty of everyone of His disciples to teach men "to observe all things whatsoever" He had commanded His original followers. This injunction was issued to the multitude who saw Him ascend to the Father, Matthew 28:18, 19. And with the injunction Christ coupled a promise, Matthew 28:20, which connects the work of evangelizing the world with Him as the chief Operator, who merely has chosen to vary His former activity as Teacher of men in this manner that He is now teaching through agents. Every baptized believer in Christ is a commissioned sub-apostle and sub-prophet of the great Prophet of Nazareth. In his particular sphere at home, in the daily routine of his business, etc. he is to carry on the teaching which Christ began in the days of His flesh.

10. The commission which Christ has granted His believers is a commission to dispense (or withhold) grace. He has placed in the hands of His believers the divine means of grace, that through the believers these means might be administered to various parties in accordance with their needs and His instruction. The transfer of the Power of the Keys, Matthew 18:18-20; John 20:21-23, which embraces the proclamation of His own mind to penitent and impenitent sinners with a divine authority and effect, and the sealing of this proclamation by the sacramental ordinances - these are measures through which Christ extends His informing, education-work among men.

11. Lastly, the institution of the Christian ministry is an action belonging to the prophetic office of Christ. Paul indicates by the peculiar language in 2nd Corinthians 5:18: "He hath given us the ministry of reconciliation," that a special office has

been erected for proclaiming to men the fact of their reconciliation with God through Christ and that this office had been at the time entrusted to them. Paul with his fellow ministers was conscious that he discharged the functions of an ambassador in this office. An ambassador represents not himself, but his sovereign. Accordingly, Paul declares that he acts "in Christ's stead," and that God is acting through him, 2nd Corinthians 5:18, 20.

Before concluding our study on these acts of Christ, it is necessary to repeat that also the acts constituting the prophetic office are theanthropic acts. "*In officio prophetico Christi advertendum est, quomodo humana pariter ac divina natura, quod cuiusque proprium erat, contulerint,*" Baier. Scripture has purposely recorded such seemingly insignificant actions, as that Christ "opened his mouth"; that He "began to speak," i.e., that He employed the common organs by which men express thoughts in articulate voice, Matthew 5:1; Luke 4:21. Scripture also enables us to measure this activity of the Lord in a pretty exact way by naming the three passovers which occurred during His earthly activity.

The divine nature in Christ, however, manifested itself in the lordly, sovereign promises which He attached to the ordinances of the sacraments, the Keys, and, in general, to the preaching of the Gospel.

We may note that the Papists have destroyed the prophetic office of Christ by ascribing to their pontiff the "*magisterium fidei,*" the dictatorship or mastery of faith, by introducing new and unheard sacraments not instituted by Christ, and by changing the form of the Eucharist.

12. It remains to note that the ascended Christ has ceased His earthly activity as a prophet but not His prophetic

office. He performs this office now in the state of exaltation, "wherever in His name and by His order, publicly or in private, His truth and doctrine is preached and applied and His ordinances are administered." The office of the ministry in the Church is Christ's office. He teaches through His servants; for, whoever hears them, hears Him, Luke 10:16. It is "in his name," i.e., upon His authority that repentance and remission of sins is preached among all nations, Luke 24:47. The appeals of the servants of the Gospel of Christ to men, to heed the great salvation which Christ has effected, are made "in his stead," 2nd Corinthians 5:20. He has assigned to particular ministers particular work. He supplies not only the laborers in general but the special workmen needed for special work, Ephesians 4:11. Therefore, ministers are "ministers of Christ" to whom they are also amenable like stewards to their lords, 1st Corinthians 4:1. And congregations, among which a Christian minister labors, are God's husbandry and God's building, 1st Corinthians 3:9, i.e., God builds up men through the agency of ministers.

The continuance of Christ's influence and activity is a comforting fact to ministers who are usually despised in this world. It is also a great comfort to their flock to know that Christ regards them so highly.

The matters here named will again be touched upon, when we begin to study the Kingdom of Grace.

§126. Christ the King.

That the Redeemer and Teacher of mankind may be viewed also as robed with royal dignity is evident from many

passages of Holy Writ, both in the Old and in the New Testament. The Messiah of Israel was constantly spoken of as a King, Psalm 2:6; Isaiah 9:6, and the New Testament takes up this ancient idea and verifies it in Christ Jesus, Luke 1:33; Hebrews 1:8. The scene during the trial in Pilate's court deserves study in this connection. "Pilate, therefore, said unto him: 'Art thou a king then?'" John 18:37. "The precise meaning of this exclamation depends on the accentuation of 'oukoun', whether it is 'oukoún', equivalent to *igitur*, 'therefore' ('therefore, on your own showing you are a King'), or whether 'oúkoun' be the form; then it would have the force of *nonne igitur*, expecting an affirmative response. It is an *hapax legomenon* in the New Testament, but it generally implies an inference and a question expecting agreement with the questioner. (Winer, Kuehnen, Godet and Luthardt differ as to the meaning of both 'oukoún' and 'oúkoun'. Westcott and Hort read the former.) Here Pilate flashes out with a haughty rebuke. He has satisfied himself that Jesus was no political rival; but, in wonderment and scorn, he would sound a little deeper the mystery of the kingly claim. It is not a judicial inquiry, but a burst of ironical surprise. So, then, after all thou art a king, even thou? wavering between positive and negative reply. Hengstenberg sees neither irony nor scorn in the 'oukoun', but a certain amount of disturbed equanimity. Jesus answered: 'Thou sayest it, that I am a King'. This mode of affirmation is not found in classical Greek or in the LXX, but it occurs in the New Testament. In the synoptists also it is given as the great answer of Jesus. Some have translated the 'hoti' as 'for' or 'because', and added 'well' and 'rightly' to 'legeis'. Thus: 'Thou sayest well, for I am a King'. Hengstenberg and Lampe separate this declaration from what follows, which they interpret

exclusively of the prophetic office of Jesus; but the 'eis touto' points backward as well as forward, and our Lord accepts that which He proceeds to explain as His royal functions. Wescott, however, says that Jesus neither accepts nor rejects the title of King, but simply reiterates Pilate's words, 'Thou sayest that I am a King; I will proceed to explain what I mean by my royal mission'. Seeing, however, that our Lord had already implicitly avowed His kingly state, it is far better to discern in the reply an acknowledgement of the inference which Pilate had scornfully drawn. (See the parallel method of answering the question: 'Art thou then the Son of God'? Luke 22:70. 'Ye say that I am'; 'hoti egoo eimi'; compare with Mark 14:62.) This is the 'good confession' to which St. Paul refers, 1st Timothy 6:13. This is the assumption before the tribunal of the whole world, that He was and would forever remain its true King.... Our Lord now solemnly declares that He Himself now (solemnly) came to bear witness to the truth in all its amplitude. Hengstenberg sees in these words simply a reference to the prophetic office of Christ; but the next clause shows that our Lord is actually defining by this claim the extent of the Kingdom that is 'not from hence', or from this world as its origin. 'Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice'. To 'hear the voice' is to obey as the supreme authority, chapter 10:8, 16, 27, and the phrase shows how widely the thought ranges. Every mind open to the influence of truth, everyone who is set against the unrealities of mere opinion or tradition, who derives life and joy from the realm of reality, everyone, who therefore knows how different he might be, how much he needs who is 'of God', as the Source and Beginning and Ground of all things.... Everyone that is of the truth heareth the voice of Christ, and will accept His authority as final and supreme. The sublime witness to the truth, which

He had been bearing, in this manifestation of the name of the Father, would make the voice of Jesus the imperial and august authority for all who felt how much they needed truth," the Rev. H. R. Reynolds, D. D. in *Pulpit Commentary*.

Still more remarkable as exhibiting Christ as King is the vision which John relates, Revelation 19:16. He sees the heavens opened and a rider upon a white horse. He that was upon the horse was called Faithful and True, "and in righteousness he doth judge and make war. And he hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written." This means that the name is inscribed on his equestrian mantle, and in particular on that part of it which covers the thigh. "The name is 'King of kings and Lord of lords'. In chapter 17:14 the holy seer had inverted the parts of this title. The title as the context in both places shows portrays the victorious career of Christ 'over the kings of the earth'," A. Plummer in *Pulpit Commentary*.

What Scripture thus states, not in a passing way but on most prominent occasions and in a most emphatic manner, our faith must confessingly reiterate. We must believe and call Christ a King. And while we may acknowledge that there are different phases in the manifestation of His royal dignity before and after His ascension, still we must acknowledge with Calov: "*quoad ius et facultatem agendi iam in terris et in diebus carnis sine ullo defecto (potestatem regiam) habuit; adeoque vix tum fuit Christus, idque ab ipsa conceptione, super omnia.*"

It is customary to speak of a *triplex regium Christi officium*. This is done in view of the fact that those whom Christ governs as King hold different relations to Him and are differently governed by Him. In ruling unbelievers – and all creatures in general – Christ manifests chiefly His power; in governing His believers here in time He manifests His grace, in

presiding over His blessed saints in heaven, He manifests chiefly His honor and majesty. This division, however, is not to be taken strictly; it is, as Baier says, an *usus loquendi*. For both the Kingdom of grace and of glory presuppose the power of Christ. In gathering the believers on earth into the holy Christian Church and in preserving this Church even against the legions of hell, Christ employs His power. It is due to the power of Christ that there is a Church of God on earth.

The power which Christ employs, also His grace and glory, are the divine attributes which were communicated to His human nature in the personal union. There is no essential difference between the Kingdom of God and of Christ, and the respective phrase in Ephesians 5:5 must be understood in the sense: "*regnum Christi, qui Deus est*," just as in Ephesians 5:20 "too theoo kai patri" means: God, and that, He who is Father. The Kingdom of Christ and God is set off from the kingdom of idols.

§127. Christ's Kingdom of Power.

Scripture in many places represents Christ as Sovereign of an unlimited domain. According to Psalm 8:6, 7, He is ruler of the entire created universe. "The works of God's hands," "all things" are in subjection to Him; the brute creatures own Him their Master. This text is taken over into the New Testament and referred to Christ, with the significant addition: "In that he put all in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him," Hebrews 2:7, 8. In the Creator's design there is nothing left out that is not put in subjection under Him. And it is to be noted, that according to this text in Hebrews "the man

referred to in Psalm 8 is not man in general, but the particular man, Jesus Christ. In the vision recorded in Daniel 7:13, 14, there is one brought before the "Ancient of Days," before the Father, who is called "the Son of man." The prophet has in the preceding chapters described the rise and fall of the great world powers. He now introduces the Lord of an empire that has no equal. It is absolutely universal and ever-enduring.

These texts speak of the dominion being "given" to Christ. Anything that is given to Christ must be referred to His office. As the Son of man, as the Substitute of man, and for the purpose of carrying out God's merciful plan of salvation, He was given to have and to hold and to exercise also according to and in His human nature, that sovereignty and glory which He possessed as God in His consubstantiality and coequality with the Father and the Spirit from eternity. The whole situation is summed up in the words which the glorified God-man addresses in the moment of parting to His disciples: "Edothä moi pasa exousia en ouranoo kai epi tās [Lachmann] gäs," Matthew 28:18. And in the exercise of this sovereign and limitless authority, He dispatches them into all the world, and endows them with marvelous powers. He owns the nations to whom they shall come beforehand; the oceans over which they shall sail, the hostile elements among brute creation or among intelligent creatures, which they may encounter, are all under His sway.

The opening words of the text in Hebrews 2:7 call attention to the fact that this mighty Potentate came among men without the trappings of royalty. He, before whom the bright seraph veils his face and before whom the devils quail, was exposed to vile temptations by the devil like any common mortal, and He needed the comforting ministrations of the

good angels in the desert and in the Garden. That was the condition of the King of Power in the state of humiliation and exinanition. Only occasionally rays of His glorious power broke through the veil of His humble exterior. The humiliation of this mighty Prince of heaven was necessary for redemptive purposes.

Now that His purpose is achieved, He has entered upon His exalted state. A Name has been given Him that is above every other name: He is Lord of lords and King of kings; and willingly or unwillingly every knee of saints and angels above, of believers or unbelievers on earth, of devils below is bent in acknowledgment of His unquestionable supremacy, Philippians 2:10, 11. This world has seen great emperors and generals, and statesmen and philosophers. The unseen world of spirits has its ranks and orders. But there is not any authority among men or created spirits that might be considered equal to His. He overtops all, Ephesians 1:22; 1st Peter 3:22. Only One there is who equals Him, that is the God, at whose right hand Christ the God-man is set down in glory, 1st Peter 3:22.

Regnum potentiae, says Baier, est quo Christus huic universo potenter dominantur, idque conservat et providentissime gubernat. Ideoque subditi sunt in hoc regno sunt omnes creaturae. In this Kingdom Christ rules *potenter*, by the exercise of His irresistible omnipotence. The expression “all things are put under his feet” also indicates this. Men may rage against Him as the second Psalm pictures them, but He laughs them to scorn and holds them in derision. Sovereignly He presides over the affairs of the universe; the rise and fall of nations, the planning and machinations of statecraft, the issues of wars, the evolution of science – all are superintended by Him, directed by Him, governed by Him. Without knowing it the

world lives and moves and has its being in Him; He bears up all things with His mighty Word.

True the actual appearance of things at times seems to contradict this view of His sovereignty. As the closing words in Hebrews 2:8 say: “Now we see not yet all things put under him.” For an exhibition of His longsuffering and patience with the impenitent and for the exercise of the faith of His believers, He permits His enemies to seemingly triumph over Him and His people. But even in such cases He rules them; they are like Balaam and Caiaphas, His agents and instruments. The study of the origin and progress of Christian missions, home and foreign, presents many opportunities for studying the rule of Christ’s power. Yea, the entire study of Church History is full of illustrations of this rule. But the day is coming when also these temporary checks and drawbacks to His universal and absolute lordship will vanish utterly, and the patient, oft-despised King of the Cross will ride upon His cloud-chariot, a King of transcendent glory, and the universe will quake at the back of His finger.

Our textbook states that Christ’s government of power is “according to His wise, good and just purposes.” Yes, also the enactment of justice, of vindictive justice belongs into this Kingdom. Some have assumed a fourth Kingdom besides the three mentioned in our *Outlines*. They have taught a *regnum iustitiae*, which is to embrace the devils and the wicked in hell. But since these are even now under the rule of Christ’s might, though they are under His vindictive justice, in so far as they are being punished for their wrongdoing, we see no reason to create a special Kingdom on their account, but classify them with all creatures who have not become partakers of the grace and glory of Christ in the *regnum potentiae*.

§128. Christ's Kingdom of Grace.

In His reply to Pilate Christ has not only affirmed His royal dignity, but also described a quality of His Kingdom, when He said: "My kingdom is not of this world," John 18:36. We have just seen that He possesses a world-embracing sovereignty, which in His parting words to His disciples He Himself asserted. There must, then, be a form of His dominion and rule that differs from the one which we have so far studied. "*Est quidem regnum Christi in mundo et super mundum, sed non de mundo,*" Quenstedt. There is in this respect a difference between earthly or secular kingdoms and the Kingdom of Christ which is spiritual. It is wholly in accord with this declaration of Christ before Pilate, when He declined the crown which the Jews were on the point of offering Him, John 6:15, and when He refused to perform the office of a civil justice, between two parties who were in litigation about their inherited estate, Luke 12:14.

1. In studying this phase of Christ's royalty, we must view Him in the particular relation which He holds to the Church on earth. He who has all things under Him, the sovereign King of power whom we beheld in the preceding chapter, has been given "to be the head over all things to the church," Ephesians 1:22, 23, i.e., "the exaltation of Christ is not merely an honor conferred on Himself, but has also a definite practical purpose; it is for the benefit of the Church. God gave Him to the Church as Head over all things. The gift of Christ to the Church is the gift of one who has sovereign authority over all things." The Church, then, is viewed as holding a peculiar relation to Christ,

different from that relation which all creatures, also the members of the Church viewed merely as creatures, hold to Him, as King of power. The Church is His "body." "He dwells in the Church, as life dwells in a living body. He fills it with His life, replenishes it with His strength, feeds it with His body and blood, beautifies it with His comeliness, calms it with His peace, brightens it with His holiness and finally glorifies it with His glory." And the Church is, furthermore, "the fulness of him that filleth all in all," "to plärooma tou ta [Tischendorf] panta en pasin pläroumenou." The Church represents the full measure of all the gifts, powers and virtues of Christ. Christ, as Sovereign of the universe, is in all. By His powerful, energetic indwelling in the created universe He gives to all things life and being. All things subsist in Him. "He fills all space with all things. He fills the ocean with water, the organic world with life, the firmament with stars, the entire creation with forms innumerable, alike beautiful and useful. And this majestic, sovereign Ruler of creation makes the Church the measure of His gifts. All that He is and has and does He places at the service of the Church. Constantly there is flowing into the Church the stream of His mighty benefactions." Hence the Church is ruled by Him in a special manner, not simply as all creatures are.

This intimate relation of Christ to the Church is, moreover, exhibited by the figure of the marriage bond, Ephesians 5:23, 24. Here Christ, who was called "the head over all things to the church" in the preceding passage, is called "the head of the church," and that in a sense similar to that in which the husband is called the head of the wife. The Church is placed in subordination to Christ. As the husband, mindful of his station, is "the ever-vigilant and self-denying protector,

guardian, deliverer of his family," so Christ is to His spouse, the Church, only in a far more exalted way.

2. Who are the subjects and what is the instrument of Christ's rulership in this Kingdom? In accordance with His declaration before Pilate, it is His bearing "witness unto the truth," John 18:37. He gains as subjects for this Kingdom those who "hear" His "voice," "who continue in" His "word," and "know the truth," John 8:31, 32. Each one individually, thus becomes His disciple, and all together become His flock, John 10:16. In Old Testament imagery, Judah and Israel, the people of the Covenant, the elect race, are the nation among whom the King rules prosperously and executes judgment and justice, and saves His people so that they call Him **Jehovah zidkenu**, the Lord, our righteousness, Jeremiah 23:5, 6. It is therefore, by His saving Word, the Gospel, and by making men righteous, hence, by justification from sin, that this Kingdom is set up. Wherever the message of pardon is delivered to a penitent and believing sinner, wherever the ordinances of grace, baptism and the Eucharist, are administered, there Christ sets up His gracious rule in the hearts of men, and governs them by the sweet influences of his unspeakable love.

Accordingly, Christ declared to Pilate: "My Kingdom is not of this world" and denied that His servants should fight for Him, John 18:36. And Paul, who was engaged in building up this Kingdom like a good soldier of his King, knew that that the weapons of his warfare were not carnal, 2nd Corinthians 10:4, 5. He was bent upon pulling down strongholds in which the enemies of his King had entrenched themselves, but he knew that he must do this only by spreading "the knowledge of God," and by "bringing... every thought" of men "to the obedience of Christ." *"Non more principium huius saeculi, non armis feris aut*

carnalibus gubernatur regnum Christi," Hollaz. *"Veritatis regnum non coactione, sed persuasione est; nec ius dicit in temporalia, sed in mores hominum,"* Andreas Osiander.

Christ here lays down the principle of the separation of Church and state, and thus blasts the claims of the Antichrist. Pilate understood very well the meaning of His words, though he was unable to measure their full import. To Pilate's mind Christ claimed no more than the Stoic philosophers, who also dreamt of the rule of truth among men. Hence his sneer: "What is truth?" And Eusebius relates that the Emperor Domitian had brought certain relatives of Christ before him, who, on being asked about the royalty of Christ said: "basileian ekeinän ouk einai kosmikän, ä epigeion, all' angelikän kai epouranion." The Catholic hierarchy, especially the Jesuits, reaches out after temporal power and preferment and has time and again proclaimed itself the supreme power in this world in temporal and spiritual affairs. Thus Rome has wiped out the distinction and abolished the separation, which Christ has carefully laid down at His trial before a worldly ruler.

But does this principle of the separation of the Church and state mean that these two organizations have nothing to do with each other? Is it really possible to separate them? Is not the Church constantly laboring for the preservation of the interests of the state? And does not the state protect the Church? How can a practical dividing line be drawn between the two? The answer is given to all these questions by Christ Himself. He says, His Kingdom is in this world. Its existence as an organized society must be secured by the state, like the existence of any other society which has placed itself under the protection of temporal powers. But in protecting the Church thus, the state simply protects those of its citizens who have

organized themselves into church societies. It secures to them merely the right of organizing and keeping up their organization without interference from violent men. Other protection and support than this the Church does not seek or ask from the state, because it needs no protection, since Christ furnishes her that abundantly.

3. "*Subditi in hoc regno sunt homines fideles, qui ecclesiam militantem constituunt*," Baier. The Word of Christ is the "Law of the realm demanding unconditional obedience." To this Word everyone who has become a citizen in the Kingdom of grace bows willingly, just as sheep, hearing the shepherd's voice, follow the Shepherd, John 10:27. Admission to citizenship is only by the door of faith. The ambassadors of the King who go out to establish the obedience of faith among men, know beforehand that they are facing men, who are strongly entrenched behind the strong walls of spiritual ignorance and in the lofty citadel of spiritual pride. The message of pardon which they carry from the King of grace, is spurned by such men, and the messengers become spiritual warriors for their King by arguing with the ignorant, the superstitious, the reckless, the wayward, the proud enemies of divine grace; they pull down strongholds which the carnal mind in all ages has reared to the Gospel; they "cast down imaginations," rather disputations or reasonings, "and everything that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ," 2nd Corinthians 10:4, 5. The authority of Christ Himself supports every proclamation made in His name. When men hear His messengers, i.e., when they hear them so as to obey them, they hear Christ, and when they refuse to hear, or when they despise them, they despise Christ, Luke 10:16. Those who

have embraced the doctrine which is acknowledged in the Kingdom, and have adopted the conduct, which citizens of the Kingdom must adopt, cannot fellowship anyone who causes divisions and offences, "schismata kai skandala," contrary to this doctrine, Romans 16:17, or anyone who claims fraternal relations while at the same time he "walketh disorderly," 2nd Thessalonians 3:6, 14. And to this effect the apostle beseeches for Christ's sake; in His name he commands the brethren.

4. This section places before us the means and agents by which the royal will of Christ is to be executed in His Kingdom of grace. Christ has left unmistakable instructions concerning this matter: a) there is, first, the great commission to evangelize the world by the preaching of the Gospel and the training of men for the observance of all His ordinances, Matthew 28:18-20. This commission rests on the "pasa exousia," the plenipotentiary quality of Christ, and carries with it a promise of His personal presence with the men who shall discharge the commission. There is b) the memorial of His death and the blessed fruit thereof in the Holy Supper, which He desires to see celebrated ("this do ye") throughout His realm, Luke 22:19; 1st Corinthians 11:24, 25. There is c) the appointment of a special class of men to whom the care of the Christian congregations is to be particularly entrusted, the Christian ministers, who must be trained ("as he hath been taught") for this work, and possess certain indispensable qualifications for it, Titus 1:5-9; 1st Timothy 5:7-20. There are d) instructions to the congregation how to deal with sin, if it crops out in a public, offensive manner within the brotherhood, viz., by fraternal admonition, leading to repentance and absolution; or if resisted by the trespassing member of the Church, to expulsion, Matthew 18:15-17; 1st Corinthians 5:13.

All these matters aim at the gathering of His Church on earth and at furnishing it with such graces and powers as will insure its continuation and equip it for its work among men. *“Regnum gratiae est, quo Christus ecclesiam militantem per verbum et sacramentum colligit, conservat et bonis spiritualibus abunde donat,”* Baier. The spiritual gifts of which he speaks, Baier divides into *bona sanctificantia et ministrantia*. Sanctifying gifts or graces are those which all Christians have in common, which they must have in order to be Christians, and which they lose only when they cease to be Christians, e.g., faith, abhorrence of sin, zeal unto good works, etc. Ministering gifts or graces are distributed among Christians in varying forms and measures, e.g., the ability to preach the Word, to exhort men to repentance, to govern the Church, etc. These are what the apostle calls *“διαρεσεις χαρισματοον,”* “diversities of gifts,” 1st Corinthians 12:4, and *“charismata diaphora,”* gifts differing, Romans 12:6. And of these he says: *“Unto everyone of us is given grace “kata to metron tas dooreas tou christou,”* according to the measure of the gift of Christ, Ephesians 4:7.

The institution of the Christian ministry, its preservation and the divine concurrence with the labors of Christian ministers, then, belongs to the royal office of Christ. A great controversy was waged in Reformation times in England between the Puritans and the Papists about the question, whether the institution of the office of the Christian ministry belonged to the sacerdotal, the prophetic or the royal office of Christ. We have already classified the activity of Christian ministers under the prophetic office; however, the institution of the ministry as an office in the Church must be assigned to the royal office. For we have seen from Matthew 28:18 that the commission to evangelize the world and to baptize is issued

by Him, who has all power in heaven and on earth, and in Ephesians 4:11 the gift of teachers and pastors to the Church is in verse 10 ascribed to Him, who by His ascension is elevated above all heavens.

5. The Kingdom of grace has been exhibited to us as an *ecclesia militans*. Its state in this world is throughout the Scriptures described as one full of dangers and requiring mighty supports and tender care. Accordingly, our textbook notes, in conclusion, that Christ, the King of grace, “graciously and abundantly provides for and powerfully protects and defends this kingdom and all His subjects within the same.” He has, with cordial affection, remembered the believers in His last prayer as people who have been given, i.e., entrusted to Him by the Father, and have, like Christ, become separate from the world, as a set of people who are essentially different and whom the world, which loveth its own, cannot but hate for the very reason that they are not of the world, John 17:6, 14, 16. These people are Christ’s own, His cherished possession, and He maintains a most scrupulous and care for them amid the dangers to which they are exposed. Their continuance in grace, their preservation from apostasy and defection are matters of anxious forethought to Him. Their unity as His body, hence, the removal of schism from the Church, is the subject of His prayer, John 17:11, 12; 10:28, 29. Yea, He has extended to one of the spokesmen of the believers on a certain occasion the glorious promise that no power found fighting against the Church shall succeed; even the picked force from Hell’s legions shall quail before the protectorate, which Christ exercises over His Church, Matthew 16:8.

Such are the words that He Himself spoke to the Church while He was still visible with it. These statements verified the

ancient expectation of Him, Psalm 23; Isaiah 40:11; Ezekiel 34:16. The gentle Shepherd of His saved people was a favorite theme of Israel's singer and prophets. And to the words of promise which Christ had given His Church Paul, no doubt, looks back in Ephesians 1:19, 20, when he records "the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe." Yea, there is in this text a significant chain constructed between the personal fate of Christ, the Head of the Church, and the believers, who are His body: As He rose from the grave, thwarting the wicked plotting of His enemies, and ascended to heaven from the very city and land where He had been shamefully put to death, so the divine power which effected these miracles for Christ will attend the believers until the end of time.

"Usque ad consummationem mundi," thus Baier, in accordance with Matthew 28:20, fixes the duration of this Kingdom. The Nicene Creed says: "of whose kingdom there will be no end." These words, we are told, were inserted to cut off the views of millenarians, who dream of a thousand year's reign of Christ on earth. This millenarian kingdom would be limited in time and in number of subjects and thus differ from the Kingdom of grace, while it would at the same time not be the Kingdom of glory. There is no room for this kingdom in the geography of Scripture. It exists no where, but in the imagination of some men.

But the Kingdom of grace will terminate. Paul has given us a remarkable description of this event in 1st Corinthians 15:22-28: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming. Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all

authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith all things are put under him it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all."

This passage has perplexed many commentators, and subordinationists, who believe Christ to be God in an inferior degree, have pointed with particular satisfaction to this passage. Luther has given an elaborate explanation of this text in 1534, in his exposition of 1st Corinthians 15 (Walch, VIII, 1254-1258; 1279): "What does this mean: He shall deliver up the Kingdom? Does not Scripture say everywhere, that He shall be a King forever and of His Kingdom there shall be no end? How, then, do we harmonize this view with these statements that He will hand over His Kingdom and Himself will become subject to the Father and place His crown, scepter and all in the Father's lap? I answer: Paul is speaking of the Kingdom of Christ as it now exists on earth. It is now a Kingdom of faith, in which Christ governs by His Word, not in a visible, public manner." But at the end Christ "will put away faith and this veiled state of affairs, and will publicly present His own before His Father, and will publicly place them in His Kingdom, which He has prepared and which He is now building every day, so that we shall see Him without veil and obscure words." Quenstedt explains the handing over of the Kingdom to the Father thus: *"Non de ipso regimine, sed de modo regnandi seu regiminis forma et qualitate tantum intellegenda sunt, quia scilicet Christus non amplius regnabit per media, nempe per*

verbum et sacramenta, per crucem et inter hostes, ut antea; sed hostibus omnis prostratis, ultimo hoste destructo, impiisque ad tartara de trusis, tradet regum Deo Patri, id est, tradet hostes, captivos et sistet electos, in quibus obtinet regnum suum spirituale. Erit ergo traditione triumphatoria hostium subactorum et repraesentatio fidelium liberatorum. Non deponet per hunc 'paradoseoos' actum regni sui spiritualis et coelestis administrationem, sed saltem alium modum gubernationis tunc Christus in suo regimine auspicaturus est, mutata conditione subditorum, non autem regis, qui regnabit cum sanctis suis in aeternum, quanquam non 'oiknomikoos', sed gloriosissimo triumpho, imperio et dominio." Similarly Dorscheus calls this handing over of the Kingdom "actus non depositionis, sed propositionis."

The Kingdom of grace passes over on the last day into the Kingdom of glory. The handing over of the Kingdom to the Father is, in effect, the same thing as the transformation of Christ's Kingdom here in time, in which Christ has reigned by the secret influence of His Word, into the eternal Kingdom of glory, in which He will govern with uncovered majesty. Nothing in this text can be constructed or construed into a subordinate relation of the Son to the Father, as regards His essence; for the entire passage describes an event which takes place in the course of History. This text states that a change will take place in the condition which Christ and His disciples have had in this world. Christ has been in the foreground now as Head of the Church. As such He was the Lord of the Church and governed the Church by His word, and all things in heaven and earth were subject to Him, in order that He might be able to rule His Church efficiently. On the last day He returns this power. The whole governmental apparatus of the Kingdom of grace, the economy

of grace, is abolished. Christ, the Lord, with His believing subjects enters into the full glory of His everlasting Kingdom, where there is no more need of faith, of preaching, etc., but God is all in all.

Kahnis has drawn the following conclusion from 1st Corinthians 15:24-28: "dass die relative Selbststaendigkeit, welche der Sohn als Haupt der Kirche einnimmt, indem er sie leitet, auferweckt, richtet, nachdem sie in der Ueberwindung des Gegensatzes ihren Zweck erreicht haben wird, aufhoeren wird, damit der Vater das allein waltende Princip werde. Sonach ist unzweifelhaft Schriftlehre, dass der Vater die goettliche Urpersoenlichkeit ist." And Hofmann says: "Das herrschen Christi hat in so fern eben so gut seine Zeit, wie sein Dienen zuvor seine Zeit gehabt hat, als es aufhoert, wenn es seinen Zweck erfuehlt hat."

§129. Christ's Kingdom of Glory.

1. There is a *regnum gloriae*, a future Kingdom to which Christ points His believers, Luke 22:29. They were then in His Kingdom of grace; hence when He appoints them "a kingdom," He means a Kingdom different from the one in which they were citizens at the time. The next verse pictures in Jewish imagery the glory of this future Kingdom, as a rich feast or banquet and as an enthronization of the believers. Likewise the dying thief thinks of this future Kingdom of Christ. His words should be read thus: "when thou comest in" (not "into") "thy kingdom," Luke 23:42, 43. He is looking forward to the second Advent of the Lord, of which he must have heard. Christ affirms his belief, and identifies His future Kingdom with "paradise," the place

and state of everlasting bliss and glory. To this Kingdom Isaiah had been looking forward, when he spoke of the Child whose name is “wonderful” and of whose “government and peace there shall be no end,” Isaiah 9:7; also Zacharias in his *Benedictus*, Luke 1:33.

2. When Christ returns at His second Advent He will appear in the paraphernalia of royalty. What the dying thief beheld with the eye of faith, while he was reading the strange inscription at the head of the cross and looked at the poor, dying Nazarene at his side, that will be a manifest fact, when He comes sitting on His throne of glory. He will be accompanied by the angels’ host. Hence these bright beings are subjects of His kingdom of glory.

3. But His believers, the elect, who have been faithful to the end, all look forward to this Kingdom, and have been promised entrance into the same. “*Adeoque subditi in hoc regno sunt homines beati*,” Baier. The eternal decree of predestination has the glorification of the elect for its climax, Romans 8:30. The call which is issued here in time aims at the same ultimate purpose, 1st Thessalonians 2:12. (The expression “unto his kingdom and glory” means “His glorious Kingdom.”) Of this Kingdom Christ spoke to His disciples as something which His Father would give them, Luke 12:32, because they were His “little flock,” and as something which they should inherit, Matthew 25:34. The thought of this Kingdom was in the Lord’s mind at the last Supper, Luke 22:18, and He, no doubt, represented to Himself that happy scene where He would be surrounded by the celestial company of His perfected saints as He was now by His imperfect saints. With the hope of this Kingdom the believers have comforted themselves amid the afflictions of the present life. At the

appearance of Christ, their Life, they expect to appear with Him in glory, Colossians 3:4. He, the Resurrection and the Life, the Prince of Life, will make their new bodies share the glory of His “*sooma tās doxās*,” the glorious resurrection body and as they have even now their “*politeuma*,” their citizenship, in heavenly faith, they will finally enter Heaven, Philippians 3:20, 21, and will then be ever with the Lord, 1st Thessalonians 4:17.

4. It is the Church Triumphant, which the Lord gathers about Him in this everlasting Kingdom, to receive from them service in perfect obedience, praise and adoration as their Savior and their King. Christ wants His servants to be where He is, John 12:26; 17:24, to receive honor from the Father on account of such service, John 12:26, and to become eye-witnesses of the glory to which Christ has been elevated according to the human nature and of the great affection of the Father for the Son, John 17:24.

There are fine glimpses of the Kingdom of Glory scattered throughout the Scriptures. The aged Apostle Paul has spoken to Timothy (2nd Timothy 4:7) of his fight, “*agoon*,” and of his race, “*dromos*.” He proceeds: “Henceforth” (“*loipon*,” i.e., the work of the conflict being over) it only remains to receive the crown, “*stephanos*” [verse 8]. “The crown of righteousness” means that crown, the possession of which makes the wearer appear as righteous before God. The analogous phrases are “the crown of glory,” 1st Peter 5:4, and “the crown of life,” James 1:12; Revelation 2:10. The righteousness, the glory and the life of the saints are conceived as displayed in crowns, as the kingly dignity is in the crown of royalty. He receives this crown from the “*kritās*,” Christ, “the righteous judge,” bearing in mind the metaphor in the preceding verse is the impartial “*brabeus*,” who assigned the

prizes at the games to those who had fairly won them. "The whole picture is that of the apostle running his noble race of righteousness to the very end, and of the Lord Himself assigning to Him the well-earned crown of victory in the presence of heaven and earth assembled for the solemnity of that great day." All who gather for this magnificent occasion of the crowning of the victors have a personal interest in the event. "It will be a characteristic of those who will be crowned at that day, that all the time they were fighting they were looking forward with hope and desire for their Lord's appearing and Kingdom. 'Thy Kingdom come' was their desire and their petition. They will be able to say at that day, 'Lo, this is our God, we have waited for Him, and He will save us; this is the Lord, we have waited for Him, and we will be glad and rejoice in His salvation', Isaiah 25:9," *Pulpit Commentary*. This very desire Paul expresses to Titus (2:13) and calls it "tän makarian elpida," which gives to the believers here below the attitude of waiting expectancy, "prosdechomenoi." A grand sight it is for which they are straining the eye of faith: "epiphaneian täs doxäs tou megalou theou kai sootäros hämoon läsou christou." The Savior Christ will appear in the majesty of the sovereign God, a lordly spectacle. And He will come as "their" Savior, not only as one who has been theirs in the past, but who comes to save them in the most elevated sense and in the highest degree at the very moment of His coming. Peter, too, urges this ultimate happiness upon his readers as something for which they should strive in a conversation befitting their spiritual state, 2nd Peter 1:11. If they do this he promises them that "plousioos epichorägäthäsetai hymin hä eisodos eis tän aioonion basileian tou (christou) kyriou hämoon kai sootäros läsou christou." The golden gates at the end of the pilgrim's weary path shall be

thrown wide ajar to receive the home-coming saint. He shall not have to sneak into heaven like a thief or a tramp, but come in with the ringing welcome of His Lord like a victor.

And when he is come in, what wonderful sight blesses his glorified vision? Hebrews 12:22-24 tells us that. "Here, as in Galatians 4, Zion and Jerusalem, ideally regarded are contrasted with Sinai. The foundation of the conception is in the Old Testament, the writer of Hebrews probably being a Jew, who addresses Jews. Very often Zion, in the view of the holy writers in both Testaments, represents the Church of Christ in the era of Gospel activity here on earth. But in the context of the text before us it undoubtedly refers to 'the heavenly Jerusalem', the city of the living God, where the believer even on earth held his heavenly citizenship. There he finds 'myriads', which are composed of the 'panägoris angeloon', and the 'ekkläsia proototokoon'. 'Panägoris' in classical Greek denotes properly the assembly of a whole nation for a festival. It is peculiarly appropriate to the angels when regarded as ministering around the throne or as congregated to rejoice over man's redemption." The term "firstborn" likely refers to the Law of primogeniture in Israel, all the first-born being hallowed unto the Lord. The Church of the first-born is God's elect people, whose members are hallowed unto Him as heirs of the Kingdom; for, "their names are written in heaven." And there is God, the Judge, before whom the spirit of man appears when he returns from earth. The text views the Kingdom of glory as it is now before the consummation of the universe, when the bodies of the saints have not yet been raised. The spirits which he views are "perfected," "teteileiomena," they have attained to the full accomplishment of their life-purpose; their warfare is over and they are at rest with God. And there is "the new

Covenant,” “contrasted with the old one before Mt. Sinai, through which no such accomplishment and approach could be obtained. This Covenant, too, like the one of old, has its ratification by the blood of sprinkling. The blood shed by Christ on earth for atonement is conceived [of] as carried by Him with Himself into the holy place on high to be forever the blood of sprinkling. And this blood speaketh ‘better than Abel’s’. Abel’s blood cried from the ground for vengeance, with the accusing voice of primeval sin. Christ’s speaks only of reconciliation and peace. Such is the vision, by the contemplation of which the inspired writers would arouse their readers, amid their trials and waverings, to realize the things that are eternal. He would have them pierce with the eye of faith beyond this visible scene, beyond into the world invisible, which is no less real. If they were perplexed and disheartened by what they found around – by the opposition of the world and the fawness of the faithful – he bids them associate themselves in thought with those countless multitudes, who were on their side in the realm of glory beyond,” *Pulpit Commentary*.

In conclusion of this study our text-book introduces two references from the gorgeous visions which John had of the *urbs coelestis beatifica*. In chapter 19:5 he hears a voice which comes out of the throne saying: “Praise our God, all ye his servants, and ye that fear him, both small and great.” In response to the invitation there is heard “the voice of a great multitude” [verse 6], raised in the *Hallelujah chorus*. In its power and swell and magnitude, it suggests to him the rush and roar, the tumble and dashing of a vast cataract thundering over a cliff. “Hallelujah, the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.” John has just beheld the overthrow of Babylon. He will soon see the overthrow of the kings of the earth. The figure on the throne is

the mighty Warrior who has led His Church militant through many a battle – the Lord strong and mighty, the Lord, mighty in strife. His host which He has led to victory are now assembled around Him in triumph. And now the figure changes suddenly. The warlike scene is turned into a peaceful one. It is the marriage of the Lamb that is begun, the complete union between Christ and His faithful Church is now being consummated since the last enemy is overthrown. When that union has taken place there ensues an eternity of serene, lordly peace, Revelation 22:3, 4. In the city of the Lord there exists nothing accursed, because there is no sin there. Accordingly, God has here reared His everlasting throne and His faithful crowd around this throne of God and the Lamb. All, all is holy joy here. They look into the very face of the Savior, behold Him face to face. They are all pure in heart, hence, they may now see God; and the purifying mark on them is the name of Him, whom we have studied all these months, first as regards His incomparable person, next as regards His matchless office – Jesus Christ, the God-man, the Redeemer, Prophet, King.

The dogmatical material presented under the head of the royal office of Christ is a gold mine of sterling comfort, from which the ministers of Christ should draw the inspiration for and the matter of their funeral sermons at the burial of their believing parishioners. The victorious hope of Christianity should be voiced at the bier and the grave of Christ’s people. When objectively stated from the fullness of Holy Scriptures these truths, spoken at such solemn moments make a most profound impression, far deeper and far more lasting than any account that can be given of earthly life and acts of the departed. Thus, too, will a difficulty be obviated, and a danger avoided, to which the funeral orator is ever exposed. In no case

can the statement be made with absolute certainty that the departed has gone to heaven. In most cases the conscientious speaker salves his conscience by adding in parenthesis “as we have reason to hope,” or words to that effect. And this sounds very much like a charitable construction that is to be put on the case. No reasoning person expects the minister to announce the entrance of the departed into heaven. But all who have come for an honorable purpose attending such an occasion, expect comfort and strengthening of the Christian hope. That can abundantly and effectually be furnished by a contemplation of the details of Christ’s Kingdom of Glory.

Appendix

“... ah, the preface! With Seidemann (*Reformationszeit in Sachsen*, p. I) one regrets that the preface was ever invented. In former times, he says, books were given an index at the end, just as gentlemen wore queues down their back, and you could pretty nearly tell the character of either by examining the final appendage. Nowadays the quintessence, or basic decoction, of a book must be deposited in the preface. That is the philosophy of the matter, whether it is useful or not” (W. H. T. Dau, “Preface,” *The Leipzig Debate in 1519* [Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1919], page III).

Today Seidemann could have included the publisher’s preface, the editor’s preface, the translator’s preface, the preface to the American edition, the foreward, the introduction, the historical introduction, the note to the reader, and the dedication.

In these volumes, what the reader further might need to know simply will be found here, in the appendix.

* * *

The background to these two revised volumes is this:

Professor Augustus Lawrence Graebner (1849-1904) had been teaching a class at the Saint Louis seminary of the Missouri Synod in biblical theology in the English language. The materials which he assembled for his class were known as the *Outlines of Doctrinal Theology*. In his own words, these *Outlines* “were not originally intended for publication. They were prepared for the students of Concordia Seminary to be used as a compend for the English lectures on Dogmatic Theology. To avoid the tedious process of dictation, by which they had for several years been transmitted to the classes, the paragraphs and texts were, by the students, printed on the mimeograph.... Finally, when the students’ supply was exhausted... the Board of Directors of Concordia Publishing House determined on the publication of the book.... It remains what, as originally designed, it was to be, not an exhaustive treatise of Dogmatic Theology, but a brief thetical compend of the outlines of Christ doctrine, consisting of concise definitions and an array of texts from which the various points of doctrine are derived as from their theological source, the written Word of God” (A. L. Graebner, *Outlines of Doctrinal Theology* [Saint Louis: Concordia, 1910], page III).

After Graebner died, W. H. T. Dau was elected to fill his position in 1905. In his classroom, Dau retained the format of Graebner’s *Outlines*, while he composed his own accompanying material which he called: “Lectures on Dr. Graebner’s

Outlines,” to elaborate on Graebner’s definitions. This material was mimeographed subsequently sometime after 1910, and assembled into two hardcover volumes: The first volume consisted of 304 pages, and the second of 207 pages. In these volumes Dau refers to Graebner as “our author,” and to his *Outlines* as “our text-book.” Dau will refer to Graebner’s numbered, biblical definitions as “paragraphs,” and to the sorted proof texts underneath as “sections.” Dau’s work could stand alone. Just the same, it would be beneficial to secure a copy of Graebner’s *Outlines* from sources on the internet.

Since Dau was confined by the limitations of a typewriter, he has transposed Greek and Hebrew words phonetically into the letters of the English alphabet. To distinguish them, this revision has underlined these Greek words, then put the Hebrew words into boldface type, and finally has italicized the Latin words. German words have remained untouched. The German umlaut over a vowel Dau has indicated by an attending letter “e.”

Though a check of Dau’s manuscript for the correct spelling of each German and Latin word, also of the correct transliteration of every Greek and Hebrew word, and the preciseness of every biblical source cited (for instance, Genesis 1:1) has not been attempted, still considerable scrutiny, corrections, and elucidations have been made in these areas for the benefit of the reader.

The pre-1930’s way of separating biblical chapters and verses has been updated; also the books’ names have been typed out fully (for example, Jn. 3,16 is now John 3:16). Whenever Dau would quote the Bible in English, he will use the *King James Version*. When he would quote the Greek New Testament, he will use the readings of Tischendorf [T.] (and

Lachmann) rather than the *textus receptus* [℣]. In some cases, this will be noted. However, when it would come to the subject of baptism, for instance, Dau will use the text from Mark 16:16.

It is unknown whether Dau was his own typist. Indeed, at one juncture, a different style is discernible temporarily. Rather than to revamp thoroughly the typist’s irregular approach to punctuation and capitalization, it has been left to stand for the most part out of respect. To be sure, considering the expansive scope of articulating, and then of assembling such an immense amount of material; and of the mighty subsequent task of typing it out for presentation, a consistent application of punctuation and capitalization by the typist understandably would have been the least of his priorities.

The pagination of this revision is different than Dau’s original due to the computer file’s format limitations.

Be advised that the quotations which Dau has cited from other books should be checked for accuracy before you would use them publicly, for his quotations are not always precise; this would include the spelling and the punctuation. Likewise, the cited volume and page numbers are not always correct.

For references from the Lutheran Confessions, Dau will use – *The Book of Concord*, editor Henry Eyster Jacobs (Philadelphia: General Council Publication Board, 1911).

When Dau would quote Luther in German, he will use a name as shorthand for his source. For example, “Erlangen” will be: Dr. *Martin Luther’s sämtliche Werke* (Erlangen: verschieden Verlage).

“Walch”: Dr. *Martin Luther’s sämtliche Schriften*, Band I-XXIII in 25 Bänden, Herausgegeben von Dr. Johann Georg Walch (Jena: 1740-1753).

“Saint Louis”: Dr. *Martin Luther’s Sammtliche Schriften*, Aufseher George Stoeckhardt (Saint Louis: Concordia, 18--) - für Bänder – 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13. For the remaining editions – Herausgeber Albert Frederick Hoppe. (Confer Ludwig Fuerbringer, *Persons and Events* (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1947), page 207.)

“Leipzig”: *Des Theuren Mannes Gottes, D. Martin Luthers Sämtliche Theils von Ihm selbst Deutsch verfertigte, theils aus dessen Lateinischen ins Deutsche übersetzte Schriften und Werke* (Leipzig: Johann Heinrich Zedler/Register: Leipzig, 1729-1733/1740).

* * *

A brief biograph of Dau would be in order. The following is an obituary notice that was posted by one of his colleagues.

“Few people, when the news of the death of Dr. William Herman Theodore Dau was flashed abroad, were so deeply affected by it as his former colleagues and co-workers who at the present time are responsible for the reading material offered in the **CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY**. No one can think of the antecedents of our present journal without recalling the work of the now sainted father and brother. Every issue of the **CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY** carries the information that this journal continues *Lehre und Wehre*, *Magazin fuer evangelisch-lutherische Homiletik*, and *Theological Quarterly-Theological Monthly*. In 1905, when Prof. Dau became a member of the faculty of Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, he was made managing editor of the

Theological Quarterly and continued to serve in that role till 1920, when the *Theological Quarterly* was changed into *Theological Monthly*. The latter journal he piloted till 1926, when he resigned from the faculty of Concordia Seminary to become president of Valparaiso University. Besides the work he did for the *Theological Quarterly* and the *Theological Monthly* he edited for a number of years the English section of the *Magazin fuer evangelisch-lutherische Homiletik* (*Homiletical Magazine*). Hence prior to 1926 he sustained the most intimate relations to several of the theological journals now united in the **CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY**, and we sincerely regret that the only wreath we can lay on his tomb are a few words of humble gratitude and appreciation.

“Born in Lauenburg, Pomerania, February 8, 1864, the deceased came to this country in 1881. In 1886 he was graduated from Concordia Seminary, a member of the last class which was dismissed into the ministry by the sainted Dr. C. F. W. Walther. From 1886 to 1892 he served as pastor of Trinity Lutheran Church, Memphis, Tenn. The next seven years saw him in the presidency of Concordia College, Conover, N. C. In 1899 he went to Hammond, Ind., as pastor of St. Paul’s Lutheran Church of that city. From 1905 to 1926 he filled a professorship at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, teaching chiefly dogmatics and comparative symbolics. The presidency of Valparaiso University he held from 1926 till 1930. In the latter year he retired from active regular church work and moved to Berkeley, Calif. He continued, however, to write and lecture when special invitations reached him. Dr. Dau led an extraordinarily busy and useful life. In addition to the tasks and labors mentioned above, he edited for a time the *Lutheran Witness*, wrote a number of books and pamphlets, and

tirelessly served as preacher and essayist at conferences and conventions. Among his books the best known are *At the Tribunal of Caesar*, *The Great Renunciation*, *The Leipzig Debate*, *Law and Gospel* (a translation of Walther's great work), and *He Loved Me*. Important was the aid he gave Dr. Bente in the preparation of the *Concordia Triglotta* and his contribution to the book edited by Dr. Engelder *Walther and the Church*. Many a time he served his Church on special missions. When, for instance, after the First World War our Synod desired to send an able ambassador to Europe in order to strengthen the brethren that were laboring there under difficult conditions and to obtain first-hand information on affairs, he was chosen for that post, and wherever he went, he made a deep and lasting impression.

"The departed was a person of the rarest gifts and accomplishments. His learning had a marvelously wide range and was marked by dependable accuracy in details. Especially was he versed in the history of the Reformation, and his monographs in that field are justly considered as classics. What delighted his hearers and readers was the originality, warmth, and artistic elegance of his style, which made listening to a sermon or essay of his not only a spiritual, but an intellectual treat. Readers of the old *Theological Quarterly* will recall the thrill with which they perused the article on "Grace," which, if we mistake not, was the first production he published as editor of that journal. His discourses were freighted with rich and precious thought, and if at times his language became more Johnsonian [Dr. Samuel Johnson, 1709-1784] than he himself desired, that was compensated for by the solidity of the material he presented. On account of his excellence as a writer and speaker in the English language, he must have been during

the first two decades of the present century one of the two or three representatives of the Missouri Synod best known in the circles outside our own church body.

"His chief distinction, of course, lay in something else – in the humble, sincere acceptance of the teachings of the Holy Scriptures as set forth in the Lutheran Confessions and their faithful reproduction in the pulpit and classroom, on the lecture platform, and the printed page. He was a Lutheran theologian that clung to the *sola Scriptura*, *sola gratia*, and *sola fide*.

"Now he has been taken into the home above. We praise God, who was glorified through the gifts of this servant, and in gratitude we say that his memory shall remain fresh and green in the hearts of us who knew him well and loved him. His death occurred April 21. He was buried in Hammond, Ind., on April 28.

"'Lord, Thou hast been our Dwelling Place in all generations', Ps. 90:1. 'Jesus Christ, the same yesterday and today and forever', Heb. 13:8." (William F. Arndt, "Dr. Dau Called Home," *Concordia Theological Monthly*, Volume 15, Number 6 [June, 1944], pages 418-419.)

